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2Abstract
This thesis is based on a comparative case study of two bustee 
neighbourhoods located in two separate wards of Calcutta, and of the factors 
which have affected the performance of public officials providing primary health 
care services to their inhabitants. It is argued that poor bureaucratic 
performance and a lack of accountability lie at the heart of problems with the 
health system in West Bengal. The thesis evaluates the effectiveness of 
‘governance’ reforms, comprising decentralisation and the application of the 
principles of New Public Management (NPM), on the performance of public 
officials.
NPM and decentralisation apply the core assumptions of neo-classical 
economics to the study of bureaucratic decision-making. The thesis argues that 
local officials in Calcutta may not always have chosen to behave in a way 
which maxmised their personal welfare, but that history, culture and politics 
may have affected the choices that they made.
The thesis questions the view that decentralisation necessarily leads to greater 
community participation challenges contemporary notions of what constitutes 
‘civil society’ and suggests a more nuanced view of the relationship between 
civil society and good government.
2
3It questions NPM’s claims to universality, which have resulted in its widespread 
application without due regard to local context, and argues that NPM inspired 
reforms have had a limited effect on health officials in Calcutta, in part, 
because of their failure to address the underlying causes of poor bureaucratic 
performance. The final chapter argues that the political influence of public 
sector workers has affected the willingness of the ruling Party to enforce the 
incentives to improve the performance of health care officials in West Bengal.
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Glossary of Terms
The spelling used in the text is a simplified and common version of the correct 
transliteration.
Bari
Bariwalla
Beri
Bhadrolok
Bhai
Bharatia
Borolokh
Bustee
Chadda
Chakri
Chottolok
Dada
Gali
Ghor
Kothabari
Mandir
Mastaan
Neta
Thika Tenancy
Para
Pandal
Prasad
Zamindar
commonly means home. It is used in the text to refer to a slum 
hutment (which is then subdivided into ghor) 
hutowner, formerly a thika tenant 
water body
literally the 'gentle folk', English speaking, generally middle
class men from the three upper castes.
younger brother
tenant, a hut occupier
the rich
a registered slum 
donations
paid (regular) employment
the common people, a disparaging term used to refer to those
diametrically opposed in the social hierarchy to the bhadrolok, ie
those that worked with their hands, without any of the privileges
of class, caste and education
elder brother/term of respect
a narrow lane or alley between bustee hutments
literally means room, but used by people in the bustee to refer to
their house (which is usually one room)
brick built house
temple
local don
leader
a system of urban land tenure unique to Calcutta, whereby a 
thika tenant rents land from a zamindar and build hutments, later 
to be divided and rented tenants. After the abolition of zamindari, 
the land passed to the state. Bariwalla pay a monthly due to the 
state.
neighbourhood
an awning, which houses effigies of deities
offerings
landowner
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Chapter I 
Introduction
1.1 Background
Access to basic health care is a fundamental right of all human beings. It is essential 
for a decent standard of living and a good quality of life. Whereas the policies of the 
Left Front (LFG) government in West Bengal over the last quarter of a century have 
had a significant impact on the indices of rural poverty, in addressing other aspects of 
well-being, notably health care, the state’s performance has been rather disappointing 
(Gazdar and Sengupta, 1997). This is particularly curious given that West Bengal has 
been governed continuously for the last 24 years by a “well organised and disciplined 
Party committed to social reform (Robinson, 1998:182), which is widely considered to 
have taken pioneering steps to reinvigorate local government, through the 
decentralisation of powers to the newly revitalised panchayati raj institutions (PRIs) 
and urban local bodies. Given the uninterrupted rule of a pro-poor political regime, and 
the existence of a favourable institutional framework, the research has tried to 
examine why qualitative improvements in basic health care services have lagged 
behind.
On account of the paucity of academic work on reforms to local government in 
Calcutta, and given that according to Chatterjee, “development and provision of 
services in urban areas are clearly not issues on which the Left Front Government in 
the West Bengal can congratulate itself’ (1997:171), The research has focused on 
local governance in Calcutta, the biggest urban agglomeration in Eastern India, and 
the delivery of basic health care services to inhabitants of the city’s bustees.
1.2 Governance
In the 1990s, “good governance” was in the vanguard of debates about 
development. Governance refers to, “the mechanisms, processes and institutions, 
through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal 
rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences” (UNDP, 1997:3). 
“Good governance is...participatory, transparent and accountable” (Ibid). 
Governance reforms grew out of the disillusionment with traditional, centralised 
bureaucracies which had been responsible for delivering services, and a belief that
16
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the role of government in the delivery of services needed to change. Developing 
countries, often at the behest of donors, undertook a series of reforms to make 
government more accountable and responsive, through decentralisation and the 
application of incentives inspired by the doctrines of the New Public Management 
(NPM).
Decentralisation, by “bringing government closer to the people" (World Bank, 
1997), was meant to make public policy more attuned to people’s needs, and 
public officials more responsive. It was also seen as an end in itself, as a way to 
deepen democracy at the local level, through the participation of previously 
excluded groups in the political process. NPM reforms were concerned with 
enhancing organisational performance through the application of market-like 
incentives to public bureaucracies, designed to make officials more flexible and 
responsive in their ways of working.
1.3 Local Governance and Basic Health Care in West Bengal
The Left Front Government (LFG), a coalition of left parties dominated by the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist), the CPI (M), has ruled the state of West 
Bengal since 1977. Shortly after coming to power, the LFG embarked on a 
vigorous process of equity-orientated reforms including the most comprehensive 
agrarian reform programme to date in India. The programme ensured that roughly 
90% of landless families received land (Sengupta and Gazdar, 1997:142).
The government also introduced significant political changes in both rural and 
urban areas of the state. The LFG introduced legislation which led to the revival of 
the panchayati raj institutions (PRIs) in rural areas. Some political power and 
certain administrative responsibilities were decentralised to these elected local 
government bodies. Furthermore, the election of panchayat members on the basis 
of regular and competitive elections and the reservation of seats for traditionally 
marginalised groups, provided for the first time the opportunity for previously 
excluded members of the rural population to play an active role in the political 
process. PRIs were found to have played an important role in the implementation
17
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of poverty alleviation programmes by correctly identifying beneficiaries from the 
proposed target group (Westergaard, 1986; Webster, 1990).
West Bengal also witnessed significant changes in the system of local governance 
in urban areas. In particular, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act (1980), which 
replaced the Calcutta Municipal Act (1951) attempted to create more autonomous 
local political institutions in Calcutta, as a way of enhancing local democracy and 
making local government more responsive. The CMC Act (1980) included plans to 
devolve powers to lower administrative levels through the constitution of Borough 
Committees (BCs), whose role was to perform local service delivery functions for 
which both administrative and financial support were ensured in the Act, and to 
serve as a platform through which local inhabitants could pressurise elected 
officials (Ghosh, 1996:6-7). This Act also introduced a cabinet system of 
government for Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) in the state. Under this so-called 
‘strong mayor system’, the Municipal commissioner, the principal executive officer 
of the corporation, was made to function under the supervision and control of the 
mayor, the elected official.
Reforms to local governance in urban areas have received little critical attention, 
relative to that given to the issue of agrarian change in the state. The redistribution 
of assets and reforms to local governance in rural areas have been well- 
documented in the literature, where it has been argued that by these changes 
have contributed to a reversal of the pattern of rural pauperisation (Harriss, 1993; 
Lieten, 1996) and agricultural impasse that had plagued the region since the 
1950s.1 Scholars have also suggested that the political changes in the state, in 
particular the reforms to local governance, created the opportunities for significant 
public policy interventions that could have a meaningful impact on prevailing 
patterns of deprivation. As Sengupta and Gazdar put it, “if the old patterns of 
political power... acted as a constraint on the expansion of public services, then the
1 Boyce (1987) showed that the growth rate of agricultural production in West Bengal since 1950s was far 
below the rate of population growth, largely due to institutional factors-inequitable land tenure arrangements 
and the inability of poor peasant farmers to gain access to necessary inputs such as water, fertiliser and credit.
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changed balance of power in rural West Bengal certainly opened up new 
possibilities of more development-orientated governance” (1998:185).
Twenty years after the reforms were implemented, it has been noted that the 
indicators of well-being in West Bengal suggest that pervasive patterns of 
deprivation continue to exist, particularly in terms of the access to basic health 
care and primary education amongst the most marginalised sector of the 
population.2 It would appear that, in the provision of such essential goods as basic 
health and primary education, the achievements of the LFG have been limited.
1.3.1 Health and the Urban Poor in Calcutta
Least impressive in this regard has been the provision of basic health care to the 
poor in urban areas. Chatterjee has noted that, “development and provision of 
services in urban areas are clearly not issues on which the Left Front Government 
in West Bengal can afford to congratulate itself. In fact, those issues constitute the 
Left Front’s Achilles heel...” (1997:171). In terms of socio-economic development, 
some scholars have suggested that urban West Bengal has fared less well, 
relative to the achievements in rural areas. Prolonged industrial stagnation and 
decline, growing unemployment and increasing casualisation of labour 
arrangements (Mukhopadhay, 1998),3 has meant that, “poverty reduction in urban 
areas seems to be beset with more problems than in rural areas” (Bagchi, 
1998:2977).
Although compared to rural areas, cities have a higher concentration of health 
professionals, a well-developed physical infrastructure, a network of health 
facilities which are close at hand, and which receive a significant portion of national 
health budgets (Rifkin, 1987),4 there is cross national evidence to suggest that the 
health conditions of the urban poor in developing countries is in many ways worse
2 See Sengupta &  Gazdar, (1997:182-199) for a good discussion of this.
3 Cited in Bagchi (1998:2977).
4 Chapter Three presents evidence to support this from West Bengal.
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than that of corresponding rural groups (Tabibazeh et al, 1989;Rossi-Espagnet, 
1984). Epidemiological data in which the status of the urban poor is disaggregated 
provides ample evidence of stark intra-urban health differentials.
For example, Rifkin (1987), quoting an unpublished WHO report, has commented 
that the TB rate in Manila slums is 50% higher than in the rest of the city, and that 
the dysentery rate in Madras is three times higher in squatter settlements. Rossi- 
Espagnet (1984) has argued that “the urban poor are at the interface between 
underdevelopment and industrialization and their disease patterns reflect the 
problems of both. From the first, they carry a heavy burden of infectious diseases 
and malnutrition, whilst from the second they suffer the typical spectrum of chronic 
and social diseases.”
Calcutta, once at the forefront of industrialisation, whilst still the hub of the largest 
economic complex in Eastern India (Sivaramakrishnan & Green, 1986:140), 
witnessed a decline in its economic predominance which has contributed to a 
slowdown in the process of urbanisation over the last twenty years. The city’s 
administration has always struggled to provide the basic services to meet the 
population’s needs, for which the city’s poor have tended to suffer the most. 
Relative economic decline combined with the need to provide for a burgeoning 
population, exposed the inadequacy of the city’s public health infrastructure, with 
the result that recurrent outbreaks of epidemics characterised the post­
independence period.
A WHO report into the outbreak of a devastating cholera epidemic in the city in 
1958, concluded that concerted public action was needed to address the risks to 
public health and prevent the recurrence of such epidemics (Bhattacharya, 
1991:18), caused by “...overcrowding, degradation of housing, health hazards, 
primitive water supplies, lack of space for new industries..."(Wolman et al: 1960).
The WHO Report led to the eventual establishment of Calcutta Metropolitan 
Development Authority (CMDA), a parastatal organisation which since 1970 has 
taken charge of planning in the metropolitan area and has coordinated efforts to
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bring much needed basic improvements to the city’s bustees, using a novel 
‘Sanitation Model’. The Sanitation Model comprised the following works:
• Conversion of service latrines
• Connection of Private water taps
• Surface Drainage facilities
• Construction and Widening of Roads and Pathways
• Provision of Street Lighting and Waste Disposal facilities
• Construction of Community Facilities5
Recently, it was estimated that 42.5 % of households and 42.6 % of people in the 
CMC area live in slums (Chatterjee, Bhattacharya and Haider, 1999). Slums are 
defined as, “clusters of hutments comprising several rooms constructed with 
temporary building materials, where each room is inhabited by a family sharing a 
common latrine, without arrangement for water supply, drains disposal of solid 
waste and garbage within the slum boundaries” (Chatterjee et al 1999: 50).6 The 
CMDA has identified some common defining characteristics of Calcutta slums. It 
found that most slum dwellers lived in semi-pucca huts, in one room measuring on 
average 161.8 square feet, where on average 3.9 people reside. Most slum 
dwellers share a community tap and toilet with other households. The majority of 
slum households earn less than Rs 3,000/month. The figures show that almost 
one half of the city’s population continues to live on low wages, in cramped and
5This model emerged following the failure of slum policy orientated towards slum clearance (see Dutt et al, 
1997) and subsequently, slum redevelopment (see Chakrabarti &  Haider, 1991). It formed the basis for donor- 
funded Slum Improvement Programmes (SIPs), such as the World Bank funded Calcutta Urban Development 
Programme (CUDP) implemented in three phases starting in 1974. By the third phase (CUDP III), which 
began in the late 1980s, a comprehensive primary health care service covering maternal and child health, 
immunisation and family welfare programmes had been added. An income and employment generation was 
also included in the package under the Small Scale Enterprise Programme (SSEP) and subsequently some 
primary schools were set up in slum areas. A DFID/ ODA funded Calcutta Slum Improvement Programme, 
conducted in two phases starting in 1990 (CSIP la and lb), adapted most of these features and added a 
significant community development component.
6 It should be noted that not all slums are necessarily bustees, although all bustees are slums. This research 
focussed on the inhabitants of bustees. A bustee is a legal entity. In Calcutta, according to the Municipal 
Corporation Act (1980), “bustee is an area of land not less than seven hundred square meters in area occupied 
by or for the purpose of any collection of huts used or intended to be used for human habitation”.
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unsanitary conditions - all factors which Rossi-Epagnet (1984) has identified 3S 
contributing to the bad health of the urban poor.
1.4 Primary Health Care and Bureaucratic Performance
There is clearly a need for the effective and equitable provision of health safe 
services to the urban poor in Calcutta. The concept of primary health care (Prjc), 
enshrined at Alma Ata (1978), is particularly useful for it widened the percepticn c>f 
health care as not being simply disease orientated, linked it to the wider process <?f 
development and bound it to broader concepts of environmental and socio­
economic issues. PHC was defined as: "essential health care made universally 
accessible to individuals and families in the community, by means accessibb to 
them, through their full participation and at a cost that a community and comtry 
can afford” (Primary Health Care: Health for all, No1, 1978). Traditionally appli^j to 
rural populations, the primary health care concept (PHC) is clearly pertinent tcth© 
urban poor in a city like Calcutta. For the purposes of this dissertation, prinary 
health care services will be taken to refer to basic, low-level, community orientated 
services.
Health is of intrinsic and instrumental value, both to an individual and to the 
development process at large. After the underestimation for a long time of the 
extent and severity of urban poverty, including the health needs of the urban pjor, 
research is now emerging to show that despite enjoying a greater proportion of 
resources, people in urban areas have extensive health problems. In particu lars 
urban poor are faced with the double burden of communicable and ron- 
communicable diseases, and in many cases suffer higher rates of infection tiaf) 
their rural counterparts. A combination of social, economic, psychological and 
environmental factors contributes to the increasing health burden of the ur>an 
poor, and lasting improvements demand progress in each of these artas. 
Nevertheless, better access to health-care services can also lead to improvements 
in the health status of the urban poor. In fact, the poor themselves f&vS 
emphasised the value they place on improved provision of health-care as a wa of 
mitigating the devastating impact that illness can have on household pov>rty
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(DAG; 1997). A well-developed system of public health is central to the pursuit of 
social justice.7
Chapter Three concludes by suggesting that the main constraint on the more 
equitable provision of health care to the poor in the state is poor bureaucratic 
performance. Indiscipline, in the form of gross absenteeism, shirking and 
malfeasance; poor staff motivation and a lack of accountability have contributed 
significantly to this state of affairs. Whilst these problems have been shown to 
affect the public health system as a whole in India (Banerji, 1985; Jeffery, 1988), 
the view taken in this dissertation - corroborated by successive Legislative 
Committee Reports on Health and Family Welfare published since 1986, as well as 
from extensive observation and interviews in the field over a period of 12 months - 
is that in West Bengal the problem is acute.
This poses a critical conceptual problem, which has guided the research from the 
start. Namely, that the need to reform the state, to make it more responsive to the 
needs of its people and accountable, especially to the poor and marginalised, has 
been at the fore of development debates since the early 1980s. Decentralisation 
has been one of the main recommended policy prescriptions to help bring this 
about and West Bengal is widely considered to have been at the forefront of 
implementing such reforms. Given the existence of such a favourable institutional 
framework coupled with the fact that the state has been ruled uninterruptedly for 
the last twenty-five years by a supposedly pro-poor political regime, the research 
tries to understand why basic health care services have not been provided more 
equitably provided in the state.
This dissertation focuses on the effect of governance reforms on the delivery of 
primary health care services to the urban poor in Calcutta. It evaluates many of the 
assumptions upon which governance reforms are premised on the basis of 
empirical evidence collected during fieldwork in Calcutta comparing the 
performance of public health care officials in two wards of the city.
7 See Dr&ze and Sen (1995: 99-101) and references therein.
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1.5 Outline
Chapter Two, which explores the theoretical rationale for these governance 
reforms, argues that they share a common theoretical background. Public choice 
theory and New Institutional Economics (NIE), both of which extend the basic 
assumptions of neo-classical economic theory to public administration, have 
influenced decentralisation and NPM. Officials working in the public sector are 
assumed to be rational, self-interested, utility maximising individuals. Based on 
this assumption, public choice theory holds that they are intrinsically unresponsive 
and unaccountable to citizens. NIE attempts to modify some of the basic 
assumptions of neo-classical theory, by arguing that rational, utility-maximising 
individuals may be constrained by ‘bounded rationality’ and imperfect information. 
NIE holds that institutions, the rules that structure and constrain human interaction 
(North, 1995), shape the behaviour of human beings, by affecting the quality of 
information on which an individual can make a choice. Based on these 
assumptions, efforts to improve governance have given rise to reforms that change 
the shape of administrative structures and modify organisational rules, to establish 
incentives for officials to perform more effectively.
Decentralisation is premised on the assumption that officials choose to behave in 
an instrumental^ rational way. Thus, it was believed that bringing consumers and 
providers closer together would result in officials being more responsive and more 
accountable to citizens. Through greater physical proximity it was assumed that 
citizens (principals) would be better informed of the activities of local officials 
(agents), and thus be in a better position to be able to appraise their performance. 
Being closer, it was assumed, would make it easier for citizens to exert pressure 
on officials to address their needs more effectively. It was also assumed that 
greater public scrutiny of the work of public officials would reduce the incentives for 
them to behave opportunistically.
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Decentralisation was seen as a way to enhance the participation of the previously 
excluded groups in the policy making process, both as a means of empowerment, 
and to ensure that their needs were addressed in policy outcomes. It assumes that 
the poor comprise a homogenous group sharing common interests and concerns, 
and that they are prepared to act together. Related to this is the notion, implicit in 
calls for decentralisation, that the roots of good governmental performance lie in a 
robust and autonomous civil society, which acts to keep the state in check. This 
way of conceiving the relationship between civil society and the state has a long 
tradition in contemporary liberal theory, and may be traced to the work of De 
Tocqueville [1835] (1990). Its current popularity can be partly attributed to Putnam 
(1993), in whose study of the performance of local government in Italy it is argued 
that social capital - stocks of which are created in a particular area through a 
history of civic associationalism - is one of the key determinants of institutional 
performance in Northern Italy.
Also based on the assumption that public officials choose to behave based on a 
systematic calculation of personal advantage (Sen, 2000:270), NPM inspired 
reforms were introduced in a number of countries. Influenced in part by private 
sector styles of management, NPM reforms were meant to lead to greater 
competition in the public sector, more hands-on professional management and an 
emphasis on output and performance, to create incentives for enhanced 
performance of the public sector and more accountable public officials. NPM 
reforms carried great intuitive appeal based on its claims to be applicable to 
different contexts. Moreover, the reforms held out the promise of cutting costs and 
so of providing more for less, through administrative changes to public 
bureaucracies and more efficient, results orientated management.
The dissertation aims systematically to explore each of these assumptions in the 
light of empirical evidence. Chapter Four provides a comparative case study of 
social relations in two Calcutta bustees, through which the assumption that the 
‘poor’ comprise a homogeneous group with common interests and concerns is 
challenged. Chapter Five is a comparative case study of the performance of health 
care officials in two wards of the city. It is shown that officials in one ward
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performed better and were more responsive to the needs of local inhabitants, than 
in the other. The chapter explores the factors which may have led to this better 
performance, suggesting that external pressure exerted by local inhabitants 
through civil society organisations may have proved decisive. It attempts to modify 
current notions about the relationship between civil society and good government, 
however, and questions the discrete separation between the two categories, which 
liberal theory proposes. Chapter Six begins by critically examining the view that 
decentralisation leads to a reduction in information and transaction costs, making it 
easier for local inhabitants to hold local health care officials to account for their 
actions. It then questions the behavioural assumptions that underlie the public 
choice/new institutional rationale for governance reforms. Through a brief review of 
the history of Calcutta Corporation, it highlights the role that ‘informal constraints’ 
may have on the performance of CMC officials, and underlines the role that 
politicians have played in legitimising certain norms of behaviour. The chapter 
ends by looking at the effect of NPM inspired reforms on the performance of 
Honorary Health Workers (HHWs) working in one ward of the city. It argues that 
the success of organisational changes depend on an appreciation of the local 
context, arguing that such efforts must be rooted in an organisational culture 
favourable to these changes. Chapter Six suggests looking beyond organisations 
to identify the roots of poor performance, and concludes by echoing Sen’s (2000) 
call for a need to trace the roots of successful organisational change to the 
attitudes and conduct of those in positions of authority. Chapter Seven evaluates 
the role that politicians and bureaucrats have played in the failure to improve 
standards of performance of health care officials in West Bengal. It argues that the 
ruling coalition in the state has failed to enforce the incentives to make health care 
officials accountable, because to do so would risk alienating a small, yet highly 
organised and influential group of supporters.
1.6 Methodology
1.6.1 Case Study of the Bustees
I undertook a case study of the health care bureaucracy in Calcutta, comparing 
the performance of health care officials working in two wards of the city, and a
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comparative case study of two bustees in two separate wards of the city, which 
were purposively selected.8 The purpose of the research was to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the institutional arrangements in regulating the performance of 
health care officials. I needed to examine the extent to which the theoretical 
assumptions implicit in calls for decentralisation, actually held true. Effectively I 
wanted to ascertain whether decentralisation had led to a reduction in information 
and transaction costs and thus resulted in local inhabitants exerting pressure on 
local officials. This required a study of ‘voice’ (Hirschmann, 1970),9 and of the 
limits to its effectiveness in achieving qualitative improvements in bureaucratic 
performance and service provision. I needed to identify the political organisations, 
social groups and networks that existed in the local area and that might have 
enabled the poor to exert leverage over bureaucrats; to evaluate the efficacy of 
these - by examining the extent they served to affect bureaucratic performance - 
and to identify the factors which have served to enhance or limit their efficacy.
The research was exploratory and thus I decided on a comparative case study, of 
two bustees in two separate wards of the city and of the performance of local 
health care officials in both of these, as the most appropriate type of enquiry for the 
questions I was trying to answer. A case study design was chosen because, 
according to Robson, “case study is a strategy for doing research which involves 
an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real 
life context using multiple sources of evidence”(1993:5). Furthermore, Yin (1994) 
has suggested that case studies are the most relevant form of research strategy 
when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context and when the research is 
exploratory in nature.
The comparative case study of the two bustees included a household survey, 
observation, informal interviews and documentary evidence - published 
ethnographies, project reports and newspaper cuttings. I also interviewed a range
8 Here Calcutta refers to what is often known as the ‘core’ Calcutta area, namely what falls within the 
boundaries of Calcutta Municipal Corporation (CMC).
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of people who were in a position to provide some extra information about the 
research areas, including: academics, journalists, civil servants as well as long­
term local inhabitants. To administer the questionnaires and for some in-depth 
interviews with bustee inhabitants, I elicited the help of two female research 
assistants, a different one for each bustee.
1.7 Selection of Case Study Sites
1.7.1 Wards
My intention was to select two wards of the city, one with high health status and 
one with lower health status, so as to ascertain what the institutional factors were 
that might have contributed to this difference. Following a thorough search 
through all the relevant sources located in the various government offices and 
departments responsible for planned interventions in the city, I discovered that 
there was insufficient disaggregated data to show the health status of people in 
different wards of CMC.
Hence I selected a ward where no donor interventions had taken place, assuming 
this to have an average health status, and compared it to a ward where a Slum 
Improvement Project (SIP) had been implemented, and the local population were 
shown to have a higher than average health status.10 Documentary evidence in the 
Bustee Cell and the Health Department, both in the CMC, revealed that that there 
was a cluster of wards in the CMC area, where no external donor intervention 
appeared to have taken place - neither under CUDP III, nor CSIP nor ICDS.111 
also discovered from the CMC Bustee Cell that bustee surveys had been 
conducted in most Calcutta wards except in those that were part of this cluster. All
9 See Chapter Two for a discussion of this.
10 The CMC had data to show that in areas of the city where donor funded SIPs had been implemented, the 
population had a higher health status than the average for urban West Bengal.
11 Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) is a WHO-funded initiative which employs HHWs to 
provide nutritional supplements and health screening for under-fives from low income families. Table 5.1 
shows the distribution of donor-funded health care interventions in Calcutta.
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the wards were located in Borough VIII, and I visited the Executive Health Officer 
(EHO), the head of CMC health services in that Borough, for advice as to which 
ward to choose.
I felt uncomfortable with the pressure being exerted by the EHO and his deputy 
(DEHO) to select certain wards and not others. I also discovered that in one of the 
wards being recommended to me, there was a well-known local NGO that had 
been working with slum dwellers for some time. It became clear through contact 
with this NGO that they were reluctant to give me the autonomy that I required to 
carry out my research in that ward. Neither the DEHO nor the EHO seemed willing 
to discuss alternatives to the ward they had suggested and so I decided 
independently to make contact with three ward councillors from other parts of the 
Borough. One referred me to his aide, who turned out to be too much of an 
unsavoury character, with a dubious and violent past for me to want to have 
anything to do with him. The other was the Borough Committee Chairman (BCC), 
with whom I wanted to build a rapport as a key informant, and I therefore decided 
to avoid working in his ward. This left ward 85, which I discovered was the largest 
ward in the Borough. It was diverse in terms of its ethnic and class composition, 
comprising kotahbari (brick houses) inhabited by middle class Bengalis and 
around 16 bustees with Bengali as well as non-Bengali inhabitants. I discussed the 
project with the councillor, who helped me to list the bustees according to size and 
arranged for me to be taken around some of these. I also visited others alone.
I decided to choose one of the wards shown to have a higher than average health 
status as my comparative case study ward. Local experts recommended Kasba, 
Ward 67, situated in the southeast part of the city. Apart from its better health 
status, I chose this ward on account of the fact that it had been recommended as a 
best case to UN Habitat of how an Urban Local Body (CMC), in conjunction with 
the local population, had sustained local services and upgraded infrastructure.
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1.7.2 Selecting a Bustee
Shortly after moving in to ward 85, I befriended the workmen carrying out repairs 
on the apartment where I lived, who introduced me to a bustee nearby, where they 
lived. After a short period, I decided to focus on this bustee, DT, as my first case 
study research site. By that stage I had visited a number of bustees in different 
parts of the city, and decided on this as it seemed fairly typical in terms of living 
conditions. 12 I also chose this bustee because of its size - it comprised 
approximately 150 households and was therefore manageable for me as a lone 
researcher to be able to study in depth. It was also very close to my place of 
residence, and I felt this proximity would provide me with easy physical access. 
Physical proximity also meant that I would be able to carry out my research in an 
unobtrusive way and take part quite easily in local social activities.
Initially in ward 67, I was shown around all the bustees by a local health official. I 
also discussed possible research sites at length with local officials and the 
councillor. Eventually, I decided on a bustee of roughly equal size to DT, located at 
a discrete distance from the bustee held up by local authorities as a model. The 
first time I visited this bustee, I was greeted and welcomed by a man who I was 
told was the bustee representative. His encouragement led me to assume that the 
initial process of gaining access and acceptance from the local community - 
essential for the research project to progress - would be facilitated. These two 
factors helped me to decide on this as my comparative research site.
12 A CMDA survey provides a vivid description of the socio-economic status and living conditions of both 
slum and non-slum households in Calcutta (Chatterjee, Bhattacharya and Haider, 1999). It was on the basis of 
this data that DT was judged to be ‘typical’.
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1.8 The Survey
1.8.1 Sampling, Piloting and Problems
A component of the case study was the survey. Through the use of a survey my 
intention was to develop a profile of the respondents: their socio-demographic and 
economic characteristics; levels of morbidity and mortality as well as their patterns 
of health-care utilisation, providing them with a choice of options to explain these.13 
It was decided for practical reasons that for a bustee with approximately 150 
households, the questionnaire would be administered to fifty households, to two 
people per household, usually the household head and spouse. Driven by the 
desire for external validity, to minimize bias and to make the data as representative 
as possible, I intended on random sample of fifty bustee households. However, I 
was unable to compile a full list of the local population, in order to make a 
adequate sampling frame for a random selection of households. Hutment owners 
{bariwallas) were very suspicious of my attempts to compile a list of their tenants, 
and became quite hostile when I persisted. Other researchers have encountered 
similar problems, Ward (1993) and Bulmer (1993) found that suitable sampling 
frames were often lacking, and where they have existed (in the case of some 
Indian villages) Lipton and Moore (1972) found them deficient. Given my desire to 
limit the scope for possible biases as much as possible, I decided against relying 
on purely non-probability sampling techniques, such as snowballing, and chose 
instead to select my sample systematically. Having chosen a number between one 
and three, I started at one corner of the bustee, at the first hutment and 
administered the questionnaire to two inhabitants in every third hutment after this.
The survey was piloted in two separate settings - first to five women who lived in 
slums, whilst they waited in a government clinic, and then to five men living in a 
bustee in a neighbouring ward. Some questions were found to be ambiguous and 
thus caused difficulties for the respondents, as well as for the research assistant.
13 A sample questionnaire is attached, see Appendix 1.
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Based on the experience of the pilot, I decided to shorten the list of questions and 
also changed the way that some questions had been phrased.
Despite all my efforts at compiling my sample, administering the survey gave rise 
to considerable suspicion and hostility. In fact, much of the rapport that I felt had 
been built between me and local inhabitants of the bustees, was undermined 
during this process. In both bustees some of those in the sample set refused to 
answer questions. There was a higher rate of refusal in DT than SL, hence in 
neither case did I manage to reach my sample target of one hundred respondents. 
Whilst the survey did not provide as complete a profile as hoped of the two 
bustees, this does not undermine the arguments presented later on social 
relationships in the two areas (see Chapter Four). The differences that were noted 
in that Chapter emerged from long periods of time spent living in the two areas. My 
arguments are based mainly on my experiences of living in these areas and 
interacting with the inhabitants there. The survey data has helped to substantiate 
some of my observations but has not formed the basis for the arguments 
contained in this dissertation.
1.9 Preliminary Information: Key Informants Mapping and Group Interviews
Before any questions were asked, I spent some weeks familiarising myself with the 
research sites with the help of key local informants or ‘gatekeepers’ - “those that 
control access to the information which the researcher seeks” (May, 1997:54) - to 
be able to generate a detailed contextual picture of the bustee and its inhabitants. I 
was interested in gathering information about the history of the bustee, as well as 
its present economic and social characteristics. I also needed to understand the 
local political context: who were the people’s political representatives, why were 
they elected; who were the power brokers in the area; how did the local inhabitants 
relate to one another?
Within a short period of entering both of my research sites, I was fortunate to be 
introduced to one key local informant in each area. In a sense these individuals 
could be considered gatekeepers, as they provided me with useful background
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information about the demographic characteristics of the bustee and some 
valuable insights into the political, social and economic background to the areas 
where the bustees were located. It is probably also true to say, in hindsight, that 
they ensured my physical safety, gave me a sense of legitimacy and provided 
access to certain people and situations for the purposes of my research. However,
I also realised through time that my being associated with these gatekeepers was 
serving to limit my access to other local informants who for their own reasons 
disliked these individuals. There is also a well-recognised risk of bias and distortion 
from relying on a few key informants (Patton, 1990:264). I decided to diversify my 
contacts, but by doing so was often accused of being closer to one group than the 
other, or at times, of ignoring my initial contacts. Field work in the bustee involved 
a constant balancing act of trying to interact with as diverse a set of informants as 
possible, whilst maintaining a good relationship with those who had been prepared 
to help me so much initially.
Towards the end of the familiarisation period, I tried to check some of my initial 
observations and information gathered informally, by undertaking some social 
mapping exercises and focus group discussions. In a recent participatory impact 
assessment of SIPs in Calcutta carried out on behalf of DFID (CMDA, 1997), 
social mapping was used as a way of building rapport with the local residents. It 
was also used to construct a more detailed physical layout of the bustee, to 
provide insights into the exact size and location of different communities, to locate 
major landmarks and to understand the relationship between the inhabitants and 
service providers.
For my research, social mapping provided very little of a holistic picture of the 
bustee, and gave little indication of the relationship between the inhabitants and 
those providing health care services in the area. The social maps which residents 
drew were exclusively of their residential cluster or enclave, what they considered 
to be their neighbourhood or para, which was very different to what I understood 
by the term - namely the layout and key landmarks of the bustee as a whole, and 
certain key locations outside the bustee which for the residents were significant.
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Crucially, though not expected, social maps provided important insights into the 
relationship between different groups inside the bustees. 14
Focus group discussions were also used to explore in greater depth the social 
relations within the bustee, and to gain an deeper insight into the nature of bustee 
politics. It should be noted that the group discussions did not follow the pattern 
often suggested in the literature on the subject, based on experience of using this 
technique for commercial purposes (c.f Greenbaum, 1998). The groups were often 
unequal in size, members left and joined according to personal convenience. 
Rather my decision to use group discussions was based on an appreciation of the 
principles behind the use of such a methodology, and through a desire to harness 
the gestalt of group discussions. Group discussions are supposed to result in a 
higher level of emotional interaction, rarely seen in individual interviews. Group 
discussions are also said to give rise to spontaneous and often polarized points of 
view. I found group discussions to be an efficient way of collecting data, as groups 
were formed almost spontaneously at particular intervals, for example around the 
water tap, as the local women waited to take their turn to fill their jerry cans.
Furthermore, group discussions were an effective way of eliciting, especially, 
women’s opinions. Many of the social constraints which often prevented me, as a 
male researcher, from talking to a woman alone in her house during the day, were 
avoided when talking to a group of women in a public place, such as near a hand 
pump in the street. Group discussions also proved a valuable way of verifying 
information. Often in the course of a group discussion, usually with women, many 
of the opinions which had previously been expressed to me, and which I had 
assumed to be representative of the bustee, were refuted. For example, in the 
part of DT bustee where I was working, there was no local club, and local men 
convinced me that this was necessary by extolling the virtues of clubs in the local 
area. In was only through group discussions with women in DT, that I discovered 
that clubs were lowest on their list of priorities for ways of improving the local area.
14 This is discussed further in Chapter Four.
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In fact the women were actively opposed to the establishment of a club in that part 
of the bustee, clubs they claimed were the source of hassles ('jhamala), for 
example fighting and extortion. The women also opposed clubs because these 
tended to exclude them. It was pointed out that women were not allowed to 
participate on the committees of local clubs, nor were they allowed to take part in 
any of their social or sporting activities.
1.10 Studying Local Politics: Listening, Observing and Asking Questions
Informal interviewing was an effective way of building rapport and becoming 
familiar with some of the rudimentary aspects of bustee life. Social maps provided 
important insights into social relations within the bustee. Group interviews were an 
efficient way of collecting data and helped me to enrich my contextual picture of 
bustee life, often by verifying comments and observations made. My preliminary 
information gathering allowed me to become familiar with my informants and with 
some social and economic aspects of the bustee and the local area. It gave me 
some idea of how people perceived their local service providers.
In addition, I needed to explore the factors that affected the behaviour of local 
officials and political agencies were seen as important to this. I needed to identify 
local political agencies, to explore their activities and to evaluate their effectiveness 
- whether and in what way they helped local inhabitants to exert pressure over 
local officials and gain better access to services. Finally, to help me to analyse the 
factors affecting the efficacy of these local organisations, I needed to test some of 
the hypotheses set out in my conceptual framework. This would involve examining 
the nature of patron-client ties within the bustees, between local actors, 
intermediaries and elected representatives. Were material (or even social or 
cultural status) inducements still proffered in exchange for political support? Did 
the provision of material inducements by local politicians undermine the capacity of 
local actors to engage in collective action? I felt it important to note the role of the 
local state in mediating conflict. What were the mechanisms used by the state for 
mitigating or else supporting popular dissatisfaction and political protest? To what
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extent were local organisations autonomous and separate from the state? What 
was the history of these and how had they emerged?
I began by asking bustee dwellers about any political organisations, social groups 
and networks that existed in their areas and helped them to improve their access 
to services. I wanted to know who were the local actors who exerted influence, for 
example a dada, a bustee representative, local politicians, or clubs whose help 
they could call on to ensure their needs were met expeditiously. This line of 
questioning yielded very little -  few people reported making a complaint to the 
councillor if they encountered a problem in their locality - hence their responses 
revealed very little about local politics in these areas.
I began to realise that direct questioning on such sensitive issues made 
respondents apprehensive. This was similar to what Whyte (1955) experienced 
while studying politics and social structure in Cornerville. 15 On account of his 
insights, I began to focus more on observing and recording daily life in the bustees. 
This ultimately revealed much more of the informal aspects of local politics that I 
was so keen to learn about, in each of the research areas. By undertaking an 
ethnography of the bustees, I was able to build up a clearer picture of social 
relations and identify those political groups, organisations and networks that 
intermediated between bustee dwellers and those responsible for providing them 
with basic services.
In particular, I found that the best way to analyse how these organisations 
operated and to evaluate their effectiveness in improving the poor’s access to 
good quality services, was to pay regular visits to the local ward office where ward 
level health officials were located. I managed to build up a very informal and 
friendly relationship with ward officials in one ward (67). It was during my morning 
visits to these offices that I discovered that there were various local ‘community’
15 See Doc’s advise to Whyte, “Go easy on that ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘why’, ‘when’ and ‘where’ stuff, Bill. You ask 
those questions and people will clam up on you. I f  people accept you, you can just hang around, and you’ll 
learn the answers in the long run without even having to ask the questions.” (Whyte, 1955:303).
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organisations active in this area, which worked closely with local officials to ensure 
that the services they provided were in tune with local people’s needs.
The main criteria for judging their effectiveness was by examining the extent to 
which the actions of these groups and organisations resulted in better services 
being provided for the poor over the long term. Evaluating ‘output effectiveness’16 
included looking at the issue of general bureaucratic responsiveness to popular 
needs and demands. This meant asking bustee dwellers and secondary 
stakeholders to identify and evaluate any changes that they may have perceived in 
service quality and in the general responsiveness of local officials. I found the 
usefulness of this method of enquiry to be limited. Bustee dwellers complained 
that services were not being properly provided, their needs were not being met and 
local problems were left unattended. Their replies gave me little scope to evaluate 
the responsiveness of one set of local officials in one ward relative to others 
located in another ward. To obtain a more objective picture of the effectiveness of 
these organisations in making local officials more responsive, I began to note for 
myself health crisis episodes in the bustees - broken sewage pipes or the 
discovery of mosquito larvae - and waited to see the steps taken to address these 
by local officials. According to Burgess, a focus on these so-called social ‘dramas’ 
enabled him to, “examine the social processes involved when conflict occurred, 
how it was handled and the basis on which it was handled” (Burgess, 1984:72).
Thus, in order to answer my final set of questions about the efficacy of local 
organisations in improving bureaucratic responsiveness and performance 
providing better access to health care for bustee dwellers, I employed a variety of 
rather informal methods. I found it difficult not to ask direct questions to those 
involved - the local councillor, slum leaders and local officials - but found that 
through having built up a good relationship with a variety of local actors (from 
professionals to sweepers) and through spending long periods of time in both 
research sites, I gained important insights to many of these questions, often 
unsolicited. Participant observation, assiduous listening and recording of oral 
evidence (gossip, rumour, and conversations) proved invaluable. In order to gain a
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comprehensive understanding of the historical, political and social context, I read 
extensively about my two research sites in back copies of the Statesman 
newspaper and other secondary sources. I also interviewed civil servants, 
journalists, politicians and academics familiar with the two areas. These separate 
sources provided useful insights, which I was able to verify through more formal 
interviews at the local level.
1.11 Comparative Case Study of the Health Care bureaucracy
1.11.1 Target Group
My set of respondents comprised public bureaucrats from national (IAS) and state 
level cadres (WBCS), as well as municipal employees. There is an apex 
committee on health, comprising medical practitioners and representatives of 
voluntary groups such as the Lions Club and Rotary club, as well as public officials 
from the state, national and municipal services. I interviewed as many of those 
public officials as I could contact, and who agreed to be interviewed, focusing on 
those who were responsible for the formulation and implementation of health policy 
in Calcutta. In each of the wards, I interviewed all those employed by the State to 
provide health services. This included doctors, nurses, health visitors and 
community health care workers. Due to the myriad of private providers working in 
slum areas of the city, I tried to interview those private health care providers most 
commonly cited as used by bustee dwellers.
The case study of the health care bureaucracy was conducted using semi­
structured interviews and observational strategies, with a view to addressing the 
three sub-questions outlined below.
■ To what extent do bureaucratic rules and regulations affect behaviour?
• What is the effect of internal norms on bureaucratic behaviour?
16 This phrase I have borrowed from Crook and Manor (1998).
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■ To what extent do pressures from clients and/or politicians affect bureaucratic 
behaviour?
Semi-structured interviews were conducted on the basis of a clear topic guide, 
which helped to shape the conversation between the interviewer and the 
informant. This method of enquiry was chosen for three main reasons. The time 
constraints and the elite identity of the informants meant that a high level of 
organisation and preparation were needed for the interviews. Semi-structured 
interviews allowed for open-ended questions to be asked, which enabled me to 
probe further in order to seek elaboration or clarification on answers given by the 
informant (May, 1997:111). According to Bernard, through a semi-structured 
interview the interviewer can demonstrate a degree of competence and establish 
some control of the interview process (1994:210), which can help to create a good 
impression. This, I felt, was particularly important when interviewing senior 
officials.
1.12 The Effect of Rules and Regulations on Bureaucratic Behaviour
There were two stages to answering this question. The first involved finding out 
what these rules and regulations consisted of; the second stage involved trying to 
discover to what extent and in what ways they affected bureaucratic performance.
Initially, I set out to identify the official rules and regulations that public bureaucrats 
were subject to. This involved buying and studying copies of “West Bengal Service 
Rules”, in the case of Government of West Bengal employees. I also studied a 
guide for government health care officials, which included some rules of conduct, 
job descriptions and described the responsibilities of different categories of health 
officials in the state. This was last published in 1969. With some difficulty, I 
managed to acquire a copy to study. In the case of CMC officials, who do not have 
an official rulebook, I made copies of different directives and circulars that were 
posted in CMC offices. I also interviewed the head of personnel at CMC. For
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Honorary Health Workers, I read the project documents for CSIP, held at CMDA 
library.17
I wanted to see to what extent top-down targets had affected the way that 
bureaucrats performed. Those officials, with whom I had managed to build a good 
relationship, would often inform me of directives issued by the higher authorities, 
either in the CMC, GoWB or central government. I asked all my informants 
specifically about any targets that they had to reach.
The second stage was to ascertain from individual bureaucrats, how these affected 
their behaviour and the type of service that they provided. I found that asking 
officials, directly, whether their behaviour was affected by official rules and 
regulations was of limited use. Most of my informants were not aware of what 
these regulations actually consisted of. Instead, I found that I could get a better 
picture of the affect of these by watching officials at work. Participant observation 
by the researcher sitting in clinics and witnessing therapeutic encounters helped to 
provide a fuller picture.
To improve the validity of the data, these two methods were complemented by exit 
interviews of those emerging from therapeutic encounters and the use of putative 
or dummy patients. In both cases, patients (real and putative) were asked to 
provide therapeutic narratives, describing how they had been treated, and whether 
they had been coerced or cajoled into following a certain course of treatment.
1.13 Internal norms
Some scholars have called for an examination of bureaucrats’ professional ethos, 
personal prejudices, motivations and predilections, arguing that these may provide 
powerful internal norms that affect bureaucratic performance (Taub, 1969; Madan, 
1972; Bhambri, 1979). Attempts to elicit this type of information from bureaucrats
17 Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA), Unnayan Bhavan, Salt Lake, Calcutta.
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has proved difficult in the past although it has been successfully undertaken using 
semi-structured interviews (Madan, 1972) or else anonymous questionnaires 
(Bhambri, 1979). I chose not to use anonymous questionnaires, fearing that it may 
have resulted in a limited response rate. Through semi-structured interviews, I 
asked health care officials their reasons for: a) joining public service and b) 
working in health care. I tried to limit the scope for respondent bias by careful 
consideration of how the questions were constructed and ordered. Various 
questions were asked to get at the same point. I piloted the questions, based on 
my topic guide, with retired or acting officials who were either friends or relatives. 
Piloting proved useful in ensuring that the questions were relevant and 
unambiguous.
1.14 Pressure from Clients and/or Politicians
I wanted to examine the extent to which “voice” (Hirschmann, 1970), the 
articulation of protest and feedback to change a state of affairs in the public sector 
felt to be unacceptable, affected the performance of local officials. Wade (1984) 
has highlighted how local elites and politicians (MLAs) can have an important 
bearing on the ways that public bureaucrats perform. Such pressure, he has 
argued, can serve to limit the effectiveness of policy implementation. The research 
also sought to evaluate the effect of recent administrative reforms (74th 
Amendment), complemented by reforms in local governance introduced at the 
state level in West Bengal which, in theory, created the potential for the poor and 
marginalised to exert political pressure to improve service delivery.
I set out to ask providers:
a) What was the nature of the pressures placed upon them; whether they included 
demands for longer opening hours, more efficient, equitable or polite service, or 
the preferential treatment of a particular group
b) In what ways these pressures were brought to bear on them; whether it was 
directly or through an intermediary, a broker (slum leader), a political 
representative like the MLA or the councillor.
c) To what extent this affected the way they carried out their work.
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I managed to collect very little data by simply asking officials in semi-structured 
interviews. It became essential, therefore, to spend extended periods of time with 
local providers in the communities chosen, to get a feel for the sort of political 
dynamics at play, to catch a glimpse of the flash-in-the-pan protests or 
demonstrations that occurred, and to see how, subsequently, these impacted on 
bureaucratic performance. I found it useful to refer to such events in discussions 
with local officials, about the factors which affected their performance.
In the case of senior officials, I was only able to collect data on these issues 
through in-depth, informal interviews with a self-selecting group of informants, on 
the conditions of anonymity. Usually these issues were discussed after three or 
four meetings with the same person, usually after office hours or in an out-of-office 
setting. I made friends with a number of senior officials working in Calcutta, and 
was invited to social events that many of their colleagues would also attend. At 
these social events, there would be considerable discussion about the relationship 
between politicians and bureaucrats in the state. I interviewed senior bureaucrats 
managing other social sector departments to get a general picture of the volume, 
nature and source of pressure exerted on other parts of the higher bureaucracy, 
and the effect that this has on policy making in their departments.
During the last few months of research, I tried to interview senior politicians, mainly 
from the ruling Party, but also from the opposition. I included many of the themes, 
which had emerged from the research as a basis for these interviews. After many 
unsuccessful attempts to contact these people by letter, I relied on personal 
contacts and sometimes cold-calling to arrange meetings with them.
1.15 Conclusion
This introductory chapter has laid out the rationale and discussed the methods 
employed for conducting this research. It has presented an outline of the chapters 
and introduced in brief, the basic conceptual issues which have guided the study. 
The next chapter explores these issues in greater depth.
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Chapter 2
Governance. Decentralisation and Bureaucratic Performance in
Service Delivery
2.1 Introduction
This dissertation sets out to investigate the proposition that at the heart of the 
problem with primary health care provision in West Bengal is the issue of 
governance. This is substantiated as much by personal observation and 
experience over 15 months of field work in Calcutta (see chapter 5), as it is by the 
secondary literature on health care provision examined in the next chapter. Weak 
incentives and accountability structures have resulted in notorious examples of 
negligent and poorly performing officials. The reports of all-party Select 
Committees provide glaring examples of administrative failure within the system 
that result in poor staff performance and lack of discipline. At one stage it is stated 
that, “the work culture has so much degenerated that even the minimal routine 
work is unusually delayed...”(1998:6). As a solution it was noted that “the 
optimisation of functioning of the department needs a system of punishment for 
delinquency and reward for good work which at present does not exist.” (ibid)
Numerous examples of similarly poor bureaucratic performance in post-colonial 
societies across the globe fuelled a flurry of academic analysis in the 1970s, which 
applied the methodological tools and theoretical assumptions of neo-classical 
economics to the study of public administration and the processes of bureaucratic 
decision-making.18 Variously termed ‘the new political economy’ or public choice 
theory, it led to the a priori demonisation of the state as a vehicle for promoting
181 am referring to methodological individualism and the assumption of rational, utility maximising man. 
Niskanen’s view that, “an assumption about the objectives of individuals is a necessary element in any theory 
of social behaviour...Purposive behaviour by individuals is the essence of social behaviour” (1971:20) 
exemplifies the trend towards methodological individualism in such analysis. See also Buchanan’s 
introduction to Tullock, “it is not from the benevolence of the bureaucrat that we expect our research grant or 
welfare check but out of his own not the public interest (1987:2).”
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economic development and social justice.19 In its place lay the concept of the state 
as a predator, comprising individuals (bureaucrats) whose sole concern was to 
extract revenue from the people, which they use to expand their own departmental 
budgets (and commensurately, their own power); in other words to maximise their 
own utility.20 Centralised bureaucracies and state run agencies came to be 
characterised as unresponsive and self-interested, essentially lacking in 
accountability.21
The theoretical analyses spurred policy prescriptions recommending reforms in 
governance, or, "the processes by which authority is exercised in the management 
of a country’s social and economic resources; and the capacity of governments to 
design, formulate and implement policies, and, in general, to discharge 
government functions” (World Bank, 1992:58). More broadly, governance looked 
at the relationships between citizens (consumers) and the local state (service 
providers). Faced with an unresponsive and unaccountable state, governance 
reforms were recommended with a view to providing consumers, or principals, with 
the information and the means to hold officials/providers, or agents, responsible for 
their performance and the result of their decisions. The emphasis was on 
enhancing accountability and cost effectiveness, which was said to comprise two 
basic sub processes (Cassels, 1995). Firstly, reforms to ensure more 
transparency in the delivery of services, so the performance of providers may be 
monitored and appraised; but also a sanctioning process through which good 
performance is rewarded and bad performance punished.
Governance reforms have focussed on bringing about changes to public 
bureaucracies using two main components - both seen as universal panacea to
19 The defining work of the new political economy (NPE) was Krueger (1974) on rent seeking in India. She 
argued that foreign trade controls created windfalls for government servants, and those privileged to be 
granted permits. Ultimately these trade controls stimulated corruption and unproductive activities in 
developing countries. See Toye (1993) for a lucid critique of NPE and Krueger’s work in particular.
20 “A bureaucrat’s utility need not be strongly dependent on every one of the variables which increase with the 
budget, but it must be positively and continuously associated with its size (Niskanen, 1971:22-23)
21 See Macintosh (1992) for a cogent exposition of the ideas of the ‘new Right’ and the context for their 
emergence in development thinking.
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the problems of public sector service delivery- decentralisation and the application 
of the doctrines of the new public management (NPM). Both have become an 
integral part of public sector reform packages, including health sector reform, 
around the world.22 Indeed, decentralisation has become a central feature of 
health sector reform with a view, primarily, to enhance accountability (Harpham 
and Tanner, 1995). NPM-inspired reforms of bureaucratic systems were intended 
to make them more lean, honest and robust (Hood, 1991:11). This chapter 
presents the theoretical rationale for these reforms, and highlights some of the 
weaknesses in the theory.
2.2 What is Decentralisation?
Decentralisation is defined by Rondinelli & Nellis (1986:5) as, “the transfer of 
responsibility for planning and management, and resource raising and allocation 
from the central government to a) field units of central government ministries or 
agencies; b) subordinate units or levels of government; c) semi-autonomous public 
authorities or corporations; d) area-wide regional or functional authorities; or 
e)NGOs/PVOs”. In a later paper, he identified four distinct organisational forms of 
decentralisation (Rondinelli et al, 1989). In its minimalist form lies delegation and 
deconcentration. Delegation refers to the transfer of specific functions by the 
centre to an agent, with the centre retaining authority and ultimate responsibility. 
Deconcentration involves, “the shifting of workload from central government 
ministry headquarters to staff located in offices outside the national capital” 
(Rondinelli et al, 1989:76). Devolution entails the creation of local units of 
government outside the control of central government, which are independent and 
autonomous and have the power to design and implement policies, for which they 
are politically accountable to the local electorate. A fourth form of decentralisation 
distinguished by Rondinelli is privatisation. This is mostly treated as an entirely
22 Cassels (1995) identifies four components of health sector reforms in developing countries: reforms of the 
civil service, through a reduction in personnel and a separation of health ministries from the rest of the civil 
service; reorganisation of national ministries of health by removing MOHs from responsibilities for ground 
level management and service delivery, instead confining them to a monitoring, coordination and regulatory 
role; managed competition, opening the possibility of competition between providers through contracting out 
and decentralisation through the devolution of responsibilities to local government agencies (c.f. Conyers et al, 
1984).
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separate institutional mechanism, which involves the transfer of responsibilities for 
the delivery of services to the voluntary or, in some cases, the private sector, (ibid). 
It will not be discussed in this chapter, because it is irrelevant to the West Bengal 
case.
“The term decentralisation can be articulated into a monetarist discourse, but 
alternatively it can be linked into a discourse that combines ideas of collective 
empowerment, democracy and socialism" (Slater, 1989:523).23 Proponents of 
decentralisation see it, axiomatically, as an end in itself, as a means to deepen 
democracy; as well as a means to an end, to improve governmental performance 
in providing services to the people. The argument runs as follows. By bringing 
government closer to the people, policies more attuned to people’s needs will 
emerge. Government at the local level is more cognizant of local circumstances 
and closer proximity to the people in turn makes it more vulnerable to citizens’ 
pressure. It will be more accountable because local inhabitants will be better 
informed about what government is doing, and more able to complain and seek 
redress. The rationale is neatly reflected by the World Bank which has stated that, 
“reinvigorating public institutions must then begin by bringing government closer to 
the people...bringing popular voice into policy-making...opening up ways for 
individual users, private sector organisations and civil society to have their say...it 
also means greater decentralisation of government power and 
resources...carefully managed decentralisation can do much to improve state 
capability creating pressures for the better matching of government services to 
local preferences, strengthening local accountability...”(WDR: 1997).
The above quote quite neatly encapsulates the arguments of proponents of 
decentralisation, who, as has been noted, hail from different ideological positions. 
Unsurprisingly therefore, it exposes some of the contradictions in the 
decentralisation literature. For instance, under the watchword of increasing cost
23 The appeal of decentralisation to those of different ideological hues is perhaps best illustrated in the case of 
India. Although support for decentralisation in the writings of Gandhi is clear, also included in the list of 
proponents of decentralisation are such disparate figures as M.N. Roy and E.M.S Namboodiripad (Ghosh, 
2000).
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effectiveness, state capability has often been run down. It is not at all clear how 
cost-effective service delivery and increased state capability are at all compatible 
with decentralisation. Rather than seeking to enhance state capability, it may be 
argued that a strong anti-statist agenda has seemed to unite those from the Left as 
well as those from the Right in support of decentralisation.
2.2.1 Democracy, Popular Participation and the Valorisation of the Local
Decentralisation has been introduced in a number of developing countries as a 
way of institutionalising the participation of the local community, the poor or ‘lower 
strata’, and of countering the traditional dominance of ‘elites’ in policy making.24 
Enhanced community participation in decision-making and service delivery has 
been established as a normative goal of development agencies in the last decade, 
as a way of improving the design and implementation of development programmes. 
25 It is also seen by its advocates as a means to empower local people, and thus 
as an end in itself in the development process (Marsden & Oakley, 1990).26
Critics of the idea that greater popular participation can improve the quality of 
service delivery have highlighted the difficulties in reconciling the need for 
hierarchy and expertise, required for the delivery of certain goods and services, 
and the bottom up control needed to ensure more efficient and accountable 
organisations (Brett, 1998). Furthermore, the desire for greater community 
participation contains a whole series of assumptions, most notably about what the 
local community actually represents, which has led some contemporary scholars to 
qualify the prevailing enthusiasm for such local participation. Though often posited 
as a means for the ‘poor’ or ‘lower strata’ to exert their rights in opposition to ‘the 
elites’, as some theorists have pointed out, the concept of community carries
24 “To make democracy real it is necessary to close the gap so that the state ultimately becomes conterminous 
with society... structures of governance have to be organised in such a manner as would enable people to wield 
sovereign power effectively.. .from day to day.. .to be real, democracy must be direct.. .In so far as democracy 
is not government of the people and by the people, it is not democracy” (Roy 1960:67).
25 Greatly inspired by the participatory development movement and the works of Robert Chambers.
26 Gandhi advocated his form of decentralisation, gram swaraj, “to awaken villagers themselves and make 
them capable of tackling their own problems” (1957:60).
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connotations of consensus and homogeneity,27 which in reality communities 
seldom display.28 This consensual view hides the actual divisions, differences, 
inequalities and sectionalism of most ‘communities’. Nevertheless it is startling to 
note how integral the concept of a homogeneous and consensual community is to 
those who advocate decentralisation as a means of enhancing community 
participation. Those who should know better seem to want to cling to this concept, 
based on some plainly utopian vision of a classless and casteless society.29 Yet, 
as Wood has noted for the Dhaka slums, “the poor are not necessarily a ‘group’, 
nor therefore a unit of social action (2000:675).”
Evidence has emerged from the comparative experience of decentralisation in 
different countries, which shows how community participation often results in the 
de facto participation of an unrepresentative few. At the same time it disguises the 
potential role for powerful, local interests. Elite capture is a real threat to the equity 
enhancing claims of decentralisation proponents, as Ostrom (1993) and Crook and 
Sverisson (1999) have noted.30 Even in West Bengal, where it is acknowledged 
that the participation of the poor had increased in the aftermath of panchayat 
reforms (Webster, 1990), it was the case that those hailing from the ‘middle strata’ 
- from the middle classes and the middle castes -  had a significant presence on 
these institutions of local government (Echeverri-Gent, 1992). Moreover, the 
evidence seems to suggest that the meaningful participation of the poor has 
remained low. As has been noted, “it is crucial to make a realistic assessment of 
the ‘social representativeness’ of the participation delivered by these direct 
methods, if their bold claims are to be fairly judged.“ (Crook and Sverisson, 
1999:9).
27 Nelson and Wright 1995
28 Chapter Five provides an illustration of this
291 am referring to the writings of Jayprakash Narayan on communitarian society. (1970) See also Ghosh 
(2000)
30 It is by no means inevitable if  a counter-elite (of the poor) is mobilized, as in the case of West Bengal. This 
counter-mobilisation of the poor seems to be waning, with middle class/caste individuals increasingly 
occupying leadership roles on panchayats (Echeverri-Gent, 1992). However, Tendler (1997) has shown that 
elite capture may not necessarily result in policies which are adverse to the interests of the poor.
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It is assumed that decentralised administration can improve micro planning, 
enhance intersectoral collaboration and ensure that programmes are more suited 
to local needs and conditions. Local level government has the potential to raise 
local resources for local development. All this leads to the almost intuitive belief 
that somehow local government has a comparative advantage in the delivery of 
certain types of public goods and services. Accentuating the value of ‘the local’ set 
out to reverse the prevailing tendency in development to ignore or subordinate 
local knowledge.
However, the uncritical adoption of decentralisation has lead to scepticism of 
outside knowledge and interventions reflected in the feeling that outsiders have 
little to offer local development and that the way forward is to focus on local 
knowledge, local insights and the self-reliance of local communities (Burkie, 1993). 
Critics have argued that it has lead to too much of a focus on the outsider/local 
division as an obstacle to development (Mohan and Stokke, 2000). At the same 
time, it seems to ignore the fact that whilst local knowledge may have something 
worthwhile to contribute in terms of the choice and location of local infrastructure or 
services, the long-term financing of these has to come from outside, often central 
government - many localities tend to have too few resources to make long-term 
local financing a realistic goal.31 Tendler’s work shows how outside interventions 
can actually contribute positively to local development. She notes how many of the 
positive features of the Ceara experience were the result of the initiatives taken by 
central government, not the result of the assumed comparative advantages of local 
government and NGOs in addressing local people’s needs (1997:143).
2.2.2 Civil Society and the State
A number of influences, including the need to ‘valorise the local’ and a focus on the 
importance of community participation, have led to the belief in policy circles that
311 am grateful to Mohan and Stokke (2000) for enlightening me on these points. It depends very much on the 
‘locality’. A metropolis, for example, is better placed than a small town in the middle of a stagnant local 
economy to raise the resources for local financing.
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good government is a function of a robust, local civil society.32 In this sense, civil 
society is conceptualised as comprising autonomous and private individuals and 
bodies, independent of government, who act to monitor government and keep it in 
check. Civil society represents the needs and desires of citizens and acts to 
protect and provide for neglected groups. (Tendler, 1997:145).
This partial view of civil society merely reflects contemporary liberal-democratic 
thinking on the subject, although it has become popular of late and has come to be 
accepted uncritically in discussions of democratic governance. The roots of such 
contemporary notions about civil society can be traced to the work of de 
Tocqueville (1835) [1990], who saw intermediary associations as unequivocally 
good, the repositories of democratic values and liberty, and a check on an intrusive 
state (de Tocqueville, 1835 [1990]).33
The influence of 20th century North American political science and the ideas of 
pluralism (Trueman, 1953) and 'civic culture’ (Almond and Verba, 1965) reinforced 
and popularised the concept of civil society as a counter-balance, acting to try and 
limit the state. The work of these political scientists built on assumptions, traceable 
to de Tocqueville, about the values, institutions and inhabitants that were thought 
to comprise civil society: an area of rights, rule of law, freedom and citizenship 
seen as vital to the establishment of democracy (Chandhoke, 1995: 26).
This notion of civil society, with its overtly positive connotations, has also emerged 
from disenchantment with the state -  particularly with what has been considered to 
be its overbearing role -  in both the economic and political sphere. In the political 
sphere the dominant position of the state was thought to have repressed the 
vibrancy of civil society (Chandhoke, 1995:27-28), whereas liberal economists 
have warned of the state’s tendency to sap creativity and individualism destroying 
the entrepreneurial spirit assumed innate in all human beings (Friedman, 1962;
32 For further exploration of some of these influences, see Chandhoke (1995) and Foley and Edwards (1998).
33 “An association for political, commercial or manufacturing purposes...is a powerful and enlightened 
member of the community... which by saving its own rights against the encroachments of the government 
saves the common liberties of the country” (De Tocqueville, [1835] 1990: Vol 1, p324).
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Hayek, 1944). Contemporary notions of civil society may be construed as being 
anti-statist, as Chandhoke states: “the argument for the sphere is a conscious 
attempt to limit the boundaries of the state and expand those of the non-statist 
sphere” (1995:30).
Notions of civil society as a sphere where free individuals as citizens with rights 
protected by law are able to engage in discussion and debate on equal terms, as a 
check on, and a balance to, an intrusive state and therefore crucial to the survival 
of democracy, are implicit in the contemporary discourse of decentralisation. This 
trend has given rise to the view of civil society as the repository of all that is good, 
thereby confining the state’s role in societal projects to the margins.
This view is analytically shallow and reflects ignorance of centuries of scholarly 
writing on the subject. For one, it fails to disaggregate the various elements that 
make up civil society and the conflicts that arise between them. The term civil 
society has come to be used to refer to associations and activities outside the 
control of the state, regardless of whether these contribute or detract from the 
promotion of democratic values. The virtuous attributes of civil society stressed by 
liberal theory stand in stark contrast to the way in which Marx, Hegel and Gramsci 
conceptualised this sphere. Civil society was the arena where “social processes 
constitute, incorporate and reflect the material world of the capitalist economy”, 
and thus for Marx, it was the site of class oppression (Chandhoke, 1995:38). This 
view of civil society as a zone of confrontation between unequal actors confronts 
the harmonious and homogenous image that liberal theory has created. It 
suggests, “civil society is not always marked by civility” (Chandhoke, 1995:37).
The currently popular view of civil society and the state as separate and opposed 
to one another is not particularly a faithful description of the historical relationship 
between the two. There have been other, quite different, conceptualisations of this 
relationship. For Hegel civil society was an intermediary stage in the formation of 
the state, whilst for Marx, the historical processes which gave rise to modern 
society, also constituted both the state and civil society (Chandhoke, 1995:35-37). 
Gramsci, who wrote extensively on the subject, never defined civil society in
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opposition to the state. As he says, “in concrete reality, civil society and the State 
are one and the same thing”. Gramsci inverted the Tocquevillean concept of civil 
society as an individual’s protection against the predations of the state by arguing 
that the state, by hegemonising civil society, turns it into a protective layer for itself. 
As such civil society became the ‘first line of defence’ for the State, helping it to 
resist in the face of a frontal assault upon it. In some instances he defined it in the 
opposite way, with the State on the outside, defending civil society. The point is 
they were never defined in terms of oppositional categories. Rather, civil society 
was comprised of competing classes and groups butressing the state and ruling 
class interests. Those who controlled the state hegemonised civil society. As 
such civil society was responsible for manufacturing the social consent, needed to 
make the capitalist state politically viable, the so-called “fortresses and earthworks” 
protecting capitalism (Gramsci 1976:238).
2.2.3 Social Capital
Contemporary liberal-democratic notions of civil society resonate with Putnam’s 
argument explaining the comparative performance of regional government in north 
and south Italy. The performance of local government and different levels of socio­
economic development in different regions of Italy was, he argued, determined by 
the level of ‘civicness’, reflected in a vibrant associational life, newspaper 
readership and political participation at the local level. The cooperation needed for 
this vibrant associational life depended on trust and norms of generalised 
reciprocity, ‘social capital’ as he famously termed it. Social capital that facilitated 
collective action at the local level leading to higher levels of socio-economic 
development in the north of Italy, was a historic endowment of certain communities. 
Further civic collaboration could help to reinforce this (1993:174). Where this does 
not exist, no suggestion is made of how it may be constructed, and instead those 
communities seem destined to face a vicious circle of amoral familism. Putnam 
invokes the concept of path dependency to substantiate his point.
Harriss and De Renzio (1997) have presented a coherent summary of the 
criticisms of Putnam’s concept of social capital. They discuss the problem,
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unresolved by Putnam, of how to construct social capital where it seems to be 
missing, and highlight the circularity in his argument. From where do the norms of 
reciprocity - which give rise to social capital that facilitates cooperation, and 
reinforces reciprocity - actually emerge? Putnam’s analysis, it is held, ignores how 
politics may affect the creation of social capital and particularly the critical role that 
the state has to play in fostering or undermining civic life. For example, Tarrow 
has shown how the semi-colonial status in which the south was held in relation to 
the North of Italy, helped suppress associational life. He concludes that, “the 
operative cause of the performance of regional institutions in both north and south 
is neither cultural nor associational life, but political (Tarrow, 1996:394).34 Similarly, 
Putzel (1997) has drawn attention to how political organisations like communist 
trade unions, through their mobilising activities, helped promote civic life in areas 
of the North, said, by Putnam, to be rich in social capital. Similar points are made 
by Evans, who argues that, “creative action by governments can foster social 
capital; linking mobilised citizens to public agencies can enhance the efficacy of 
government (1996:1130).”
Scholars have also questioned the unilinear causality between networks of civic 
engagement and good government. On the one hand they criticise the consensual 
and harmonious notion of ‘the local community’, which is implicit in this argument, 
and that ignores the divisions and conflicts which tend to be a feature of most 
‘communities’. However, there is also a considerable body of empirical evidence 
which suggests that it may not be sufficient - and may in fact be counter-productive 
- to rely simply on the ’community’ or local associations to provide the incentives 
for officials to perform well.
Granovetter (1985) has argued that trust may be enhanced and malfeasance 
discouraged when transactions and agreements are ‘embedded’ in a structure of 
social networks. Subsequently Wade (1988; 1992), Moore (1989) and Tendler 
(1997) highlighted the importance of ‘embeddedness in social structures for 
ensuring good bureaucratic performance and accountability amongst public
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officials. For example, Moore has shown that local ‘embeddedness’ exposed 
Taiwanese irrigation managers to pressure and censure by members of irrigation 
associations, and made it practically impossible for them to ignore the needs and 
concerns of their clients (1989:1742). Nevertheless, the same authors have also 
qualified their support for ‘embeddedness’ as a means of improving bureaucratic 
performance. Moore (1989) has shown that even when legal, socio-economic and 
institutional barriers have been reduced, local communities may still not pressure 
their irrigation officials. Furthermore Wade, through an analysis of the 
performance of irrigation officials in Korea, has been careful to point out how too 
much ‘embeddedness’ can result in “cosily-corrupt networks” developing between 
officials and local communities (Wade, 1992). Their evidence suggests that well 
performing governments are not simply a function of robust civil society/networks 
of civic engagement and instead has underlined the need for a ‘Leviathan’ - some 
sort of third party, usually the government, which supervises and monitors the 
institutional arrangements in place, and when necessary enforces management 
control. Tendler’s (1997) explanation of the good performance of health agents in 
Ceara (Brazil) lends support to these insights. Whilst she admits that the success 
of the health agents program may be attributed to the fact that the agents were 
recruited and subsequently employed to work in the areas they resided, she points 
out that this was only a partial explanation. Crucial to their success was the role 
played by the state government of Ceara which, through the ‘socialization’ of all job 
candidates, instilled a sense of duty in those candidates that were selected, but 
also encouraged those not selected and the population at large, by means of 
public education campaign, to monitor the performance of health agents at the 
local level. In each of the success stories highlighted by Tendler, central 
government played a proactive role “doing things it had not done before and more 
of certain things it had done previously” (Tendler, 1997:147).
2.2.4 State-Society Synergy
Tendler’s findings challenge much of the contemporary theorising on the role of 
the state, which seeks to confine it to regulation and monitoring, standard setting
34 Quoted in Harriss and de Renzio (1997:927)
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and activities involving externalities and economies of scale. Her conclusions 
resonate with those of Evans (1996) who, by summarising the results of research 
into successful development strategies in five separate settings, has highlighted 
the importance of “state-society synergy", comprising both “complementarity” and 
“embeddedness”. Complementarity requires the state to go beyond merely the 
provision of a rule-governed environment, and involves “the public provision of 
intangibles” (Evans, 1996:1120), such as media publicity, which proved so 
effective in enhancing the performance of health agents in Ceara. As he puts it, “ it 
is not just about government providing inputs that its scale and bureaucratic 
organisation allows it to provide more effectively...complementarity supports day- 
to-day interactions between public officials and communities” (ibid: 1121). In the 
case of Ceara, Evans argues that making public officials part of the communities in 
which they worked, thereby enmeshing them in local networks of social 
relationships, meant that they could not avoid criticism if they were not performing 
their jobs effectively, and also provided the officials with an incentive to build 
relationships of trust within the community. Through ‘embeddedness’ networks of 
trust were generated which span the public-private divide (ibid: 1122).
Thus according to Evans, ‘synergy’ emerges through a mixture of ‘embeddedness’ 
and complementarity, but he also emphasises the key roles played by competitive 
political regimes, robust bureaucracies and egalitarian social structures in 
facilitating its emergence. Robust bureaucracies are those with a strong 
organisational capacity - the ability to actually deliver the goods. In addition, he 
argues, they also need to embody traditional Weberian features, as it is these 
which prevent officials from engaging in rent-seeking alliances with local elites, 
despite the opportunities that exist. Similarly, he argues taking the example of 
Kerala, that political competitiveness can have a positive impact on service 
delivery because it means that citizens’ reactions have to be valued by the 
government. The final condition for the construction of synergy is the existence of 
egalitarian social structures. This is clearly problematic for most parts of the 
developing world, but may be overcome by efforts to construct social identities 
amongst marginalised groups, which enable them to unite across social 
boundaries (Evans, 1996:1129).
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2.2.5 Enhancing Governmental Performance
The belief that decentralisation could enhance governmental performance was 
partly premised on arguments valorising the local and the potential for popular 
participation that it held. Local government was meant to be better informed of 
local needs and more effectively able to answer local demands. Local 
‘communities’ were meant to be better placed to provide the incentives for local 
officials to perform effectively, than a hierarchical, bureaucratic, centralised state. 
Analytically the rationale for improving governmental performance builds upon a 
choice-theoretic approach embedded in neo-classical (micro) economic theory- 
with its inherent assumptions about humans as rational individuals uniformly 
dedicated to maximising their own individual utility. This is where the influence of 
theories of public choice and the new political economy (NPE) is most keenly felt.
The neo-classical assumption is that an individual acts in a given situation based 
on a prior calculation of the costs and benefits of a particular course of action. The 
New Institutional Economics shares some of the same theoretical foundations of 
neo-classical economics, but has offered a critique of many of the assumptions of 
this orthodoxy. On the one hand it does not challenge the basic neo-classical 
proposition that opportunism is a fundamental characteristic of self-interested 
individuals. Nor does it question the viewpoint that choices are exogenously 
defined by formal institutions (Hodgson, 1989; 1993), which affect the quality of 
information available, and thereby influence the types of actions that individuals 
may take. However, NIE does involve the view that an individual’s ability to make a 
rational judgement is ‘bounded’ by imperfect information. Furthermore, whilst it 
doesn’t question the assumption of the opportunistic, self-interested individual, NIE 
holds that some institutional arrangements privilege opportunistic behaviour while 
others constrain it.35
35 Behaving opportunistically means “behaving in a deceitful way intended to improve one’s own welfare at 
the expense of others” (Ostrom, 1993:46)
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Institutional reform - designing the right institutional arrangements - was 
considered critical for guiding rational utility maximising individuals, towards 
socially optimal choices.36 Bringing government closer to the people through 
decentralisation promised to reduce the ‘agency’ (information and transaction) 
costs arising from the provision of public services by centralised bureaucracies.37 
On the one hand, this would increase the likelihood of the use of ‘voice’ by 
principals, as elucidated in Paul’s (1991) classic treatise on public accountability. 
Paul argued that a reduction in the agency costs would result in the use of ‘voice’ 
by principals to ensure greater accountability (and thus better performance) from 
agents. The assumptions about rational behaviour were also applied to agents and 
thus it was assumed that reduced transaction costs would expose the agent to the 
positive influence of local criticism - fuelled by better information - providing a 
disincentive to behave opportunistically. Although he shows some appreciation of 
the importance of educational and socio-economic constraints, for Paul the use of 
voice was primarily seen as a function of the ‘costs’ involved.38
2.2.6 Rational Individuals, Social Norms and Informal Rules
Critics of this choice theoretic rationale question the validity of seeing institutions 
as merely transaction cost reducing devices (Stein, 1995). They also challenge 
the notion that individual behavioural choices are the result of a purely cost-benefit 
analysis of a given course of action, with institutions affecting that analysis by the 
quality of information which they allow to filter through.
36 See Williamson (1975) and Ostrom et al (1993) for a lucid presentation of this approach, and Hodgson 
(1989; 1993) and Bates (1995) for critiques.
37 Principal agent theory states that the principal, deprived of perfect information, is at a loss to judge whether 
the agent is performing her/his duties adequately or not. Thus a smokescreen exists for the agent to behave 
opportunistically. (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985). The principal refers to what is sometimes called the 
consumer or client; the agent refers to the provider. North defines transaction costs as, “the costs of measuring 
the varying attributes of what is being exchanged, the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing 
agreements” (North, 1990:27 in Platteau, 2000:7). Harriss-White has described them as the costs of 
information, monitoring and enforcement involved when making and enforcing contracts’^ 1995:99).
38 See Paul (1991: ii and 47).
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For the proponents of the old institutionalism (01E) institutions are not merely 
sieves of information, enabling utility maximising individuals to transcend social 
dilemmas. They are the social norms that emerge over time resulting from a 
pattern of routine actions and habits-“through the operation of tradition, custom or 
legal constraint”, which in turn give rise to, “durable and routinised patterns of 
behaviour” (Hodgson, 1989:10). At the same time, OIE laid out the real possibility, 
denied by rational choice theory, that people’s actions, choices and behaviour, 
may also be embedded in the “habits of a group or the customs of a people” 
(Veblen, [1919] 1994:239). The significance of this approach is that it does not 
take the individual as the basic unit of analysis. Rather, the emphasis on group 
habits and popular customs reflects an appreciation of the role of history and 
culture in the shaping of choices, thereby suggesting that preferences may be 
endogenous.
It has been difficult for proponents of the NIE, married as the discipline is to neo­
classical economics, to distance themselves from methodological individualism 
and assumptions about rational utility maximisation. Nevertheless NIE theorists 
have shown an appreciation for the role of history and culture in helping to define 
choices, whilst modifying the notion of instrumental rationality (North, 1995). North 
has argued that “informal norms and enforcement characteristics” unique to an 
environment, have underpinned successful economic performance (North, 1995). 
Informal constraints to human behaviour are different from formal institutions such 
as property rights. Instead they consist of “conventions... norms of behaviour... 
and self-imposed codes of conduct that become ingrained in individuals through 
learning, schooling and family life” (North, 1989:239). Informal constraints, he 
says, refer to what is often termed ‘culture’. Their importance lies in the fact that 
they are both “tenacious” and “pervasive in defining the characteristics of a 
society” (ibid). The role of history must be examined in any discussion of the 
pervasive effects of informal constraints, “the past carries over to the present and 
makes those informal constraints important sources of continuity in long-run 
societal change” (1990:37). By endorsing the notion of path dependency, North 
has highlighted the role that history plays in shaping individuals’ choices. “Path 
dependency means that history matters. We cannot understand today’s choices
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(and define them in the modelling of economic performance) without tracing the 
incremental evolution of institutions” (North, 1990:100). If we are to accept the role 
of culture in shaping institutional outcomes (choices), we must accept that this may 
result at times in productivity constraining outcomes.
So far it has been suggested that history and culture can shape choices; the other
message that emanates from much contemporary scholarship on institutions is 
that so can politics. This is not just because formal institutions such as property 
rights are defined and enforced by political organisations - as North says, “politics 
shapes economic performance because they define and enforce the rules of the 
game" (1995:25) - but because of evidence which suggests that institutions “are 
created to serve the interests of those with bargaining power to devise the rules” 
(North, 1990:16). The work of Bates (1988; 1989) has been important in this 
regard. His analysis of policy making in Africa has shown how powerful societal 
interests have been able to shape institutions in their favour, giving rise to 
outcomes which were often socially inefficient. Similarly, Khan found that the 
outcomes of institutional arrangements depended on the balance of power 
between different groups in the political context (Khan, 1995). The evidence runs 
contrary to neo-classical theory, which sees institutions emerging in response to 
market failure to help rational individuals overcome social dilemmas, in other 
words that institutions are created to be socially efficient. The evidence has 
spurred Bates call for embedding institutionalism in a study of politics (Bates, 
1995). The literature on enhancing organisational capacity for effective and 
equitable provision of services takes history, culture and politics as given. Nowhere 
is this better illustrated than in the decentralisation literature and in the doctrines of
NPM, which I shall refer to later in this chapter.
If we accept that history, culture and politics have a bearing on the way that 
individuals choose to behave - that individual choice may not always reflect a 
desire to maximise personal welfare - then this must lead us to question the choice 
theoretic reasoning which assumes that decentralisation, by reducing agency
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costs, results in officials opting to behave less opportunistically.39 Indeed it holds 
out the possibility, in theory, that years of behaving opportunistically without risk of 
punishment may have helped to establish and legistimise patterns of behaviour 
within an organisation that have proved adverse to producing socially optimal 
outcomes, resulting in an unresponsive bureaucracy providing poor standards of 
public service. There is the possibility that perverse social norms may have 
become engrained by the political legitimaton of opportunistic behaviour, in the 
sense that shirkers and opportunists have had their interests protected by different 
power groups. In sum it holds out the possibility that certain organisations may be 
resistant to behavioural changes, when these are premised on narrowly 
rationalistic assumptions.
The criticisms of instrumental rationality refer to principals as much as agents. So, 
just as agents may not behave rationalistically in response to a reduction in 
transaction and information costs, neither may principals. Rondinelli et al (1989:67) 
recognise this in their discussion of service users’ (principals’) engagement with 
decentralised institutional structures. They note that, “political constraints, social 
taboos, religious principles and well-ingrained economic practices - even inefficient 
ones - can restrict people from pursuing their concepts of rational self-interest”. 
Principals may not ‘participate’ and may not exercise ‘voice’, even though officially 
the channels are available and easily enough accessible for them to be able to do 
so, as Moore (1989) has shown.
The first part of this chapter has tried to highlight some of the basic assumptions 
about human beings and their choices, as well as about the nature and role of ‘civil 
society’, which lie at the core of decentralisation as a policy measure. Many of the 
weaknesses in the theory that have been highlighted here are further explored in 
Chapter Six. The empirical evidence from fieldwork in Calcutta calls into question 
many of the assumptions of choice theoretic reasoning highlighted in the previous 
discussion. Chapter Six tries to disentangle many of the assumptions bound up in 
the theories behind decentralisation, and systematically seeks to test the validity of
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these. For example, have agency costs been reduced, and do officials actually 
respond to this by changing their behaviour from opportunism to social 
optimisation? Or, alternatively, do historically evolved social norms that have 
emerged within the CMC bureaucracy result in enduring patterns of opportunistic 
behaviour? Guiding the analysis of primary health care delivery in two wards of the 
city lay the critical question of whether decentralisation in the administrative 
functions of Calcutta Municipal Corporation (CMC) has actually resulted in 
improved standards of service provision. If it has not, why not? The next section 
examines the second major policy component of governance reforms, the 
application of the doctrines of new public management (NPM).
2.3 New Public Management
Of the four components of health sector reform laid out by Cassels (1995), the first 
three: civil service reform, managed competition and the reorganisation of national 
ministries, are part of a set of doctrines which have come to be known as the New 
Public Management (NPM). At heart NPM may be summarised as advocacy for 
the application of market-like incentive structures to improve the accountability of 
public sector units.
2.3.1 Theory
NPM emerged out of a belief that the traditional, Weberian model of bureaucracy 
characterised by hierarchy, formal political control, merit-based recruitment and 
permanent tenure, which was considered an antidote to earlier models of 
administration characterised by patronage, nepotism and corruption, was failing in 
its objectives. In particular, criticism of the theory of political control, which 
questioned assumptions about the separation between bureaucrats and politicians 
and the proposition that organisation based upon rational/legal authority was 
always the most efficient (Hughes, 1994:ch2), fed a growing disillusionment with 
the traditional model.
39 That is if  decentralisation actually results in a reduction of agency costs.
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It was found that there was no clear separation between bureaucrats and 
politicians and that administration and policy were often complementary. 
Furthermore it was held that rational/legal bureaucracy was no longer the most 
efficient form of organisation. Rather it was argued that such a model produced a 
poorly accountable, risk-averse, wasteful and inert public sector.40 Rationality, 
hierarchy and rigidity served as adverse incentives for bureaucrats to be more 
democratically accountable; whereas secure employment tended to encourage 
‘time-servers’- those who worked under-par, safe in the knowledge that they could 
not be dismissed, simply buying time until retirement (Hughes, 1994:41-50).
The loss of faith in traditional rational/legal bureaucratic systems provoked a 
fundamental re-appraisal of the role that government should play in the delivery of 
public services like health care (Bennet and Muraleedharan, 2000:59). The 
contemporary view held that government’ should not be the sole provider of 
services, but rather should confine its role to formulating policy. Government, it 
was felt, should co-ordinate actors, regulate, facilitate and provide information 
(ibid; Batley, 1999a:755). The traditional model was also undermined by the 
onslaught of public choice theory, which applied the models of neo-classical 
decision making to the behaviour of public officials. Public officials were assumed 
to be rational utility maximising individuals and as the market allocates resources 
most efficiently, public choice theory provided the justification for the application of 
market like incentive structures to public bureaucracies as a way to make them 
more efficient and better performing. Finally, the influence of professional 
managerialism and its emphasis on organisational outputs and performance had 
an important impact41
Each of these viewpoints may be reflected in the set of doctrines which have come 
to be known as the New Public Management (NPM). Although regarded as a very
40 In the case of health, for example, see World Bank, 1993 and Bossert et al, 1998.
41 All these influences and the basic underlying intention of the NPM package have been described in the 
World Bank’s, “Running Public Enterprises on Commercial Principles”. Two instruments for improving the 
effectiveness of the public sector are highlighted: corporatisation - making public entities independent and 
thus insulating them from non-commercial (ie political pressures) and explicit contracts between government 
and bodies responsible for infrastructure services, which specify performance objectives and cost recovery 
mechanisms (WDR, 1994: 37).
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loose term, there are said to be seven doctrinal components of the NPM (Hood, 
1991:5):
a) hands on professional management in the public sector
b) explicit standards and performance indicators
c) emphasis on output controls
d) disaggregation of public sector units
e) greater competition in the public sector
f) adoption of private sector style of management practice
g) stress on discipline and parsimony in resource use
These doctrines have resulted in policies that in practice have led to cutting back 
on the size of bureaucracies, reducing staff and exposing those that remained to 
incentives that were to encourage them to be quicker and more flexible in their 
ways of working. The focus of these changes has been on outcomes and results 
and less on process and procedure.
NPM’s attraction lay in its applicability to different contexts and its perceived 
political neutrality. Furthermore, its promise to cut costs and provide more for less, 
through better management and structural reforms in public bureaucracies carried 
enormous intuitive appeal. Yet these, perhaps the key to its popularity, have been 
extensively criticised.
2.4 Criticisms of NPM
2.4.1 Low Morale
Hood (1991) has presented a coherent summary of the common criticisms of NPM 
which bring into question many of the factors that make it so attractive. Recent 
evidence from the application of NPM in ten developing countries further 
highlighted these. For instance, Hood has noted how NPM reforms have damaged
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public service whilst not delivering on its central claims of enhancing efficiency and 
accountability. The evidence referred to by Warrington seems to support the first 
part of this claim. Warrington highlights the paradox, in many countries, whereby 
NPM reforms, which are meant to empower and reward officials, in most cases 
have resulted in retrenchment, redundancy and the displacement of long- 
established expectations. This he observes has been, “demoralising for 
individuals but also debilitating for organisations” (Warrington, 1997:6).
2.4.2 Accountability
Similarly a core objective of NPM has been to create stronger incentives for 
performance and ensure greater accountability (Bennet and Muraleedharan, 
2000:59), through contracting out to the private sector as well as through the 
separation of regulatory and supply roles. However, the evidence from NPM 
reforms in ten developing countries was far from convincing. Summarising this 
evidence, Batley has claimed that, “ accountability to public politicians has hardly 
increased and may have become more opaque; the main gainers from reform are 
senior managers of service delivery organisations in the public and private sectors” 
(Batley, 1999b:765). This would appear to also support another of Hood’s 
criticisms- that NPM is a vehicle for private gain (of senior managers, consultants) 
rather than, what it is meant to be, which is a vehicle for public good (better 
services at lower cost).
2.5 Ignoring the Local Context
2.5.1 Changes to Relationships within the Executive
Critical to the popularity of NPM have been the claims by its proponents of its 
universality. The assumption was that NPM inspired reforms in places such as 
New Zealand or the UK could be transposed to other countries regardless of their 
constitutional arrangements and their level of socio-economic development. The 
extent to which reforms altered relationships within the Executive in these 
countries was often not recognised, yet NPM inspired policy innovations had
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“altered the conventions underpinning important constitutional roles and 
relationships, notably between ministers and civil servants” (Warrington, 1997:5). 
The subsequent difficulties encountered in implementing NPM reforms elsewhere 
in the developing world may be attributed to this fact. As Warrington has pointed 
out, in most Commonwealth countries, “it is far less easy to modify relations within 
the Executive or to revise procedures for appointing and removing senior public 
officers and decentralise human resource management than it was in Canada, the 
UK or New Zealand” (Warrington, 1997:5). This is one example of how NPM has 
been applied without sufficient regard to the broader policy environment.
2.5.2 Organisational Capacity and Systemic Constraints
Another criticism is that NPM has been applied without due regard to local context 
in terms of the organisational capacity of public bureaucracies. Experience from 
developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, has revealed how the 
organisational context, particularly whether the skills exist to perform the new tasks 
assigned, has a crucial bearing on the success of NPM reforms (Batley, 1999b:761 
and Russell et al, 1997 for the case of Zimbabwe). Furthermore, systemic 
constraints such as centralised accounting structures and financial regulations 
were seen to have hindered the capacity of ministries in contracting out, monitoring 
contractor performance or decentralising financial authority to ensure greater 
financial accountability. Weak personnel management structures have resulted in 
overstaffing and a weak link between performance and reward and centralised 
systems of personnel management curtailed managers’ ability to hire and fire. The 
prevalence of such centralised and weak human resource management systems 
was found to undermine managers’ efforts to improve performance (Batley, 
1999b:762; Bennet and Muraleedharan, 2000).
Systemic constraints were noted to be significant in limiting the success of NPM 
reforms in the health sector in Tamil Nadu, India. The government there is making 
some changes to the way in which it provides health care, moving to a more 
regulatory role and contracting out certain services (See Bennet & Muraleedharan, 
2000). However the effects of the reforms have been mixed. Problems arose out of
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political resistance to the changes in power structures that NPM implied. The 
piecemeal application of NPM against a background of more traditional methods of 
bureaucratic management was seen as a constraint. In particular, the 
management of personnel on traditional lines - the prevalence of overstaffing, 
inflexible contracts and the weak correlation between pay and promotion prospects 
was seen as a source of problems in efforts to implement NPM (ibid: 65-67).
2.5.3 Organisational Cultures
Russell et al (1999:771) has been alleged that NPM was applied without regard to 
prevailing organisational cultures. There is a growing recognition that, 
“organisational culture is more important as a determinant of performance than 
structures for remuneration and control” (Grindle and Hildebrand, 1995:444). In 
general, organisational culture has tended to be used in an unspecific way, often 
seen as a residual - the missing factor that serves to explain the failure to 
implement reforms successfully. Thus, according to Hughes, “accountable 
management can only develop to meet the purposes and conditions of the public 
domain, if it is set in an organisational culture supportive of that domain” 
(1994:163); and in the specific case of health sector reform in developing countries, 
organisational cultures characterised by patronage and based on hierarchical 
command were said to have prevented the effective implementation of contracting 
out and attempts to make hospitals autonomous (Russell et al, 1999:773).
A focus on organisational culture means looking at the deeper factors underlying 
why, for example, patronage and nepotism persist. It requires an understanding of 
the “informal constraints” - to recall North’s terminology, discussed earlier in the 
chapter - which he argues are so pervasive in defining how people behave. Only 
by understanding local patterns of thought and behaviour and the social relations 
on which they are based can we understand why things are done in a certain way.
It is important to note at this point that the term ‘organisational culture’ is being 
used here to refer to the assumptions, values, norms and customs of an 
organisation’s members and their behaviour. It is being used in a very specific
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way to refer to the fact that individuals may not always behave in an instrumental^ 
rational way in response to the opportunities and constraints placed upon them by 
organisational rules and incentives. Rather, their behaviour may be guided by 
conventions and norms that have become ingrained through learning, schooling 
and family life, in other words through a process of socialisation.
For example, merely to recognise that patronage and nepotism have constrained 
efforts towards merit based recruitment is not enough, it is also important to be 
aware of the factors which have promoted such practices and to recognise that 
these are likely to exist just as long as the underlying factors remain in place.42 
Warrington notes that they may have arisen on account of economic insecurity. It 
is also often the case that such practices may have arisen to reward people for 
their political support, and as a means to expand a political party’s influence at the 
local level.43
The final observation made from evidence of the implementation of NPM reforms 
in developing countries is that a commitment to management from those at the 
highest level of political authority is essential to the successful implementation of 
management innovations (Kaul, 1997:25). This may also be inferred from the 
findings of Grindle and Hildebrand’s case studies (1995). They argue that the most 
important features of organisational culture are those that inculcate “a mission 
focused mystique”, in other words the message that performance is important 
(1995:457-458). They cite Tendler’s work in Ceara to support their argument. This, 
it may be recalled, was a clear case of a state government committed to reform 
reinforcing the message about public sector performance and consistently taking 
the necessary steps to ensure this. One of the major problems encountered in 
Tamil Nadu was the considerable political resistance to the changes in power 
structures which NPM implied (Bennet and Muraleedharan, 2000:65).
42 In a way that resonates with North’s comments about informal constraints, Warrington has stated “habits of 
thought and patterns of behaviour are likely to exist as long as the circumstances which give rise to them” 
(Warrington, 1997:11).
43 Which appears to have been the case in West Bengal, as discussed in Chapter Six.
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Political authority devises and enforces the formal rules, but local politics also has 
an impact on how institutional arrangements are enforced, as North has pointed 
out. For example it was noted that in Sri Lanka, bribes to politicians affected 
contracting procedures and capital investments were driven by the need to provide 
electoral and political patronage (Russell and Attanayake, 1997). Just as 
economic insecurity may promote nepotism, so may political interests. Managers 
may be pressured by politicians to recruit staff from amongst party supporters. 
Politicians may use this as a source of patronage, to reward loyalty or to redress 
historical imbalances in recruitment.
2.6 NPM and the Bureaucracy in West Bengal
The bureaucracy in West Bengal, as with the rest of India, was modelled on the 
traditional, rational/legal type discredited of late. Despite their influence around the 
world, NPM doctrines took some time to have an effect on administration in India. 
A thorough review of the functioning of the bureaucracy in the state, commissioned 
by the newly formed Left Front government, underlined the need to address much 
criticised aspects of bureaucratic performance in the state, not least the lack of 
accountability and indiscipline, but made no reference to NPM.44 This would seem 
strange given their popularity at this time in other parts of the globe.45 Instead it 
placed great importance on recognising the rights and improving the working 
environment of state government employees. Rather than focusing on rules and 
structures to provide incentives, which were meant to motivate rational, utility 
maximising public officials, the authors appealed to public employees’ sense of 
commitment and dedication46 This is reflected in the concluding observations, “a
44 The Report of the Administrative Reforms Committee GoWB, April 1983. The erstwhile Finance Minister, 
Dr. Ashok Mitra, chaired the Committee.
45 In 1984 New Zealand began introducing NPM reforms to their public sector (Hood, 1991).
46 This is unsurprising given the fact that public choice theory, which underlies many of the doctrines of the 
NPM, has long been associated with conservative elements and the New Right; whereas the authors of the 
Report are intellectually as well as politically closely associated with the Left.
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system, and the quality of its performance, are determined not so much by rules 
and codes, but by the sense of commitment on the part of those who are involved 
in it. Unless such a commitment pervades the administration at all levels, the 
Committee’s recommendations by themselves are unlikely to transform the 
situation” (1983:28)47
NPM’s claims to universality which have resulted in attempts to implement similar 
policy reforms across the globe without due regard to local contexts, may be 
traced to the theoretical assumptions on which it is premised. This may be traced 
to assumptions about individuals as instrumentally rational, which have provided 
the theoretical underpinning to NPM doctrines. Getting the incentives right by 
changing organisational structures was thought to be enough to make rational, 
self-interested public officials perform effectively.
2.6.1 NPM and the Health Bureaucracy in West Bengal
Given the contextual factors that have constrained the application of NPM 
elsewhere, outlined above, it is open to conjecture whether NPM doctrines could 
have led to a transformation in the performance of the bureaucracy in West Bengal. 
The health care bureaucracy, for example, is characterised by strong control 
structures and is highly centralised. Even fairly mundane decisions such as the 
contracting out of service or the disciplining of a member of staff have to be 
referred for consideration to the Director of Health Services (DHS) and sometimes 
even to the Principal Secretary (PS) Health. One health centre that I was 
observing went without medicines for eight weeks because of problems with a 
collection van. The option of simply hiring a taxi and charging it to the department - 
by far the most practical - was considered impossible owing to the long procedures 
for seeking permission and eventually reimbursement for such a simple act. As a
47 The behavioural assumptions behind the 1983 Report represent a bias towards “high minded 
sentimentality”, and as such represents the polar opposite to the assumptions behind NPM, which may be seen 
to reflect “low-minded unsentimentality”. Both, according to Sen, are unreal assumptions (Sen, 2000:280).
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result of this, children in the area were denied vaccines for eight consecutive 
weeks.
The bureaucracy in West Bengal is characterised by systems of personnel 
management which are likely to weaken managers’ attempts to improve 
performance. Overstaffing, especially at junior levels, is common; there is a weak 
relationship between performance and reward or promotion, creating negative 
incentives for individuals’ to push themselves to shine, and it is practically 
impossible to dismiss staff or make them redundant. Such ways of managing 
human resources, by no means unique to the bureaucracy in West Bengal, would 
be considered by the proponents of NPM as fundamental in supporting ways of 
working characterised by inefficiency and sloth.
In response to falling standards of health care provision and particularly poor 
discipline and accountability in the health care bureaucracy, a committee of MLAs 
appointed by the West Bengal Legislative Assembly, and led by the health advisor 
to the State Planning Board, has made a number of recommendations in their 
yearly reports evaluating the performance of the health department.48 These bear 
conspicuous similarities to NPM inspired reforms implemented in other parts of the 
world. For example on account of the lack of discipline at all levels of the health 
care infrastructure, the 1987 report recommended that disciplinary powers be 
given to CMOs for all medical and non-medical staff. In this way, they would not 
have to continually refer even minor disciplinary issues to the Director of Health 
Services (DHS) in Calcutta. The reports have repeatedly emphasised the need to 
fix lines of control - focal points of responsibility at each level, with officers 
assigned specific responsibility and accountability. This would mean that hospital 
superintendents would be answerable to CMOs in matters other than direct 
medical care to patients. In the early 1990s other solutions were suggested. 
These included the involvement of local self-government bodies, and the 
involvement of people’s representatives through management boards and advisory
48 Report of the Subject Committee on Health and Family Welfare, West Bengal Legislative Assembly (1987- 
1999).
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committees. The creation of boards is a well-worn strategy to give hospitals 
greater autonomy, and the incorporation of people’s representatives in these is 
considered a means of strengthening mechanisms for downward accountability 
(Bennet and Muraleedharan, 2000:64).
The Subject Committee noted that where changes were enacted and lines of 
control fixed, officers have often been unwilling to take action in cases of 
indiscipline. It also remarked that management boards had not been set up 
throughout the state, and that where they did exist, were seen to be 
malfunctioning. The 1998 Report observed that the department itself has very 
weak administrative control over its staff members, thus causing even poorer 
standards of functioning.
Unsurprisingly widespread shirking and malfeasance are reported to continue 
unchecked as rules are seldom implemented.49 In part, this is a result of the slow 
and laborious disciplinary processes that exist, as well as of fear of reprisal from 
individual employees backed by their trade union or a political leader.50
It is tempting to see such behaviour as a means of expressing resistance by public 
officials - “ordinary weapons of relative powerless groups” - to defend their 
interests against attempts of the authorities to make them change their behaviour 
(Scott, 1985). Indeed there are features of the behaviour of public officials which 
are similar to the “everyday forms of peasant resistance” described by Scott 
(1985). Despite this, however, we should reject the temptation to see the 
behaviour of public officials in West Bengal as necessarily “weapons of the weak”. 
Firstly, public officials in West Bengal are not powerless, but unionised by a trade 
union with close links to the ruling political Party, which has a long tradition of 
moblising and agitating in defence of their interests.51 Moreover they comprise a
49 See Subject Committee Reports (1987-1999). The English-language press provides examples of this almost 
daily. For example see The Statesman Editorials: “Sick Hospitals” (7/07/2000) and “Just Criminal” 
(31/07/2000).
50 See Chapter Five for further discussion of this.
51 See Nossiter (1988) and Chapter Seven, later, for more on this.
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privileged minority in the state, with regular, relatively well-remunerated and 
permanent employment. Secondly, there would seem to be no logical reason why 
public officials in West Bengal, with a history of confrontation with those in 
authority, should adopt forms of resistance used by some peasants to avoid 
confrontation with authority. Finally, whilst such forms of resistance are suited to 
the social structure of the peasantry, who tend to be scattered and lacking in 
formal organisation, there is no reason why these should be favoured by public 
officials who, in West Bengal at least, are well-organised along the lines of a 
rational Weberian bureaucracy. It is worth challenging colloquial perceptions of 
‘shirking’ or ‘laziness’ on behalf of health care officials in West Bengal, but the 
analogy with Scott's notion of "everyday forms of peasant resistance” would seem 
inappropriate.
The Subject Committee Report (1996) pointed to the role of irresponsible trade 
unionism in creating a culture of fear, fomenting indiscipline and then interference 
in administrative issues. It stated, “the work culture among most of the employees 
of the health dept leaves much to be desired. One of the contributory factors for 
such an unwelcome situation is, perhaps, militant and irresponsible trade union 
activities of all sections of the employees... past experience suggests that such 
interference by the unions, in certain cases, stood in the way of posting the right 
person for the right job and posting a person away from one station to another on 
very good and cogent grounds” (1996:16).
Once again we are reminded of the crucial role that politics can play and the 
organisational culture, in determining the success of institutional reforms. If the 
organisational structure is hostile to changes and political interests ensure that 
those who err are protected, then it is likely that even the most carefully planned 
changes in organisational structure, will bear little fruit.
The doctrines of the NPM have begun to creep into some aspects of health care 
delivery in Calcutta, mainly in the parallel bureaucracies established by donor 
agencies (CSIP/CUDP) for providing primary health care to the doorsteps of 
deprived sections of the community. Chapter Six shall consider the effect of these
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on service delivery, particularly bureaucratic performance. It will consider the case 
of the health component of CSIP in one ward of the city and in particular how 
changes in organisation design, influenced by NPM, have affected the 
performance of HHWs in the field.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has presented an analysis of the theoretical arguments behind 
policies which seek to enhance the performance of public officials in the delivery of 
services. Decentralisation and reforms inspired by New Public Management have 
been at the heart of public sector reform packages, especially health sector reform, 
with a view to making government more efficient, responsive and accountable.
Decentralisation and NPM have received support from those holding contrasting 
ideological positions, as a way of improving the governmental performance in the 
delivery of services - although in the case of decentralisation, many of its 
proponents have considered it an end in itself, as a means to deepen democracy 
by facilitating the incorporation of the lower strata in the political process. This 
chapter has shown that both propositions are premised on a choice-theoretic 
rationale, with its core assumptions about individuals as rational utility maximisers. 
Certain institutional arrangements are considered to privilege opportunistic 
behaviour, while others constrain it. Hence decentralisation is seen as a way of 
improving the performance of government by making the work of officials more 
transparent, and by creating the opportunities for principals to pressure agents so 
as to improve their standards of performance. Similarly, NPM reforms have led to 
the restructuring of public bureaucracies to cut costs and make them more 
transparent, and through the application of market-like incentives to public 
bureaucracies to make them respond more quickly and perform better. 
Furthermore it has been argued that decentralisation as a policy measure has 
been premised on the view that much of the motivation for good governmental 
performance will come from civil society - seen as an autonomous sphere separate 
from the state, comprising free individuals as citizens with rights, protected by law,
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able to engage in discussion and debate on equal terms to act as a check on the 
state.
The chapter has highlighted some theoretical weaknesses in these arguments. 
The choice theoretical rationale, it has been shown, excludes the possibility that 
informal constraints - often referred to as culture - and history and politics affect 
the choices that individuals make, and thereby shape their behaviour. Informal 
constraints can give rise to organisational cultures that have proved resistant to 
NPM inspired policy innovations. Similarly, support from the highest political 
authority is necessary to devise and enforce rules, although the interests of 
different groups in a political context often also help to undermine the effects of 
organisational changes, such as the creation of hospital boards, merit based 
recruitment practices and contracting out of capital inputs.
As a way of institutionalising the participation of the local community, 
decentralisation has seldom achieved its objectives. Local communities are rarely 
the consensual social units that they are imagined to be, and hence 
decentralisation has resulted in the participation of an unrepresentative few. It has 
also been argued that the claims made on behalf of local communities and civil 
society as the repositories of the incentives for good performance are overblown. 
Rather, civil society is a zone of confrontation between unequal actors, often 
comprising groups with competing interests, some of which are neither democratic 
nor tolerant. It is optimistic to expect that these will necessarily have a beneficial 
effect on the state. Furthermore, the separation between the state and civil society 
which the decentralisation literature assumes, is a contemporary construction 
which does not reflect the fact that for centuries scholars had never conceived of 
them as oppositional categories, but rather have held that the state has helped to 
constitute civil society, and at times has even used it for its own benefit.
The work of Wade (1988; 1992), Moore (1989), Tendler (1997) has challenged the 
popular view that civil society and local communities can provide the incentives for 
local officials to perform well. Evidence of improvements to the performance of 
local officials in different parts of the developing world, presented by Evans (1996),
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suggests that positive changes have occurred instead through state-society 
‘synergy’. This is where the state ensures a rule governed environment and also 
plays an active role supporting the day-to-day interactions between officials and 
the public, but also sees a value in enmeshing local officials in the communities in 
which they work.
This chapter has raised doubts, based on the secondary literature, over the 
effectiveness of decentralisation and NPM to improve the performance of public 
officials in the delivery of services. These will be investigated and evaluated in 
Chapters Four, Five and Six.
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Chapter 3 
Health Care in India and West Bengal*
3.1 Introduction
Access to basic health care is a human right. A well-developed system of public 
health is central to the pursuit of social justice.52 It is of both intrinsic and 
instrumental value. For the individual, access to health-care is critical to the 
expansion of human capabilities - expanding the range of options available to 
people to decide upon the sort of life they wish to lead. As such, it is part of a 
bundle of goods that people require, helping secure entitlements to a decent 
standard of living. Good health enables the use of available social and economic 
opportunities. Furthermore, health can be an important variable in a country’s 
process of economic development. India’s inability to provide for the health needs 
of the majority of her population has been seen by many as crucial to explaining 
the limited success of India’s development efforts since independence (Dr6ze and 
Sen, 1995:14).
Health and poverty seem to share a symbiotic relationship - one that the literature 
on the subject has seldom failed to notice. Shortly after independence in India, the 
Report of the Health Survey and Development Committeee (Bhore Committee, 
1946) highlighted that, “unemployment and poverty produce their adverse effect on 
health through the operation of such factors as inadequate nutrition, unsatisfactory 
housing and clothing and lack of proper medical care during illness”. At the same 
time, good health is a prerequisite for gainful employment. It is an asset in itself, 
but also one that can improve security and facilitate the enhancement of other 
assets that can help to mitigate the poor’s vulnerability.
* In this chapter, the words Committee, Subject Committee and Report, all refer to the Reports of the Subject 
Committee on Health and Family Welfare, West Bengal Legislative Assembly (1987-1999). Exact dates for 
each of the references to these Reports are provided in parentheses in the text.
52 See Dr6ze and Sen (1995: 99-101).
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“Illness is obviously one of the most widespread causes of human deprivation and 
economic insecurity in India." (Dr6ze and Sen, 1995:101). Whilst access to regular, 
gainful employment is an important determinant of urban poverty, slum dwellers in 
Indian cities have identified physical incapacity to work, through illness, disability or 
old age, as the main obstacle to gaining employment. Illness features prominently 
in discussions with slum dwellers, who consider it to have a double impact on 
household poverty. Illness leads to a loss of earnings and indebtedness, the latter 
out of the need to pay for medicines and (often private) health-care. Furthermore, 
permanent or long-term illness and disability forces others within the household to 
undertake caring roles, undermining their ability to earn income, which in turn 
compounds household poverty and vulnerability (DAG, 1997).
This chapter begins by briefly describing the health system in India and some of 
the problems identified with it in the secondary literature. In the light of this, the 
chapter goes on to discuss problems with the health care system in West Bengal, 
combining evidence from the secondary literature with data collected through 
primary research. Whilst there are some issues of concern shared with the 
evidence from an all-India perspective, the chapter argues that the state is quite 
generously endowed with infrastructure and resources. Rather the problem lies in 
poor planning, inadequate information and, in particular, poor and ineffectual 
performance by health care officials - a pervasive scenario, perpetuated by a 
governance structure which has ensured that providers are barely accountable to 
patients. The chapter ends by identifying some of the proposed solutions to 
improve the “organisational incentive regime” (WHO, 2000:65) of health care 
delivery to ensure greater accountability from health care officials. These 
measures shall be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters, but tentatively 
I suggest that the effectiveness of changes in the incentive structure of the health 
system depends on the extent to which political actors are aligned to these 
objectives.
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3.2 Challenges to Effective Health Care Provision in India: Equity and 
Efficiency
Health policy in India has tried to honour a basic ideological commitment to 
redressing inequalities in the light of the totemic Bhore Report (1946). This 
recommended a system of public health provision, comprising preventative and 
curative services, offered by full- time paid professionals, in tandem with efforts to 
improve public health, nutrition and general living standards, seen as major 
determinants of health. It provided the vision for health policy in independent India.
The public health-care system in India is in principle free and available to all. In 
practice it is neither, and fails to address most of the criteria for equity. In some 
states, Dr6ze and Sen claim, “the system is little more than a collection of deserted 
primary health care centres, filthy dispensaries, unmotivated doctors and chaotic 
hospitals” (1995:101). Equal access for equal need has been understood as the 
underlying principle for equity in health care (Gilson, 1989:324). Abel Smith has 
identified four determinants of equity in health: geographic proximity; financial 
accessibility; cultural accessibility - the provision of a service relevant to people’s 
needs and in line with their cultural practices and functional accessibility - the right 
care for those in need when in need. (1994:108). Equity along with access have 
dominated thinking on health policy in general. Access involves the costs that 
people incur in obtaining health care (Van Doorslaer, 1993:14), which can be both 
monetary and non-monetary. The concept is notoriously difficult to define. Yet 
according to Markides, it is related to three elements: “the structure of the health 
system, the behaviour of health professionals and the characteristics of the 
population seeking health" (1992:621).
3.3 Sources of Inequity
3.3.1. Urban-Rural Differences in the Distribution of Resources
In the developing world, the public health system’s human and financial resources 
tend to be disproportionately distributed- concentrated in urban areas, on mainly
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curative services and tertiary facilities (World Bank, 1993). India is no exception to 
this (Cassen, 1978:201; Jeffery, 1988:115).
In India, there is an undeniable ‘urban bias’ in health care spending. Almost 70% of 
the total number of hospitals in India can be found here (Directory of Hospitals, 
198853), and per capita spending on health in urban areas far exceeds the amount 
spent on rural areas (Duggal et al, 1995:836). The table below provides some 
evidence of the extent to which health resources are disproportionately distributed 
in the state of West Bengal.
Table 3.1 Some Aspects of the Distribution of Health Resources in West 
Bengal
YEAR 1987 RURAL URBAN TOTAL
Population (a) 45,138,547
(73.83%)
16,000,222
(26.17%)
61,138,769
Beds (b) 19,348 45,981 65,329
Bed-Population Ratio (c) 1:3159 1:1329 1:2244
% of Beds Distributed by 
Area (d)
29.62 70.38 100
Total Number of 
Registered Allopaths with 
Addresses (e)
9,005 20,704 29,709
% of Total No Registered 
Allopaths distributed by 
Area
30.31 69.69 100
Doctor-Population Ratio
(f)
1:5013 1:773 1:2058
Source: Adapted from Table 1&Table III- Report of the Subject Committee on Health and Family 
Welfare, 1989-90 (West Bengal Legislative Assembly Secretariat)
Clearly scarce resources are not being directed to where they are most needed - 
where the majority of the population resides. The rural-urban differences are stark
53 In Bhat (1993:48)
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and are most clearly shown by the figures in row (c) onwards. Whereas more than 
70% of the population of the state live in rural areas, almost the exact same 
percentage of health care resources- in terms of hospital beds and registered 
allopaths with addresses-are concentrated in urban areas. There appears to be an 
inverse relationship between the distribution of population and that of health care 
resources.
3.3.2 Barriers to Access in Urban Areas
In spite of the greater concentration of resources in urban areas, the urban poor’s 
access to public health care services remains limited. Despite comparatively easier 
geographic proximity (than in rural areas), distance remains an important 
constraint to access for the urban poor (Rifkin, 1987). Distance combined with poor 
quality service (long waiting times, poor testing facilities, inadequate referral 
system and unavailable medicines) augments the overall resultant costs of using 
public health care services. These are further heightened once incorporated with 
the opportunity costs of labour time lost - significant, particularly for the urban 
poor.54 These overall costs, not the availability of services, prevents the poor’s 
access to government health care facilities (Kundu, 1993:265). In a survey 
undertaken in an urban Delhi slum, 82% of respondents claimed that long waiting 
time, and the resulting loss of wage hours, was the main factor stopping them 
using public hospitals (ibid).
Yesudian (1988) has shown that for slum dwellers in Bombay, long waiting times 
and minimal contact with doctors act as disincentives to the poor’s use of public 
health services. Slum dwellers in Calcutta reported valuing government health 
services primarily in times of emergency and for prolonged periods of hospital 
based treatment. Lower income groups reported using these services more 
frequently, but in general, they were perceived as distant and generally 
unsatisfactory due to prolonged waiting times and the rude attitude of staff (CMDA, 
1997).
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Kundu also makes the point that the public health care system in urban India is 
biased in favour of the organised sectors of the economy, yet discriminates at 
every level even within this sector, between state and central government 
employees, organised and unorganised workers. It is the unorganised workers, 
those employed in the informal sectors who comprise the largest portion of the 
urban poor. People of higher wealth and status are provided for best (1993:89-90). 
Attempts to target benefits to the poorer sections of society have failed due to a 
failure to identify potential beneficiaries, resulting in benefits leaking to non-specific 
beneficiary groups.
3.3.3 Misplaced Priorities: Curative Care and Doctors
In terms of the type of health care that resources are channeled towards the 
distribution is also unequal. Financial resources are concentrated on curative 
services, and personnel have traditionally been occupied in delivering vertical (top 
down) programmes, such as those associated with family planning, with set targets 
fixed by central government.
Spending on primary health care remains disproportionately less than that on 
curative care. In the case of West Bengal, the government has been unable to 
match its rhetoric of expanding promotive and preventative care.55 Curative 
services still consume the lion’s share of resources. For example, in 1992, out of a 
total estimated health budget of Rs 5038542 crore, the amount allotted for curative 
care was Rs 363,9238 crore; for public health, Rs 62,5693 crore and for family 
welfare, Rs 77, 3611 crore. If the amounts for Family Welfare and public health are 
added together, they amount to less than 28% of the total health care budget for 
the state. The 8th Report (1994-95) calculated that only 13.72 % of the total budget 
was for public health, and 14% for family welfare. Most alarming was the fact that 
of the total budgeted sum for health, 70.7% is spent on salaries and wages,
54 Who are forced to depend on a wage income to survive in a highly monetised economy.
55 See the Budget Speech of the Honourable Minister for Finance, Govt of West Bengal, 1990.
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16.12% is spent on establishment costs and only 13.18 goes for drugs, diet, 
materials and supplies.56
The emphasis given to curative care is reflected in the strong bias towards the 
employment of doctors as opposed to nurses and other health care professionals. 
Curiously, national reviews have tended to encourage this imbalance in staff 
strength. For example, the Mudaliar Committee (1961) recommended a ratio of 
one doctor for 3,500 population and one nurse for 5,000 population. It is thus not 
surprising that health care planning in the West Bengal has reflected these 
imbalances. According to the fifth Report, “the imbalance between Medical and 
paramedical personnel is remarkable. The imbalance requires rectification by 
restricting the number of clinicians and increasing the number of nurses, etc” 
(1992:5). The imbalance in staff composition has been said to undermine the 
performance of the health care infrastructure. For example, community health 
centres (CHC), the second tier of the rural health system, were designed to 
comprise thirty beds, attended by eight doctors and eight nurses. The small 
number of nurses, compared to doctors, was found to be one of the factors 
undermining the effective functioning of these centres (Dutta, 1993:322).57
3.3.4 Medicare and Vertical Programmes
Inequities extend to the type of services provided by the public system, and 
particularly the emphasis on vertical, targetted programmes. Once family planning 
(FP) services dominated the public health system (Gupta et al, 1992). FP 
programmes consumed a large chunk of the available resources and the 
performance of health workers was judged by their ability to fulfil a set of family 
planning objectives (Jeffery, 1988:168-169). In fact, the pressure to meet FP 
targets meant that other health care activities were put aside (World Bank,
56 The figures have been gleaned from the Report of the Subjective Committee on Health and Family Welfare, 
West Bengal Legislative Assembly (1994:3).
57 West Bengal has a remarkably low doctor-population ratio, 1:700 if  all systems of medicine are included. 
This is five times higher than the doctor-population ratio recommended by the Mudaliar Committee (Dutta, 
1993:323).
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1989:142). FP affected the quality of care provided by the public health system, 
resulting in a service that was inappropriate to the needs of the majority.
According to Jeffery, the emphasis on FP has contributed to undermining staff- 
client relationships. It has lead to erosion of the trust and confidence that should, 
ideally, exist between patients and staff (1988:298). This is especially pertinent in 
the case of poor women. It has been suggested that poor women, who have 
amongst the worst health status in India, may find the public system, whose efforts 
and resources are concentrated towards affecting their reproductive health, 
culturally alienating. For them, using public services carries with it the prospective 
chance that a consultation may result in sterilization either by coercion, deception 
or unbearable pressure (Jeffery et al, 1989; Basu, 1990).
After independence, the primary responsibility for health matters was given to the 
states in India. The Union government, in theory, only retained control over 
international aspects, quarantine and the control of communicable diseases. After 
1983, the states have been subservient to the National Health Policy of the Union 
government, and they have been forced strictly to apply the different parts of this 
policy. FP is just one example of the many vertical, centrally driven programmes 
that states have had to implement, often with a significant contribution of their own 
human and financial resources. These have often been target-based programmes 
and, just as with FP programmes, are alleged to have adversely affected the 
provision of primary care to patients. Jeffery (1988:175) has argued that target- 
based approaches to health care mean that staff rush to meet their specific targets 
often at the expense of general health care duties. The 6th Report (1993:6) also 
highlighted this problem in the case of Multi Purpose Health Workers (MPHWs) in 
West Bengal.
Primary care suffers as a result of vertical programmes, but the economic cost, 
and particularly the leakages due to corruption are held to be significant as well. It 
has been noted that FP targets encouraged corruption and fraud (Jeffery, 
1988:298). For example, it has been estimated that of the total budget for FW in 
West Bengal (1998-99), approximately one third, Rs 11.16 crore, was dispensed
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as incentives for reaching FP targets. This was mostly given to regular employees 
of the DOH, who were carrying out these tasks during their ‘working hours’. These 
employees in addition to their salary were thus gleaning incentives which they 
were not strictly entitled to.
3.3.5 Gender Inequality and Health Care
Gender relations within the household may be considered one of the key sources 
of health inequities, given the disturbingly low female-male ratio in India (Dr6ze 
and Sen, 1995:141). Whereas there are regional disparities in the decline of 
female-male ratios in India since the beginning of the 20th century, it has been 
noted that in West Bengal it has stagnated (ibid: 147). Among the lower age group, 
this has been attributed to the neglect of young girls in the allocation of resources 
within the household, particularly in terms of spending on health care and nutrition 
(ibid: 144); whereas in the case of older women this has been ascribed to women 
benefiting disproportionately less from improvements in living conditions and 
medical care (ibid: 154). In either case, it is in part gender inequities in access to 
health care which are seen to have been crucial in explaining the phenomenon of 
‘missing women’ in India today.
Whilst addressing systemic problems within the health care system is no doubt 
important, it has been argued that women’s health should be seen as embedded in 
a system of social relations (Jeffery et al, 1989:222). The nature of social relations 
within the household in parts of India has meant that women are often to be found 
in the conflicting situation of being ‘guardians of the household health’, yet 
systematically prevented from taking decisions about health within the household 
(Chatterjee, 1989). This is a feature of some of the social and cultural aspects of 
Indian society. It is argued that unless the status of women within the household 
and their own self-perception is raised, addressing the systemic issues will be of 
limited effect (Jeffery et al, 1989).
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3.3.6 The Bureaucracy: Health-Care Providers
Abel Smith has noted that one of the key impediments to the poor seeking out 
health care can be the treatment dealt to them by health care workers (1994:110). 
Banerji (1985) has advocated focusing on health bureaucracies and particularly 
health bureaucrats, to examine how their behaviour constrains the effective and 
equitable functioning of the health-care system. Jeffery (1988) has argued that the 
poor motivation and performance of health-care workers is a major impediment to 
the provision of an equitable client orientated service. Such attitudes and 
behaviour are considered to add to the non-monetary costs of using the public 
health-care system by the poor in India.
This brings to the fore another common problem associated with the contemporary 
public health system in India, namely the ubiquity of poorly motivated and rude 
staff, failing to perform their duties effectively and/or treating clients in an offensive 
or demeaning way. There is considerable empirical evidence of the latter, from 
south India (Zubrigg, 1984) as well as from the north (Jeffery et al, 1989). Poor 
management has been blamed for this situation. Health workers are not 
performing their primary duties properly, Jeffery (1988) has suggested, because of 
hierarchical, management structures, in which managers (senior officials) are 
detached from pervading ground realities, and elicit good performance through 
coercion. This, he argues, is not conducive to ensuring motivation, enthusiasm and 
job satisfaction (1988:274). Furthermore, such structures reinforce upward 
accountability and compound the weakness of client-based organisations. Few 
incentives exist for providing a better service to clients and thus accountability to 
clients is minimal. Other reasons have been suggested, and these will be 
considered in the next section.
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3.4 Explanations
3.4.1 Political Economy Approaches
The reasons why some of the highlighted problems have arisen, and continue to 
pervade the system are intriguing, and merit analysis. A tendency, in India at least, 
has been to interpret this from a Marxist viewpoint, by arguing that, in general, the 
health system in India reflects the interests of the ruling classes and is used as a 
tool of domination and control over the masses. Banerji, who has been a leading 
exponent of this view, has argued that there is a glaring disparity between 
community health care needs and health care provision, because planners and 
health professionals alike hail from the upper classes whose priorities are not 
necessarily to address the health requirements of the masses (Banerji, 1985).
Poorly motivated and rude staff, Marxists argue, exist because health care workers 
are merely reflecting the needs and interests of the dominant classes to which they 
belong (Banerji, 1985). Bhadwaraj (1975) extended this explanation to incorporate 
caste as a factor. He has argued that the lack of empathy, understanding and 
respect proffered by government allopaths to their patients derives from deep- 
rooted class and caste-based prejudices, and is reinforced by an exclusive and 
elitist education and training.58
Jeffery (1988) has incorporated some aspects of class analysis into a political 
economy approach. Whilst he has argued that health services are not central to 
class interests in India, and that conflicts usually emerge between practitioners 
over their respective share of benefits, not between classes as such; he does 
accept that class is an important component of health care in India. He points out 
that the class structure of medical professionals and traditional beneficiaries has
58 The importance of caste prejudice in influencing the way that health care personnel treat their patients - for 
example, cases of upper caste health care personnel, particularly nurses, being reluctant to touch lower caste 
patients and particularly their bodily fluids - has also been pointed out to me by Prof. A.K. Bagchi (personal 
communication, Calcutta June 2000) and Prof. D. Banerji (personal communication, New Delhi August 1999).
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changed little since independence and this has impeded changes that could 
benefit the majority. Further, he adds that the class links of the medical profession 
(helped by the work of international aid and MNCs) has meant that they have 
dominated the rewards from this system (1988:175). Jeffery also highlights the 
enduring influence of colonial ways of thinking and practices on the ways that the 
system is shaped today (ibid). He claims that these are unsuitable for local 
conditions.
3.4.2 Transfer Mechanism
Jeffery points to the transfer mechanism as a case in point. This characteristic 
procedure in the Indian system of administration was inherited from its colonial 
past, and involves transferring officials from one posting to another every few 
years to enhance their exposure and experience and to prevent the development 
of corrupt relationships between these officials and local elite. Bureaucratic 
transferal procedures, Jeffery claims, limit the acquisition of adequate context 
specific knowledge and experience by health workers and undermines attempts to 
build trust between client and provider-which he claims, “could be the difference 
between success or failure of a health program” (1988:270).59 Further, Bhardwaj 
(1975) argues that the ‘social and cultural distance’ between clients and public 
providers (of education, class and caste) is exacerbated by bureaucratic transferral 
procedures (Bhardwaj 1975).
This wider political economy approach resonates with the views of the Subject 
Committee on Health and Family Welfare, West Bengal Legislative Assembly. 
This yearly exercise in self-monitoring and evaluation, unique in India, has 
consistently argued that deficiencies in the public health system in West Bengal 
may be traced to a combination of factors, comprising those already mentioned, 
plus, crucially, a conceptual lacunae in the understanding of health.
59 The issue of recruitment and transferral procedures of Indian bureaucrats, and its effects on public policy 
has been discussed at length by Wade (1988; 1992). He has argued that it is one of the reasons why the Indian 
state is no good at development (Wade, 1984).
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3.4.3 Conceptual Lacunae: Health Care v Medicare
There is a tendency to confuse healthcare with medicare, some scholars claim, 
and therefore good health is equated with an absence of disease through the 
provision of medicines. This may be traced to India’s colonial past, to the Royal 
Commission (1859) and the subsequent acts which specifically set out to control 
and cure disease, given the manpower losses this was proving to cause, 
particularly in the armed forces.60 The Bhore Report, recognised for its emphasis 
on the need for proper preventative and promotive care, has also been accused of 
providing a justification for the subsequent emphasis on curative care or medicare 
in post-independence India (Dutta, 1993: 326). This is because the Bhore Report 
concluded by saying, “in view of the complexity of modern medical practice the 
health service should provide, when fully developed, all the consultation laboratory 
and instrumental facilities for proper diagnosis and treatment”. Finally, the focus on 
medicare as health care, has been traced to the fact that medical education in 
India has adopted the western model, without making the changes necessary to 
adapt to its new environment, wholeheartedly borrowing its focus on diagnostic 
and therapeutic procedures, at the expense of the analysis of the social causes of 
disease. (2nd Report, 1990:4)
The view of the Subject Committee has consistently been that, far from being 
simply the absence of disease, health cannot be separated from the broader issue 
of socio-economic development; that “health comprises the physical, mental and 
social well-being of the individual” (Alma Ata, 1978:15). As such the good health 
of the population depends on the universalisation of social justice.61 The Reports 
emphasise that most of the health problems in a country like India are linked to 
malnutrition and unhygienic living conditions. These, it is claimed are, on the whole, 
easily diagnosable and treatable not to mention preventable, without recourse to 
sophisticated medical technology and expensive drugs. The continued emphasis
60 The 1859 Royal Commission highlighted the fact that disease induced manpower loss in the army far 
outweighed the casualties due to war and other unrest (quoted in 6th Report, 1993:2).
61 Personal Interview Prof Dr. G.P. Dutta Special Advisor on Health, State Planning Board, GoWB (Calcutta, 
3/09/99).
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on medicare together with its corollaries, it is further argued, is the means by which 
the ruling classes, in collaboration with international pharmaceutical companies, 
keep the “means of health care under their control...and in a form most suitable for 
their political and economic gain” (1990:5). The same Report adds, “the training of 
medical manpower along with drug and therapeutic appliances are designed to 
satisfy their commercial and political interests”(ibid).
It is held that target-based vertical programmes like FP, which stand accused of 
undermining the work performance of health care officials, have arisen out of a 
failure to understand the meaning of health and results from equating it to 
medicare. The 15th Report concurs with this, by highlighting that the confinement 
of para medical personnel to immunisation and FP activities, has meant that other 
key points in PHC have not been taken seriously (1998:9-10).
3.5 The Scenario in West Bengal
Many of the problems highlighted above may be considered to be generic to the 
health system in India. But it may be worth reconsidering all of the factors shown to 
undermine the equitable provision of public health care in India, in relation to the 
actual situation in West Bengal.
3.5.1 FP and Vertical Programmes
In the 1988 Report, it was noted, “subcommittees were surprised to find that 
Multipurpose Health Workers were keen in bringing tubectomy cases to the camp 
as they got financial incentives for the purpose and implemented the immunisation 
programme in the subcentres in a perfunctory manner“(1988:8). In this sense the 
situation in West Bengal was not drastically different from that of the rest of the 
country.
Whilst the state still has a long way to go in terms of abandoning (or probably more 
sensibly, adapting) top-down, centre-driven target-based approach to health-care, 
it is surely a positive development that vertical target-based FP programmes have
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now been replaced in West Bengal, by a more bottom-up, participatory model of 
family planning.62 It would appear that the state is no longer compelled, as it was 
previously, to adhere mechanically to central directives on health programming. 
The change has come largely due to a new phase in federal relations between the 
centre and the state, promoted by the UF government in the Centre (1996-1998).63 
The 14th Report announced that, “this time the Centre has on principle conceded to 
the autonomy of the state in the implementation of the Centrally 
Sponsored/Assisted Schemes and Programmes” (1997:1)... It is allowing the 
implementation of vertical programmes more attuned to the states’ needs and 
wishes” (ibid: 7).
3.5.2 Distribution of Resources
It cannot be denied that the state reflects the countrywide tendency towards urban- 
based, curative care and tertiary facilities; or that the rural urban differentials in 
terms of the distribution of health care resources are stark (as Table 3.1 has 
illustrated). But, in terms of infrastructure, what exists on paper in the state 
exceeds most recommended levels as well as the achievements of other states of 
the Union, with the possible exception of Kerala. It is with no hint of exaggeration 
that the Subject Committee Reports repeatedly refer to the state’s substantial 
infrastructure for primary and secondary care (1999:3), noting in its first Report 
that, “so far as the superstructure and infrastructure for the Health Care Delivery 
System is concerned, the State perhaps occupies the highest position in the 
country”(1988:1).
If we consider once again Table 3.1, it may be seen that in terms of the doctor- 
population ratio, the state’s position exceeds the Mudaliar recommendation of 
1:3500. Indeed in urban areas, the ratio is five times higher than this. The first
62 Since 1997 the Govt of West Bengal has taken a Community Need Assessment Approach to FP, in which 
health workers agree FP targets for the forthcoming year with the community. (Personal Interview with 
Additional Secretary Family Welfare, GoWB 17/11/99 Calcutta).
63 The Left parties, of which the CPI (M ) is the biggest, were key coalition partners of the UF government at 
the Centre 1996-98. Jyoti Basu, the former CM of West Bengal, was the favourite for PM in the UF 
government.
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Report also noted that the state has the second highest bed-population ratio after 
Kerala. West Bengal has sixty State General and Special Hospitals - intermediary 
static units between the block and subdivision, which is unique in India (5th Report, 
1992:4). The state’s health-care infrastructure is extensive and needs 
rationalisation - a point which has been reiterated by the Subject Committee (see 
for example, 1997).
Moreover, a primate city like Calcutta would seem to be positively well endowed 
with health care facilities and personnel. In Calcutta, government health care 
facilities include OPDs attached to the big hospitals in the city, all under the 
jurisdiction of the Government of West Bengal Health Department. Calcutta has 
four main teaching hospitals, in addition to a number of general as well as 
specialist hospitals for women, children, infectious diseases and cancer; all have 
OPDs. The Labour department (GoWB) is also a significant provider of (public) 
health care in the city. The Labour department runs the Employees State 
Insurance Scheme (ESI), which provides free curative and preventative services to 
organised sector employees and is financed by a combination of contributions from 
employees, employers and the GoWB. There are ESI hospitals in the city, insured 
medical practitioners (IMPs) as well as Rastro Bimar Osudnagar (RBO) state 
medicine shops. There are also central government dispensaries and a certain 
number of beds reserved in public hospitals for central government employees 
under the Central Government Health Service Scheme (CGHS). Indian Railways 
also run hospitals and a limited number of clinics for its staff and their relatives. 
There is a hospital and OPD for dockworkers and a Port Trust hospital for central 
government employees employed in shipping and port related activities.64
In addition, four separate governmental organisations are now working in the core 
Calcutta area to provide primary health care to the population, especially to the 
poorer sections. Calcutta Municipal Corporation was traditionally meant to provide 
preventative services-water, sanitation, conservancy vector control and some 
immunisation activities. According to the Municipal Commissioner and CMHO, its
64 I am grateful to Prof. G.P. Dutta for this information.
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role has now been expanded to include promotive and basic curative services. 
The CMC also runs a TB hospital and fourteen maternity homes. Calcutta 
Metropolitan Urban Health Organisation (CMUHO) works in the greater Calcutta 
area, including the core city, to provide preventative, promotive and basic curative 
services. Vector control has been its main area of activity, but CMUHO is also 
responsible for MCH, FP&W and the prevention and control of epidemic diseases. 
CMUHO is also meant to provide basic curative care in its static health units. Two 
foreign donor-funded slum improvement programmes, which latterly have included 
a significant health component, have spawned their own health delivery system 
which is responsible for providing primary health care only to bustees. These are 
Calcutta Slum Improvement Programme (CSIP) initiated by DFID/ODA, and 
Calcutta Urban Development Project-Phase III (CUDP III) a World Bank funded 
project. These two programmes cover 87 of the 141 wards in the city. In addition 
an Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) has also been established and is 
working in a number of wards in the city. Recently, with World Bank funding, 
another delivery system has been established called India Population Programme 
8 (IPP8) scheme. This is functioning in the wards on the periphery of the city, as 
well as in the greater Calcutta area.
3.5.3 Finances
Contrary to popular misconceptions financial resources are readily available, yet it 
would seem that they are not being used optimally. This is pertinent to West 
Bengal where financial resources though scarce (as they are anywhere), do exist 
and are accessible. It is the manner in which they are used which is the problem, 
or not used, as is the case of West Bengal. The 15th Report noted the inability of 
the Department of Health (DoH) to use its allocated funds from the 1997-98 budget 
(1998:16). By the following year, it is highlighted that the Plan Outlay of the DoH 
had increased by around 74% of the previous year’s plan outlay (1999:17). Whilst 
clearly good news, the same Report notes with some concern that the DOH was 
only able to utilise 71% of the previous year’s Plan Outlay, and that some 
branches of the Department had not utilised even 50% of money allocated from
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1997-98 budget. The Committee deemed unsatisfactory the reasons given for this 
(1999:17).
3.5.4 Medical and Paramedical Personnel
There has been a bias in favour of employing clinicians, instead of nurses and 
paramedical personnel. However, it should be noted that the state has invested 
heavily in expanding its cadre of para-professionals especially in urban areas, in 
part supported by aid from foreign donors like DFID and the World Bank. The 
Janata government in 1977 established the concept of Community Health Guides 
(CHGs). The idea was to choose a cadre of volunteers from amongst the local 
population, and train them to impart health education and preventative health care. 
These were to be controlled by the community and paid a small stipend. West 
Bengal was estimated to have 42 thousand of these CHGs in the field (6th Report, 
1993:4). In addition Multi-purpose Health Workers (MPHWs) were also introduced 
in the state. They were to provide Malaria control, the TB and infectious diseases 
programme and Family welfare planning, all in one package to the doorstep of 
beneficiaries. Different paramedical staff from the DOH had previously provided 
these. MPHWs were meant to be competitively selected and given the pay, perks 
and status of government employees. There are three tiers of supervisors for 
MPHWs. In Calcutta, in addition to the considerable cadre of paramedical staff 
already employed by the Calcutta Corporation (CMC) as well as Calcutta 
Metropolitan Urban Health Organisation (CMUHO), the health components of 
donor funded slum improvement programmes (SIPs) also introduced voluntary 
health workers, as have the WHO inspired Integrated Child Development Schemes 
(ICDS). The model on which the idea of the honorary health worker of the CUDPIII 
and CSIP 1 projects was based, was that of the CHGs.
3.6 Primary Health Care and the Extension of Social Justice
If health depends on the universalisation of social justice, then West Bengal seems 
to have done more than most to progress in this regard, according to the Subject 
Committee. It has noted that, the “the key philosophy of the Left Front government
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is to provide social justice to the unserved and underserved people by enhancing 
their self-respect and self-confidence. The endeavour was partly successful 
because of land reform and land distribution to the underprivileged population of 
the state. This qualitative social change has been reflected in food production, 
food consumption and limited financial affluence of the poor and marginal 
farmers..." (16th Report, 1999:2).
This view is supported by two decades of scholarly work on West Bengal. The 
state is considered to have implemented the most far reaching land reforms in 
independent India, involving the redistribution of land and ensuring tenure for 
tenants (Sengupta and Gazdar, 1997). The “revitalization" of the panchayati raj 
institutions (PRIs) has resulted in the incorporation of the rural poor in the planning 
and implementation of programmes (ibid; Lieten, 1992; Webster, 1990). Together 
with the impact of technological changes, these reforms have helped to boost 
agricultural productivity significantly, and accelerate the reduction in the trends of 
inequality (Sengupta and Gazdar, 1997:174).
Scholars have also underlined the huge potential of these reforms for the state’s 
efforts at social development and poverty eradication. Sengupta and Gazdar have 
noted that, “the political changes of the type experienced in West Bengal can 
expect to have a major impact on prevailing deprivation...the changed balance of 
power in rural Bengal certainly opened up new possibilities of more development 
orientated governance” (1997; 185).
Initially, the effects of extending social justice were said to be reflected in the 
state’s health indicators (5th Report: 1992). The 14th Report notes that the state 
had done better than the all India average. According to the Health Information of 
India (Gol, 1987),65 West Bengal had a birth rate of 28, ranking it third on an all- 
India level; a crude death rate of 8.3, ranking it also third on this count and an IMR 
of 70, placing it fourth in the rankings. By 1999 it was reported that the vital health 
indicators in the state had improved dramatically: for example, CDR was 8.1 and
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IMR had been lowered to 55(16th Report, 1999:8). This was attributed in part to the 
“improvement of the socio-economic situation of the erstwhile deprived section of 
the people” (ibid).
So far this chapter has argued that West Bengal possesses a good health care 
infrastructure, as well as ample financial and human resources. Urban centres and 
particularly Calcutta - even given the important barriers to equitable health care for 
the urban poor which have been shown to exist - enjoy a disproportionate share of 
health care resources: doctor: population and beds: population ratios exceed that 
of other states as well as targets which are regularly recommended. Moreover, the 
state has been ruled by a well-disciplined and organised Left coalition committed 
to equity orientated reforms, which has made significant progress in terms of 
redistributive reforms and participatory democracy - meant to enhance the 
universalisation of social justice, the basic component of good health. Whilst West 
Bengal is not exempt from the pervading inequities in the health system in India, it 
must be recognised that on many counts, it fares better than most states. This 
begs the question, what’s the problem; indeed, is there a problem?
3.7 The Problem
3.7.1 The Re-emergence of Fatal Diseases
The Reports of the Subject Committee, which provide considered authentic and 
mostly non-partisan insights on the performance of the department by state 
legislators, and as such constitute a valuable resource, claim that there is a 
problem with the health care delivery system in the state. As early as 1992, the 
Committee reported that, “the functioning of the health department has become a 
major point of criticism against the Left Front Government” (5th Report, 1992:2). 
Three years later, the situation does not seem to have improved, now there is the 
suggestion that the social benefits which the “universalisation of social justice” was 
felt to have brought, are coming to an end. “The LFG in the last 18 years have 
instituted the remarkable qualitative and quantitative changes in the concept and
65 Quoted in Dutta (1993:318).
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lifestyle of people of the State. This is unfortunate that in the recent years of the 
Third Session of the LFG stagnation has become a marked phenomenon” (1995:1) 
As time progresses, the Reports become less guarded in their criticism. In 1997, it 
is reported that, “the overall impression of the health situation is still extremely 
gloomy” (1997:3) By 1999, it is accepted that the much vaunted link between 
socio-economic improvements for the majority of the population and better health, 
is fraying. With the utmost frankness, the Report says, “in one word even with the 
increased socio-economic status, Health Care situation has not been optimally 
improved” (16th Report, 1999:9)
One alarming consequence of this has been the reappearance in the state of fatal 
communicable diseases like Kala-azar and Malaria, which had been kept under 
control and were considered to be practically eradicated. The year 1999 saw a re- 
emergence of malignant malaria in the city, which resulted in significant increases 
in levels of morbidity and mortality amongst the general population. This was 
attributed to “lacunae in public health management” (16th Report, 1999:9). The 
same Report notes a rise in the incidence of TB, and highlights the continued 
failure to control the major causes of morbidity and mortality in the state: 
gastroenteritis and other diarrhoeal diseases, as well as acute respiratory infection.
In addition, scholars have criticised West Bengal’s failure to emulate Kerala - a 
state with a similar record of redistributive reforms and left wing activism - in 
improving key indicators of well-being, through better access to health and 
education (Nag, 1989). In fact West Bengal has exceeded Kerala in terms of the 
amount of land redistributed, and has been a recognised pioneer in democratising 
local governance, through the revival of the panchayat system. However, these 
changes have brought limited improvements in terms of expanding social 
opportunities and improving key indicators of deprivation (Sengupta and Gazdar, 
1997). In terms of vital indicators for education and health, West Bengal stands 
some way below Kerala in the rankings.
There is evidence to suggest that the department of health (GoWB) has been 
performing poorly for some time. The Subject Committee suggests three reasons
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for the poor performance of the health department (12th Report, 1995:1) -  
administrative breakdown, including bureaucratic performance, improper planning 
and the inefficient communication of information both to providers and, perhaps 
more importantly, to clients. The rest of the chapter explores each of these 
reasons.
3.8 The Roots of Poor Planning: Lack of Relevant Data on Which to Evaluate 
Performance, Prepare Budgets and Develop Policy
It has already been established that West Bengal has an extensive health care 
infrastructure, is well endowed in terms of human resources and that apparently 
the DOH has more financial resources than it is able to spend in one budgetary 
year. Calcutta fares better than the rural areas of the state on the first two counts. 
However, according to the 9th Report, “the Committee painfully noted overcrowding 
of patients in one hand and malutilisation of the resources in the other”(1994:2). 
My frequent visits to OPDs and other government health centres in Calcutta were 
revealing in this regard. The scene outside OPDs resembled that of a train station, 
not a hospital. From early morning crowds of people can be found waiting for 
treatment. Milling around amongst them are a motley crew of hawkers, magicians, 
soothsayers and touts-often indistinguishable from hospital employees - the scene 
sometimes interrupted by a fight amongst those jostling in the queue. One is left 
with the impression of a system on the point of collapse, apparently unable to bear 
this huge strain on its resources.
By talking to those waiting, one discovers that many have come from the outskirts 
or even further afield, from the rural areas. They have travelled long distances to 
seek treatment for usually quite minor ailments - fractures, acute sore throats and 
chronic diarrohea - serious problems no doubt, but ones that could easily be dealt 
with at lower levels of the health care infrastructure. Even primary health centres, 
917 of which are scattered throughout the state in rural areas, are meant to be 
sufficiently equipped to be able to provide a limited number of beds for indoor care. 
The fact that people are prepared to travel such long distances to urban teaching 
hospitals suggests that the facilities lower down are not functioning. According to
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the 9th Report, “The overcrowding of the hospitals is due to the rush of patients 
from the periphery of the District and the subdivsions. The centres below the level 
of Subdivision, ie State General, Rural and Block Hospitals are not providing the 
desired secondary care to the people for which these units are meant” (1994:6).
The Subject Committee has attributed the situation described to poor planning. 
There has been a mushrooming of, often unnecessary, civil works - hospitals and 
health centres have been built when only a up-grading of the existing facilities was 
needed. There is a problem with overstaffing, with new staff still being recruited 
without first assessing the performance and workload of the staff already in place. 
Then there are some inexplicable oversights such as the purchase and distribution 
of new technology, like X-Ray machines, which have subsequently been 
abandoned for lack of the necessary technical staff, a dark room or a suitable room 
for installation (9th Report, 1994). Primary health care centres were found in 
Calcutta to be empty and inactive for want of slides, or test-tubes, a functioning 
fridge or other such basic equipment; similar cases of poor planning abound in the 
Reports. Duplication of activities is another common problem. In Calcutta, some 
wards enjoy the services of four separate PHC delivery systems - CMC, CMUHO, 
CSIP/CUDP and ICDS. In some wards, including one of the research sites, ward 
67, three organisations - CSIP, CMC and CMUHO are all working to provide 
basically the same types of services - vector control, health promotion and the 
treatment of common ailments.
Since its inception the Committee has consistently lamented the lack of decent 
base line data required for the health department to draw up a state health policy. 
There are no data on the functioning of the different wings of the DOH, no idea 
about the exact number of employees that belong to the DOH and no data on 
mortality and disease patterns. This lack of relevant data was seen as hampering 
the ability of the department to evaluate the performance and functioning of its 
various wings. Furthermore, it left it with little capacity to make an accurate 
assessment of its needs and priorities for planning (1992). In 1993, it claimed that 
the lack of “thorough analysis or assessment of the different units of the health 
dept, was affecting attempts to bring about improvements in the functioning of
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health care delivery. It was undermining the dept’s ability to coordinate its activities 
and ensure maximum output of its various wings and huge infrastructure (1994). 
The failure to produce relevant base-line data shows, according to the Committee, 
that the DOH is, “neither aware nor concerned about the appalling state of affairs 
prevailing in the infrastructure. Consequently this dept has a very low 
accountability of its performance” (1994). By 1999, the committee reported little 
improvement on this count - startling, considering the level of criticism sustained 
over the previous 13 years - saying that, “no effort had been made by the 
department to assess the performance and work load of the department, to 
facilitate planning and help maximise the use of existing resources.”
Linked to this has been the issue of budgetary formulation. The Committee 
suggested in 1992 that the “budgetary formulation of the state is not based upon 
the performance of the department, but on the mechanical increase of the amount 
of demand which they have traditionally incorporated into budgetary heads” (5th 
Report, 1992). In 1994, it went even further, analysing how the budget for health 
was worked out each year. This was done, it claimed, as part of a pre-fixed pro­
forma. Increased funds are demanded for ensuing years on the basis of actual 
expenditure and revised budget estimate of the previous year. Due to the lack of 
assessment of its own functioning, it concluded that, “budgetary allocation 
becomes mechanical”, without a proper assessment of needs and performance.
3.9 Poor Information
Given the poor quality of the information that the department claims to possess 
about the functioning of its different wings, its total number of employees and other 
important information, it should be of little surprise that officials within the 
department are equally unaware of the roles and responsibilities of different wings 
of the same department. Even less extraordinary is the extent to which the 
general population is poorly informed about the services offered by government 
facilities, leading the 5th Report to claim that, “the transient benefit (of social justice 
for the poorest) will be lost in the near future, unless various programmes are 
coordinated and recipients are educated about all these programmes. The
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community should know about the infrastructures that have been provided for their 
health care” (1992:6).
Sections within the DoH are unaware of the activities of the other sections within 
the same department. This remarkable state of affairs was confirmed to me during 
my initial period of research. I asked IAS officers and other senior bureaucrats 
within the health department where I could find baseline data on urban health and 
health care services. On the whole they suggested that I make inquires at CMDA 
or CMUHO-both of whom have very little data of this kind. Surprisingly, not one 
official suggested visiting the CMC, the body mainly responsible for preventative 
and promotive health care in the core Calcutta area. Even after I had ascertained 
where to locate the data required, very senior officials in the DoH during interviews, 
would continue to direct me to people and to organisations where I knew from 
experience that the data were not available.66
At a lower level, researching in two bustees of the city, I became aware of the 
extent to which local level health care officials were ignorant of the activities of 
other agencies responsible for providing primary health care in the same area. 
The Borough Committee chairman (BCC) of Borough VIII where DT bustee is 
found, and under whose direction was a dedicated cadre of CMC employees 
representing different departments including health, confessed to knowing nothing 
about the work of CMUHO, nor of the new responsibilities of the CMC (to provide 
basic curative as well as preventative and promotive care). In ward 67 the local 
CMC medical officer, was unaware of the activities of the Honorary Health Workers 
(HHWs) belonging to the CSIP programme - he knew neither when they met, what 
they were actually doing nor what they were meant to be doing. Yet these CSIP 
workers were to have been incorporated into the CMC system on completion of the 
ODA/DFID scheme and he was, in theory, meant to be supervising them. Where 
CMC and CMUHO were found to be working in the same area, CMC staff had very 
little knowledge of the activities of CMUHO staff and vice-versa.
66 The fact that even ‘friendly’ informants did this has led me to interpret this as ignorance, rather than as a 
deliberate attempt to mislead.
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Predictably, the inhabitants of the local bustees were unaware of what to expect 
from the governmental agencies providing health care in their area. One common 
misconception was that CMC is only responsible for vector control, when 
according to the Mayor and the CMHO, the CMC was meant to be providing 
preventative, promotive and basic curative services. Nobody knew that CMUHO 
staff as well as the HHWs of CSIP were meant to pay occasional visits to 
vulnerable households to check on those felt to be at greatest risk of morbidity and 
mortality. It was not known either, for example, that HHWs were meant to visit 
households at least twice a month and compile health records for under fives.
Poor information has meant that local communities do not know what to expect 
from the State. Not knowing what to expect, they have no way of holding state 
officials to account, creating an incentive for these officials to behave 
opportunistically. Belief in the public system has reached such a low ebb that the 
bustee dwellers whom I interviewed came to see any service given to them free of 
charge as a favour- for which high standards could not be expected and for which 
it would be ungrateful to complain. Often people resigned themselves to the poor 
treatment and filthy surroundings of a government hospital, as it was a service that 
was free and used, mainly, by poor people. One young mother who was rushed to 
a government hospital after suffering from malaria-like symptoms for some days 
(a shortage of beds meant that the preferred local hospital, Ram Krishna Mission 
could not admit her), and luckily survived, described the hospital in the following 
way. “In Sombunath (Sombunath Pandit, the local government hospital), 
everything is done in a rush, they don’t take care to give good treatment. For us 
poor people, Sombunath is OK, it’ll do. Sweepers just come and barely sweep the 
floor. There are no proper light or fans. Sushor Mongal (Ram Krishna Mission) is 
much better because you pay; since you don’t pay in a government hospital, you 
can’t expect good service.”
Poor information has also extended to poor people’s understanding of illness 
therapies. The idea that sickness could be cured without recourse to drugs was 
unanimously alien to all my informants. Similarly foreign was the fact that some
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medicines, notably antibiotics, had to be taken as part of a course lasting a number 
of days. Cost was clearly a constraint here, but allied with this was the widespread 
ignorance about the need to adhere to a prescribed course. Even when a full 
course was prescribed, local pharmacists reported that people rarely bought more 
than a couple of tablets/capsules at a time. It was common to hear people report 
that they had bought one capsule, often an antibiotic, to alleviate some minor 
symptom like a sore throat. This carries a number of implications for the individual 
as well as for health care providers serving bustee inhabitants. Clearly bustee 
inhabitants were unaware of the fact that prematurely curtailing a course of 
prescribed drugs such as antibiotics could undermine their long-term effectiveness. 
It also meant that providers were pressured to prescribe medicines, even when 
these were not required. In the case of private providers, who also often dispense, 
this was a sure way of both keeping the patients happy and also of maximising 
profits. For the government provider there is no such profit maximising incentive. 
Rather directives exist to discourage the unnecessary prescription of drugs; but a 
doctor who does not prescribe as he is expected to, risks the wrath of his patients. 
There is a common adage which I often heard amongst bustee dwellers in Calcutta 
that, “there is no such thing as a good doctor, whoever gives the medicines that 
work is a good doctor”.
Poor information has meant that people are more likely to bypass free government 
services in favour of the private sector. This exodus to the private sector has been 
fuelled by the propagation of myths and prejudices about government health 
services. This has been in part from bad experiences suffered in the past, by 
individuals or those known to them; but also it has also resulted from ignorance 
about what the government services actually provide. These findings are illustrated 
in the responses to one of the survey questions asked to a sample of respondents 
in each of the bustees studied. Respondents reported visiting government 
providers least when they experienced an illness episode - in DT 7.7% of 
respondents reported visiting a government provider when ill; in SL this rose to 
24.5%. The reasons given are illuminating, and an analysis of these responses 
has been complemented with data from group discussions and in-depth personal 
interviews.
102
103
SL DT
Reasons Male Female Total Reasons Male Female Total
7 10 9 19 7 7 7 14
6,8 4 9 13 8 4 9 13
8 3 3 6 1 3 3 6
6 4 3 7 12&13 3 0 3
6,8,12,13 5 0 5 1.12&13 0 2 2
Table 3.2: Five most compelling reasons for least using a health care provider 
Ward 67 and Ward 85 disaggregated by sex.
Table 3.2 Key to Reasons : 1= Far away; 2= No dispensary; 3=No relation; 
4=Different Caste; 6=considered not very good; 7=charges high; 8=treatment do 
not alleviate symptoms; 9=due to nature of illness; 10=rude and unkind; 11=place 
is dirty and unwelcoming; 12=slow service; 13=long waiting times
For the respondents of both ward 67 and ward 85, high charges were the main 
deterrent to using a health care provider. The fact that respondents cite high 
charges in relation to a government provider (the least commonly visited in both 
wards) would seem incongruous, for OPDs as well as CMUHO do not charge fees. 
Hence this was explored in group discussions and individual case histories with 
groups of women in the bustee.
3.9.1 Misconceptions and Distrust at the Community Levei
The first point to note was the prevailing distrust and suspicion on the part of the 
women that a free dispensary actually existed in their area. In SL, CMUHO was 
known for its malaria testing and treatment, but not for its basic curative care. This 
conviction was reflected in the words of one of the women, “when the patient 
becomes serious, there is no other way than to go to a private doctor. But we 
often don’t have the money to go” They also felt that for attention at CMUHO, 
some kind of appointment slip was needed. Without this, women said that the 
attendants there shouted them at. A common perception was that a ‘letter’- 
something akin to an informal letter of referral-was needed so as to be able to avail
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of treatment at CMUHO. The other complaint was that CMUHO wrote long 
prescriptions for medicines which did not seem to instantly cure; thus the women 
reported being told to buy a series of drugs, many of which had very little 
immediate curative effect. It was reported that if they visited CMUHO with a 
symptom, they often left without even a prescription. Instead, they were advised to 
go for further investigations-often involving blood tests, scans and/or x-rays. Thus 
it was felt that CMUHO rather than giving them something to relieve their 
symptoms, often directed them in such a way that would mean them having to 
incur more costs.
The case of one 35 year old women, Rita, with a recurring fever for over one 
month is revealing. Rita had been off work for one month and had not even been 
able to perform her household duties, both of which was making her very 
depressed when we met. She had visited two private doctors, which had cost her 
Rs 150 in total. One doctor had taken some tests that cost her about the same 
amount again, and diagnosed typhoid and suggested some treatment. When we 
met she was still incapacitated and was deciding whether to visit a teaching 
hospital, roughly five kms distance away. She wouldn’t go to the CMUHO clinic 
(five minutes walk away) because she was afraid of being shouted at for not 
having her ‘slip’ - which she claimed to have lost. I persuaded her to visit the CMC 
doctor, who was also close by, and with whom I had built a rapport. Despite 
assuring her that the doctor would see her immediately without a charge, Rita 
insisted that I write a letter in English to the doctor, as she was convinced that only 
this would ensure proper treatment. I insisted that this was not necessary and 
eventually she went with her teenage son, only to return later, disappointed, 
because the doctor had advised her to go for a chest x-ray and had not prescribed 
her any drugs as she was expecting. She visited a local religious charity that 
charged her Rs40 for the x-ray, and asked her to return four days later for the 
results.
When I next saw Rita, she regretted having ever been to the CMC doctor. She 
had not received a diagnosis, was not given or recommended any medicines, 
spent more money on further investigation and even then was no clearer about her
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illness and no closer to finding a solution. In the meantime, she was still sitting 
around unable to work in the house or outside - as a domestic servant in other 
people’s houses. She thought that if only I had written a letter, then she would 
have been ‘well treated’ to by the CMC doctor. For her, to be treated well, meant 
being given injections and medicines
It was surprising that given that CMUHO was at such proximity to SL bustee, many 
of the inhabitants reported not visiting it as their first choice. Almost half of all 
respondents cited it as their least used provider. Many people were unable to give 
a reason for this. High costs were often cited, but this did not accurately reflect 
their underlying motivation for not using this service. High costs did not appear to 
have much to do with direct costs of availing that service, but the eventual costs 
that using that provider would lead to, as seen in the case of Rita. It could also 
have been a convenient answer, reflecting a deep-seated prejudice that there was 
no such thing as free curative care.
Perceptions of a service as being poor, possibly born out of prejudice, possibly out 
of bad previous experiences, were important in determining why respondents used 
a service least. It is not clear whether respondents themselves experienced that 
the treatment given did not alleviate symptoms in the past, and so considered it not 
very good; or whether other people’s experiences of not being cured, had affected 
their opinion, in saying that the treatment was not considered very good.
The respondents from DT gave high charges and ineffective treatment as the first 
two reasons they had, in common with the respondents of ward 67, for visiting 
least a government provider (in this case it was the OPD). Distance, slow service 
and long waiting times were also cited as reasons for using a provider least. The 
distance of the OPDs from ward 85 (mentioned previously), together with the fact 
that these departments in city hospitals are heavily overcrowded, are facts that are 
entirely congruent with the responses given.
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3.10 Administrative Breakdown
3.10.1 The Condition of State Health Care Facilities
It has already been mentioned earlier in this chapter that while the urban poor 
have better physical access to public health care facilities, the opportunity costs of 
time spent travelling and waiting to be attended were considered to be significant 
barriers to the use of public facilities by poor people. This was confirmed by 
residents in both SL and DT through their survey responses, and women during 
focus group discussions in at least one of the bustees (DT) reported distance as 
an important reason for not using government facilities - in this case the local 
hospital OPD, located no more than half an hour from the bustee. These women 
also cited a lack of cleanliness as another major reason for not using such facilities. 
One hospital dedicated exclusively to women and children, within relatively easy 
access to their place of residence, was cited in relation to this. Opposite the 
hospital entrance was a festering garbage dump. As well as being hopelessly 
overcrowded - sometimes more than four hundred people wait to be attended by a 
handful of doctors working only during the morning hours - the hospital was in a 
wretched condition. Broken furniture and old files had been discarded into a central 
courtyard, surrounded by broken pipes and open drains emitting putrid looking 
liquid which dripped down the walls. Inside, the walls were stained and covered in 
grime. People had made their homes on hospital property, wherever there was a 
free space. As with other government hospitals in the city, the place was unkempt, 
dirty and often dilapidated.
One aspect of administrative failure that the Subject Committee has repeatedly 
emphasized has been the critical condition and outright neglect of many of the 
state’s health care facilities. In 1987 it was reported that the majority of the 
subsidiary health centres were not functioning, with buildings throughout the state 
in disrepair. Frequent references have been made to the appalling state of affairs 
inside hospitals and their compounds, particularly the lack of basic cleanliness and 
hygiene in health care institutions. In 1999, the committee noted, “lack of
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cleanliness within and around the hospitals. Labour rooms, operation theatres, 
indoor and outdoor patients departments are dirty and utterly unhygienic. The 
hospitals should be neat and clean. The surroundings of the hospitals should be 
attractive and assuring to the patients...cleanliness should and can be achieved 
with minimal financial help.”
Concern not only exists for the state of dirt and disrepair, but also for the physical 
safety of patients and staff alike. Doctors and nurses working in government 
hospitals report being regularly intimidated and sometimes assaulted by 
dissatisfied patients, their relatives and sometimes even staff. The ransacking of 
government hospitals has become, sadly, a frequent occurrence in Calcutta. In 
1988, the committee stated, “hospital compounds have become havens for anti­
socials, animals etc". Six years later, it reported, “after evening the hospitals 
become a hunting ground for the anti-socials. They operate through a section of 
the delinquent staff of every category. No-body dares to protest. This is the 
horrible state of affairs in many of the district, sub-divisional and rural 
hospitals”(1994:7). The members reported discovering touts roaming freely inside 
the hospital, trying to take patients to private nursing homes, and outsiders doing 
plasters, injections and charging fees in the hospital building using hospital 
materials (ibid).
3.10.2 Bureaucratic Performance
One government clinic under study, belonging to CMUHO and responsible for 
providing primary health care to a predominantly poor population located in a part 
of the city prone to floods and epidemics, was unable to provide regular 
immunisations for a period of eight weeks. Sometimes this was on account of the 
state of disrepair of the collection van, at others it was due to the unaccounted 
absence of the store manager, and the refusal of his deputy to go in his place. The 
centre was seldom manned at more than half strength. Staff came and went as 
they pleased and even the senior doctors in charge seldom arrived before midday. 
Desperate to find a good example, I visited other centres run by the same 
organisation in different parts of the city. One of these was located on the site of
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the oldest and grandest medical college in India. The fact that staff from the local 
hospital had no idea about the whereabouts of this particular centre did not bode 
well. When I finally reached the sub zonal health unit, I found the place empty of 
patients with staff sitting around, drinking tea and chatting. Any suggestion on my 
behalf to accompany them on their ‘field visits’ was fiercely resisted. I eventually 
built up a rapport with some of the field staff, who allowed me to accompany them 
at an immunisation camp that they were holding. Finally, I felt that I would be 
allowed to witness the work that this organisation carried out. On the day of the 
camp, I was disappointed to see that people were being turned away as there 
were no vaccines available. The vaccines had been stored at the local CMC office, 
and on that exact day the office was closed.
On daily visits to government health care facilities, both within my research sites 
and beyond, I encountered shirking in different forms -  absenteeism, dereliction of 
duty, chatting, gossiping, drinking tea and reading the newspaper. Staff attending 
to patients were visibly condescending, abrupt and rude.67 Those that acceded to 
being interviewed recognised that there was a lack of supervision and monitoring, 
no rewards for hard work and no risk of punishment for not performing their duties. 
They also, on the whole, recognised that the service being offered was of a very 
low quality.
It has been already mentioned how a lack of motivation, rudeness and poor 
performance of health care personnel has been a constraint on the equitable 
access to health care for the poor in India. The most damning and recurrent 
criticisms in the Subject Committee Reports are directed at health care personnel 
from all groups and at all levels, confirming the perception that the situation is 
grave in West Bengal. They are accused of being corrupt, lazy and undisciplined. 
For instance, the 12th Report stated, “patients do not receive proper care and 
attention from the doctors, as also from the nursing and paramedical staff...”
67 By accompanying informants to attend these facilities and as a non-participant observer, I managed to gather 
considerable first-hand experience of this. For a further discussion of the methodological tools employed in 
this study, see Introduction.
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(1995:13). In 1996, the 13th Report noted, “the work culture among most of the 
employees of the health department leaves a lot to be desired”. The following year, 
it claimed, “ indiscipline is rampant amongst almost every section of the staff 
working in institutes or in the field”(14th Report, 1997:2).
The Subject Committee has frequently condemned the performance of 
government doctors. They are accused of being unwilling to work in rural areas, 
and of leaving health care units (static units) unmanned. The 14th Report states, “in 
the new PHCs even though doctors are posted, they are not attending their units 
regularly. There are instances, that sometimes they go once a week, there are 
instances also that they only come on the payday”(1997:3). It has been alleged 
that, “patients do not receive proper care and attention from the Doctors and other 
staff in those units, including State General...hospitals” (ibid). On one occasion, 
the Subject Committee complained that doctors show more concern for their 
private practices than for their patients in government hospitals (12th Report, 
1995:13).
The Subject Committee places the blame for this state of affairs upon “the virtual 
collapse in the administration department.” The 12th report goes on to note, “it is 
felt that the Medical Administration System is in the doldrums and unless remedial 
measures are taken and meticulously implemented, the matter will go beyond 
control. “ (1995:12). In 1997 it was noted that, “nobody could be blamed for any 
lapse that could have occurred at any place and time, it was observed that the 
administration was in crisis - the administrators “begged to be relieved of their 
duties”. The Subject Committee has lamented the existence of a system where 
nobody can be blamed for any lapse (1988), and chastises supervisors for not 
using the administrative powers which they have been given (ibid). Administrators 
are accused of being inexperienced and incapable. But these are merely 
symptoms of a deeper malaise. Contrary to the argument that coercive 
management techniques were a source of poor motivation, which Jeffery (1988) 
has presented, the evidence from West Bengal suggests that supervisors are in 
fact reluctant to take action against delinquent staff.
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3.11 Accounting for Bureaucratic Failure
All the government doctors that were interviewed were unanimous in their 
frustration and disillusionment with the system. Staff were divided as to the 
reasons for this administrative breakdown, seen through the poor performance of 
government health care personnel and the critical state of government health care 
facilities. Some saw the problem as being something innate in their colleagues, a 
lack of commitment. For one hospital superintendent, the desire to help poor 
people - which drew him in to the health profession - was being frustrated by the 
“lack of commitment and moral fibre" of his fellow colleagues, doctors and non­
doctors alike. “People know their duties but will not work...there has been a 
degeneration in people’s nature and their morals. This is the main problem with 
the health service”. 68
For others it had to do with the incentives under which health care officials worked 
in the state. Focus group discussions with a group of post-graduate medical 
students, most of whom had already worked for some years in the public system, 
proved illuminating in this regard. In rural areas, they reported, staff appear 
sporadically, clinics are thus unable to perform to full capacity and local people 
start to go elsewhere. The point which they reiterated was that nothing can be 
done about staff members who fail to turn up to work. A number of doctors agreed 
that, “there are no incentives and no punishments”. One gave the following 
example, “say there are four doctors working, two are working well, and two are 
working lazily. Those two working well will not be rewarded, and those two who 
are lazy will not be punished”. They also highlighted the weak institutional 
mechanisms that exist for redress, for patients to complain about the quality of 
service being provided. Although in theory a complaint procedure does exist, they 
claimed that it was practically out of the reach of the majority of (poor) patients. 
The complaint has to be written and sent to the Superintendent, and it is his 
prerogative whether to pass it on to the relevant higher authorities. It was pointed 
out that if a poor person does manage to write a letter of complaint, unless some
68 Interview with Hospital Superintendent (identity withheld) Calcutta, 11/11/99.
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authority backs it up (a local politician, a gazetted officer or some other 
professional) more often than not the letter is simply disposed of.
3.12 Accountability
From the previous discussion it appears that the institutional mechanisms of 
accountability in the health system in West Bengal are weak and thus government 
health workers are not accountable to those they serve. Accountability carries a 
number of connotations, but holding office bearers responsible for their 
performance and the results of their decisions may be an adequate definition of the 
term (Cornwall et al, 2000:3). It means giving those receiving a service the ability 
to exert pressure on those responsible for providing a service (Banerji, 1985; 
Jeffery, 1988). In the terminology of principal-agent theory, in which the literature 
on accountability is often couched, it involves creating “organisational systems 
(that) allow principals to exert exit, voice and reciprocity in their dealings with 
agents (Brett, 1998:8). According to Cassels (1995), accountability is a two-step 
process. First there is a need to specify to whom the provider is accountable, and 
then to invest the power of sanction with that person/body to which accountability 
has been fixed. This is akin to the sub-processes of appraisal and sanctioning, 
which Moore has said comprises the process of accountability (Moore, 1993). In 
the case of public urban health care, the system is in part to blame, as there is no 
clear single line of accountability.
The Corporation runs CMC basic health units, whereas the state government runs 
hospital OPDs and Calcutta Metropolitan Urban Health Organisation (CMUHO). It 
is not quite clear who is responsible for CSIP and CUDP personnel - the GoWB 
pays their honoraria and provides their drugs and equipment, the CMC is meant to 
guide and supervise them. GoWB employees are in no way answerable to 
Corporation councillors and CMC staff are not answerable to GoWB 
representatives. Dissatisfied patients would be forced to use a number of different 
and unclear institutional channels to have their voice heard - councillors for CMC 
services, MLAs for GoWB services. However, it is far from clear that there actually 
exists some means by which bureaucrats are made subordinate or answerable to
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these elected officials. Even where there is some institutional means of redress for 
principals against agents, the agents themselves (doctors) accepted that once 
entered, these channels are time-consuming, and higher officials may easily fudge 
the process at any time. To embark on the process requires considerable amounts 
of education, knowledge and, most importantly, support from those with power and 
status. All of these are assets which are least possessed by the poor. The system 
requires a transparent and independent complaints procedure which is easy to use 
and accessible to the poor and illiterate. But as a whole the system is wracked by 
poor information, as has been pointed out, and thus hardly anyone knows what to 
expect from the public system. Consequently it is difficult to monitor or make 
judgments (appraise) about the performance of providers, and therefore hold 
officials to account. To confound the situation, the fact remains that government 
employees are extraordinarily well protected in India and the sanctioning 
procedure is fraught with obstacles. “There is an in-built long term procedure for 
taking disciplinary action against a government employee... it can take a long time 
and effort.”69 Constitutional provisions exist, making it very difficult to dismiss a 
government employee.70
3.13 Institutional Arrangements for Ensuring Accountability
The governance structure of the health care system in West Bengal is debilitated 
by poor information, the high transaction costs, especially for the poor, involved in 
using (obscure) channels for redress and the constitutional impediments to 
sanctioning public employees. In response to this the Subject Committee has 
recommended a number of administrative changes in the health system, many of
69 These were the insightful words of a secretary (IAS) in the DoH, GoWB. Personal Interview, Calcutta 
24/07/2000.
70 Enquiry and disciplinary procedures relating to the conduct of state as well as central government officials 
are subject to Article 311 of the Indian Constitution (Arora and Goyal, 1996: 609). Even after the 42nd 
Constitutional Amendment Act introduced during Emergency in 1976, Article 311 (2) stated that no person 
who holds a civil service post under Union or a state, shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank,
“except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable 
opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges.” According to the Santhanam Committee, “Article 311 
of the Constitution as interpreted by our courts had made it very difficult to deal effectively with corrupt civil 
servants.” (1964:10-11).
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which have been implemented in recent years. These draw from the contemporary 
‘toolkit’ of institutional reform and include: the decentralisation of health 
administration; the enhancement of popular participation in the management of 
hospitals, through the formation of health advisory committees; precise job 
descriptions and the identification of focal points of responsibility, with officers at 
each level held accountable for ensuring that the area under their control is 
properly attended. There has been encouragement for better coordination between 
departments within government as well as with quasi government agencies, to 
avoid duplication. The extension of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 (COPA) to 
cover health care services presents patients, who have suffered at the hands of 
negligent health care officials, with legal recourse to complain and seek 
compensation.
The following section will briefly discuss the proposed institutional changes. 
Chapter Two has presented a more substantive discussion of the theoretical 
rationale for these changes. Chapter Six discusses the effect of such changes on 
primary health care provision to bustee dwellers in Calcutta
3.13.1 Consumer Protection Act 1986 (COPA)
Recently, the introduction of a Consumer Protection Act (COPA) has provided the 
faint hope that patients may be able to seek redress against medical practitioners, 
through consumer councils which are meant to be quicker than the civil courts and 
able to financially reimburse those whose claims were upheld.71 Although the Act 
was initially only applicable to private practitioners, it was as an important step 
towards the regulation of this group. The usual interest groups (doctors and their 
professional associations) opposed this Act, but despite their protests it was 
introduced and cases have been brought against private providers using the 
means provided. In 1999, in what has become a test case, an aggrieved family 
used the Act to bring a case of negligence against doctors working in a well-known
113
114
government hospital in Calcutta. Until the case was brought to court, the COPA 
had only been applied in cases where payment was made for a service. It was 
argued by the hospital that it was not applicable to ‘free medical’ treatment given at 
a government hospital. Eventually, in May 2000, judgment was made in the High 
Court that since some beds and cabins in a government hospital are paid for by 
patients, then the service offered in government hospitals cannot be considered to 
be totally free, and “hence, the case is maintainable to be processed by Consumer 
Protection Councils under COPA (1986).
Whilst it is a positive development, considerable obstacles remain for the 
aggrieved consumer’s (patient) use of COPA. For example, if a doctor has acted 
according to general and approved practice, he cannot be charged under COPA 
for adverse effects which may affect the patient, as these are considered to 
emanate from the imperfections and risks inherent in medical practice. Clearly 
these obstacles increase if the person is poor. Furthermore the onus of proving 
medical negligence is on the complainant. Evidence shows that complainants have 
found it hard to get medical practitioners to testify on their behalf, whereas doctors, 
who are defending their position, have not experienced the same problem. Thus 
the transaction costs for the complainant far outweigh those for the defendant 
(Bhat, 1996).
3.13.2 Health Advisory Committees and Decentralisation to Panchayats
The calls for the establishment of Health Advisory Committees and for the 
decentralisation of health administration to local government, as noted in Chapter 
Two, is a strategy to give hospitals greater autonomy. The incorporation of 
people’s representatives in these is considered a means of strengthening 
mechanisms for downward accountability (Bennet and Muraleedharan, 2000:64). 
In the contemporary West Bengal context, the strategy seems to fall in line with the 
Left Front’s commitment to enhancing local governance.72
71 See Bhat (1996) for an excellent discussion of COPA and its implications for regulating health care 
providers.
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The DoH’s stated intention of involving local self-government bodies and people’s 
representatives through management boards and advisory committees has 
attracted considerable praise from the Subject Committee. It has noted that, “the 
Left Front’s political sustenance depends on its ability to develop and enhance 
popular participation and planning from the grassroots” (1999). However, it was 
predicted that the lack of information about the functioning and performance of the 
different aspects of the department would undermine the ability of these local 
bodies and advisory committees to do their job effectively. In practice, advisory 
committees’ performance has fallen short of expectations, in part due to 
information problems, having “no clear cut understanding and directions of their 
responsibility, authority and functions” (9th Report, 1994:7). In other instances the 
Subject Committee discovered them to be inactive or malfunctioning - “their activity 
has been creating difficulties for the administration, rather than helping its proper 
functioning” (12th Report, 1998:5). The reconstitution of these bodies together with 
a review of their functions, and the elaboration of specific guidelines for functioning 
was recommended (1998).
In 1998, the health minister called for further decentralisation and the need to 
increase people’s participation in health care delivery. For some time, the 
Committee had recommended involving local bodies (both rural and urban) in 
health care delivery. Initially it was proposed that CHGs and MPHWs would be 
controlled by the panchayat system, as the first step in the gradual handing over of 
the health administration to the Zilla Parishads in consultation and co-ordination 
with the corresponding urban bodies (1993). In 1995, the 12th Report 
recommended giving the Panchayats and Municipalities more regulatory functions 
over the traditional administrative apparatus. In 1998, it was noted that many of the 
institutions deemed necessary for people’s participation through decentralisation 
had been established in the state. These were district planning committees and 
sthaayi samities for health care constituted by elected representatives. At the 
panchayat samity level it was reported that Sthaayi samitys for health care had
72 Discussed in Section 3.6.
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been established, with one member of the Gram panchayat responsible for looking 
after the health care activities of the department and other health care related 
organisations. However, the Subject Committee found them not to be functional, 
leading to the conclusion in 1999 that, “the committee has recommended times 
without number to involve the panchayat in a more effective manner in health care 
delivery...although principally accepted, this suggestion has not been translated 
into action” (1999).
3.13.3 Fixing Lines of Control
In its first report, the committee recommended giving CMOHs administrative power 
commensurate with their responsibilities - making them responsible for the entire 
health care superstructure in the districts. This included carrying out essential 
repairs and taking disciplinary action for medical and non-medical staff. The 
committee has repeatedly insisted on clear job descriptions which are then 
properly implemented. It has reiterated the need to fix focal points of responsibility 
at each level, with officers assigned specific responsibility and accountability; for 
example by making superintendents answerable to CMOs in matters other than 
direct medical care to patients. Yet, it notes with dismay that officers are unwilling 
to take action in cases of indiscipline. It has also remarked that given that the 
department itself has very weak administrative control over its staff members, it is 
not surprising that lower level officials are reluctant to use their disciplinary powers. 
Even to this day interviews with senior health dept officials point out that power to 
take disciplinary action against class C and D staff rests with superintendents. For 
class A and B staff it is in the hands of the secretary of health, thereby making a 
mockery of all the statements of intent on behalf of the department to devolve 
these responsibilities to lower administrative levels.
The governance structure of the health system in West Bengal is weak. 
Information is poorly disseminated and owing to the high transaction costs involved, 
the chances of seeking redress through the channels which exist are slim. These 
factors merely compound the challenges which already exist in disciplining public 
officials. Changes in the institutional arrangements to enhance the accountability of
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the public health care officials in West Bengal have been attempted, but so far the 
evidence suggests that these have failed to make the expected improvements. 
The effectiveness of COPA to bring public officials to account has yet to be proved, 
whilst the transactions costs involved in its use remain formidable.
3.14 Conclusions
This chapter has argued that health is neither equitably nor efficiently provided by 
the government system in India. Health care resources have tended to be 
concentrated in urban tertiary, curative care, and on target-driven, centrally 
sponsored programmes such as family planning. The health care bureaucracy has 
tended to focus its efforts on selective, target-based interventions, often in return 
for financial incentives and at the expense of primary care. This has been one of 
the factors which has contributed to the continued presence of rude and poorly 
motivated staff serving the public.
Whilst these sources of inequity are reflected in the health system in West Bengal, 
as they are in the rest of the country, the chapter makes the point that the health 
system in West Bengal compares favourably on many counts compared to that of 
most other states in the country. It has an extensive infrastructure in terms of civil 
works and is well endowed in terms of personnel - a considerable proportion of 
whom are now non-clinicians. Finances do not seem to be a constraint, and the 
state has been ruled for almost 25 years by a left of centre political regime that has 
introduced pioneering redistributive reforms as well as changes to the system of 
local governance, attracting much acclaim for this. It was hoped that political 
changes in the state had created the potential to address key aspects of 
vulnerability and deprivation. However, in terms of improving access to basic 
health care, the state has not been able to fulfil expectations. Though the state has 
shown improvements in some health care indicators, it is widely accepted that 
these are by no means commensurate with what could have been achieved given 
the favourable political changes and the ample resources at its disposal. Lately, a 
process of stagnation seems to have set in - fatal diseases thought to have been 
eradicated have begun to make a reappearance and the huge infrastructure
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seems to be beset by problems: dirty and dilapidated health care installations, 
some of which are hopelessly overcrowded, and others which are grossly 
underutilised; no proper planning; poor information of what services are on offer; 
fraught with labour problems and with clear evidence of a pervasive lack of 
accountability. Indeed even those sympathetic to the LF government describe 
health care workers as negligent, corrupt and indisciplined.
The chapter concludes by arguing that the institutional mechanisms for ensuring 
accountability in the health care system in West Bengal are either weak or non­
existent. I have documented some of the latest efforts to remedy this. For 
example, there is now the possibility of recourse to the law, using the Consumer 
Protection Act (COPA, 1986) so as to seek compensation for the negligence of 
medical staff, including doctors. The full implications of COPA are currently being 
worked out in the courts. In any case there exist considerable barriers to the poor’s 
ability to use this legal mechanism. The Subject Committee Reports have 
recommended a number of administrative changes in the health system - to 
increase popular participation in health care administration through 
decentralisation, including regulatory functions, to the three tier panchayat system 
and the urban local bodies and the establishment of health committees and 
councils to help oversee the running of hospitals and other aspects of the 
infrastructure at the local level. It has advocated the establishment of identifiable 
and measurable indicators of performance, to minimise duplication and overlap 
and to establish focal points of responsibility throughout the health system.
Efforts to improve downwards accountability through the establishment of hospital 
boards and management committees have proved unsuccessful, in some 
circumstances giving rise to perverse outcomes. It would appear that the 
decentralisation of health administration to local government bodies, despite what 
seemed like progress initially, has in fact remained at the level of rhetoric. Fixing 
lines of control seems to have had little effect in changing practices. The 
procedures for disciplining officials remain cumbersome, and still “no-one can be 
blamed for any lapse”.
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The Subject Committee has blamed lower level administrators for being unwilling 
to use the incentives at their disposal to ensure higher levels of performance from 
those below them, whilst accepting that the DoH has weak control over its cadre of 
employees. It has also attempted to blame officials in the DoH for poor planning 
and the consequences of this, illustrated earlier. However, there are clear parallels 
with unsuccessful attempts to implement similar changes in other parts of the 
developing world under Westminster style political regimes and similar 
bureaucratic systems discussed in Chapter Two. In West Bengal, whilst attempts 
were made to devolve lines of control, personnel management remained 
centralised. It is unsurprising, then, that this has led to an undermining of local 
efforts to improve performance. This last point is a good example of how reforms 
when implemented in a piecemeal fashion, against a background of more 
traditional bureaucratic management, are likely to be of limited effect. Systemic 
constraints are not enough to explain the lack of success of these administrative 
reforms.
The view, forwarded in the previous chapter, that organisational culture may be 
more of a determinant of performance, warrants some consideration in this context. 
There is clearly opposition within the organisation to transparency, information 
sharing and self-evaluation. There is a tradition whereby patronage in the 
recruitment of paramedical health workers has undermined attempts to make them 
responsive and accountable deliverers of health care to the poor. Before reforms 
can be successfully implemented there is a clear need to understand why things 
are done in a given way.
In 1995, two Reports that were published which highlighted the perverse effect of 
political and union interference. In its report on Nursing, the Committee reported 
that politicians and unions are supporting nurses who refuse to perform regular 
duties. This has even interfered with the implementation of ‘orders’ from 
headquarters and, it is alleged, has perverted the whole transfer system. In the 
12th Report, the Committee note that, “there is no gainsaying the fact that the work 
culture among most of the employees of the Health Department leaves much to be 
desired. One of the contributory factors for such an unwelcome situation is
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perhaps militant and irresponsible trade union activities of all sections of the 
employees. There are instances of unhindered interference of the Union in the 
day-to-day administration of the departmental 995:16).
The suggestion is that in the case of the DoH, politics can have a bearing on why 
things are done in a given way, and thus there would seem to be a strong case for 
looking beyond the DoH and its officials to higher levels of the organisation, 
particularly to politicians, to understand why the health system in West Bengal 
continues to underperform.
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Chapter 4
Demographic Characteristics and Social Relations in two
Calcutta bustees
4.1 Introduction
It is important to note how integral the concept of ‘community’ is to the concept of 
decentralisation as a way of improving the performance of government. Yet the 
desire for greater community participation contains a whole series of assumptions, 
most notably about what the local ‘community’ actually represents, which has led 
some contemporary scholars to qualify the prevailing enthusiasm for such local 
participation. Though often seen as a means for the ‘poor’ or ‘lower strata’ to exert 
their rights in opposition to ‘the elites’; the concept of ‘community’ participation 
carries connotations of consensus and homogeneity which in reality communities 
of residence seldom display. This consensual view hides the actual divisions, 
differences, inequalities and sectionalism of most such (residential) ‘communities’. 
This chapter sets out to illustrate this argument through a detailed description of 
the demographic characteristics and social relations in two registered slums 
(bustees) in Calcutta. It begins with a brief background description of the two 
research sites, before presenting the results of a household survey undertaken in 
each of the bustees. The survey, though useful, fails to bring out the key 
differences that actually exist between the inhabitants in each of the 
neighbourhoods. Although ethnic and linguistic cleavages were most obvious, 
class differences and kin ties also divide the inhabitants of the two bustees.
4.2 The Research Areas: Garcha and Kasba
4.2.1 Garcha
The neighbourhood known as Garcha is lodged between four arterial roads: Hazra 
Road to the north, Rashbehari avenue to the south, Gariahat Road to the east and 
Sarat Bose Road (Landsdowne Road) to the west. It forms part of the South 
Calcutta Lok Sabha constituency, with Mamata Banerjee of the Trinamul Congress
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(TMC) as its MP and also is part of the Rash Behari Assembly seat, whose MLA is 
Shobondheb Chattopadhay, also of the TMC. Garcha comprises what are now two 
Corporation wards, ward 85 and ward 86. The bustees that were studied are 
located within ward 85. In the 1995 municipal election the ward 85 council seat 
was reserved for a woman candidate. Mrs Josoda Ghosh (Congress), the wife of 
the previous incumbent was elected to represent the ward, although for all 
practical purposes her husband continued to fulfill most of the obligations of 
councillor, and all but appeared at council meetings.73 There was no attempt 
made to disguise this. In the last municipal elections, held in June 2000, the seat 
was won by an independent candidate, Deba Kumar, who had established his own 
party after being denied the official backing of the TMC for this seat. After his 
victory, Kumar was welcomed back into the fold of the TMC and became the 
official TMC councillor for ward 85.
Ward 85 is the biggest ward of Borough VIII, and the area is known as a typical 
south Calcutta, mainly Bengali, middle-class area, but with large residential 
pockets of non-Bengali working class inhabitants. The ward has 16 bustees - the 
largest number of bustees concentrated in any ward of this borough. The bustee 
selected for in depth study were 11,12, 13&14 Dover Terrace, which were of 
manageable size and appeared to contain a mixed population of Bengali and non- 
Bengali (Hindi and Oriya) speaking inhabitants.
4.2.2 Kasba
Situated in the southeast of the city, directly to the east of ward 85 - at a distance 
of approximately three kilometres - Kasba also borders Ballygunge. The area is 
part of the same south Calcutta Lokh Sabha constituency as Garcha, with Mamata 
Banerjee as the local MP. It falls within Ballygunge Assembly constituency, with 
Robin Deb of the CPI (M) as MLA. The CPI (M) won the seat from Congress (I) in 
the watershed 1977 assembly elections, and has held it ever since. Since elections
73 Reservation for SC/ST and women candidates in urban local bodies became mandatory under the provisions 
of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (1992). In 1995 municipal elections, 47 seats for reserved for 
women and 9 for SC/STs (including three for women) in the CMC.
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for councillors were re-introduced in 1985, the CPI (M) candidates have held the 
seat, each one serving for one term only. In the last fifteen years, for each 
separate Corporation election, a different person has been nominated to stand as 
the official CPI (M) candidate by the local Party. In the last municipal elections, the 
seat was reserved for an SC candidate, and was won by a convincing majority by 
Chottu Choudhury of the CPI (M).
Kasba constitutes a large area, in the same way as Garcha, divided into at least 
two Corporation wards - 66 and ward 67, both of which are part of Borough VII, a 
CPI (M) dominated borough. The research site was located within ward 67. Kasba 
has been traditionally a working class satellite settlement, predominantly 
comprised of bustees and inhabited largely by Bengali Hindus-migrants from east 
Pakistan (now Bangladesh), or from the district to the south of the city, mainly 
South 24 Parganas. The area was selected on the basis of its superior health 
status, which surpassed that of other urban areas of the state. The ward fell within 
the target area for the first phase of ODA/DFID Calcutta Slum Improvement 
Programme (CSIP-Phase 1), and the former British Prime Minister, John Major, 
visited one of its upgraded bustees. Recently, it has been proposed that the area 
be presented to the UN as model case of how the local community has 
participated with the Corporation for the upkeep and maintenance of inputs. The 
bustee selected was 52, 53, 53a Swinhoe Lane, on the same street, but at the 
opposite end to the bustee made famous by the visit of Mr. Major.
4.2.3 Historical Background of Research Sites
Kasba lies beyond the railway tracks, which symbolically makes it peripheral to 
what is considered core Calcutta. Previously the area fell within Tollygunge 
Municipality, and was only included as part of Calcutta Corporation after 1965. It 
borders the Eastern Metropolitan Bypass and is connected to the rest of the city by 
the 'Bijan Setu' bridge. These civil works are relatively recent phenomena, built in 
the last thirty years, and have been crucial in the incorporation of the area to the
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rest of the city. Kasha's geography and its topography have helped create a sense 
of isolation. It was a water body (her/); some claim even an island surrounded by 
water, into which the excess rainwater from Southern Calcutta drained for many 
years. Although now most of the lakes and ponds have been filled, Kasha’s 
topography continues to give the impression that it is isolated, and makes it prone 
to floods during monsoon.
On the main-line railway track joining Calcutta with southern Bengal, Kasba was a 
convenient place to settle on account of its proximity to the city. Nearby lies the 
staunchly middle class neighbourhood of Ballygunge, which has been a source of 
employment opportunities for local residents. The area was relatively uncluttered - 
surprising given its proximity to the city - largely due to its neglected condition and 
relative underdevelopment. Furthermore, Kasba has always had an unenviable 
reputation for violence and criminality, which persists to this day.74 Isolated and 
marginal relative to the rest of the city, on account of a few unsavoury incidents, 
the area, with its inhabitants, has acquired the stigma of social marginality.
The area was the scene of considerable bloodletting during the tumultuous decade, 
1967-77. The cities were wracked with labour disputes and industrial stagnation, 
whilst in the countryside the agrarian situation was becoming increasingly 
polarised, with the growing pauperisation of the majority of the rural populace. 
From 1967-70, two democratically elected left dominated coalitions, the United 
Front government (UFG), were toppled and replaced by President’s Rule from the 
centre. Avowedly, this was to curb what many perceived to be excessive political 
violence and terrorism in the state. The streets of Kasba witnessed the bloody 
apotheosis of the political rivalries being played out on a local and national scale. 
The area was singled out as a den of criminals, ‘anti-socials’ in local parlance, and
74 “Kasba, the dingy congested suburb in South Calcutta, was fast earning a fearsome reputation...it was a 
politically complex area...lawlessness has been a feature. The area contains a huge concentration of refugees, 
most of whom live in sub-human conditions...” The Statesman 26/04/68 ‘Massive Drive to Rid Kasba of 
Rowdies’.
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a hiding place for Naxalites.75 A campaign of state sponsored violence by the 
security forces and local criminals, with backing from the Congress Party, was 
unleashed on the area. Disappearances, assassinations and extortion became 
commonplace, leaving Kasba with the indelible stain of lawlessness.
The bustees of Garcha share a history similar to that of many such residential units 
in the city, but different to those of Kasba. At the beginning of the century, the 
area was largely uninhabited ‘jungle’ owned by an absentee landlord or zamindar. 
Garcha is part of a wider area known as Ballygunge - traditionally part of the city 
inhabited exclusively by Europeans (Moorhouse, 1974). With the rise of a Bengali 
professional middle class at the turn of the century, wealthy Bengalis soon began 
to settle in the southern parts of the city. The bustees emerged to house the 
economic migrants from Calcutta’s traditional hinterlands, who flocked to the area 
to take advantage of employment opportunities in local businesses and to work in 
the houses of the new Bengali urban middle class. The eldest inhabitants of the 
area report that once a small Muslim population used to reside here, and a few 
kattals (cattle pens for supplying milk, usually owned by migrants from UP) also 
dotted the area. The historian P. Sinha has noted that amongst the slum 
population of Ballygunge, milkmen from Bihar and UP were quite prominent. He 
also noted that the slum population had a larger proportion of people dependent on 
middle class households, as servants, and on middle class consumption - selling 
milk or other goods and services to these (1978:247).76 Mutual dependence is a 
major feature of the area even to this day, as shall be discussed later in this 
chapter.
75 The Naxalites were a radical movement, inspired by the Chinese Revolution and the political ideology of 
Mao Zedong. The movement emerged out of land disputes in Naxalbari (North Bengal) in the late 1960s, and 
by the end of the decade had become a much feared urban guerrilla movement, comprising mainly, middle 
class intellectuals and college students. There have been some interesting discussions of the naxalites, for 
example Ray (1988) and Chatterjee (1997).
76 Exhaustive searches provided little in terms of written history of this area. Hence, the information included 
here is drawn from oral accounts, elicited from senior members of the bustee, and triangulated through group 
discussions.
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4.3 Demographic Characteristics of the Research Sites
Both Garcha and Kasba are large areas comprising many possible research sites, 
bustees, within their boundaries. I purposively chose two bustees, one from each 
ward, of roughly equal size - 150 households. This section presents the 
demographic characteristics of the two research sites from the results of a 
household survey. This quantitative data supplements the results of detailed 
ethnographic fieldwork, carried out over a period of 14 months, which sought to 
understand, in depth, the social relations in the two sites. A closed-ended 
questionnaire was administered to approximately 30% of households in each 
bustee77
77 The criteria and process of selection of the bustees has been outlined in the introduction.
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4.3.1 Comparative Ethnic Composition: SL (Ward 67) and DT (Ward 85)
PLACE OF ORIGIN KASBA
SL (N=98)
GARCHA
DT (N=91)
Calcutta 44% 42%
Rest of West Bengal 37% 21%
Bihar 13% 27%
Orissa 0% 6%
Bangladesh 4% 3%
Other parts of India 1% 0%
Other parts of subcontinent 0% 1%
Don’t know 1% 1%
Table 4.1: % Distribution of Households by Place of Origin SL & DT
PLACE OF ORIGIN % DISTRIBUTION OF 
HOUSEHOLDS
CMC 50.6
Rest of WB 16.9
Bihar 15.7
Other States 7.3
Bangladesh 9.4
Others 0.3
Table 4.2 Percentage Distribution of Households by Place of Origin-CMC 
Source: Chatterjee, Bhattacharya & Haider, 1999:28a
For each of the research sites, a large proportion of respondents gave Calcutta as 
their place of origin - in both cases slightly less than 45% of respondents gave this
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reply. The majority of respondents gave their place of origin as Bengal (including 
Calcutta) in both sites, although SL has a far higher proportion of respondents 
reporting this (81%) than DT (63%). DT has a higher proportion of inhabitants 
claiming non-Bengali origin (34%) than SL (14%). In DT, over one quarter of these 
give their place of origin as Bihar, twice as many as in SL. In fact, DT has a far 
higher proportion of inhabitants with origins in Bihar, than the city as a whole for 
which they represent 15.7% of the total (see Table 4.2)
It is worth mentioning that in the DT sample, the figure for Biharis would have been 
higher still if all those asked who consider themselves Hindustanis, commonly 
communicate to one another in Bihari vernaculars and whose parents have 
migrated from Bihar, had given their place of origin as Bihar. But even as they 
stand, the figures show the ethnic heterogeneity of 11,12,13&14 Dover Terrace 
(DT). By contrast, the data for SL seems to confirm what secondary sources have 
said about the Bengali dominance of Kasba, although this is by no means absolute 
as the figures also show the limited, but real, ethnic heterogeneity of 51,52, 53 and 
53a Swinhoe Lane (SL), the comparative research site.
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4.4 Comparative Socio-Economic Characteristics
SCHOOLING
(1)
MALE 
SL DT
(2) (3)
FEMALE
SL DT
(4) (5)
TOTAL
SL DT
(6) (7)
No schooling 31.8% (14) 24.5% (12) 44.4% (24) 45.2% (19) 38.7% (38) 34% (31)
Primary or less 9.1% (4) 22.4% (11) 7.4% (4) 14.3% (6) 8.2% (8) 19% (17)
Upper primary or 
less
27.3% (12) 22.4% (11) 20.4% (11) 30.9% (13) 23.57% (23) 26% (24)
Secondary or less 27.3% (12) 14.2% (7) 27.8% (15) 7.1 % (3) 27.6% (27) 11% (10)
High School or less 0 14.2% (7) 0 2.4% (1) 0% (0) 9% (8)
Diploma or less 0 0% (0) 0 0% (0) 0% (0) 0%(0)
University or more 4.5% (2) 2.0% (1) 0 0% (0) 2.0% (2) 1% (1)
TOTAL 100% (44) 99.7%(49) 100(54) 99.9(42) 100% (98) 100% (91)
Table 4.3: Educational Status of Respondents for DT and SL, disaggregated by 
sex.
Comparable numbers of respondents in both bustees -more than one third of the 
population of both SL and DT- have had no schooling. However, when the total 
figures are disaggregated by sex, they show that in both bustees more women 
than men reported not having attended school, the difference between the sexes 
was greater in DT than in SL. In DT, almost twice as many women as men 
reported not having gone to school.
More than twice as many respondents reported studying up to secondary school in 
SL than in DT. This was true for a similar proportion of men and women in SL 
(around 27%), whereas in DT more than twice as many men than women had 
reached this level. Particularly striking was the comparison between women in 
each of these bustees. More than three times as many women reported having 
reached secondary education in SL than in DT.
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4.4.1 Occupational Status
OCCUPATION SL(N=98) DT(N=91) TOTAL
MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE WARD 67 
WARD 85
Housewife/
Husband
2.27%(1) 66.67%
(36)
2.04%(1) 73.81%
(31)
37.76%
(37)
35.16%
(32)
Manual 79.5%(35) 29.63%
(16)
87.76%
(43)
19.05%
(8)
52.04(51) 56.04%
(51)
Administrative 6.8%(3) 0% (0) 6.12% (3) 0 3.06%(3) 3.296%
(3)
Professional 2.27%(1) 0%(0) 2.04%(1) 0 1.02% (1) 1.099(1)
Other 9.09%(4) 3.70%(2) 2.04%(1) 7.14%(3) 6.12% (6) 4.40%
(4)
Total 99.93%(44) 100%(54) 100%(49) 100%
(42)
100%(98) 99.99%
(91)
Table 4.4: Occupational Status of Respondents for DT and SL, disaggregated by 
sex
Figures suggest that the two bustees were very similar in terms of the occupational 
status of their inhabitants. Almost the same proportion of inhabitants in each 
bustee reported involvement in each of the four main occupational groups: home, 
manual, administrative and professional. Over half of the respondents in both 
bustees reported being manual workers. For men, in both cases, almost a quarter 
were drivers - either taxi drivers or chauffeurs. Of the rest, in ward 85, most 
exercised a trade - either as mechanics or as masons; whereas in ward 67, of 
those that were not drivers, many sold fish in the local markets. Some also sold 
cooked food on the street and a few rode rickshaws. Less than 5%of the 
respondents from either bustee occupy professional or administrative jobs. The 
one professional in the two bustees was a man, working as a tutor.
The total proportion of manual workers in each bustee, disguises notable 
differences between the sexes. At least 80% of men from each bustee reported 
being manual workers. While in both bustees the proportion of women reporting
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themselves to be manual labourers was small, there were more female manual 
labourers in SL than in DT. Female manual workers in both SL and DT were 
mainly employed as domestic servants. A few worked as cooks. Nevertheless, in 
both bustees, the vast majority of women reported housework as their main 
occupation, although slightly more women gave this response in DT than in SL. 
These figures merely confirm what has been reported elsewhere about the low 
levels of female participation in the labour force in West Bengal (Standing, 1990).
Differing levels of participation in the manual labour force between men and 
women may be attributed to the fact of men, on average, having benefited from 
more years of education than women have. Different levels of participation 
amongst women from the two bustees, may reflect differences in educational 
status - women in SL have on average more years of education than those of DT. 
But this is unlikely to be the only reason. Low educational status should not be a 
barrier to female participation in manual occupations and clearly significant 
numbers of men with little or no schooling manage to take an active role in manual 
occupations. Other factors must also play their part.
In the course of my fieldwork, I perceived there to be distinct differences in gender 
relations between a bustee with a significant Bihari population and that with a 
significant Bengali population. This was manifested in a number of ways. In the 
Bihari segments of DT, women of child bearing age were rarely seen in public 
spaces. Instead they would be occupied in their ghor, or sit chatting on the corner 
of their galis. Both men and women concurred that it was not appropriate for 
women of such an age to be seen “out, roaming around”. Young Hindustani 
women in DT never ventured out of the bustee without a chaperone, often a man, 
but sometimes another woman relative. When asked if they worked outside of the 
home, most Hindustani women would reply that they didn’t work outside the home, 
and seemed horrified at the mere suggestion. Surprisingly, the few that did work 
were not themselves the subject of social ostracism or criticism. Instead their 
husbands were gossiped about disparagingly, and referred to as uncaring, 
irresponsible and lazy.
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By contrast, women of comparable age and marital/childbearing status in SL, were 
usually very active outside the confines of their bari, even if they didn't work 
outside their houses. The women in SL would visit the market alone and for the 
most part move freely without a chaperone outside the bustee - usually to visit 
family, collect children from school and visit a doctor. Questions about work, when 
asked to women in SL, were answered at face value, without a hint of offence and 
without making the interviewer feel that the question was impertinent.
4.4.2 Household Income
HOUSEHOLD INCOME/MONTH 
(RS)
SL (N=98) DT (N=89) TOTAL (N=187)
<=1,000 5.10%(5) 3.37% (3) 4.28%(8)
1,000-2,000 48.98%(48) 23.60% (21) 36.90%(69)
2,000-3,000 28.57%(28) 40.45%(36) 34.22%(64)
>3,000 17.35% 117) 32.58%(29) 24.60% (46)
Table 4.5: Distribution of Monthly Household Income in SL and DT/a
In DT, two respondents declined to give their average household monthly income. 
The figures reveal slight differences in income between the two bustees. Almost 
54% of households in SL reported a monthly income of less than Rs 2,000, 
whereas only 27% of households in ward 85 reported a monthly income of less 
than Rs 2,000. On the opposite end of the scale, 46% of households in SL 
reported earning over Rs 2,000, whereas 63% of households in ward 85 reported 
earning more than Rs 2,000/month. Households in DT reported a higher average 
monthly income, compared to households in SL. To give a more consolidated 
picture of the comparative wealth of the households in the two research areas, a 
list was compiled of household assets.
70
In SL, the mean was Rs 1 -2000. 
In DT, the mean was Rs 2-3000.
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4.4.3 Distribution of Househoid Assets
Asset SL (N=98) DT (N=91) Total
Pressure cooker 53% (52) 45% (41) 93
Fridge 3% (3) 2% (2) 5
TV (b&W) 73% (72) 69% (63) 135
TV (Colour) 8% (8) 8% (7) 15
No TV 18% (18) 23% (21) 39
Radio 39%(38) 43% (39) 77
Tape 31% (30) 36% (33) 63
Fan 87% (85) 90% (82) 167
Car 0 1% (1) 1
Scooter 2% (2) 1% (1) 3
Bicycle 16.3% (16) 19% (17) 33
Table 4.6: Distribution of Household Assets for SL and
Despite having different average household incomes, with DT appearing to be 
more prosperous, the two communities seem to have a comparable distribution of 
assets. In this sense, the income disparity between the two communities is not 
reflected in their possession of assets. SL has slightly more TVs, pressure cookers 
and fridge owners than DT. However, DT has a marginally higher number of 
respondents who reported possessing radio, tape, fan and bicycle, than in SL.
The survey data from the two research sites provides an insight into the socio­
economic characteristics of the two bustees, and suggests that in socio-economic 
terms, there are broad similarities between the two. The men are mainly involved 
in manual labour, whereas on the whole women work within the household. The 
inhabitants of both bustees seem to share a broadly similar relationship to the 
means of production. Although the inhabitants of DT appear on average to earn 
higher incomes than those of SL, there is no significant difference in the household
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distribution of assets between the two bustees. It has been noted that SL has more 
space, but the average household size is the same for both areas. So as to gain a 
richer picture of life in the two bustees, the next section will present comparative 
ethnographic data on social relations.
4.5 Social Relations: Dover Terrace, Garcha
4.5.1 Residential Characteristics and Kin Ties
The evident ethnic diversity of DT does not mean that the different groups are 
evenly scattered throughout this bustee. The same applies to SL, where there is a 
small, yet perceptible non-Bengali population. Instead, the clustering of ethnically 
homogeneous groups is a prevalent aspect of both these research areas, as it has 
been in the city as a whole (see Bose, 1965), and each of the bustees is separated 
into ethnically homogenous enclaves.
DT is divided between a predominantly ‘Hindustani’ segment (#13), a Bengali 
segment (#11&12) and a small enclave located within the Bengali segment, 
occupied by Oriyas (#14). The inhabitants of #11 &12 hail from the districts of the 
centre-south of West Bengal, mainly from 24 Parganas (South) - around the 
Diamond Harbour area, and a few from what is now Bangladesh. There are a 
handful of Christian families in this part of the bustee. 11 and 12 DT are almost 
exclusively Bengali, with a handful of Bihari families.
#14 Dover Terrace is a walled enclave in the middle of 11&12. The 15 households 
are all occupied by Oriyas, mainly from Cuttack district. This community is 
relatively small in number and physically isolated from the surrounding bustee 
population. The Oriyas live in a self-enclosed residential unit, with rooms joined by 
a narrow corridor through the middle. The unit is almost entirely male dominated, 
with only two of the fifteen ghor containing non-male inhabitants. As a rule, wives 
and children stay in Orissa, whilst men migrate to Calcutta for work, returning 
perhaps once a month, and sometimes for prolonged periods at times of crisis.79
79 After the Orissa cyclone of 1999, the ‘oriya bari’ remained deserted for at least 14 days, whilst the 
inhabitants had rushed home to see to family and property.
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Their attachment to Calcutta would seem entirely for economic reasons. Most of 
the day is spent working and the rest of the time, resting or doing household 
chores. Participation in social activities is avoided and interest or awareness of 
local issues is minimal.
It is estimated that the settlement now called #13, is approximately 80 yrs old. The 
older men in #13 bustee (those of 50 years or more) say that their grandfathers 
settled here. The majority of the older inhabitants claim to hail from Munghir 
District (Bihar), some from Dharbanga and Bhagalpur and one household from 
Madhumani district also from Bihar. As such, the inhabitants are mainly Magahi 
speakers, with those from Dharbangar speaking pure Maithili. The first generation 
of migrants were mainly masons (mistri) and adopted the title ‘mistri’ in addition to 
their surname/title, Gupta. Some were weavers, but also hold the surname Gupta. 
In fact every non-Bengali household in#13 except for three - Mahato, Misra and 
Das - has the surname Gupta. Just as the Bengali part of the bustee has a few 
Bihari families, so #13 also has three Bengali families, two of whom are related.
The ways in which the bustees have been occupied and settled has reinforced the 
separation between the ethnic groups. The pattern suggests that previously the 
thika tenant rented his ghor to his kinfolk.80 For example the sons of the bariwalla 
would settle with their wives in the huts adjacent to that of their father. Often a 
wife’s relative would then come and occupy another hut in the same bari, and in 
this way all the huts would be rented out. The pattern was broken most often if the 
bariwalla had only female offspring, in which case custom held that the daughter 
should marry outside her own community and move to live with her in-laws. In this 
case, although kinfolk were often preferred, necessity meant that friends, 
acquaintances and even those recommended by others, ended up renting rooms.
For example in #13 Bithun (Mistri), Mahabir (Mistri) and Kaila (Mistri) were three 
brothers all of whom worked as masons and arrived from Bihar more than seventy
80 Calcutta bustees have traditionally been organised on a three tier tenancy system, known as Thika Tenancy. 
Zamindars rented land to individuals thika tenants (bariwallas) who built hutments on the land and then rented 
these out to tenants (bharatias).
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years ago. They rented some land and built a bari with hutments. Kaila married 
and occupied one room. There he brought up his four sons and three daughters. 
Three of his sons continue to live with their widowed mother in the room, together 
with two of his daughters - one separated and one unmarried. Next door lived his 
brother, Mahabir with his three daughters and one son. His son and second 
daughter live in two separate rooms, adjacent to one another, whilst his widowed 
wife, Radha, lives in the converted cattle pen which the three brothers once owned. 
People who occupy the other rooms in the gali have no kin ties within the bustee, 
and I suspect belong to different castes - one Brahmin, one Kayasth and one 
Kurmi - of which two, of the three families, are Maithili speakers, who arrived from 
different parts of the city after hearing from friends that there were rooms available. 
Hence, although baris were once settled along kin lines, the recent settlers here 
seem to have diluted this.
4.5.2 Social Life and Worship
There is no community space except for the road and street corner, and it is here 
that the children play and adults congregate. The residential segregation of the 
bustee along ethnic lines is the aspect that is the most easily noticeable to the 
researcher. Only through chronicling social life do some of the other divisions 
within as well as between the different ethnic groups become manifest. People do 
not habitually visit neighbouring bari, but inhabitants of, say, #13 will meet and 
interact in the public space of a street corner or the road.81 However, the 
inhabitants of the Bihari, Bengali and Oriya parts of the bustee do not mix, even in 
public spaces. To the observer, this is curious, particularly as they live adjacent to 
one another, or at least no more than 20 metres apart. 11.12&14 have a youth club 
in the local vicinity, Five Star, used only by the (Bengali) male youths from the 
bustee. Local clubs and societies often take the leading role in organising sporting
81 When I first visited the bustee, inhabitants of one bari were pleased to introduce me to their neighbours, but 
refused to venture into even the adjacent ‘gali’ for the same purpose. Bari commonly means home. In this 
context it refers to a hutment, which is often divided into separate rooms (ghor), each one occupied by a 
separate family. A gali is the narrow lane between hutments.
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and cultural events, yet those participating will often be exclusively from one part of 
the bustee, and hence are usually ethnically exclusive.
Differences amongst ethnic groups crystallize during times of religious festivals. 
Bihari and Bengali bustee inhabitants living practically adjacent to one another, 
organise and celebrate their own religious festivals, largely to the exclusion of the 
other group. Inhabitants of each part of the bustee are meticulous about preserving 
their customs and cultural traditions, particularly those that are manifestly different 
to those of their neighbours. For example for Durga Puja, the most popular Bengali 
festival, the Bengali part of the bustee erected a pandal and collected donations, 
whereas no such effort will be made by the inhabitants of #13 - many of whom 
have lived in Calcutta for over three generations. Durga Puja is not perceived to be 
their festival. But, on the occasion of shothpuja - the biggest festival of the year for 
Biharis - the inhabitants of #13 were busy preparing themselves weeks in advance, 
whilst for those in 11,12 &14 the event will pass off without so much as gesture of 
solidarity.
In this bustee not only do the different ethnic groups live, socialise and worship 
separately. At the bottom line there seems to be a prevailing animosity that is quite 
palpable between the two communities. Residents of each cluster seem distrustful 
and suspicious of one another although rarely did this descend into open conflict 
during the period that I spent there. The reason for this enmity is unclear, although 
it was suggested by older middle class resident Bengalis that this stems from 
Bengalis’ sense of superiority over non-Bengali speaking migrants from Bihar and 
Orissa, who they have tended to marginalise and look down upon.82 Adding to this, 
the vernacular of the Bihari inhabitants in Garcha, most of whom are Magahi 
speakers, was traditionally considered “boorish and rude by speakers of other 
Indian languages”. This may have influenced Bengalis’ attitude to Biharis speaking 
Magahi.83
82 Bengalis looked down upon the Biharis and considered them dirty- Sinha (personal communication).
83 Imperial Gazeteer o f India: Provincial Series Bengal Vol 2 (1979:150).
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Unsurprisingly in such a densely congested living environment, there is high 
pressure on scarce local resources. Disputes over access and sharing of water 
are common in the bustee, according to my informants. As each cluster of the 
bustee has its own taps and tubewell these disputes never seem to acquire an 
openly ethnic dimension within the bustee. Where these do occur between 
representatives of two different ethnic groups, however, this dimension does 
surface and often serves to fuel the dispute. After one such incident, a Bengali 
bustee inhabitant, living in a predominantly Bihari bari, referred to her Bihari 
neighbours as uncouth, uncultured and dirty. I have even heard the accusation 
that Biharis are not of the same ja t as Bengalis, but are actually descended from 
Muslims.84
4.5.3 Occupation and Educational Status
Differences in socio-economic terms, though less severe than those between 
different groups of inhabitants within the ward, were nevertheless a source of 
cleavage and conflict which cut across other important affinal ties like ethnicity. 
Take for example the case of #13, a predominately Bihari part of the bustee. The 
young men living here clearly separated themselves into different groups on the 
basis of their education and occupation. One group was comprised of those who 
have studied up to and beyond their HSC and, possibly, possess degrees. The 
other group comprises those who have studied at the most to upper primary level 
but mostly those who have not studied at all.
84 Stories of the Bengalis distinctiveness to other regional groups in India are legend. This is the staple of 
most conversations with Bengalis of all classes and status, although most common in middle class circles. It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to explore this issue at any great length; suffice to say that although the 
region shares some affinities with other parts of India, it is nevertheless distinct from the north and the south. 
Peripheral to the subcontinent in geographic terms, as well as to the dominant Vedic Brahminical culture and 
Hindu empires, it was also largely beyond the reach of the early invaders. These basic differences were then 
extenuated with subsequent early contact with the British, which had a long-lasting effect on the industrial, 
agrarian, commercial and political development of the region. Coupled with this is the feeling, prominent 
amongst many Bengalis, that the fertility of the land, which allows for more time to be spent on life’s luxuries; 
the climate, which encourages the pursuit of leisure and the racial composition of its people are unique 
attributes of the region and help account for the ‘genius’ inherent to Bengali people (See Franda, 1971b: 5,56).
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Whereas the former group members aspired to clerical, administrative or skilled 
employment - one of the members of the group is a computer operator, another an 
insurance clerk - the members of the other group aspired to nothing more than a 
regular job as a chauffeur, at best, and would settle for regular employment as 
masons and mechanics. Members of this second group, whilst occasionally 
successful in securing temporary employment, tended to spend most of their time 
sitting around, playing cards, running errands and, eventually, drinking. Whilst the 
members of the former group were similarly unsuccessful in reaching their 
aspirations, they tended to deprecate the way of life of their less educated 
neighbours. In the end, it is they that keep themselves separate from the rest.
Another group comprised those of similar ages who were barely schooled but who, 
due to their family contacts, had managed to secure stable employment in manual 
occupations. This small group was keen to disassociate itself from the drinking 
and gambling of those of comparable educational status, but who were 
unemployed. Equally, it chose not to associate with the educated but partially 
employed. Another discernible group was comprised of moderately educated men 
(with class 6-8 education), with secure jobs as chauffeurs. Members of this group 
chose not to associate themselves with any of the other three groups. Due to their 
higher educational status and regular employment, they had little in common with 
the second group of unemployed and illiterate men. Driving a car gave them a 
status, which set them apart from regularly employed manual labourers of the third 
group. And finally, the fact that they settled for jobs such as driving, rather than 
sticking it out for a slightly more lucrative and undeniably higher status clerical job 
marked them apart from the first group of educated yet unemployed men.85
Divisions also appeared between landlords/ hutowners (bariwallas) and tenants 
(bharatias). In terms of declared income and assets, there was no significant 
difference between the two. Admittedly, some colour TV owners were bariwallas, 
but there were also colour TV owners who were not. The only perceptible 
difference in their standard of living was that bariwallas occupied bigger rooms, in
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general, than their tenants. However, despite the absence of any overt divergence 
in prosperity there nevertheless existed a pervasive sense of distrust and 
suspicion between the two.
Bariwallas would complain to me that their tenants paid them too little rent, too 
infrequently, which they used as a justification for not carrying out any of the 
necessary repairs or improvements on their properties. Tenants in turn would 
report constantly being under pressure to pay more in rent and of having to 
shoulder the costs of upkeep and renovation themselves. There would be frequent 
hushed accusations of landlord avarice at the expense of the general living 
conditions of the area. The building of second floor rooms, by landlords, for rent at 
ten times the average area rent whilst the level of facilities remained the same, 
was cited as an illustration of this. Further fears that in fact landlords would collude 
with land speculators (promoters) to have them evicted also seemed to be a 
prominent concern, which was only really spoken about in the concluding months 
of fieldwork and only in one part of the bustee, #13.
For the researcher, the logic of this was hard to fathom. The inhabitants of DT, as 
registered bustee dwellers, are protected by the terms of the Thika Tenancy Act.86 
Nevertheless, they feared that at some stage the terms would be ignored, and they 
(bharatias) would be offered money to give up their plots (and their rights). Those 
that refused would be forcibly evicted. On the one hand, whilst they knew that they 
could not be simply evicted without compensation, they were also aware that the 
hutments were not theirs to sell. The suspicion was that some sort of cash 
inducement would be offered to lure them away, but it would be the bariwallas who 
would receive the lion’s share and have most to gain from this. They knew that it
85 This group of young men for the most part, fell out of the sample set-which included only household heads 
and their spouses.
86 To gain control of the land so as to more effectively upgrade bustees, the state tried to abolish the three-tier 
tenancy system in 1981, through the introduction of the Thika Tenancy Act. All bustee land was vested in the 
state and every thika tenant (bariwallas) would pay the state a rent equivalent to what s/he had paid the 
landlord (zamindar). Bariwallas were permitted to convert their properties into multi-storey buildings to 
accommodate more tenants, and landlords (zamindars) were compensated for the loss of their income. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the impact of these changes, suffice to say that they have not been as 
successful as expected. See Ghosh (1992).
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would be in the interests of some, particularly the bariwallas, to accept this, and 
that those that did not would then be pushed out.
The likelihood that bariwallas would accept the inducements was considerable in 
this area given another aspect of this bustee that the survey failed to reflect, 
namely the fact that many inhabitants, and most bariwallas, owned property 
elsewhere in the city on its periphery in places like Kasba and Subhas Gram. 
Whereas they rented in DT, the properties in the periphery were owned and now 
either rented or occupied by other family members. With an exit option available to 
them, the feeling was that should a cash inducement be offered to move from the 
bustee, many of the inhabitants having an exit option would probably accept.
According to the account of one anthropologist who researched the bustee 
adjacent to my research site, there had always been a simmering tension between 
bariwallas and bharatias. During the time that he researched the bustee - some 
thirty years ago - tenants used to protest against poor living conditions and high 
rents imposed on them by the bariwallas (hutowners). These sentiments, he 
recalls, helped to fuel a movement led by the local councillor at that time (Suchin 
Sen, later to be MLA) against thika tenancy and hutowners.87
The prevailing tension between the tenants and the landlords on one occasion 
spilled over into open conflict and hindered attempts at community improvement. 
Efforts to persuade the city authorities to introduce improvements in the bustee 
have been opposed by a section of the residents themselves, who feared that this 
would result in them paying higher rents. For example, in the corner of the bustee, 
between two walls rubbish has been piled up over time and is used by those who 
live furthest from it for urinating. There is a ubiquitous stench emanating from this 
area, which after dark becomes infested with vermin. Those living closest to the 
dump, the bariwalla, lobbied the CMC to have the area cleared and a toilet built. 
Attempts were made by him to block the area off to prevent further dumping and 
urinating. These proved unsuccessful after residents using the dump reported
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those protesting to the police, who promptly arrested and imprisoned the most 
prominent protester, releasing him the next day. He admitted to losing the will to 
protest any further after this incident.
More often than not the mistrust between the landlords and tenants hung at a level 
sufficient to effectively prevent or undermine any attempts at group activity. This 
first came to the fore when I tried to organise a bustee children’s trip to the 
National Museum around Diwali. The chance to go to the museum was open to all 
the children in #13 who felt that they would be able to appreciate the trip and 
whose parents would allow them to join. Eventually a group of some 15 children 
informed me that they would be going, and when the appointed day arrived, we 
made arrangements to leave for the venue. Before the trip even began, it was 
nearly abandoned because of the mistrust and suspicion expressed by some of 
the children towards others. Whilst by no means unusual, the nature of the 
comments reflected the same sorts of views and positions adopted by their parents, 
and covertly expressed subsequently at various stages through the fieldwork. 
Children would say that they could not be in the same group as x, because he was 
cunning, bad, untrustworthy and greedy -  because, for example, x’s father was a 
landlord always trying to extract money from them.
4.6 Social Relations in Swinhoe Lane Bustee, Kasba
4.6.1 Residential Patterns and Kin Ties
From a reading of the survey data, the comparative research site appears less 
ethnically heterogeneous than DT, yet it was divided along ethnic lines. SL has a 
sizable Hindustani population comprised of migrants from Bihar and UP who have 
dominated one bari of the bustee, #53. There are three Bengali households in #53. 
Whilst, as in DT, inter-bar/ communication and interaction is rare, except in public 
spaces on the thoroughfare itself, as between Hindustanis and Bengalis it was 
non-existent. In over 6 months spent studying the bustee, not once did I witness a
87 Personal Communication, Interview with Dr. Dixit Sinha Santineketan, 20/03/200. See also Sinha (1972).
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conversation between, on the one hand, Bihari and UP women of #53, and, on the 
other, Bengali women from the other bustee bari.
Ethnic cleavages dividing the local population crystallised on numerous occasions 
during my time in SL, of which three examples follow. Separation between the two 
ethnic groups first became apparent during the construction of a social map, about 
one month after arriving. The children of #53 were asked to draw a map of their 
'para', their neighbourhood. Of a group of about ten children, three drew, guided at 
times by the rest. The result was a detailed map of their bari, with all the main 
points of reference - the mandir (temple), the tree, the water tap - clearly marked. 
When asked to describe the picture, the children described it as a map of their 
para (neighbourhood,), when clearly what they had drawn was map of their bari. I 
tried again, by asking them why certain features of the neighbourhood (what I 
considered to be their ‘para’) were not included. The children replied quite 
unequivocally, that the points of reference that I had mentioned were from another 
para, a neighbouring para not their own.
Just as in DT ethnic divisions were further highlighted during the celebration of 
religious festivals. #53 had its very own places of worship - a Shitala and a Shiv 
Mandir - that replicated those that already existed elsewhere in the bustee. I first 
encountered the residents of this bari as they were celebrating puja for the 
goddess Shitala. Whereas the celebration of Shitala Puja is not unusual, the fact 
that they chose to celebrate it almost one month before the rest of the bustee (and 
Bengal), to celebrate it amongst themselves and, not in the open but inside the 
courtyard of their bari, was certainly strange.
Similarly, though Durga Puja was celebrated with some style in this bustee - 
donations were collected, a thakur (an image sculptor) employed, bamboo rented, 
a sound system installed and a pandal erected - the non-Bengali (Hindustani) 
inhabitants took no interest whatsoever in these events. The presence of a large 
pandal erected no more than ten metres from their bari, seemed to make no 
difference to their attitude. Whilst the children seemed excited at the thought of 
there being a celebration and all that this entails-music, food, dancing, new
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clothes-their elder siblings and the adults around them quickly doused such 
enthusiasm by reminding them that this was not ‘their puja’. When I went to visit SL 
during the height of the puja celebration, I found the street lit up, mantras mixed 
with film music were blaring out of loud speakers arranged around the bustee, and 
crowds of people were flocking to visit the pandal in their street. But for the 
residents of #53 it was if nothing was happening. I found them going about their 
evening’s activities as usual. They seemed to completely ignore what was 
occurring around them, except to complain about the noise and the ostentation of 
the festivities.
When asked as to the reasons for this separation, older inhabitants of #53 
informed me that there was a ‘communication gap’ between them and the rest of 
the bustee. The source of this was unclear, and they were obviously embarrassed 
to explain their gripes about their Bengali neighbours in front of two Bengalis- my 
research assistant and myself. Although language was cited as barrier to open 
conversation, it should by no means have been insuperable. The Hindustani 
inhabitants had spent long enough in Calcutta to converse in Bengali although, 
admittedly, they lacked confidence to be able to do this. One lady, who had moved 
from Garcha, confessed that she felt alienated here, because Biharis were very 
much in the minority. The same people also mentioned food to be a major source 
of difference. Bengalis, they said, went to great lengths to prepare elaborate 
meals, of at least five items, nearly always comprising fish and/or meat dishes. 
They on the other hand, kept their meals simple: daal, sobji and roti or rice.88 
Although on the surface this reason may appear minor, for the residents of #53, it 
was serious enough to demand mention.
4.6.2 Social and Economic Differences
There were noticeable disparities in assets and income between bari and within 
bari in this bustee. For example, it was clear that the ghor in #53 (the Hindustani 
bari) were on average smaller and had fewer assets compared to the ghor in the
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other bari in the bustee, and in some cases did not even have basic amenities 
such as electricity. In contrast, #52 stood out, primarily, as more prosperous on 
account of its bigger and more ornate ghor.
It was also obvious that even within bari, there were differences in the level of 
affluence. For example in #53, two households stood out as exceptional in terms of 
their assets and the space they possessed. The first of these belonged to the 
landlady. It was speculated that she possessed considerable assets in her two- 
roomed ghor in SL, in addition to what she professed to own in her desh in Belia 
District of UP - namely a considerable amount of land and livestock. A Bihari 
Brahmin, Mr. J headed the second visibly prosperous household in this bari. He 
was the local CPI (M) cadre and bustee representative to the Bustee Federation. 
Mr.J’s ghor showed unmistakable signs of being more prosperous than the rest. It 
had a telephone, its own separate water tap, a kitchen and two bedrooms - the 
second was a separate room rented in another part of the bari at a reduced price.
Similarly within other bari, notably #52, there were differences between 
households. Some households were considerably more prosperous than others. 
These belonged to the bariwalla and his kin, who occupied nearly all the rooms in 
the bari. Most of the household heads were close affinal kin-brothers, sisters, 
uncles and aunts of the bariwalla, and carried the surname Sardar. The men all 
worked selling fish in local markets, and most ran their own stalls. Only a few were 
not related to this kin group, and were visibly less affluent. These included one 
man, Mr. Mondal, who the bariwalla had befriended when he was sleeping rough 
and working as a market labourer. He was invited to live here by the landlord 
himself and given a room to occupy and a job selling fish, for which he has ever 
since been deeply grateful. The case of the second family, the Maitis, the youngest 
son who was jobless, was taught a trade (fish selling and filleting) by the landlord 
and offered a job in the fish market.
88 Lentils, vegetables and unleavened bread
145
146
Within the bari there was little discernible resentment towards the Sardars’, despite 
the fact that some of their neighbours were not property owners, earned less and 
had a lower standard of living. Curiously, throughout the time spent in the bustee, 
neither was there any resentment expressed on the part of the inhabitants of #53 
towards either of these two individuals who clearly were so much more affluent 
than they were.
In #52, one reason for this may have been due to the predominance of one kin 
group. Kin loyalties proved a powerful bond between the majority of the inhabitants 
of the bustee. For those bari members who were not related to the Sardars, the 
livelihood opportunities provided by the landlord had resulted in a deep and 
intimate loyalty to him and his relatives, extinguishing the possibility of conflict 
which the other differences could have otherwise caused. Probably for these 
reasons, material differences did not emerge to divide the inhabitants of this bari.
For the Hindustanis of #53, the sharing of a common culture, language and 
ethnicity, seemed to provide a sense of security - enhanced by the sense of 
isolation and alienation that they felt living in a predominantly Bengali bustee - 
which helped to overshadow the potential divisions which differing levels of 
affluence could have produced. Mr.J’s political prominence - as a member of the 
Bustee Federation and a CPI (M) member - meant that loyalty and allegiance to 
him could carry benefits (access to social goods, security, employment), which 
almost certainly would not arrive if mutual antagonism was allowed to flourish. In 
the prevailing atmosphere of alienation and isolation in which they lived, political 
allegiances were essential to add to their sense of security. The need to survive 
and feel secure in a hostile environment, for the inhabitants of #53, meant that 
solidarities based upon ethnic lines came to the fore to subsume the sorts of class 
divisions that the clear differences in assets and income could have produced.
Far more noticeable were the disparities in assets and income between baris in the 
bustee. # 52 stood out as the bari with, on average, the most prosperous 
households. Strong local kin ties and privileged access to lucrative employment 
opportunities helped explain these differences and were the source of
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considerable resentment within the bustee. In #52, the bariwalla belonged to the 
oldest and numerically dominant family in the bustee, the Sardars. Not only were 
they all related to one another, but all the male heads and most of their male 
offspring, worked selling fish, mostly in their own stalls, in local markets. Selling 
fish (or in their case, previously, tortoise) does not carry a particularly high ritual 
status in Bengal. But it is lucrative - especially for the person who sells from his 
own shop, and would place him in an economic position superior to that of his 
neighbours in the bustee.
The Sardars perceptibly greater affluence was not the only source of division 
between them and their neighbours. Whilst their comparative economic prosperity 
was palpable, as a group they wielded considerable social power and political 
influence throughout the bustee. This was largely on account of the strength of 
their local kin ties and their dominance of the ritual affairs of the bustee.
4.6.3 Kin Ties
The baris in SL are comprised of a mixture of kinfolk as well as outsiders. The 
vast majority of the local inhabitants hail from South 24 Parganas, from villages 
around Joynagar, Laksmikantipur and Diamond Harbour. There are two families 
from Murshidabad in north Bengal. #53 was the exception, being predominantly 
Hindustani. In general, no bari is dominated by one kin group - kin ties seemed to 
cut across bari boundaries - except in the case of #52, which was dominated by 
the Sardar family.
The first settlers to this part of Kasba were the ancestors of the present day 
Sardars. According to local accounts, the great grandmother of the present 
landlord, Haridasi Sardar, was the first person to settle in this area of Kasba. She 
probably came from the 24 Parganas (South) region, or the Sunderbans (which 
may have been indistinguishable at that time). Haridasi married Moti Singh, who 
after marriage left his parent’s home and settled in Kasba with Haridasi, assuming 
her surname. He used to sell tortoise in Gariahat market.
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They had a daughter nicknamed Kalaburri. Kalaburri continued in the tradition set 
by her mother. After marriage, her husband also joined her at Kasba and adopted 
her surname. They had three sons and three daughters. The three sons were 
Khadu, Probod and Ajit. All Kalaburri’s sons lived here, as do their male offspring. 
The three daughters were Rajubala, Jamuna and Annarda. After marriage they 
also all stayed in Swinhoe Lane, where they were joined by their respective 
husbands and assumed their husband’s surname. Kalaburri's property passed 
both to her sons and also to her daughters. The last two features mark them out 
from mainstream Bengali Hindu society, which is patrilineal and uxorilocal.
The already significant Sardar clan that had decided to settle in the bustee was 
consolidated by the fact that on many occasions the Sardar men, Kalaburri’s 
grandsons, had fallen in love with and married girls from neighbouring bari in SL, a 
practice widely frowned upon. Kin ties thus extended beyond #52 to the other bari 
in the bustee, ensuring for the Sardars a prominent social position in SL. In the 
words of one resident, “They’re uneducated, you know I don’t think any of them 
have been to school. And they’ve married all the girls in the vicinity and had loads 
of kids. That’s all they know, marry the local girls and have lots of children. That's 
how they've become so powerful".
4.6.4 A Dominant Role in Ritual Life
The Sardars have gained prominence locally through their role in the ritual life of 
the bustee, particularly their control of the main place of worship in SL, and on 
account of their leading role in the organisation of religious festivals. It is a role 
that has given them a certain social status, which is resented by other inhabitants 
of the neighbourhood.
All bustees have places of worship, usually a Shiv temple and a Kali temple. The 
central point of reference in SL is a Shitala Mandir (temple) which occupies a 
whole ghor, exactly mid-way along SL. Given the acute shortage of space in all 
bustees, even though SL is comparatively more spacious than DT, to see a whole 
ghor dedicated to a goddess is unusual. A picture of Kalaburri, who was said to be
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a staunch believer in Shitala (the goddess of the underworld and the person 
prayed in order to cure pox), adorns the wall of the Shitala mandir. People claim 
that the mandir in fact occupies the room that she once lived in, and this ‘family 
connection’ goes some way to explaining the size and prime location of this 
particular mandir in relation to the rest of the bustee.
It is traditional amongst farming castes in southern Bengal to worship the goddess 
Shitala (Shitala devi) as a way to ward off illness. Many of the present day 
inhabitants of SL - with titles like Haider, Mondal and Dass - belong to these castes, 
making the mandir an important place of worship for the bustee. As the mandir 
marks the start of #52, the Sardar's bari, and is clearly situated in what others 
consider to be their para, in a room formerly occupied by Kalaburri, the mandir is 
inextricably linked with the Sardar family. They control access to the mandir, which 
is used to reward those regarded as friends, and to punish those considered to be 
enemies. Allies were given the keys to the mandir and allowed to clean and 
decorate it with prasad (offerings). Those that were disliked, for whatever reason, 
were prevented from having access to the keys, and so had to worship from a 
distance, without being able to leave offerings.
This organic attachment to the shitala mandir provided a platform from which the 
Sardars managed to branch out to take the lead in other religious festivals, most 
notably Durga Puja. For the last seven years, they have collected the donations 
from the other bustee inhabitants, have hired the artisans to sculpture the statues 
of the goddess and have made all the necessary arrangements for a pandal. Their 
dominance of ritual life in the bustee, not so much around Shitala, but certainly 
around Durga Puja, would seem to be a potent symbol of their local power and 
influence, although entirely incongruous with their ritual status. Although by no 
means categorical, it may be assumed that Sardars are of low status in the Bengali 
caste system. Their line of occupation, selling tortoise flesh, further confirms this 
notion.
Many residents of neighbouring baris resented how the Sardars had monopolised 
ritual life in SL. The Sardars controlled access to the Shitala Mandir, dominated
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the Puja Committee and collected chadda (donations). Resentment particularly 
surfaced at the way that chadda was collected, and allegations were rife about its 
eventual destination. Some residents spoke of the rich making themselves richer. 
It was alleged that most of the chadda was channeled into the upkeep of the 
Shitala Mandir and for their own personal consumption, rather than into the Puja 
celebration. Although donations were avowedly voluntary, non-payment was said 
to result in quite severe social sanctions. It was alleged by inhabitants of 
neighbouring bari that the Sardars picked arguments with them and intimidated 
those that didn’t pay. Furthermore, informants that confessed to challenging the 
collection of donations claimed that they were subsequently prevented from giving 
offerings at the Shitala mandir.
Though chadda was collected from all inhabitants, Puja celebrations seemed 
somewhat exclusive, adding to the resentment felt by local inhabitants towards the 
Sardars. The pandal was set up at the entrance to #52, and effectively resembled 
an extension of the Sardar’s bari. The way that Puja actually took place reinforced 
the sense that this was a family affair, rather than a bustee affair. Rows of chairs 
were set up inside the awning (pandal), but only members of the Sardar family 
could be seen sitting on these. The young women married to Sardars distributed 
the food, whilst the young Sardar men fiddled with the display and made sure that 
all the technical aspects were in order. Sardar offspring played around the pandal 
in their new clothes. The suspicion that this may be a family affair was confirmed 
when Dilip Sardar welcomed me into 'amader bari puja' (our house's Puja).
The inhabitants from neighbouring baris looked on, some in curiosity, others with 
quite apparent disdain. Few had bothered to get dressed up, and even fewer 
ventured into the pandal to say a prayer or give an offering. During the evening, I 
saw one woman from a neighbouring bari venture in to pray. She literally ran in to 
the pandal, hurried through her mantra, gave her offering and rushed out again, all 
the while avoiding eye contact with any of those seated.
Divisions became manifest in this bustee at different times, on account of ethnicity, 
kin ties, prominence in ritual affairs and economic affluence. The point is that at
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times, cleavages could be noted which also cut across important social categories 
such as ethnicity. Different levels of affluence divided the Bengalis in SL, as did the 
monopolisation of ritual life that one family seemed to enjoy. The poor Biharis of 
#53 did not seem to resent their more affluent Bihari neighbours, possibly on 
account of a common ethnicity and language, but more likely due to the security 
which these more affluent, and in one case politically well-connected, neighbours 
could provide. Far from being a harmonious or consensual unit, despite being 
predominantly ethnically Bengali, jealousies mistrust and resentment over a whole 
range of issues served to divide the local inhabitants of SL.
4.7 Conclusion
Through the use of survey data and detailed ethnography, this chapter has 
presented an account of social relations in two Calcutta bustees. The chapter has 
highlighted the differences between inhabitants living in two separate bustees of 
the city. Cleavages, conflict, divisions and differences between inhabitants 
characterised social relations in each area. Most obvious were the divisions along 
ethnic lines - members of different ethnic groups (mainly Biharis and Bengalis) 
socialised and celebrated religious festivals separately, as well as residing in 
ethnically homogeneous clusters. However, it was shown that differences 
emerged which served to divide those of the same ethnic group, cutting across 
broad categories such as ethnicity. For example, within the broad ethnic clusters of 
DT, there were clear differences of education and occupational status, and these 
affected associations within this segment of the bustee. In the Bengali cluster of SL, 
divisions along class lines as well as kin lines emerged. The largest kin group 
exerted a great deal of influence and social power within the bustee. This was 
partly on account of their economic position as fish sellers and stall owners, and 
partly on account of their ancestral ties, which had given them access to and 
control of key aspects of local ritual life. This was the source of jealousy and 
resentment amongst their neighbours - mainly Bengalis. In some instances it was 
shown that solidarities were forged in spite of these differences, often based on a 
rational decision by some inhabitants to ensure their own personal security, in 
terms of physical well being and access to livelihoods.
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The view of the local community as a consensual and homogeneous group, which 
is prepared to act collectively to exert pressure on government, is at the heart of 
the concept of decentralisation. The description of the divisions and differences 
amongst local inhabitants in these two neighbourhoods challenges this notion of 
the ‘poor’ as a harmonious group with common interests and concerns, and serves 
to qualify the assumption that decentralisation will necessarily result in the greater 
participation of the local community in local government. This is not to say that on 
account of these differences, that collective action is impossible - indeed Chapter 
Five shows that community participation has been a feature of one of the areas 
that was studied - but that it is not as straightforward as perceived by proponents 
of decentralisation.
The chapter has also tried to make a methodological point. It has been argued that 
whilst the survey highlighted some clear comparative similarities and differences 
between the two bustees - for example how the inhabitants of DT on average 
earned more than in SL, but in terms of occupational status, household size and 
asset distribution, the two bustees were quite similar - it gave no indication of the 
extent to which the inhabitants of these two areas were divided along different 
categories.
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Chapter 5
Comparing the Performance of Local Health Care Officials in
Ward 67 and Ward 85
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a comparative case study of the health care bureaucracy 
working in each of the wards where the bustees are located. Key differences were 
noted between the two wards in terms of the performance of local officials, and an 
attempt was made to analyse the reasons for this using a conceptual framework 
devised for understanding the factors which may affect bureaucratic performance. 
The chapter argues that the exercise of ‘voice’, through vibrant local civil society 
organisations, was decisive in explaining better bureaucratic performance in one 
ward. It then considers some of the theoretical perspectives on the conditions 
necessary for collective action, in order to try to understand the reasons for the 
vibrancy of civil society organisations in one ward. The chapter concludes by 
questioning contemporary notions about the relationship between civil society and 
good government.
5.2 Government Funded Primary Health Care in Calcutta
5.2.1 CMC
In West Bengal, public health receives approximately one tenth of the state health 
budget, of which 73% is spent on prevention and control of disease. Public and 
preventative health care is the responsibility of CMC. Under Calcutta’s cabinet 
form of municipal government, the portfolio for health, public safety and sanitation 
is the responsibility of one nominated member mayor in council (MIC).89 From 
1990-2000 this post remained vacant, and the mayor assumed the municipal 
health portfolio in addition to his other portfolios. According to a one senior 
municipal officer, the Left Front partner (RSP) to whom this portfolio had been 
allotted refused to assume the seat (for unspecified reasons), after which it 
remained vacant. In a city the size of Calcutta, with its history of poor public health
89 See Chapter Six for a detailed description of municipal government in Calcutta.
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and sporadic epidemics, there would seem a clear need for there to be an elected 
representative with exclusive responsibility for public health and sanitation. The 
absence of such a person for a period of almost ten years is astonishing. Both 
elected representatives and senior officials considered that allocating the health 
portfolio to the Mayor, already burdened with numerous other duties, was an 
unsatisfactory arrangement. The failure to deal effectively with the outbreak of 
malignant malaria in the city in 1999 exposed the weaknesses of such an 
arrangement, and the stark inadequacies of the main nodal agency responsible for 
public health care interventions in the city.
A health care infrastructure providing primary health care within easy reach of the 
population, similar to that in rural areas, does not exist in Calcutta, except for the 
wards covered in the CUDPIII and CSIP projects. This lack of public, community 
based primary health care services is seen as a major shortcoming by some 
bureaucrats, especially given the perceived success of the health care 
infrastructure model attempted in CUDP III and CSIP projects. In 1996, a decision 
was taken by the Mayor in Council Health (MIC Health), to rectify this. The 
objective was, “decentralisation of primary health care services to peripheral ward 
level for better coordination with ward committee, surveillance, monitoring, prompt 
interventions and providing service facilities closer to the population”.90
CMC is attempting to establish a decentralised health care infrastructure of its own 
throughout the municipal area, based upon the model used in donor assisted 
projects mentioned above. According to the Chief Municipal Health Officer 
(CMHO) each ward is meant to have one basic health unit (BHU), to which 3 
multipurpose health assistants (MPHAs) and 4 field workers (FWs) would be 
attached, providing both preventative, promotive and basic curative services (see 
fig 5.1). Staff would get their orders from the executive health officer, who in turn 
would be under the direction of Borough Committee Chairman (BCC), as well as 
the CMHO. In practice, the BCC is powerless to do more than suggest a course of 
action. Ultimately the decisions of the MIC Health are percolated through the
90 Agenda 18, item 14 MPL Meeting 19/12/96, approved by the M IC (Health) 27/12/99.
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Health Department in the form of directives from the CMHO. It is the MIC (Health) 
in consultation with senior health officials (CMHO, DCMHO) who decides what 
action health workers will take at the local level. Line departments can only morally 
oblige the employees to perform their duties satisfactorily. In the case of non­
performance, it is left to the Municipal Commissioner to take disciplinary action.
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Fig 5.1 Calcutta Municipal Corporation: Executive Body Organogram (Health Dept)
Roads Conservancy W ater Build
Municipal Commissioner 
Joint Municipal Commissioner
Heads of Departments 
l-lealthing Law
Chief Municipal Health Officer (CM HO)
4  Deputy Chief Municipal Health Officers (DCM HO)
Zone 1 Borough (1,2,3,4) 
EHO  x 4 
DEHO x 4
Zone 2 Borough (5,6,7) 
EHO x 3 
D ^H O  x 3
— !------------------------------------------------- 1
Zone 3 Borough (8,10,11,12) Zone 4 Borough (9,13,14,15)
EHO x 4 EHO x 4
DEI^O x 4 DE^HO x4
141 Ward Health Units: Headed by Medical Officer*
Multipurpose Multipurpose Multipurpose
Health Assistant Health Assistant Health Assistant
Senior Field Worker 
Field Worker FW  f 5v  FvF  
Honorary Health Workers (HHW s)91
91 The idea of employing HHWs was initiated in the CSIP and CUDP project areas. It has since been expanded to all CMC wards. * There have been only 80 
Ward Health Units Established (09/99). The rest are either under construction, or else the search is still on for suitable land and/or accommodation
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5.2.2 Calcutta Metropolitan Urban Health Organisation (CMUHO)
Calcutta is unique in having a health care infrastructure and bureaucracy, parallel 
to that of the municipal body, which is also responsible for public and preventative 
health care interventions (see fig 5.2).92 This emerged due to the corporation’s 
shortage of manpower and resources to carry out these tasks satisfactorily in the 
past. In 1984, two bodies, Calcutta Metropolitan Immunisation Organisation and 
Malaria Eradication Urban maintenance Organisation were amalgamated to 
constitute Calcutta Metropolitan Urban Health Organisation (CMUHO), under the 
Directorate of Health Services (DHS), GoWB. The aim was to provide, “ a good 
public health infrastructure in Greater Calcutta region for the Control of 
Communicable Diseases and also for the rendering of other public health services, 
including MCH, Family Welfare etc”.93 The overall objective was “Health for all by 
2000 A.D. “ Under the same directive, it was stated that 10 municipal wards of the 
city would not be covered by CMUHO, but would remain the sole responsibility of 
CMC. Eight out of the Ten wards affected fall under Borough 8, and include the 
ward 85, where DT is located. Ward 67, and hence SL, does fall under the purview 
of CMUHO activities. It is worth noting that CMUHO administrative units are not 
conterminous with CMC administrative boundaries. Thus CMUHO zones are not 
the same as CMC zones, as for example the case of CMUHO Zone 3, which 
covers 28 CMC wards and a population of approximately 1,066,074.
The responsibilities of CMUHO include:
1) Anti-malarial activities
2) Immunisation of Infants below 1 year with BCG, Polio, DPT, Measles.
3) To provide Vitamin “A” in oil and to protect expectant mothers by TT vaccines.
4) Prevention and control of epidemics by surveillance of diseases
Maternal and Child Health (MCH) and Family Welfare Programme (FW), through 
distribution of oral pills and nirodhs (condoms). Distribution of Vitamin “A” in oil,
Iron
92 Most of the information about CMUHO has been provided by senior bureaucrats working in the system, 
from both Medical and non-medical technical cadres. The insights that they have provided have proved 
invaluable.
93 Memo: PH 1730 2M-20-84, DHS, GoWB (18/10/84)
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and Folic acid tablets
5) Enumeration, vital statistics, reference of cases to hospitals.
Fig 5.2 Organogram of Calcutta Metropolitan Urban Health Organisation (CMUHO)
Zone I
(Barrackpore)
I
1 2 
11 Sub Zonal Unit (SZUs)
Basic Health Units94
Chief Health Officer (Additional Secretary, DoH, GoWB)
(Assisted by epidemiologist, pathologist and malaria medical officer)
Zone II 
(Dum Dum)
Zone III 
(Tangra)
Zone IV  
(Jadavpur)
Zone V  
(Howrah)
Zonal Health Officer (Head)
I
Second Zonal Health Officer (Programme Executor)
Zonal Health Supervisor (Programme Coordinator)
T------------- 1------------------- 1-------------------
3 4  5 6
(Each SZU  is headed by one Senior Hes
 1 1 1 1-------
7 8 9 10
Ith Inspector, and covers 1 lakh population)
BHU 1 B H U 2T BHU3 BHU4
Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3
j ,Health Assistant Health Assistant 2 Health Assistant 3 
(Each sector is assigned to one Health Assistant who is the basic level health worker and covers 8-9 ,000  population)
Zone VI 
(Hoogly)
11
94 One sub Zonal Unit (SZU ) is divided into four basic health units (BHUs). Each B H U  covers a population o f 25,000 and is headed by a paramedical Health Inspector. 
BHUs are divided into three sectors.
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5.2.3 Calcutta Urban Development Programme III (CUDP III) and Calcutta 
Slum Improvement Programme (CSIP 1)
After a successful trial in the late 1980s, donors began to incorporate a health 
component in to slum improvement programmes (SIPs). The aim was to deliver 
primary health care services to the doorsteps of beneficiaries in bustees, 
through community based Honorary Female Health Workers (HHWs). A cadre 
of middle aged women with class 8 standard education, was to be recruited 
from amongst the beneficiary communities and paid a monthly honorarium of 
Rs 300 (p53ff). They were to be provided with a kit of basic medicines and 
responsible for educating selected beneficiaries about family welfare, nutrition, 
personal hygiene, general cleanliness and government health care facilities 
available locally.
The HHW was the link to the community of another separate health care 
bureaucracy, comprising a Health Administrative Unit (HAU) and subcentres. 
HAUs were to be under the administrative control of elected local 
representatives, who were to be formed into a local coordination committee. In 
the case of CSIP, all project components were supported by ODA for five years, 
after which technical staff were to come under the control of the CMC, whilst 
being paid by the GoWB, which was also responsible for providing the 
medicines.
The donor-funded model described above was implemented in 97 wards of the 
city including one of the research sites, ward 67. Data showing the distribution 
of health care interventions in the city at the ward level, in the table below, 
shows that on the whole interventions have taken place in boroughs of the city 
which contain large bustee populations: boroughs 15,3,1,7 (see Table 5.1). 
The correlation is by no means perfect. Boroughs 2 and 8 with comparable 
numbers of bustee dwelling units, received a different share of donor funded
95 The information in the following paragraph was gleaned from, Calcutta Slum Improvement Project 
Phase 1 Project report CMDA, Calcutta August 1990. For a fuller discussion of CSIP in Ward 67, see 
Chapter Six,
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health care interventions. Whereas all the wards in borough 2 were fully 
covered by projects, a cluster of wards, in borough 8, remain uncovered.
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Table 5.1 Boroughs, Borough Committees and their Chairmen; Distribution of dwelling units, households and Population of Registered Bustee Premises by CMC Borough, and Ward-wise Distribution of Health Facilities by Foreign 
Agencies in Urban Slums Under CMC (valid until June, 2000)
Borough Number Wards No of Dwelling 
Units (of registered 
bustee premises)96
No of Households 
(of registered bustee 
premises)97
Population 
(registered bustee 
premises)98
Wards covered by CUDP 
III
Wards 
covered by 
CSIP
Wards Covered by 
ICDS
Uncovere 
d Wards
1 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 3,680 23,920 119,600 1,2,3,4,5,6, Nil 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8& 9 Nil
2 10,11,12,15,16,17,18, 19&20 1,232 8,008 40,040 10,11,12,15, 
16,17,18,19&20
Nil 17,18,19& 20 Nil
3 13,14,29,30,31,32,33, 34&35 6,261 40,697 203,483 I3&14 14 13,14,29,30,31,32,3
3,34&35
Nil
4 21,22,23,24,25,26,27 28,38 &  
39
1,314 8,541 42,705 26,27,38&39 Nil 38 21,22,23, 
24 &  25
5 36,37,40,41,42,43,44,45,48,49 
&50
735 4,778 23,888 36,37,40,44,48&49 Nil 40&44 41,42,43,
45&50
6 46,47,51,52,53,54,55, 
60,61&62
1,484 9,646 48,230 Nil Nil 54,55,60,61& 62 46,47,51, 
52 &53
7 56,57,58,59,63,64,65, 66&67 3,485 22,653 113,263 58,59,65,66 59&67 56,57,58,59,63,64,6 
5& 66
Nil
8 68,69,70,71,72,73,84,
85,86,87&90
1,224 7,956 39,780 Nil Nil Nil 68,69,70,
71,72,73,
84,85,86,
87&90
9 74,75,76,77,78,79,80,
82,83&88
2,621 17,037 85,183 74,76,77,78 &  79 Nil 74,75,76,77,78,79,8 
0&  82
83&88
10 81,89,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98 
,99&100
192 1,248 6,240 89,91,92,93 Nil 89,91,92,93,94,95,9
7,98,99,100
81&96
11 101,102,110,111,112, 113,114 Data unavailable Data unavailable Data unavailable 101,102,110, 111,112,113, 
114
Nil 101,102,110,111,11 
2, 113&114
Nil
12 103,104,105,106,107,
108&109
Data unavailable Data unavailable Data unavailable 103,104,105, 
106,107,108& 109
103,104,106,1 
07,108& 109
104,105,106107&1
09
Nil
13 115,116,117,118,119, Data unavailable Data unavailable Data unavailable 115,116,117, 118,119, 117&118 Nil nil
96 CMC 1999 reproduced in CEIP Final Report (ADB/CMC: 2000)
97 CMC 1999 reproduced in CEIP Final Report (ADB/CMC: 2000) 
91 CMC 1999 reproduced in CEIP Final Report (ADB/CMC:2000) 
The rest courtesy of the Health Department, CMC (1999)
1 AT
120,121 J22&123 120,121,122&. 123
14 124,125,126,127,128, 
129,130,131 &  132
Data unavailable Data unavailable Data unavailable 124,125,126,127,128, 
129,130,131 &. 132
Nil Nil Nil
15 133,134,135,136,137, 
138,139,140& 141
10,650 26,106 153,822 133,134,136,139,140&141 133&134 133&141 nil
TO TA L 141 32,878 170,588 876,232 79 15 81 29
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5.3 Health Indicators
Disaggregated ward-level data relating to health is notoriously hard to come by 
in Calcutta, except in the case of malaria infection. Indicators exist to depict the 
health status in urban areas of the state. In addition, where donor funded 
projects have been implemented which carry a health component, figures have 
been compiled which display the vital health indicators previous to project 
initiation and subsequently after project completion. The table below presents a 
comparison of basic health indicators for urban areas of the state and for wards 
covered under ODA/DFID’s CSIP. The data shows the health status in the 
CSIP wards to be better than urban West Bengal as a whole.
Vital Health Indicators/thousand pop Calcutta 
CSIP 1a 
& 1 b "
West Bengal 
(Urban) 1996100
Crude Birth rate 10.2 16.0
IMR 34.0 44
Table 5.2: A comparison of health care indicators for Urban West Bengal and
CSIP Project Areas
Based on this information, in addition to extensive consultations with relevant 
experts and a survey of the available literature on the subject, one ward of the 
city with average health status (Ward 85) was chosen as a case study and 
compared to one ward where the health status was known to be higher than 
average (ward 67).
5.4 Comparing Infrastructure
Comparison of infrastructure (civil works and staff) shows that ward 67 is 
endowed with more than 5 times as many govt health care workers as Ward 
85. The three main government health providing bodies are all present in Ward 
67 whilst in Ward 85, only the Corporation health services are available.
99 CSIP Health la  &  lb CMDA-figures refer to all CSIP wards covered, and are not disaggregated by 
ward, for the year 1995-96.
100 “Health On the March: West Bengal 1996-97” pp 21-22.
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Agency
Ward 67 Ward 85
CMC 1 MO; 1 MPHA; 1SFW;4FWs 1MO; 1 SFW; 4 FWs
CMUHO 1 MO; 1 Pharmacists Nurse; 3 HAs; 
1 HI&1SHI
None
CSIP 2 MOs;1 FTS; 1 STS; 12 HHWs None
Total 31 health officials 6 health officials
Table 5.3 Distribution of Health Officials forwards 67 & 85
Despite what the figures show, for the first four months of research in ward 85, 
neither personnel nor infrastructure were visible. Local people reported no ward 
health unit, no multipurpose health assistants and no field workers active 
locally. A Borough health office was situated close to ward 85, where malaria 
testing and dispensing of malaria drugs took place. The Executive Health 
Officer (EHO) and Deputy Executive Health Officer (DEHO) were in this office 
engaged in administrative, not therapeutic activities
Four months into the research the DEHO and the local councillor gave 
repeated assurances that a Basic Health Unit (BHU) had been established, in 
accordance with the reforms sanctioned by the MIC (Health) on 27/12/99, whilst 
at the same time CMC field workers in the area consistently denied the 
existence of such a health unit.102 The search for a BHU in ward 85 continued 
to prove elusive. A building housing the prospective BHU, which had been 
completed one year previously, stood empty and inactive for no logical reason. 
Instead, a makeshift BHU was established in a derelict factory, inside a room 
used for storing toxic chemicals. On 22/04/2000, a purpose-built structure was 
publicly inaugurated amidst great fanfare as the local BHU. Eight months had 
passed since I had first moved in to the area.
In sharp contrast, Ward 67 had the benefit of a purpose built ward office to 
accommodate the entire CMC staff for this area, courtesy of CSIP. The second 
floor of the ward office served as the HAU, with dedicated CSIP personnel. 
Dispersed throughout the ward were in total seven subcentres. In addition, at
101 Medical Officer (MO); Multi-Purpose Health Assistant (MPHA); Senior Field Worker (SFW); Field 
Worker (FW); Health Assistant (HA); Health Inspector (HI); Senior Health Inspector (SHI); First Tier 
Superintendent (FTS); Second Tier Superintendent (STS); Honorary Health Workers (HHWs).
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approximately 200 yards from the ward office, was CMUHO, located in a 
separate building with its own cadre of dedicated staff. Hence for a population 
of approximately 80,000 inhabitants103, there were 31 health officials - giving a 
ratio of roughly 1: 2,500.
In addition to the government services available in the local area, in both wards 
a plethora of private providers were available to treat patients. For both 
research sites, these were the most popular source of therapy amongst my 
informants. No NGOs worked in the research sites, although religious 
organisations ran clinics located nearby.
5.5 Assessing the Performance of Health Care Officials
For a period of six months, the activities and performance of health care 
officials were observed in each ward of the city. Differences were noted in the 
level of performance of local officials in each of the areas chosen. Performance 
was analysed using a set of subjective measurable indicators suggested by 
Crook and Manor for judging bureaucratic performance: effectiveness; 
responsiveness and process (1998:8-10).
Effectiveness refers to the amount of development projects and services 
measured in relation to official objectives and targets and to previous pre­
reform levels of output. It also looks at the institution’s capacity to be effective, 
and thus focuses on role commitment of officials, internal accountability 
systems and budgetary process (1998:9). Responsiveness refers to the 
degree to which the public values activities and expenditure: “the degree of 
congruence between people’s perceived needs and govt policies, but also look 
at which sections of the population are being responded to...”. It includes a 
reference to the speed and quality of responses as important factors to bear in 
mind (ibid: 10). Process refers to the means rather than the ends “ legal and 
political norms embodied in the modes of operation of decentralised 
institutions.” How do officials deal with members of the public when providing
102 One time, whilst sat in the DEHO’s office, I was part of a discussion whereby the DEHO was telling 
me all about the BHU in ward 85, whilst the MPHA was all the time denying that a BHU even existed. 
Eventually, the MPHA was asked to leave the room, as the DEHO continued with his explanation.
103 According to the Chairman of the Nagorik Committee.
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services, implementing consultation procedures or trying to deal with 
grievances?
5.5.1 Bureaucratic Performance of Health Care Officials in Ward 85: Confusion 
and Lack of Transparency
Even after it was inaugurated the local health officials seemed unclear about 
the role of the BHU in ward 85. The CMHO and DCMHO were categorical that 
its responsibility would be to provide, “complete health service for the people of 
an area: mainly preventative and promotive, but also basic curative services”. 
The former Municipal Commissioner preferred to emphasise their preventative 
and promotive role: “health education, vector control, community hygiene, 
public health, MCH.” It was strange then to hear the local councillor inaugurate 
the BHU in ward 85 as a “malaria testing centre”, and to witness health officials, 
locally echoing this by informing local people that it is a place they should visit if 
they “have a fever” for a malaria test.
Similarly, was difficult to establish the responsibilities of health staff, and 
practically impossible to ascertain their whereabouts on any working day. No 
information was available in the previous makeshift BHU, and enquiries there 
were met with rude rebukes or else embarrassed silences. Enquiries with the 
councillor proved similarly fruitless. Though more courteous, he was unsure 
about the whereabouts of health staff, the opening times of the BHU or the 
stipulated working days of the MO. Indeed, he was unable to provide the 
medical officer’s correct name. On the basis of this, it was largely impossible to 
determine whether employees were absent, late or actually working. Once the 
stipulated working hours of the medical officer were established, he was 
discovered to be mostly ‘unavailable’ during these times. On the rare occasions 
he was seen at his desk, he was found gossiping, reading the newspaper, and 
in general engaging in activities other than those he is employed to carry out.
A short story may illustrate the level of prevailing confusion regarding the state 
of health services in this area. In mid-November 1999, I met the Deputy 
Executive Health Officer (DEHO) for Borough VIII. He was trying to find the 
councillor to inform him that there would be a polio immunisation camp held 
that Sunday (three days later). The councillor was out of town, so the DEHO
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proceeded to inform the different CMC outposts in the ward: the BHU, the 
spraying depot and one other Corporation owned office. I accompanied him. 
First stop was the BHU, which the DEHO was at first unable to find! Inquiries 
with local inhabitants failed to shed any light on this ‘centre’ which according to 
official sources was functioning. Eventually, when found, the BHU looked 
splendidly painted, but was closed, and according to the neighbours had never 
been opened.104
We then proceeded to visit the other centres where the camps would be held. 
One by one, the DEHO grew visibly more embarrassed and frustrated as each 
of the centres was either closed or empty, with the staff that were meant to be 
on duty, nowhere to be seen. When eventually staff were located, they 
expressed complete bewilderment at the thought that an immunisation camp 
would be held within the next three days in their workplace. The story I hope 
illustrates the level of shirking amongst health department officials in this ward, 
as well as the total confusion and lack of information about which health care 
facilities were actually functioning, especially amongst those that should know, 
like the DEHO and, lastly, his complete powerlessness to do anything to rectify 
the situation.
Given this scenario, it was an arduous task to get a clear picture of health 
interventions undertaken by CMC in this research area. In the case of malaria, 
the local councillor had reported that spraying of insecticide and bleaching of 
water tanks was irregular and sporadic, due to a shortage of manpower, 
equipment and materials. He claimed that there were three spraying machines 
and only four people to work them for the whole of ward 85. Bleaching powder, 
he said, was often not available. The Borough Committee Chairman echoed 
these complaints. In contrast, a senior official in the Health department denied 
these allegations. He maintained that resources were available in sufficient 
quantity, but were being used inefficiently by locally elected representatives. 
However, he did accept that the supply of bleaching agents and insecticide was 
controlled to prevent their “injudicious use” by locally elected representatives 
who may be keen to boost their own popularity by excessive spraying, which 
may be unnecessary. Bustee inhabitants reported an upsurge in spraying in
104 This is the BHU referred to in a previous section, which was eventually inaugurated on 22/04/2000.
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the period October -  December 1999, which also happened to coincide with a 
sharp increase in reported cases of malaria deaths in the c ity .105
The health care provided by the sole government agency working in ward 85, 
the CMC, was at best poor and at worst non-existent for most of the period 
spent living in the area. It took a long time for the planned basic health care 
infrastructure, once built, actually to become operational. Even then, its role 
remained unclear and staff continued to perform poorly.
5.5.2 Bureaucratic Performance in Ward 67.Transparency and Responsiveness
Table 5.3 shows that ward 67 was better endowed with health care 
infrastructure than ward 85. However, a basic comparison of what they both 
possess - a BHU with a handful of CMC officials - revealed the differences in 
the levels of performance of officials in this ward. In contrast to ward 85, local 
CMC officials were regularly found at their desks/places of work before the 
stipulated time, 10 am. The field staff from the health, conservancy and 
engineering departments were on their rounds before 9am each day. Senior 
officials, including the ward level engineer, doctor and conservancy officials 
were seen at their desks on the stipulated day by 9 am. Even on Sundays, 
officials could sometimes be found at work. These standards of punctuality and 
attendance were remarkable for public officials in West Bengal.106
In other respects also, their performance was seen to be much better. The 
health officials in this ward actually seemed to have instituted what may be 
described as a transparent and systematic complaint procedure. Local 
inhabitants would come to the ward office to highlight an issue of concern - for 
example a blocked drain or stagnant water. Officials kept a note of these 
complaints in a ‘Repair Book’, and each day field staff were sent to attend to 
them. Once the complaint was dealt with, the complainant was asked to 
countersign in the repair book to confirm that the task has been completed. In 
addition to a repair book there was a ‘movement register’ listing the
105 Borough 8 & 9 were the worst affected in terms of reported cases of malignant malaria. The CMC was held 
primarily responsible and roundly criticised by various sections of society for this.
106 The Chief Minister, Jyoti Basu, was forced into the imbroglio over punctuality of government 
employees. In July 1999, he issued a circular insisting that staff start work, at the latest, by 10.30 am
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whereabouts of each staff member, as well as the materials provided to each of 
them to be able to complete a job. For example, in the health department, the 
amount of chemicals taken by each field worker for spraying was noted down.
At the end of each day, line managers carefully examined the books to ensure 
that the tasks had been accomplished. In the case of the repair book, they 
checked to see that the person who had made the complaint had signed to say 
that it had been dealt with. The books were then signed by the SFW - if 
satisfied that the work has been completed as stipulated - and the head of the 
department, the MO, and eventually by the Councillor herself. Great care was 
taken to ensure that these books were made easily accessible both for the 
public as well as for higher departmental officials to inspect.
Every effort was made to deal with these complaints within 24 hours or as soon 
as possible thereafter. Staff were observed to be courteous and sympathetic to 
members of the public. Local informants criticised the doctor because he was 
unwilling to prescribe on sight, and instead encouraged them to go for further 
tests, before suggesting medication. Whilst on the one hand this may be 
frustrating for them, it should be commended in the light of the rash, 
overprescribing that characterises the health providers, especially in the private 
sector, in India. (Yesudian, 1994)
In contrast to ward 85, the councillor was familiar with all her ward level staff. 
They in turn seemed open and responsive to her advice and guidance. The 
overwhelming impression was that of a relatively well performing, committed 
and responsive local bureaucracy. The challenge lay in exploring what were the 
mechanisms by which this was ensured.
5.5.3 CMUHO: Ward 67 (Zone IV)
During the initial months of fieldwork, I tried to analyse the performance of 
CMUHO Zonal Health Unit in Tangra, the flood and epidemic prone area on the 
eastern fringes of the city. This ZHU was nothing short of a grotesque 
caricature of the grossly under performing health system in the state. Lateness
(Statesman, July 1999). Challenged over this in the Assembly (06/2000), he reported that the vast 
majority of govt employees were now reporting for work before 10.30.
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and absenteeism were endemic. Office hours were 9.30-2.00 pm, but staff 
seldom appeared before 11 am. Out of a staff of 39 employees, rarely were 
more than 10 seen to be in the unit working at one time. During each of my 
visits, the head of the unit, the zonal health officer, arrived after midday. Most 
alarming was the fact that for a period of eight weeks, 15/09/99-3/11/99 no 
vaccinations took place on the stipulated day, Wednesday, for a host of what 
appear to be frivolous reasons. For example, one week the store manager, who 
is responsible for collecting the vaccines, was absent and his deputy refused to 
go in his place. Another week, the driver responsible for taking the store 
manager to collect the vaccines was absent; and on another occasion the 
collection van had broken down. By the eighth week, exasperated by the 
situation, the senior health inspector hired a taxi and went to fetch the vaccines 
himself.
The performance of CMUHO in ward 67, whilst by no means perfect, was 
comparatively better than what I had witnessed of the organisation in other 
parts of the city. On each of my visits, there was a full complement of staff and 
a doctor sitting and attending patients (albeit rather casually, and at times 
seemingly as a diversion from reading the newspaper). Interviews with patients 
waiting to be attended revealed their satisfaction with the service provided here, 
although many reported being too poor to go elsewhere and lamented the 
waiting times, the opening hours and the fact that the medicines often took 
some time to 'work', and sometimes didn't work at all. Immunisations took place 
on the appointed day (Wednesday), and a good stock of some basic drugs was 
always visible on display. It was clear from conversations with CMC health 
officials, that there was a good rapport between them and CMUHO, and 
although their knowledge of one another's work was scant, during major 
immunisation drives, some attempt was made to coordinate efforts.
Initially, a framework was developed to help analyse bureaucratic performance 
in the two wards. Three factors were examined for the effect that they might 
have on bureaucratic performance: bureaucratic rules and regulations; internal 
norms on bureaucratic performance and external pressures (from clients or 
politicians). Each one will be considered below with reference to the health 
officials in the two research sites.
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5.6 Rules and Regulations: Seniority based promotion and the 
Transfer System
It has been claimed that the bureaucracy in India is based upon the Weberian 
ideal type (Taub, 1969). Two aspects of the modern-day bureaucracy in India - 
promotion based on seniority and the system of transfer -  clearly have their 
roots in Weber’s model. Point seven of the model states that “[service in the 
bureaucracy] constitutes a career. There is a system of promotion based on 
seniority or achievement or both” (Weber, 1947:333-334). Weber’s model sees 
seniority and achievement as equivalent, which they are not. The seniority 
system works well where decisions are routine and made on the basis of clear- 
cut rules, but it would not seem to encourage or reward outstanding 
accomplishments, and hence some scholars have claimed that it does little to 
nurture the initiative and flexibility needed for the job (Taub, 1969:196).107 
Promotion on the basis of achievements, on the other hand, has more to do 
with solving problems and reaching goals, than of adhering to rules. It thus is 
more results-orientated and would seem to encourage initiative. Whilst in theory 
promotion in the Indian bureaucracy (both state and IAS) can be based on 
either, seniority not achievement has become the main criterion for 
bureaucratic promotion. One aim of this has been to protect lower level officers 
from favouritism.
The present day system of transfers - perhaps one of the most enduring and 
distinctive features of the Indian bureaucracy - has its roots in point nine of 
Weber’s ideal model. This states, “the official works entirely separated from 
ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his 
position” (Weber, 1947:333-334). This has led to the frequent transfer of 
bureaucrats from post to post. The present-day transfer system is a legacy of 
the colonial administration, when it was believed that frequent transfer from 
post to post could widen the experience of bureaucrats, and limit the 
opportunities available to them for behaving corruptly.
107 Taub states, “the replacement of the present seniority system with a more achievement-orientated system of 
promotion is desirable as an incentive to innovation in the Service” (1969:197).
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The transfer model, in particular, has been the subject of much debate and 
criticism. Scholars have repeatedly noted how this severely undermines the 
quality of service the public system can offer, from irrigation (Wade, 1984) to 
health (Jeffery, 1988). Paradoxically it has been shown that the transfer system 
creates incentives for officials to behave corruptly.108 In the specific case of the 
public health-care system, Jeffery has argued that posting bureaucrats (health 
workers) for longer periods in the same place, can help build up important 
stocks of local knowledge, experience and expertise in dealing with local 
problems, and in building up trust with local people. This he notes, “could make 
the difference between the success or failure of a health program” 
(1988:270).109
It has been recognised that certain rules and regulations can have a perverse 
effect on bureaucratic performance. However, it has also been suggested that 
in some cases rules are ignored or else not fully implemented. For example 
Wade (1984) has noted that many of the regulations guiding bureaucratic 
behaviour, such as the pursuit of disciplinary action against officials, are absent 
or simply not enforced.
5.6.1 Circumventing Ruies
The autonomy of the CMC as an administrative body means that it has its own 
set of service rules, separate from those of GoWB, which has two volume 
manual entitled "Service Rules". The CMC's rules are not contained in a book, 
but have been reproduced through circulars which apply to all CMC personnel. 
The last Municipal Commissioner of Calcutta, Mr. Asim Barman (IAS), as a 
means of inculcating a modicum of discipline in his staff, became notorious for 
issuing circulars - earning him the nickname 'circular Barman'. One such 
circular had to do with punctuality and attendance. The circular stated that: a) 
"every officer must note time of arrival and departure in an attendance register"; 
b) every officer must arrive within 15 minutes of stipulated start time of work. If 
s/he arrives after this time, they shall be marked as late. If the officer is late for
108 Wade maintains, “the system of personnel transfers thus constrains the extent to which development 
departments push forward with their objectives...indeed it even tends in some cases to move them 
backwards, to make the results of their programmes worse than no intervention at all” (1984:1)
109 Although Jeffery does not use the term, there are clear parallels here with the concept of 
“embeddedness”, discussed in Chapter Two.
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more than three times in one month, then a half day of casual leave will be 
deducted" and c) if later than 45 minutes, then s/he will be marked absent...and 
will not be able to take up post during that day".110
The circulars - the first of their kind in terms of dealing with punctuality and 
attendance - seemed to have little consistent effect on these two important 
sources of poor performance amongst CMC officials. This was evident from a 
comparison of wards 67 and 85. In one ward (67), officials were usually on time, 
sometimes even arriving early, and were seldom absent, except on rare 
occasions for extenuating circumstances. In ward (85), officials would seldom 
arrive on time and often could not be located, as confirmed during the visit that I 
made with the DEHO.111
In other CMC offices that I visited, I discovered that employees had devised 
rather ingenious ways of circumventing these edicts. As one junior employee 
often kept the attendance and time keeping books, he was usually persuaded 
to keep the book open and/or sign his colleagues in if they were late. Even 
when a senior officer was in control of the book, I observed cases of employees 
strolling in hours late and signing in, without the senior officer showing any 
response.
5.6.2 Enforcement
Many confessed to fearing intimidation and retribution if they dared to 
implement the circulars, and indeed rules concerning the performance of 
officials in general, by the letter. It would seem from their responses that senior 
officials working in government agencies in Calcutta (CMC as well as GoWB) 
found the transaction costs of implementing rules and regulations too high, and 
discouraged them from taking such action. Simply stated, fear of retribution 
and/or apathy meant that senior officials would usually avoid implementing 
rules and enforcing sanctions.
110 Municipal Commissioner's Circular, No 32, CMC 2/08/99.
111 I should add that this was probably not exceptional. My notes reveal that random visits at various 
times during the fieldwork, were usually unsuccessful in locating a health official in ward 85. Even when 
I didn't actually visit the BHU, I would ask those living and working in its vicinity if  they had seen any of 
the staff. Their answers were revealing.
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The centralised system of personnel management referred to in Chapter Two, 
meant that to discipline a public official was a time consuming and laborious 
process. For example, in CMUHO if say a HI has been found to be breaking the 
rules, then disciplinary proceedings against him/her would have to be started by 
the SHI, who must put his complaint in writing to the Zonal Health Officer. 
From there it is sent to the head of CMUHO (who also holds the post of 
additional secretary, DoH), who then has to make the decision of whether to 
take further action or not. In case further action is decided upon, the issue must 
then be passed on to the Director of Health Services (DHS), the highest ranking 
(medical) administrator in the Department of Health (DoH). Only the DHS can 
take disciplinary action against the errant official.
A similar set-by-step procedure must be followed in the case of CMC officials, 
with only the Municipal Commissioner able to take disciplinary action. For 
example, in the case of a health official of the CMC, firstly a letter of complaint 
outlining the misdemeanors committed would need to be written by the SFW to 
the MO. The MO must decide whether it is worth pursuing and if he thinks that 
it is, must then refer the letter to the EHO. The EHO has to then judge the 
merits of the complaint and if judged worth pursuing, must then send it on to the 
zonal health officer. In this way the process crawls along until it reaches the 
Municipal Commissioner. The MC is at the apex of a huge bureaucracy, and is 
responsible for implementing the decisions of the Mayor in Council. 
Disciplining an officer would probably be low on his long list of tasks. Months 
could pass before any preliminary action could be taken and during all this time, 
the errant official would continue working, often in close contact with the person 
who originally made the complaint.
In Chapter Three (section 10) it was mentioned that public officials in India are 
extremely well protected. Not only are disciplinary powers centralised, making 
disciplinary procedures long and arduous, but also even if a disciplinary 
procedure is successfully pursued, the punishments which can be dealt to an 
errant official are on the whole rather weak, and sacking is very rare. Together, 
these two aspects gave rise to a sense of apathy amongst senior officials in 
both the CMC and CMUHO. On almost every occasion on which I asked a
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senior official about why no action had been taken against an officer found to 
have broken the rules, the answer was the same: a disciplinary case against an 
official would take considerable time to be processed, and at the end of it if a 
punishment was dealt out, it was rather benign. For example in one case a 
person working in the pharmacy of a big teaching hospital was found to have 
stolen drugs for resale on the black market. Although the case against the 
official was pursued until it reached the highest official in the DoH, the DHS - 
itself a tremendously long process lasting over six months - the guilty official’s 
punishment was to be transferred to another hospital.
Senior officials also cited fear of retribution or attack as an impediment to 
taking disciplinary action against errant officials. This was partly a result of the 
slowness of the disciplinary procedure, which meant that often the complainant 
and the errant official would continue working together for many months before 
action, if any, was eventually taken. Many officials felt that this would expose 
them to threats and violence. Intimidation of this type was reported to be 
commonplace, and is mostly perpetrated by those with political and/or trade 
union backing. Various reported incidents suggest that their fears were not 
misplaced. Early in 2000, a senior official of the conservancy department who 
had pursued disciplinary proceedings against conservancy staff, was attacked 
by other conservancy staff - allegedly led by a trade union leader and local MLA 
- in his office in Corporation headquarters, and punched to the ground.
The point that fear has become a key impediment to senior officials’ willingness 
to punish errant staff was emphasised by an IAS officer in the DoH, interviewed 
during fieldwork: "if senior staff punish someone for non-performance or 
dereliction of duty, they have to be able to enforce it. In theory they have the 
power and the means to do so, in practice if they are threatened or harassed by 
the person in question or his/her accomplices, then they often retract notice of 
disciplinary proceedings.”
The enforcement of rules for officials working in the DoH (GoWB) was further 
complicated by the fact that the erstwhile Director of Health Services (DHS) 
was found guilty of a number of charges including, 'hoarding of assets
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disproportionate to his known source of income'.112 Instead of losing his job, he 
was moved sideways to less high profile position (Joint Secretary, Leprosy) and 
continued to work for the Department, whilst his post of DHS was left vacant for 
a number of months until a temporary appointment was made. The next 
incumbent was clearly a temporary appointment and felt that he was 'buying 
time'. As such, he was unwilling to do much in terms of real administration. At 
the time of leaving Calcutta, there had been as yet, no permanent appointment 
to the second most important health post in the state of West Bengal. The other 
point to make is that the leniency shown to the former DHS was seen as 
undermining efforts to maintain discipline in this department, lower down. 
Officials often cited it as an example of how weak the whole sanctioning 
process had become.
5.6.3 Promotions: Seniority or Performance
According to the head of personnel affairs at the CMC, promotion within the 
service is by both efficiency and seniority. Senior officers (line managers) are 
supposed to write yearly reports on their charges. The report is filed and kept 
confidential, but if there is anything negative or detrimental to the person 
concerned, then s/he has a right to read it. These reports are meant to be used 
to gauge a person's efficiency in their post and to help in deciding who should 
be promoted. However, a senior officer (IAS) confessed to me that often these 
reports were not compiled, or else compiled without due thought and attention. 
The same officer reported that often these reports were not a truthful reflection 
of a person's performance in the job, because in the end if anything negative is 
said about the person concerned, then the person appeals and the whole issue 
of intimidation again comes into play.113
Effectively, seniority becomes the sole criteria for promotion in public service - 
in both the Corporation and the State government. Seniority is also the main 
criteria for pay rises. All the officials when asked about, this agreed that it was
112 Statesman, 1/12/99
113 Central government IAS officers, who were interviewed, felt this to be an acutely Bengali dilemma. "In the 
north, if the senior officer deems you to have not performed your duties adequately, he'll write it, and to hell 
with you if you have a problem with that. And people would not dare to challenge this, if they thought it was a 
fair reflection. On the other hand, in Bengal you get this constant war of attrition - the cold shoulder from your 
staff, your room won't be cleaned etc. Moreover you are continually met with statements like, 'how could you 
do such a thing', 'you'll take the food out of his mouth'..."
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perhaps one of the greatest disincentives to hard work and dedication. In the 
words of one senior official in the CMC, "That is why this place doesn't work... 
Take two men, let's call them A and B. A, may work eight hours/day; B, may 
work four hours/day, but because he is more senior in service years, B will get 
promoted ahead of A. Sooner or later A will ask himself, why should I work so 
hard when it does not affect either my salary or my chances of promotion. 
Rather, if I just do the bare minimum, then through seniority, eventually, I'll get 
promoted".
The criteria for salary increments were considered to be similarly uninspiring. In 
the words of one doctor occupying the position of additional secretary in the 
DoH, "there is no financial gain to be had in promotion. My salary depends not 
upon my responsibilities or in the type of post that I am in, but on the number of 
years that I have had in service. This is a source of frustration, for it means that 
a block level medical officer who is senior in service to me, will earn a higher 
salary, even though I am in a more responsible position than him, with 
responsibilities for the whole state, not just one block".
5.6.4 Transfer Mechanism
The first thing to note about the transfer mechanism is that whereas in state 
government service, staff are transferred every 2-3 years, in the CMC, staff are 
rarely transferred so frequently, and neither are employees of CMUHO. HHWs 
are not liable to be transferred. In the cases considered, the officials of both 
these organisations, CMC and CMUHO, reported remaining in the same post 
for five years or more.
In the DoH (GoWB), transfer is seen both as a reward and as a punishment. 
Transfer towards Calcutta, or better still to the city itself, is considered a reward. 
On the other hand, transfer away from Calcutta, in the worst case to a rural 
backwater in a 'backward' district, is considered a punishment.
For a middle-aged bureaucrat with a family and children at school, living in 
Calcutta, transfer to the districts is seen as a scourge. No effort will be spared
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to avoid i t .114 As lucidly illustrated by Wade (1984), the transfer mechanism 
frequently places tremendous pressures on an official to behave corruptly - 
either actively, by taking bribes and showing favouritism or passively, by turning 
a blind eye or not collecting dues - in other words by simply not doing what he 
is meant to, so as not to get transferred.
Jeffery (1988) criticised the transfer model for curtailing chances to build up 
experience and expertise in a job. An additional secretary in the Health 
Department whilst recounting his own personal experience of transfer gave a 
good illustration of this: 'Til compare my career history to that of a colleague of 
mine in another state. We met on an ophthalmology course. I was made 
director of Ophthalmology in West Bengal and he got the same post in 
Maharastra. We were sent around the country for training. Just as I was 
getting into my stride as Director of Ophthalmology, I was transferred into 
Administration and then transferred again. Meanwhile my colleague in the 
other state remained in Ophthalmology and was promoted upwards in the 
department, where he gained considerable experience and knowledge.” 115
Whilst the transfer model may prevent the bureaucrat from fostering 'cosily 
corrupt networks’ with local people (Wade, 1992), it would seem to expose him 
to almost constant interference from politicians. Wade (1984) highlighted the 
deeply political nature of the transfer mechanism, when he showed that 
politicians were actively involved in transfers and MLAs wielded 
disproportionate power over the bureaucracy. One senior bureaucrat admitted 
that the "whole system of recruitment and deployment of staff is far from 
transparent and has been totally politicised. A doctor I know was appointed to 
Cooch Behar and within three years received a transfer to Calcutta. Another 
one that I know was appointed to Jalpaiguri (North Bengal) in 1974, his native 
home is Barrackpore (on the outskirts, north of Calcutta), despite repeated 
requests, he has still not been transferred." Many of the bureaucrats 
interviewed, privately, admitted that there was a close relationship through the
114 As one IAS officer said when referring to a colleague, "he's comfortable in Calcutta. His children are 
in a good English Medium school, his wife is near to her family and diverse and well stocked shops. He 
has the club and his friends here too. He'll be keen not to rock the boat so that he doesn't get moved from 
here." Transfer from Calcutta would be interpreted as leading to a significant drop in the quality of life, 
reduced educational opportunities for children, the severing of social networks and the loss of the 
comforts of modem urban life, such as access to foreign consumer goods.
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cadre system between Party higher officials and lower level field workers. 
Hence those at the top know very well who is sympathetic to the Party cause, 
because they are kept informed by cadres working at the lower levels. If one of 
these reports that an official is being unsympathetic to the Party, then the 
higher officials close to the Minister and even the Minister himself, will come to 
hear of it, and ensure that the person is transferred to a backwater, or else if 
s/he is already in a back water, ensure that all requests for transfer out are 
rejected.
As far as performance of municipal employees was concerned in the two 
research sites, official rules and regulations, whilst they existed, were not 
clearly specified, nor widely circulated in the form of, say, a rulebook. Where 
they were specified and distributed to all employees, through circulars, they 
were seen to have minimal effect on improving bureaucratic practices. Rules 
were not followed because the sanctions for transgression were usually not 
enforced; and these were not enforced because of the high transaction costs 
involved. The transfer mechanism in spite of its initial objectives has been 
considered by scholars to adversely influence bureaucratic performance, by 
creating incentives for officials to behave corruptly, and by undermining the 
acquisition of skills and knowledge of a given context. There was little evidence 
of transfer being a consideration at all for municipal (CMC) employees. 
Similarly there was little evidence of it giving rise to corrupt practices on behalf 
of GoWB health care officials. However, there was some support for the view 
that transfer affected an individual’s chances of building up extensive skills and 
expertise in a given area. Seniority, instead of efficiency, as the main criteria for 
promotion was routinely cited by municipal and state government employees 
alike, as providing perverse incentives, discouraging hard work and role 
commitment. However, it is worth noting that those factors, discussed above, 
which were found to adversely affect bureaucratic performance, may have done 
so in some, but not all cases - for it did not seem to have too much of an 
adverse effect on the performance of officials in ward 67.
115 Interview, 14/02/2000.
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5.7 Internal Norms: Ethos, Motivation and Prejudices
Old Institutional Economics (OIE) has noted that choices may also be the 
product of internal norms, which emerge over time and are shaped by different 
cultural and historical influences. Veblen emphasised the endogeneity of 
preferences, comparing institutions to genes, sustaining and passing on 
characteristics through time (Hodgson, 1993:15/16). Rudolf Klein has pressed 
the need to consider the “appreciative framework” (values, norms and interests) 
of policy-makers, as this, he claims, has a bearing on the way that they 
interpret the facts presented to them, and in turn shape policy.116
Damle (1979) has emphasised the need to consider bureaucrats’, “ 
predilections and prejudices...loyalties of kinship, caste, religion, language and 
region”. These he argues must be kept in check to ensure that the bureaucracy 
functions smoothly. Bhambri (1979) has attributed sub-optimal performance to 
the attitudes and motivations of bureaucrats, which, it is held, contradict 
constitutional objectives, goals and the national consensus. Taub (1969) asked 
new recruits to the civil service about their aspirations and expectations. He 
found that most joined (often through family coercion or cajoling) based on the 
expectation that the job would provide power, status and comfort. The failure of 
the job to live up to their expectations has, he holds, eroded the motivation of 
many in the service (p191). The findings of Madan’s study of health-care 
providers in Ghaziabad (1972), mirror those of Taub in many ways. Most of 
those interviewed became doctors through persuasion, rather than personal 
conviction. The opportunities for material (car, house etc) and non-material 
(prestige, status, respect) benefits that being a doctor would provide, also 
helped to convince many to join the profession.
Through semi-structured, in-depth interviews, officials from the CMC, CMUHO 
as well as HHWs were asked their reasons for 'joining the service', as well as 
whether there were any factors about a patient which may have affected the 
way that they were treated. The expectation was that in the better performing
116 Lecture LSE, 02/99
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ward, respondents' answers would reveal a significant commitment to the 
organisation and its goals, as part of a public service ethos. It actually turned 
out that in some cases this was true, whereas in others respondents reported 
joining service for what can only be interpreted as selfish reasons.117
5.7.1 Doctors
All reported becoming doctors because they wanted to 'help others' and do 
'social work'. One senior medic from the CMC reported that he made the 
choice of municipal public service, partly because it would allow him to continue 
in private practice, and partly to ensure that he didn't have to move out of 
Calcutta. His colleague echoed the second claim, saying that his mother was a 
widow and that he needed to stay in the city to accompany her.
5.7.2 Paramedical Health Workers
Paramedical health workers in ward 67 showed nothing that suggested an 
innate public service ethos or significant commitment to their roles. One MPHW 
reported getting his job in the CMC through friends that he used to hang about 
with at that time. They were CMC employees, and he used to keep them 
company in their jobs. When the time came to look for work, he asked them to 
help him find a job and they obliged. Another CMC paramedical health worker 
got his job through political connections. He reported being a Congress activist 
though the 1960s and 70s and in this milieu became known to the Minister of 
Municipal Affairs (the current Mayor), Subrata Mukherjee. For his loyalty 
Subrata arranged a job for him in the Corporation.
A Municipal Service Commission has existed for some time, but has only been 
for the recruitment of senior officials, group A staff. Officially, the rest were 
recruited through the employment exchange. In practice close ties with 
someone already in the Corporation, usually a prominent local leader or 
politician, was the most popular means of entry for para-professionals - grade 
B,C,D employees. In the words of one employee, who has recently retired after 
42 years in service, "in those days there was no Municipal Service Commission.
117 It should be noted that the CMC health officials in Ward 85 refused to be interviewed. Those in ward 67, 
both CMC and CMUHO, were however quite happy to answer my questions. Questions were also put to senior 
medics within the municipal health care bureaucracy.
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I knew somebody who worked in the Corporation, who got me in. In those days, 
if you had a job with the Corporation, then you could get others recruited as 
well. I reckon that I have given chakri (regular employment) to over 150 
people."
The CMUHO official whom I interviewed in ward 67 reported joining out of 
financial compulsion. He said, "my real intention was to become a doctor. I 
joined this service when I was eighteen years old. I really needed the money. 
But this is not my only job. I am a M.Comm and also give tuition classes outside 
of work." Other CMUHO employees reported deciding to become paramedical 
workers, as it seemed the best opportunity available to them at a time when 
they needed a job.
The desire to see a strong public service ethos, ‘a calling’, as a key driving 
force to deciding to be a health worker may be considered to the rationale for 
introducing Honorary Health Workers (HHWs). The job brought with it a paltry 
honorarium and no social benefits or protection, but rather the threat of instant 
dismissal should performance slack.
Of the twelve HHWs, one was quite clearly motivated and displayed what may 
be termed a public service ethos. She was regularly seen wandering the 
bustee, fulfilling her ascribed role. Although she complained about the small 
honorarium she received, she categorically and repeatedly stated how pleased 
she was to be doing 'social work'. She was proud of the fact that she had been 
commended by local dignitaries for her role in preventing diarrohea deaths 
since she has worked in this area.
This woman may have represented the silent majority of HHWs, yet the 
responses her colleagues gave during focus group discussions, suggested 
other reasons were uppermost in their minds when choosing to become HHWs. 
Although the honorarium was paltry, most of HHWs reported joining because 
they assumed that as the British government was funding the project, and CMC 
would later assume administrative and logistical responsibilities, there was the 
distinct possibility that eventually they would be given a chakri with a 
government agency.
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One further point which will be expanded in the subsequent chapter has to do 
with the issue of selection. We may recall that in the case of health agents in 
Ceara - said to have had a sense of ‘calling’ which helped make them 
dedicated to their roles despite meagre salaries and few social benefits - the 
‘sense of calling’ was created not solely by their conditions of employment, but 
by the active role the state government played in following a transparent and 
merit-based selection procedure. This would appear to be in sharp contrast with 
the situation in ward 67 where it was widely rumoured that these women had 
been selected on account of their close links to the CPI (M), and particularly the 
councillor at the time, who was a member of the selection panel. The 
community was meant to play a key role in the selection of HHWs. For this 
purpose 'community groups’ that supposedly represented the community were 
formed, led by the local councillor, for the selection procedure.
Some scholars have argued that a public service ethos and strong motivation 
are important qualities for committed public servants to have. However, the 
evidence from the interviews undertaken with a number of health care officials, 
medical and paramedical staff alike, suggests that such noble intentions did not 
feature in their reasons for choosing these occupations. This is not to say that 
a desire to serve the public was not completely absent in their decision to 
become health care workers. Rather, public spiritedness was combined with, 
and at times even overshadowed by, other more selfish considerations in 
helping them to decide their career choice. Yet the existence of these selfish 
considerations did not seem to define the way that they subsequently 
performed their roles; for even well performing officials did not show radically 
different motivations than those that performed less well.
5.8 External Pressures: The Exercise of ‘Voice’
In the public sector, policies are shaped and quality maintained by citizens 
exerting political pressure, or voice, on agents.118 “Voice is the dominant mode 
in the public domain and has the potential to shape the nature of the services 
available” (Ranson & Stewart, 1994:92). In either case, it is not merely the
118 Exit and voice are a complementary set of mechanisms, identified by Hirschmann(1970) with which 
principals may exert leverage over agents.
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existence of the right to voice or exit that is important - although this is 
fundamental - but the ability and willingness of principals (clients, consumers) 
to use the institutional mechanisms available to them.119
Recently, the work of Tendler (1997) in Brazil, has shown that recruiting 
bureaucrats locally, and also posting them for prolonged periods in their locality, 
has improved their performance and the quality of the service provided. Moore 
(1989) and Wade (1992) have suggested similar policies, arguing that 
incentives for socially optimal behaviour emerge from local bureaucrats’ 
enmeshment in local networks of social relations (Moore, 1989: 1742). In other 
words, the internal norms that encourage good performance may result from a 
sense of belonging’ to the local community. Yet even in prosperous and 
egalitarian societies, such as Taiwan, where principals are aware of problems, 
Moore (1989) notes that formal institutional channels for the articulation of 
protest, have not resulted in the expected changes in bureaucratic and 
organisational performance.
The possibility of articulating ‘voice’ rests on the existence of channels through 
which objections can be articulated, together with a strong likelihood that 
positive change will occur. The next part of this chapter examines to what 
extent pressure brought to bear on bureaucrats by local inhabitants, affected 
their performance. Essential to this will be an examination of local politics - both 
the political opportunities that the state provides for protest, as well as the 
political agencies at the slum level, mediating between local actors and the 
state.
5.8.1 Voice in Ward 67
When asked why they take so much care to note down their daily activities, 
maintain a repair and movement register and ensure that, generally, it is kept 
up to date, local officials reported that it was in order to be able to defend 
themselves against attacks or accusations from local inhabitants that they have 
been shirking their responsibilities. As one Block Sarkar said, “its for us to hold
119 As stated by Ranson &  Stewart, “voice and the right to voice is a condition of the public domain” 
(1994:91).
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up when they come to organise an andolan (demonstration) against us...our 
protection against a gherao.120 These words seemed to encapsulate the 
feelings of local CMC and CMUHO health care officials working in the area.
The Block Sarkar’s response reflected two key aspects of local governance in 
this ward, which the following section shall discuss in greater detail. Firstly, that 
the local population was active, organised and interested in holding local 
officials to account, and secondly that local officials felt sensitive enough to 
local pressures that they are actually prepared to react to these and to take pre­
emptive measures to prevent such forms of public reaction ensuing. In other 
words, not only were principals willing to exercise voice, there was the 
likelihood that voice could lead to positive change.
Overtime, working, living and interacting with the people of the area, it became 
clear that local civil society/community organisations were very active and took 
a special interest in issues around local services. The local information 
furnished by these groups and the pressure exerted by their members, was 
seen to affect the ways of working of local officials.
5.9 Local Civil Society Organisations in Ward 67
At least 7 apparently separate local ‘community organisations’ were identified 
as being active in this ward: Mahila Samity', Bustee Federation; Nagorik 
(Citizens) Samity', Jonosashtho (Health) Committee and Youth Federations 
(DYFI & SFI). Each of these groups has an identical organisational structure. 
Basically, a plethora of small units, para or mohalla committees are dispersed 
throughout the ward, from which members are elected to form two local 
committees. For example, in ward 67 there are two local (ward) committees of 
the Nagorik Samity, one representing the north of the ward, the other 
representing the south. Seven local committees, elect a zone committee. The 
process is repeated through to district, state and, in some cases, to central 
level. It is restricted to city level for the Nagorik Samity and state level for the 
Mahila Samity. These groups form a dense and intricate network of groups and
120 “A Gherao is the physical blockade o f a target, either by encirclement or forcible occupation. The 
‘target’ may be a place or a person or persons, usually the managerial or supervisory staff o f an industrial
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organisations avowedly concerned with local issues, and committed to 
improving the livelihoods and living conditions of local inhabitants, especially 
the poor and marginalised. Most of these bodies claimed to be independent 
and autonomous, open to all with no political allegiances.121 The work of just 
two of these is highlighted below.
5.9.1 Mahila Samity
The Ganotantrik Mahila Samity was established for “the upliftment and 
emancipation of downtrodden women”.122 Organised from the grassroots level 
throughout the ward, up to state level committees (see diagram), it is claimed 
that the mahila samity has been very active in the campaign against domestic 
violence. As a result of its work, there has been a drop in the incidences of 
domestic violence in the ward (according to CMC officials). Where a case of 
domestic violence has been reported mohalla or para level members of the 
samity gather the conflicting parties together in the company of neighbourhood 
leaders. Samity members try to encourage a dialogue to discover the source of 
the problem. Their preferred policy is to encourage the two factions to ‘talk it 
out’ in the company of community leaders, after which the aggressor is 
‘persuaded’ to desist from further offensive acts. If the abuse continues, then 
the mahila samity reports the incident to the local police and presses for action 
to be taken.
5.9.2 Nagorik Committee
This is another prominent local group, organised along the same lines to the 
Mahila Samity (see Fig 5.4 and 5.5) and very active in the local area. 
According to the secretary of the Nagorik Samity (ward 67, south), in 1977 the 
Kasba Ganotantric Nagorik Samity was formed for the old ward 70, by the 
former CPI (M) MLA, Suchin Sen. This committee mobilised people to prevent 
and combat anti-social activities in their area.123
establishment...” See Chapter Seven.
121 The Mahila Samity was the exception.
1221 am grateful to the secretary of the Mahila Samity (ward 67) and to the councillor, for informing me 
about the work of this samity.
123 In response to the situation of terror and lawlessness that had been presiding in Kasba since the late 
1960s, a citizen’s committee was formed in 1977. (The Statesman, 24/11/77)
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Since then, the Nagorik Samity has grown. At the grassroots level, the Nagorik 
Samity (Ward 67) has 27 units, called mohalla samities. An elected president 
and secretary head each mohalla (neighbourhood) samity; and represent their 
mohalla as members of the larger ward level samity. Seven ward Nagorik 
Samities form a Nagorik zone committee; sixteen Nagorik zone committees 
form one central committee for the city of Calcutta. Officially, the Nagorik 
Samity is apolitical, open to concerned citizens from all political hues, 
regardless of class, caste or creed.
The Nagorik Samity is involved in all sorts of activities in the Ward, including: 
prioritising for local planning; environmental protection - preservation of ponds and 
planting of trees; raising awareness of public health issues and keeping local 
officials informed about public health risks. For the last 7 years the Nagorik Samity 
has been campaigning for a proper sewerage and drainage system to remove the 
stagnant water which accumulates here during every monsoon. Finally, in 2000 
the work started at a cost of Rs 60 lakhs. This is seen as quite an achievement 
considering that this same amount is on average what has been spent in previous 
years for upgrading all the services in the area.
In 1999, the Nagorik Samity organised a convention about malaria eradication 
and prevention in Kasba. Local private doctors, CMC health officials as well as 
health officials from GoWB and beyond were invited to discuss ways of tackling 
the problem. Again this was a significant and novel attempt to bring experts 
together in one place to tackle a serious public health risk in an area of the city.
Nagorik committee leaders were the most visibly active of all the local groups 
during fieldwork. On a number of occasions the Nagorik committee secretary 
was seen visiting the MO and SFW to discuss strategies for prevention and 
combating the spread of malaria in the area. He pressed for a strategy to be in 
place well before the malaria ‘season’ was due to start. The same person was 
also seen requesting local health care officials to issue notices against local 
householders whom due to a lack of care or civic sense were creating the 
circumstances for an incident threatening to public health. At least one Nagorik 
Samity secretary accompanies the councillor during his morning ‘surgeries’. 
Furthermore, local health care providers, from both the private and public
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sector reported occasional visits by nagorik committee members to urge them 
to take action in the event of an outbreak of a certain communicable disease 
(acute gastroenteritis or jaundice). No-one was seen or reported ignoring their 
requests.
5.10 Good Government and Civil Society In ward 67
In Chapter Two it was stated that proponents of decentralisation have tended to 
believe that good government comes about through the pressure from a robust 
civil society, conceived as a realm of activity separate from and in opposition to 
the state, made up of autonomous and private organisations. This chapter has 
argued so far that civil society organisations (CSOs) active in ward 67 were key 
to the good performance of health care officials in this ward. The local 
councillor corroborated their status as independent and autonomous. The 
parallels with the contemporary ‘liberal’ notions of civil society appear striking - 
good government was seen to result from pressure from the civic realm, which 
was made up of private and autonomous bodies separate from the State. 
Whilst tempting, it would be facile and erroneous to see such organisations in 
this way.
5.10.1 Neither Autonomous nor Separate
A comparison of the organisational structure of these groups, seen in Figs 5.4 
and 5.5, with that of the CPI (M), seen in Fig 5.3, highlights some conspicuous 
similarities between the two. The organisational structure of these local popular 
organisations would seem to mirror that of the CPI (M). Moreover, during 
fieldwork I found that members of these organisations perceived themselves to 
be answerable to the CPI (M). For example, I was asked to seek permission 
from the local Party office to be able to interview the secretary of the mahila 
samity or to attend the meetings that any of these organisations used to hold. It 
was constantly emphasised to me that no information about these groups could 
be imparted without prior permission from the Party. Thus, as well as sharing 
the same organisational structure, the organisational norms of these 
organisations resembled those of the Party. The CPI (M) is organised under a 
system of democratic centralism, and its members are expected to follow 
norms of discipline and hierarchy.
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Historically, the origins of these organisations are closely linked with the CPI 
(M). In Calcutta, these are widely regarded as mass fronts organisations of the 
CPI (M), which undermines the claims, made to me in ward 67, of their 
autonomy. The fostering of mass organisations is widely recognised as the 
cornerstone of the Party’s organisational strategy in the state, and much has 
been said about the strength and effectiveness of these in guaranteeing 
election victories for the CPI (M).124 They were also conceived to monitor the 
performance of local officials, and since their inception this has been one of 
their key roles. In the words of one MLA, “we are proposing the setting up of 
committees everywhere, to observe how officials, including the police are 
working, and to suggest how they should”.125 Mass organisations linked to the 
Party have served practical purposes: they have monitored, mobilised and 
informed.126
The emergence of the Nagorik Committee in Kasba provides a good illustration 
of this close relationship, and supports the view that the CPI (M) nurtured these 
organisations mainly for practical reasons. Established in late 1977, the 
Nagorik committee was set up at the behest of a local CPI (M) MLA during the 
official visit of two ministers from the first Left Front Government, and in 
response to the situation of lawlessness which presided in the area at that time. 
During fieldwork, prominent local Party members recalled that after coming to 
power in 1977, the Party felt that it needed to be vigilant to the possibility of 
threats, on account of the history of political violence in this area. It was felt that 
mass front organisations, such as the Nagrorik Committee, would be well 
placed to keep track of the movement of ‘anti-socials’.127
Though clearly the Nagorik Committee played an important social role - its 
efforts were geared towards improving the living conditions of local people,
124 For example, see Chatterjee (1997). Further discussion of the CPI (M ) and its ‘mass fronts’ is 
contained in Chapter Seven.
125 Prabir Kumar Sengupta M LA Bansberia (Hoogly), in Sengupta (1979:28).
126 For a discussion of the origins of these, see Franda (1971a: 15).
127 The term ‘anti-social’ is commonly used to describe criminals, who during the period of terror and 
state sponsored violence, carried out many of the attacks on supporters of the left, locally.
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particularly in terms of basic services, infrastructure and security - it would 
appear that groups such as this also provide an organic link from the Party to 
the people at the grassroots. As the local Party’s proverbial ‘finger on the 
pulse’, these organisations kept the local councillor and MLA, and thus the 
Party, informed of local needs. If there was a problem at the local level - a 
broken pipe, or some kind of criminal activity - the dense network of mohalla 
and para committees at the grassroots level would pass the information to the 
ward level committee, whose leaders would ensure that local officials were 
informed of this, either directly or via the councillor.
Local officials were seen to comply with the requests made of them by the 
councillor and by the representatives of these organisations even though 
statutorily they were under no obligation to do so.128 The local councillor, by 
sheer dint of being nominated by the local Party, was clearly a powerful political 
figure locally, which in Calcutta usually assured a considerable degree of 
compliance from local officials. Pressure from these organisations was usually 
successful because, through their links to the higher echelons of the Party 
under the system of democratic centralism, it was implicit that pressure exerted 
by them from below implicitly carried the support from the state’s political 
leadership. It was to this leadership that bureaucratic line managers were 
ultimately accountable. If officials did not respond to this pressure from below 
as they were expected to, there was the likelihood that it could always be 
combined with pressure from on top - from Ministers or MICs through senior 
officials. Ultimately, it was the former combined with the risk of the latter, which 
proved decisive to influencing the performance of bureaucrats for the better.129 
However, on the account of the sheer power that leaders of these local 
organisations and the local councillor were felt to hold, rarely was pressure 
from on top ever brought to bear.
128 According to the Municipal Commissioner, see quote in text in Chapter Six.
129 It should be noted that it was not just the CPM’s authority which forced bureaucrats to be responsive. 
This authority was backed by the fact that the Party had a pro-poor agenda, had endeavoured to bring 
improvements to the bustees by securing tenure and introducing some basic services, like water and 
electricity. One key source of its power has traditionally been the low-income settlements on the periphery 
of the city, such as Kasba. See note 136 later.
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Fig 5.3 Typical Organisational Structure : CPI (M)
District committees
State Committee
Central Committee
New Delhi
16-20 Zone Committees
Zonal Committee
6/7 Local Committees
Ward 67
Local Local
committee committee
(N) (S)
41 Branchep
Branch/Part (1 Branch Secretary & 15 Party Workers)
1000 voters
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Fig 5.4 Organisational Structure: Calcutta Nagorik Samity
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Fig 5.5 Organisational Structure: Mahila Samity
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5.11 The emergence of collective action
Given the role as well as the effectiveness of the local neighbourhood 
organisations, such as the Nagorik Committee, in ensuring that local officials 
perform their duties adequately, the paper will turn to consider the conditions 
for their emergence in one ward (67), and not the other.
Modern scholarship on the determinants of collective action in the form of social 
movements may be seen as split into three main theoretical strands. On the 
one hand, Putnam (1993) and his disciples have emphasized the idea of 
historical endowments of what, famously, has been termed social capital - 
norms of cooperation, generalised reciprocity and trust, which have manifested 
themselves through time in the form of vibrant associational life, a proliferation 
of clubs and associations, wide newspaper readership and political participation 
at the local level. Prior stocks of this must exist for it to be useable, and 
through use more stocks are built up. For Putnam, social capital was an 
historical endowment of communities with a tradition of civic associationalism.
Where these stocks of 'social capital' do not exist, no ready solution is given for 
their creation and these communities, we can only assume, are doomed. 
Putnam’s use of the concept of social capital as the social adhesive that allows 
people to overcome the dilemmas of collective action and cooperate with one 
another for common ends (Putnam, 1993), is allied to the liberal democratic 
notions of civil society discussed in the previous section. According to Putnam, 
in the case of northern Italy, social capital enabled people to get together and 
participate in local politics more actively, which resulted in higher than normal 
levels of governmental performance.
Another strand has focused on the structural factors affecting collective action, 
namely the state and the opportunities that it provides for people to join 
together to engage in collective action. According to Foweraker, "the form of 
the state which political action confronts, will have a crucial influence on the 
form and content of action" (1995:70) Brockett has spoken of the political 
opportunity structure (POS), "the configuration of political forces in a group's 
political environment that influences that group's assertion of its political claims" 
(1991:254).
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The third identifiable strand is one that focuses on the common internal 
characteristics of the actors - their class, caste, ethnic, linguistic identity - and to 
the extent that these have facilitated the emergence of collective action. 
Scholars such as Portes have cited the concept of 'bounded solidarity', which 
has been central to Marxist analysis of emergent class-consciousness in the 
industrial proletariat. Through sharing a common situation, workers learn to 
identify and support one another. This ‘bounded solidarity', according to Marx, 
comes from sharing a common fate and according to Portes (1998) can be a 
"powerful motivational force".130 Castells (1982) has highlighted how urban 
social movements in Latin America have shared some common characteristics, 
particularly the conditions in which they have emerged and become effective.
These perspectives, which provide a useful preliminary framework for 
examining collective action at the local level, are split, broadly, into a focus on 
aspects of the state on the one hand and characteristics or commonalities 
shared by the local population on the other. Scholars working on India and 
West Bengal have tended to follow this lead by focusing on one at the expense 
of the other, in analysing collective action at the local level. A notable exception 
would be Dreze and Sen, in their analysis of 'public action' (1989), in which the 
second and third perspectives have been neatly combined to explain the 
context for public action. 'Public action', they argue, is the result of opportunities 
provided by the state and the political regime, which "must accept the discipline 
of public criticism and social opposition", and rests on the ability of the actors to 
get along and share enough common goals to organise effectively.
For instance, Kohli (1987) would suggest that a suitable political opportunity 
structure has existed for some time in West Bengal. The state, he argues, is 
controlled by a left of centre political regime, which is committed to equity- 
orientated reforms. Moreover, it came to power on the crest of a social 
movement for agrarian reform. This fact, together with the revitalization of local 
government institutions, has created the spaces at the micro-level for 
engagement in political action. This explanation has been challenged by 
Echeverri-Gent, who has noted how through the distribution of poverty
130 See Portes (1998) for further discussion of this.
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alleviation programmes, the LFG nurtured patron-client relationships which 
were used to guarantee loyalty. This, he argues, has effectively undermined the 
public's ability to engage in autonomous collective action (1993:168ff). In a 
similar vein Bhattacharya (1999) believes that the Left front has deradicalised, 
and now conducts a "politics of middleness", allowing it to become the 
hegemonic force in the political landscape, as such leaving little symbolic space 
for the emergence of a political or social movement with an autonomous 
identity. It is not clear whether this has been inadvertent or intentional on the 
part of the LFG. Webster (1999) hints at the latter, arguing that the policies of 
the state have not supported efforts for collective action. The proclivity for 
collective action has been scuppered, he says, by "the politics of agrarian 
development at the levels of both the state and the village" (1999:334), it was 
nothing to do with a lack of collective will or group cohesion. On the other 
hand, taking the third perspective, Williams (1999) has suggested that the class 
consciousness needed for a collective identity, and then in turn collective action 
to emerge, is in fact lacking in West Bengal, contrary to the intentions and, he 
claims, despite the efforts of the LFG. The focus thus turns to the internal 
commonalities, or divisions, affecting group cohesion, and therefore collective 
action, although admittedly the failure of the CPI (M) - an external force - is 
implicit in his account.
The next section assesses which of the three strands provides the most 
adequate explanatory framework for understanding the emergence of civil 
society organisations in Ward 67.
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5.12 Social Capital: Distinguishing Between Types of Associations and 
Tracing their Origins
There are two immediately perceptible problems with Putnam’s analysis. The 
first has to do with the tendency running from De Tocqueville through to 
Putnam, of not distinguishing between different types of civic organisation, but 
seeing them all as possessing the positive qualities outlined above. Clubs and 
societies have proliferated in Kasba as they have done in the city as a whole, 
but there is little evidence that they have given rise to virtuous consequences, 
in terms of enhancing governmental performance, equally in the two areas that 
were studied. The second has to do with tracing the origins of associational life, 
and judging the effects of periods of rupture and conflict on stocks of social 
capital. Was the capacity of groups such as the Nagorik Committee to 
overcome the dilemmas of collective action - as seen through their continued 
vibrancy - the result of the existence of prior stocks of social capital in this area, 
built up through a history of associational life, as Putnam has argued in the 
case of Northern Italy?
5.12.1 Types of Association
Whether the organisation is based on horizontal or vertical ties is significant for 
Putnam, but whether it is political or social or cultural is not.131 For Putnam, 
apparently, just “taking part in a choral society or a bird-watching club can 
teach self-discipline and an appreciation of the joys of successful collaboration” 
(1993:90). These in turn, he argues, “nourish wider co-operation” (1993: 175), 
ultimately contributing to deepen democracy. Rudolph, however, has 
recommended differentiating between types of associations in order to assess 
their effect on democracy. She argues that there is a need to question whether 
an association is political or not, whether it is hierarchical or egalitarian and 
whether it is natural or ascriptive (2000:1766).
For a start, It is probably worth questioning whether simply “taking part” in 
associational life is indeed enough to lead to the sort of democratic practice and 
good governance that Putnam eulogises. Putnam himself later qualifies this by 
arguing that those organisations which display certain “civic virtues such as
131 Just as it didn’t seem to be for De Tocqueville, see Chapter Two.
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tolerance and equality” are more likely to contribute to democratic governance. 
This nuance is pertinent in the case of a city like Calcutta, where associations 
in the form of clubs and societies abound, but do not all produce the same 
virtuous consequences, in terms of improved governmental performance. It 
was mentioned that Garcha (ward 85) was well served with clubs, yet 
governmental performance was poor. Merely taking part in an association, or 
the proliferation of associational life there has clearly not been enough to 
produce the sort of good governance referred to by Putnam. This may be 
because traditionally these associations have not, in general, displayed an 
interest in civic matters.132 But it is also an inalienable fact that none of these 
associations was organised in an egalitarian way, and few seemed committed 
to democratic goals. The clubs in and around DT were organised in a 
hierarchical way and dominated by a coterie of youths. They were exclusive of 
non-Bengali ethnic groups, of local women and girls. It should be of little 
surprise that whereas these may have produced strong interpersonal bonds, 
because of the basic lack of any notion of equality within them, these 
associations have contributed little to enhancing governance locally.
While it is difficult to imagine associations that do not embody notions of 
equality contributing to deepen democracy locally, it is hard to think of those 
that are not political being able to inculcate the skills relevant to democratic 
practice. Putnam’s view that “networks of civic engagement” ultimately serve to 
consolidate democracy (1993:175), suggests that political skills and 
participation would be just as much fostered in a choral society as in a patients’ 
committee of a local hospital. But Levi (1996) has noted that there is no 
evidence that the skills and habits learned in such neutral associations (as, for 
example, choral societies) are relevant to the construction of democratic 
practice, or that they are transferable to the project of enhancing governance. 
Furthermore, Habermas has argued that historically it has mattered whether an 
association is political or non-political. Political associations are required for 
deliberative communication. By taking as an example the 18th century coffee 
house and political clubs, he argues that these made public what monarchs and
132 According to Weiner, this was a feature of associations in the city as a whole (1963:249).
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aristocrats had kept private. Associations based on private interest, he believed 
would not lead to a deliberation of “matters of general interest”.133
One eminent local journalist made a relevant point about clubs in Calcutta, 
emphasising that it was not the fact that clubs existed, but the type of clubs that 
existed, which was critical. Some neighbourhood clubs, he claimed, were 
clearly more political than others - “look at how Ajit Panja (an Union minister 
and prominent local Congress politician) developed clubs in north Calcutta. He 
used these clubs for electoral politics, as a breeding ground for Congress 
supporters although he would also sponsor sports tournaments...give TVs... 
(Similarly) in Kasba the clubs have no choice but to get involved in real life 
issues - they are a more integral part of people’s lives”. 134
In a similar vein, in a cross-country analysis of associational life it was shown 
that political, economic and community groups were more likely to be involved 
in political and community participation than cultural and personal interest 
groups. Stolle and Rochon concluded that “generalised enthusiasm for the 
effects of associational membership on social capital must be tempered by a 
specification of what types of groups we are talking about and what aspects of 
social capital are being considered” (1998:57).135
There is a need to distinguish between political and non-political associations, 
to be able to understand why some forms of associational life have led to 
virtuous consequences, whilst others have not. It is not enough just to 
associate with one another for a sense of fellow feeling to emerge that 
facilitates collective action, and has a positive external effect on governmental 
performance. From my fieldwork is was evident that many types of associations 
existed in both wards, but the ones that proved to be decisive in improving the 
performance of local officials, in ward 67, were patently political and tended to
1331 am grateful to Rudolph (2000) for bringing the pertinent views of Habermas to my attention.
134 Personal Interview with Ashish Chakraborty, Coordinating Editor of the Hindustan Times, Calcutta 
11/07/2000.
135 They differentiate between two types of social capital: membership of associations giving rise to 
enhanced interpersonal trust thereby facilitating collective action; and social capital which facilitates co­
operation beyond one’s own group, making possible social interaction in a region (1998:48). It is this last 
type of what they term “public social capital”, which they examine in their study.
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be more inclusive in terms of gender, class, caste and ethnicity. By contrast in 
ward 85, none of the numerous clubs seemed to have any political end, but 
instead were places for general socialising and sometimes sports tournaments. 
Furthermore, it is important to emphasise what was implied in the last chapter 
about the exclusiveness of these clubs in Garcha. We may recall that they 
were organised by and for men, usually pertaining to one particular ethnic 
group.
5.12.2 Tracing the Origins of Associational Life
It is difficult to ascertain with any degree of accuracy whether associational life 
in Kasba dates back to before independence. Kasba, as an inhabited area, 
really only emerged in the post-independence period with mass migration from 
parts of West Bengal and the erstwhile East Pakistan. It is thus difficult to see 
how any history of associational life can be traced back to before then. 
Furthermore, it is likely that whatever politically orientated associational life may 
have existed was extinguished, or at the very least stifled, in the tumultuous 
period between 1967-77.136 Although Putnam would accept that social capital 
could be put into “mothballs” and preserved through times of crisis (Rudolph, 
2000:1765) - as in the case of Northern Italy, between the 14th and 19th 
centuries - this would seem counter-intuitive. Realistically it is hard to believe 
that stocks of social capital can be preserved through periods of breakdown 
and rupture of associational life, through an era of violence, terror and
1 "V7oppression.
Nevertheless, given what has been said about the origins of organisations such 
as the Nagorik Committee, it is clear that politically orientated associational life 
in this area does have a history, although there is little evidence to suggest that 
this can be traced to before the late 1970s. Moreover, I have suggested that the
136 For example, “Anti-Social Elements said to be holding Kasba ransom” (Statesman 23/09/68); “Fear 
and tension prevail in some areas of Kasba” (Statesman, 14/12/77) Kasba in this period was the scene of 
considerable violence. At a macro level, the 1970s saw the rigging o f state Assembly elections, and the 
State’s curtailment of civil, political and human rights-seen through the crackdown on left parties and the 
imposition of Emergency. See Chatterjee (1990).
137 It depends, of course, on the type of associational life being considered. Evidence from Central 
America has shown that repression affects people’s inclination to join formal associations, but not so 
much to engage in communal activism and informal group formation. Nevertheless cross-country 
evidence has led to the conclusion that, “repression impedes the development of social and political 
capital” (Booth and Richard, 1998:42).
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Party fostered these organisations mainly for practical reasons, to inform, 
mobilise and monitor the performance of local officials in the state. This was of 
particular importance in the case of Kasba, where a history of lawlessness and 
violence against supporters of the Left meant the CPI (M) had to be vigilant of 
what went on in the area. It may also be worth recalling that Ward 67 is on the 
periphery of the city, and as such has constituted what is considered a ‘vote 
bank’ for the CPI (M). The Left has depended on the support of such peripheral 
areas to win the last three Municipal Elections.138 Thus, for the Party, ward 67 
may be considered of strategic electoral importance.
Garcha provides a different historical and political context from that of Kasba. In 
the former, there was nothing comparable to the state-sponsored persecution 
of the Left, witnessed in Kasba. Moreover, in electoral terms Garcha is not 
strategically as important to the Left as are peripheral areas like Kasba. In spite 
of its large working class population, Garcha has traditionally been a Congress 
(I) bastion. Its large non-Bengali population has probably been instrumental in 
ensuring this. Traditionally, Calcutta’s non-Bengali inhabitants have provided 
the main source of support for the Congress Party in the city (Ashraf, 1970:60). 
This has been a phenomenon that the Left has been unable to reverse.139 
Garcha’s different historical and political context may have meant that there 
was less of a practical need for the CPI (M) to pursue a strategy of mobilisation 
through mass organisations there.
5.13 The Political Opportunity Structure for Collective Action
Structural factors affecting the emergence of collective action refer to the state 
and the opportunities that it provides for people to come together to engage in 
collective action or not. The evidence of civil society organisations active in the 
Ward 67 suggests that the CPI (M) effectively nurtured these organisations. 
Furthermore, their close ties with the regime controlling the state has helped 
ensure that these have been effective in exerting pressure on local officials. It
138 See Thomas (1998:41 -42;54-55). Many of these peripheral areas were included in the city’s boundaries 
after 1985, as a way to ensure continued support for the LF coalition in CMC elections. For an excellent 
discussion of the relationship between these areas and Left politics, see Chakrabarti (1990).
139 Personal communication from Prof. S. Roy Congress MLA.
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may also be argued that the Party’s control of the state has enabled it to 
provide local inhabitants in an area like Kasba with the incentives for their 
continuing participation in such groups.
5.13.1 Access to Social Goods
From being a deprived suburb, lacking in basic infrastructure and services, 
where service privvies, katcha housing and surface drains were the norm, 
Kasba has witnessed significant improvements in the last fifteen years. The 
area itself has benefited enormously from development related funds. It is 
estimated by the local secretary of the Nagorik Committee that Rs 10 crore had 
been spent alone in Kasba in the last 15 years, mainly on slum improvement. 
Investment continues to flow into the area. At present, a new sewerage and 
drainage system costing Rs 60 lakh is being laid to prevent flooding, which is a 
perennial problem in this low-lying area. Clearly activism in such groups has its 
rewards. It would seem that the inhabitants of ward 67 have enjoyed privileged 
access to the distribution of social goods which the state controls.
Access to such ‘privileges’ comes at a price: staunch loyalty and a willingness 
to dedicate time and resources to the Party. Those who do not, for whatever 
reason, place themselves at the disposal of the Party, may be excluded from 
anything more than the most basic of services. In the case of some local 
services it is almost impossible to show favouritism to some individuals over 
others, living in a residential unit like a bustee bari. Yet if an identifiable group 
that was unwilling to play by the ‘rules’ - to attend meetings or to join rallies - 
was identified, its access to some services was curtailed. A good case in point 
was the bustee being studied. Inhabitants unanimously reported decreasing or 
absolutely no participation in local committees or clubs, stating lack of time as 
the main reason. It was not perhaps surprising to note that that local services 
were scantily provided - garbage clearance was haphazard, and during six 
months HHW were seen only once.
Hence, the CPI (M) has created the political opportunity structure for the 
emergent local civil society organisations and has, through its channelling of 
development funds in to the area, been able to reward local inhabitants for their 
loyalty and activism. Local inhabitants have been provided with a return on their
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investment in time and resources through participation in rallies, events and 
meetings - which these groups, as mass fronts of the CPI (M) are involved in - 
by receiving privileged access to the social goods distributed by the state. This 
in part may explain their continued vibrancy and activism and people’s 
willingness to participate in them.140 At the same time, sanctions also seem to 
exist for those who do not participate in such events. This may be seen as 
necessary to deter free riders, but has also resulted, in parts of SL bustee, with 
some local services being poorly provided. The evidence would seem to 
support the view that the State has created the opportunities for local actors to 
come together.
5.13.2 The Congress Party in West Bengal
In contrast the absence of such organisations in ward 85 may be attributed to 
the fact that the Congress Party, which has dominated this area since 
independence, has pursued a different political strategy at the local level to that 
of the CPI (M). Rather than organise through broad based mass organisations, 
of the type seen in ward 67, Congress built a “political machine” around a 
coterie of key leaders who were driven by selfishness rather than moral, 
political or ideological principles.141 The machine provided an efficient system 
of spoils directed towards the rural gentry and urban business community who 
were permitted to evade government laws and restrictions so as to pursue their 
own interests, in return for financial support; together with an extensive system 
of patronage-providing assistance to the poor and providing avenues for social 
mobility.142 The Congress avoided bringing about any far-reaching social 
change through social upheaval, working instead through men who were 
“influential in the social structure of their localities and could sway a needed 
portion of the electorate by particularistic appeals” (Franda, 1971b: 99). This 
modus operandi which, according to a former leader, had turned the party into
140 Baiocchi (2000) reports that in Porto Alegre, Brazil, which has pioneered a system of participatory 
local governance, the poor participated in associations if  they saw returns on their investment o f time and 
resources.
141 A political machine is defined as, “a party organisation held together and motivated by desire for 
personal gain rather than political principle or ideology” (Banfield, 1961:132) applied by Franda 
(1971b:89-108) to describe the Congress Party in West Bengal.
142 See Franda op cit and Chatterji 1985(pp31-61).
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“a place of spoils and gaining favours” was justified on the pretext of preventing 
,mobocracy,) which he believed would undoubtedly ensue if the Communists 
came to power.
Although attempts were made to pursue a wider support base through the 
creation of mass organisations of its own like the Chattro Parishad or the 
Mahila Mandats after the national split in 1969, factionalism and poor 
leadership have depleted their strength.143 Whatever mass organisations may 
have existed in Ward 85 have disappeared in a maelstrom of allegations about 
corruption and malpractices. Local leaders show no interest in replacing them. 
Instead, the peddling of patronage and spoils by the candidates through a 
handful of locally influential bosses (mastaans) remained the linchpin of 
Congress organisation in ward 85, seen in the 2000 Corporation elections. The 
pretence of trying to pursue a wider support base through mass organisations 
has been dropped. As one prominent Congress MLA recently admitted, 
“Congress is not strong in mass organisations, its not in the ethos...Congress 
organisations depends on individual councillors-we believe that you can’t beat 
the personal touch, the CPI (M) organisation is too mechanical, it lacks the 
personal touch ”.144
The differences in political strategy between the CPI (M) and the Congress 
Party in West Bengal are surely part of the reason for the absence of popular 
organisations in ward 85. However, there is the danger of seeing the differing 
levels of official performance in the two wards as a consequence of the different 
political parties in power in each of the wards. The problem with this argument 
is that it leaves open to question the fact that as a whole in the state, the health 
system is in a very poor state and officials are known to perform generally quite 
poorly, despite the fact that the CPI (M) has been in control of the state for the 
last 25 years. Clearly, to see the better performance of officials in ward 67 
solely as a result of the fact that the CPI (M) has an ideological commitment to 
mass organisations is too simplistic a view.
143 The indifferent response to the Bandh called in the city by the Youth Congress on July 31st, 2000, and 
the disassociation of the state Congress from it and its leader reflects the disarray into which one such 
mass organisation has fallen.
144 Interview with Prof. Saugata Roy Congress M LA 30/09/2000.
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Instead, the rationale for the CPI (M) to pursue such a political strategy in an 
area like Kasba, it has been suggested, was more likely practical than 
ideological, and the combination of factors that led to the formation of mass 
organisations in Kasba do not seem to have existed in Garcha. It would also 
appear that through its strategic position in relation to the state, the Party has 
also been able to provide the incentives for the continuing activism of local 
people in these organisations, thereby helping to ensure their long-term 
vibrancy. The Congress Party in West Bengal, on account of its disintegration 
and the fact that it has been out of power for so long, has probably not been 
able to provide incentives, comparable to those of the CPI (M) in places such 
as Kasba, to encourage local people to take part in such organisations. In 
support of this point it may be worth pointing out that ward 85 was part of a 
cluster of wards, all ruled by Congress, where no donor funded interventions of 
the type seen in other parts of the city had taken place (see Table 5.1). In this 
sense, the inhabitants of this ward have not been given the privileged access to 
social goods controlled by the state, which other areas of the city, like Kasba, 
have enjoyed.
5.19 Internal Characteristics: Commonalties and Cleavages
5.19.1 Bounded Solidarity
According to some local sources, differences in terms of demography and 
socio-economic characteristics may explain why such civil society organisations 
emerged in ward 67, but not in ward 85. Kasba was traditionally a working class 
area, predominantly comprised of bustees and inhabited largely by people who 
share the same language (Bengali), Hindu religion and culture. The area’s 
demographic characteristics, its topography together with its bad image may 
have meant that its inhabitants were forced to share a common fate, which 
required them to identify and support one another. This, as Portes notes, “can 
be a powerful motivational force” (Portes, 1998:5). By contrast, attention is 
drawn to Garcha's heterogeneity, its divisions along lines of class, ethnicity and 
language.
207
zvo
The residential segregation of Calcutta along ethnic and linguistic lines, it was 
claimed, worked against the possibility that people from different ethnic groups 
would unite to tackle problems of common concern (Bose, 1965). 
Subsequently, there has been a tendency amongst social scientists working on 
Calcutta to see such cleavages as undermining concerted (and collective) 
political action.145 The implication is that Kasba is more homogeneous and 
hence likely to display more of a sense of ‘community’ than Garcha, making the 
possibility of collective action that much more likely in this area.146
The perception that one area was heterogeneous whereas the other was 
homogeneous, in terms of ethnicity, language, is disputed by the demographic 
data from the bustee household survey presented in the last chapter. This was 
complemented by an ethnographic description of social relations, which 
showed that there were very real ethnic cleavages in SL (Kasba), just as there 
were in DT (Garcha). The evidence should challenge the widely held 
perceptions of why collective action emerged in Kasba and not in Garcha. 
Rather than the neat but simplistic dichotomisation which some local experts 
have offered - that collective action has been a feature of one area on account 
of its greater homogeneity - Chapter Four presented a much more complex 
comparative picture of social relations in each bustee, and demonstrated 
irrefutably that cleavages, conflict, divisions and differences between 
inhabitants characterised social relations in each bustee.
Furthermore, the work of social historians such as Hobsbawm (1987) and 
Chandarvarkar (1998) has challenged the idea that divisions and differences 
amongst the working classes set up insuperable obstacles to the emergence of 
collective action. Instead they have highlighted the important role of politics 
and political parties in giving rise to collective action in neighbourhoods and 
amongst groups of workers, otherwise divided. For example, Chandarvarkar 
has argued, “the political consciousness of the working class appeared to be 
shaped crucially by their experience of, and their relationship with, the state.
145 See, for example, quotes by Ray (1979:51) and Chakrabarty (1989:4) in support of this view.
1461 am grateful to Prof. Biplab Dasgupta MP for reminding me of these points: “Garcha is a fragmented 
society...people are still rooted to their ‘desh’, often outside of Bengal, and associate along lines of 
ethnicity, rather than in mass based organisations which cut across social and cultural cleavages” Personal 
Interview 30/06/2000.
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Their solidarities were not the natural outcome of popular culture or a reflex of 
the specific character of production relations, but rather they were politically 
constituted” (1998:9). Hobsbawm has noted how, “the unity of all who worked 
and were poor was brought into the remotest corners of their countries by the 
agitators and the propagandists...they also brought organisation, the structured 
collective action without which the working classes could not exist as a class, 
and through organisation they acquired that cadre of spokesmen who could 
articulate the feelings and hopes of men and women who were unable to do so 
themselves" (1987:125).
However, there may be some analytical mileage in focusing on the differences 
in class composition between the two wards, though not so much the bustees. 
The relations between the middle classes and the bustee dwellers in ward 85 
described in Chapter Four, made it inconceivable for middle class residents to 
form organisations to campaign about issues of local concern with bustee 
dwellers. Furthermore the concept of what constitutes an issue of local concern 
would differ considerably. The middle classes viewed CMC health services 
(preventative and public health services) as having little relevance to them, and 
thus avoided this health care delivery system. Hence there was little incentive 
for them to press for improvements in the delivery of these services. At the 
same time, the sorts of reciprocal arrangements under which the middle 
classes and the bustee dwellers lived in Garcha meant that bustee inhabitants 
seldom reported a broken tube well or a damaged electricity connection to the 
municipal authorities. Instead it was dealt with through an appeal for 
contributions from local middle class inhabitants. The money collected in this 
way was then used to bribe local officials to expedite the necessary repairs. 
Finally, it may be argued that because the inhabitants of DT retained strong 
links to their desh, and owned houses elsewhere in the city, it was more likely 
that they would ‘exit’, than exert pressure on local officials through ‘voice’.
By contrast in Kasba, the opportunities to ‘exit’ may be seen as limited. The fact 
that ward 67 had a higher proportion of bustee dwellers, who depended on 
such public services, meant that the need to avail of free services provided by 
the local municipal administration was much more acute, and provided a 
powerful incentive for local inhabitants to pressure for these to be provided
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effectively. Similarly, there was little of the tradition of a relationship of mutual 
dependence with bustee dwellers and local middle class inhabitants,147 which 
had developed over many years in Garcha.148 This meant that for bustee 
dwellers in ward 67 there were probably fewer opportunities to ‘exit’, by 
appealing for help from local middle class neighbours, compared to ward 85, 
resulting in more pressure on the local administration for the delivery of basic 
services.
However, there are also problems with these explanations. Whilst they may 
have had more opportunities to ‘exit’ thereby possibly weakening the intensity 
of the pressure that could otherwise be brought to bear on the local 
bureaucracy, bustee dwellers in ward 85 still had to deal with daily aspects of 
bureaucratic inertia. In actual fact, the opportunities for their ‘exit’ may actually 
have been rather slim. The chance to escape from the bustee either back to the 
village or else to another property in the city, for most was not an option. 
Livelihood opportunities in the desh were few, and in any case would have to 
be keenly contested with kin already residing there. Prolonged absence from 
their source of livelihood in Calcutta would also pose a problem. Furthermore 
for many of the inhabitants of DT, Calcutta had become their home and many 
informants admitted, reluctantly, that it was in Calcutta where they felt that they 
belonged, not in the village. At the same time, moving to property owned in 
other parts of city was, in reality, not really an option. Informants reported that 
property was seldom empty to be able to simply move into, apart from the fact 
that living conditions were often worse than in DT. Easy access to their 
sources of livelihood was also an issue. Those that lived in Garcha usually 
work close by, and a shift to the outskirts was considered inconvenient.
147 The middle class inhabitants of ward 67 were recent arrivals.
148 See 4.2.3 and the references therein.
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5.15 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a comparative case study of the functioning of the 
health care bureaucracy in two Calcutta wards, ward 67 and ward 85. Officials 
in ward 67 were shown to perform their duties better than those in ward 85. 
Three explanations were given for why this may have been the case: on 
account of bureaucratic rules and regulations; on account of the ethos and 
motivation of local officials or due to the effect of external pressure from local 
citizens and politicians.
It was argued that rules and regulations had little effect on bureaucratic 
performance, as these were found to have been easily circumvented or else 
rarely enforced. For example, there was no evidence to suggest that the much 
maligned transfer mechanism adversely affected the performance of either 
CMC or CMUHO officials. Similarly, although seniority based promotion was 
cited as a factor undermining personal motivation by a number of officials, there 
were those for whom it appeared to have little effect. Despite seniority based 
promotion officials in ward 67 were to be performing well. The literature has 
also emphasised the need to consider the ethos and motivation of public 
officials in trying to understand what motivates them to perform their roles 
effectively. Yet it was found that local health care officials made their career 
choices partly through a commitment to public service and partly for selfish 
reasons. Hence, ethos and internal motivation could not be identified as 
decisive in explaining differences in bureaucratic performance. Finally some 
scholars have argued that ‘voice’, pressure exerted by citizens on public 
officials, determines the quality service which local officials provide. The 
evidence from the two wards would seem to support this. In ward 67, local civil 
society organisations were shown to play an active role ensuring that local 
officials, as far as possible, addressed the needs of local inhabitants. By 
contrast in ward 85, where health care delivery was of poor quality, no such 
neighbourhood groups were seen to be active.
The activism of these groups was taken as an example of collective action at 
the local level, and the chapter has considered the factors which may have 
accounted for the emergence of this. Was their emergence the result of greater
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stocks of social capital which have emerged through a history of associational 
life in one area, and not the other; was it the result of the opportunities which 
the state has provided for local people to engage in collective action and the 
existence of sufficient incentives to persuade individuals to take part in such 
forms of action; or was it on account of commonalities -  of ethnicity, language, 
kin and class -  shared between inhabitants of ward 67?
The chapter has argued that in ward 67 the CPI (M), for both practical and 
strategic reasons, encouraged the formation of local civil society organisations, 
as part of its mass organisational base. By contrast, it was posited that the 
absence of such organisations in ward 85 was partly on account of the fact that 
another political party had ruled it, with a different political strategy to that of the 
CPI (M). However, it was also noted that the historical and political 
circumstances which created the need for the establishment of such 
organisations in ward 67, did not exist in ward 85. It was also argued that the 
CPI (M) was able to secure for this ward privileged access to certain social 
goods distributed by the state, which provided an incentive for local inhabitants 
to continue to be active in such organisations.
The view that collective action was a feature of ward 67 because of its greater 
homogeneity and sense of community has been rejected by citing data on 
social relations presented in the last chapter, which showed how differences 
divided bustee inhabitants in both wards, and also by referring to the work of 
Hobsbawm (1987) and Chandarvarkar (1998) who have argued that differences 
amongst the working classes have not been an insuperable impediment to the 
emergence of collective action. However, it was argued that differences in the 
social composition and the social relations in the two wards meant that the 
possibilities that bustee dwellers would exert pressure on local officials in ward 
85 were diffused. In particular it was noted that the close relationship based 
upon mutual dependence between the middle classes and bustee dwellers in 
ward 85, and the fact that bustee dwellers in this ward maintained close links 
with their place of origin and often owned property in other parts of the city, may 
have made it easier for them exploit these exit options, and therefore not to use 
‘voice’ to pressure local officials.
212
Z 1 J
The findings presented in this chapter highlight some key conceptual issues. 
The evidence challenges the view, implicit to decentralisation, that good 
government results from pressure exerted by a vibrant civil society, conceived 
as comprising autonomous and private organisations separate from the state. 
Local organisations were shown to be effective in improving the performance of 
local officials in ward 67, but the organisations were neither autonomous nor 
separate and opposed to the state, but were shown to have been fostered by 
the political Party that has ruled the state since the late 1970s. The findings 
contained in this chapter also have a bearing on the notion that collective action 
depends on stocks of ‘social capital’ in one particular place, which are built 
through a history of associational life. The evidence presented on the 
emergence of collective action modifies this notion, which implicitly minimises 
the role of the state in creating the conditions for people to come together and 
associate with one another. Secondly, the view that local participation in clubs 
and societies is indicative of higher stocks of social capital has also been 
brought into question. Participation in clubs and societies was found to be 
common to both wards, yet clearly in each area this produced different 
outcomes in terms of governmental performance. It was suggested that not all 
associations should be seen to produce the same virtuous consequences in 
terms of enhancing government performance, and thus neither the act of 
participating in an association, nor even the existence of associational life in the 
forms of clubs and societies were in themselves decisive to producing such 
consequences. Rather it was stated that the type of association in which 
people participated, and the norms embodied in such associations determined 
whether ‘virtuous consequences’ ensued or not. In this way, it was highlighted 
how the associations in ward 67 were political, orientated towards improving 
local conditions and open to members form different ethnic groups. Each of 
these features marked them out from the groups and associations that were 
proliferating in ward 85.
Rather than discount the State, the evidence shows the important role that 
political organisations have played in encouraging civic involvement and 
promoting associational life. Hence the findings suggest more of a synergistic 
relationship between the state and civil society than that envisaged by 
proponents of decentralisation, who assume a unidirectional line of causality
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between civil society and good government - whereby the two distinct and 
separate spheres are locked in an oppositional and antagonistic relationship 
with one another.
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Chapter 6
Interrogating the Governance Agenda with Empirical
Evidence
6.1 Introduction
Chapter Two set out the context in which ‘governance’ emerged as a key issue 
in contemporary development thinking. It showed that administrative 
decentralisation and the doctrines of the NPM are two of the vital components 
of policy prescriptions which seek to improve governance in developing 
countries.
It was argued that implicit in the arguments for decentralisation lie a number of 
assumptions, which may be summarised as follows:
a) locally designed solutions to development problems are necessarily 
superior to those imposed from outside
b) decentralisation will result in the greater participation of the local 
‘community’ in local government leading ultimately to their political 
empowerment. This presupposes that the local community is a consensual, 
homogeneous and harmonious unit.
c) good government comes about through the pressure of a robust civil 
society, comprising a realm of activity separate from the State, made up of 
autonomous and private organisations
d) consumers may be inspired to exercise pressure on agents as a result of 
being better informed about the responsibilities of local officials and as a 
result of efforts to institutionalise their participation at the lower level
e) officials as rational utility maximisers will respond to better information and 
lower transaction costs to exert pressure on officials by choosing to behave
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in a socially optimal way - the costs of opportunism far outweighing the 
benefits on account of agents being closer to ‘the people’ and having their 
work more easily accessible to scrutiny.
The first part of this chapter examines the last two of these assumptions in the 
light of the empirical evidence on decentralisation and its effect on service 
delivery in two wards of Calcutta. The second part of the chapter will look at the 
effects of the application of the doctrines of the NPM to the organisational 
design of the health component of Calcutta Slum Improvement Programmes 
(CSIP).
6.2 Reforms of Local Government in West Bengal
The last two decades have witnessed significant changes in the system of local 
governance in West Bengal. The revival of the Panchayati Raj Institutions 
(PRIs) in rural areas and the proactive role that they have played - providing an 
institutional platform for the implementation of redistributive reforms in the 
countryside - has been well documented and widely discussed in the academic 
literature.149 Decentralisation and local governance in urban areas has attracted 
comparatively less critical attention.
Calcutta Municipal Corporation (CMC) is the designated Urban Local Body 
(ULB) for the city of Calcutta. According to the 1981 census, the CMC covers 
an area of 104 square kilometres . The Calcutta Municipal Corporation Bill 
(1979) was introduced by the then Minister of Local and Urban Development, 
Prasanta Sur, whose vision of municipal administration in Calcutta was “local 
government, which is responsive and responsible to the people at large...with 
powers to take major decisions locally - unfettered by too many controls and 
regulations by any higher form of government”. The Bill was meant to be a step 
towards enhanced local democracy; “local democracy resumes its place as a
149 See Kohli (1987; 1990); Webster (1990); Lieten (1996); Crook and Sverrisson (1999).
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major part of our democratic system itself...genuine local democracy implies 
that decisions should be taken as locally as possible.” 150
Sur’s words reflect a clear ‘valorisation of the local’. The CMC Act (1980) was 
an attempt to create more autonomous local political institutions in Calcutta, 
and thus pre-empted many of the features of the groundbreaking 74th 
Constitutional Amendment Act. Probably for this reason, “West Bengal has 
been described by many as providing a model of municipal governance to be 
emulated by other states” (Ghosh, 1996:1).
6.3 CMC Act 1980
The Municipal Corporation Act of 1980 established a local government body for 
the city known as Calcutta Municipal Corporation. It introduced some innovative 
institutional features, the most important of which was the constitution of 
borough committees (BCs), whose role was to perform local functions for which 
both administrative and financial support were ensured in the Act. BCs 
comprised of elected local councillors representing each ward in a Borough and 
were to serve under the supervision and control of the Mayor, and act as a link 
between the people and the Mayor in council. BCs were meant to be the 
platform through which local inhabitants could pressure elected officials.
This Act was amended in 1981 and 1983, partly as the result of the 
incorporation of 41 new wards in the city limits. The most salient features of the 
amendments were the specification of all obligatory and discretionary functions 
of the corporation (1981) and increased executive powers for the mayor and 
the MICs (1983). The amendments of 1994, incorporated the provisions of the 
74th Constitutional Amendment Act (74th CAA).
• All members were to be directly elected, and the post of alderman removed
150 Minister’s Speech on Calcutta Municipal Corporation Bill, 1980. See CMG Vol X C V III ppl600-1604, 
1980. Mr. Sur was Minister-in-charge Local Development and Urban Development GoWB, during this 
time.
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• The state election commission was to be responsible for the 
superintendance, direction and control of preparation of electoral rolls and 
conduct of elections
• Each ward of the CMC was meant have a Ward Committee (WC). The 
councillor was to be the chairman of the Ward Committee. The state 
government has determined the rules governing the composition and 
functions of WCs.
• If the corporation is dissolved, elections must be held within six months of 
its dissolution.
It also stated that the corporation was to have three authorities:
Corporation 
Mayor in Council 
Mayor
A so-called ‘strong mayor’ parliamentary system of local government for the 
Calcutta Corporation was introduced through this Act.151 Under this system, the 
councillors elect the mayor and he in turn nominates a cabinet from among the 
elected councillors from the victorious party. The Mayor assigns each member 
of the cabinet, known as Member Mayor in Council (MIC), responsibilities for 
one aspect of urban policy, for example roads, health, water supply. Since 1985 
ten MICs have been nominated for each term. Together with the Mayor and the 
Deputy Mayor, in total twelve members comprise the Municipal Council, the 
legislative wing of the Corporation.
The executive wing comprises the Municipal Commissioner, Joint Municipal 
Commissioner, followed by the various heads of departments, such as roads, 
water, buildings, health etc. The Municipal commissioner is the principal 
executive officer of the Corporation, and functions under the supervision and
151 The ‘strong mayor’ cabinet system of government was felt to be a radical departure from the colonial 
legacy in local government, whereby a bureaucrat was appointed to control the executive. (Bhattacharya, 
1981).
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control of the mayor. All officers and secretaries are subordinate to the 
Municipal Commissioner. Since 1980, the number of statutory officers has 
increased and a few new posts have been created, for example, Joint Municipal 
Commissioners and Chief Municipal Auditors.
6.3.1 Boroughs
One of the most innovative features of the new Act was the establishment of 
the Borough as the basic administrative unit, with specific responsibilities and 
personnel with which to carry them out.152 Nine to eleven wards constitute a 
borough. There are 15 boroughs within CMC (see table below). The Act 
provided for the constitution of Borough Committees (BCs) made up of the 
councillors representing each of the wards within that borough. These were 
assigned a number of obligatory functions to be discharged within the 
boundaries of each borough, which include:
• Provision of water pipes, sewerage and drainage to premises
• Removal of accumulated water on the streets and public places due to rain 
or otherwise
• Collection and removal of solid wastes
• Disinfection
• Provision of health immunisation services
• Provision of bustee services
• Provision of lighting
• Repair of category IV, V and VI roads
• Maintenance of parks drains and gullies
• Other such functions that the Corporation may, from time to time, determine 
by regulation. CMC Act (1980) Part II; 11(6)
The establishment of Borough Committees was to ensure greater devolution of 
powers to lower levels of the administration (Ghosh, 1996:6-7). Borough 
committees (BCs) were to meet on a monthly basis, when they would make 
proposals about work to be undertaken within their respective boroughs. 
Proposals were to be sent to CMC, deliberated upon and then returned to BCs,
152 The 1951 Calcutta Corporation Act also provided for BCs, but never assigned them any functions. 
Consequently none were ever established.
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once a decision had been made. Corporation employees assigned to a 
particular Borough were to be under the direction of Borough Committees, 
which were to guide them on which activities to carry out within the confines of 
the borough. The building of new establishments or the creation of new posts 
was not a permitted function of Borough Committess, or of the CMC.
BOROUGH
No
WARD No
I 1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 ,9
II 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18, 19, 20
III 13, 14, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35
IV 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 
38, 39
V 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 
48, 49, 50
VI 46, 47, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 60, 
61,62
VII 56, 57, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67
VIII 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 84, 85, 
86, 87, 90
IX 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 
83, 88
X 81, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 
97, 98, 99, 100
XI 101, 102, 110, 111, 112, 113, 
114
XII 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 
109
XIII 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 
121, 122, 123
XIV 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 
130, 131, 132
XV 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 
139, 140, 141
Table 6.1: List of Boroughs and Wards: CMC (as of July 2000)
6.3.2 Wards
CMC comprises 141 wards. Each ward elects a councillor (representing a 
political party) in council elections held every 5 years; the last elections were 
held in June 2000. The 74th CAA stipulated that Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) 
with populations above 300,000 people were to constitute Ward Committees 
(WCs) in each municipal ward, comprising an elected ward councillor along 
with ‘notable persons’ (usually professionals and social activists) nominated
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from among the local population by the councillor. The West Bengal Assembly 
decided that all ULBs, irrespective of size, should create Ward Committees and 
this constituted another pioneering feature of the new Act. The responsibilities 
of these include:
• to oversee the implementation of development works
• to redress citizens’ grievances relating to municipal services
• to motivate citizens to pay taxes
• to keep borough committees and municipal bodies informed about citizens’ 
problems
Ward Committees were meant to convene yearly meetings of the ward 
inhabitants to disseminate information about the community activities of the 
municipal bodies’ concerned - plans, budget proposals and annual 
administrative reports. Feedback from these should go to the Borough 
Committee and other municipal bodies, as a means of providing valuable 
insights for improving service delivery. The system is intended to create the 
opportunity for greater popular participation in the planning and implementation 
process (Jha, 1998).
6.4 CMC Act Applied
6.4.1 Assessing the Capacity of the Borough Committees
Borough Committees (BCs) are functioning throughout the city. There is a fully 
composite body of employees representing different Corporation departments 
(engineering, conservancy, health etc) now located at the ward level, with the 
executive heads of each line department sitting in the local Borough office. In 
the case of the health department, at the ward level there would usually be: one 
Medical Officer (MO); three Multipurpose Health Assistants (MHAs); one Senior 
Field Worker (SFW) and four Fieldworkers (FWs), supervised by an Executive 
Health Officer and one deputy executive health officer, at the borough level.153
Officially the BC can issue directions to all Borough-level employees, through 
the Borough Committee Chairman (BCC), to carry out the functions that it has 
statutorily been given (CMC Act, 1980:11(7)). Yet, its power to take decisions
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is limited, as the Borough Committee (BC) is a deliberative body. Executive 
power is vested solely in the hands of the Mayor in Council (MICs); and therein 
lies a basic anomaly. The BC has a list of statutory responsibilities and a 
dedicated cadre of employees, but limited powers of decision making. As such, 
it is effectively restricted to carrying out basic ‘housekeeping functions’, like the 
collection of garbage, cleaning of roads and lighting (Maitra, 1981:59). 
Furthermore, its regulatory capabilities are also weak. BC’s have supervisory 
powers, but no power to apply incentives or sanctions to ensure that the 
directives given to local officials are actually implemented. This limits their 
capacity to act as a platform for local inhabitants to pressurise their local 
officials.
6.4.2 Ward Committees
By June 2000, just one (#39) of the 141 wards in CMC had managed to 
constitute a Ward Committee, as there was widespread disagreement among 
the councillors as to who should constitute the Ward Committees. There has 
been a tendency for ward councillors to pack Ward Committees with their own 
party supporters, rather than to select an able group of committed and capable 
local inhabitants. This has created objections, which stalled all efforts to create 
more Ward Committees (CMHO: 4/09/99).154
6.4.3 Mayor and Mayor in Council
It was previously noted that executive powers have not been devolved to lower 
administrative units, but remain concentrated at the centre, with the Mayors-in 
Council (MICs), who are widely assumed to be collectively responsible to the 
Corporation. Careful reading of the Act reveals that it is the Mayor who, 
“allocates among the members of the council such business and in such 
manner as he deems fit.” The MICs are under the supervision and control of the 
Mayor thus holding little power to guide the Municipal Commissioner. 
Effectively the new Act confines the various MICs to be executive heads merely 
in their assigned areas, and in no specific way does the Act empower the
153 During my field research (1999-2000), on average, there was a MO for every two wards.
154 Corroborated by the Mayor and a number of councillors.
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Mayor in Council, as a body, to act as a political executive. In fact the Act gives 
the executive body limited powers, and instead concentrates power in the 
hands of the Mayor himself (Maitra, 1981:59).
6.4.4 Recruitment of Personnel
Top echelons of the Corporation are appointed by the Mayor in Council in 
consultation with the state Service Commission, or by the state government 
directly, from amongst government officers.155 Though the Mayor in Council 
was given a greater role in personnel matters, it should be noted that officers 
appointed by the state government, enjoying its benefits and protection 
continue to hold senior positions. The CMC is not permitted to create any post 
without the state government’s prior approval.
6.4.5 Financial Authority
The Act does little to confer financial autonomy on the CMC and so ensures its 
continued dependency on the state government. Urban local government 
remains a state subject, which means that the state decides on the functions to 
be delegated and the resources that are to be shared by ULBs. In this regard, 
the GoWB has opted for limited sharing of its resource bases with the CMC, but 
instead provides grant transfers to carry out the functions that it has delegated. 
For example, from its share of taxes, the government has given approximately 
Rs 350 crore to the CMC each year, of which Rs 100 crore was for 
maintenance of roads and drainage. Hence, the CMC is clearly not completely 
free to make spending decisions by itself, as far as the grants it receives from 
the state government are concerned, as these are earmarked for specific 
purposes.
The CMC remains heavily dependent on the state government for financial 
support. Often its very survival rests on the state government’s continued 
willingness to bail it out. The state government gave Rs 17 crore of the Rs 22 
crore needed by the CMC to pay its staff salaries each month, prior to the June
155 Municipal Commissioner; Joint Commissioner; Controller o f Muncipal Finance; Chief Municipal 
Auditor; Municipal Engineer in Chief; Deputy Municipal Commissioners and Chief Municipal Engineers; 
Chief Municipal Architect; Chief Municipal Health Officer; Chief Municipal Law Officer and the 
Municipal Secretary.
223
2000 election. The state government provided Rs 4 crore to pay for the 
pensions of retired employees. In the past, when the CMC has been unable to 
pay for an electricity bill for example, the state government has paid instead.156
Since the change in municipal government, fear of non co-operation from the 
state government has loomed large over the CMC.157 Civic officials noted that 
development work could stop if the state government delayed or stopped 
sanctioning funds. It was feared that failure to comply by the letter with the 
provisions of the CMC Act may result in funds being delayed or refused to the 
CMC by the state government. The failure to establish Ward Committees (WC) 
is a case in point. Prior to June 2000, the failure to constitute WCs for most of 
the wards in the city had not affected the flow of funds to the CMC. Yet, the 
state government would be fully within its rights to use this as a reason, 
following the accession of the Trinamul Congress (TMC), to delay disbursement 
of some funds to the Municipal Corporation.
Financial decentralisation within the administrative structure of the Corporation 
has not been commensurate with the level of functional responsibilities 
decentralised to lower levels. For example, in the health department, BCs are 
given a nominal amount of money, Rs 5,000, to be able to carry out their work. 
Any project costing Rs 50,000 or less has to be referred to the Zonal Head - in 
the health department it would be the DCMHO. Only the Chief Officer 
(CMUHO, Chief Engineer) can sanction projects in excess of 1 lakh.
Borough Committee Chairmen argue that some level of funds, in excess of 
what already is allowed, must be held and managed at the Borough Committee 
level, at least, to enable them to carry out their statutory responsibilities. 
Without at least a modicum of financial autonomy, they are confined, allegedly, 
to the most basic of ‘housekeeping functions’, which blunts their capacity to
156 The financial estimates given in the two paragraphs were taken from an article in the Statesman, 
28/06/200.
157 Since it was re-established under the aegis of the CMC Act (1980), the Corporation has been run by the Left 
Front, who have also been in power at the state level, continually since 1977. Elections in 2000 brought a 
change at the helm of municipal government. The Left Front lost the elections, marginally, to the Trinamul 
Congress although it continues to hold a majority in the State Assembly.
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respond to local needs effectively, even when these fall within their stipulated 
responsibilities.
It may be argued that the CMC Act (1980) has not resulted in greater 
participation or locally designed solutions to development problems. The State 
government effectively takes the major policy decisions for Calcutta and 
allocates grants to finance these. So far, the hope that decentralisation would 
allow for more ‘locally’ devised solutions to local problems has proved elusive, 
in Calcutta at least. The creation of different platforms for community 
participation such as the Borough Committee and Ward Committee, in theory, 
created the possibilities for greater community participation and ownership of 
local government policies. But, by ensuring that decisions continue to be taken 
at the centre - in actual fact by the Mayor - the Act has simultaneously 
disempowered these same local platforms. Finally, the failure to devolve 
regulatory control to the Borough level has further weakened the role of these 
local level organisations as platforms from which local inhabitants can 
pressurise local officials.
6.5 The CMC Act Reconsidered: Reduced Agency Costs and Improved 
Governmental Performance
Whilst the impact of the 1980 Act has been limited in terms of enhancing 
community participation in local governance, it has brought about some quite 
significant administrative changes. It has led to the deconcentration of staff 
away from the main Corporation office, to the ward level. It has also resulted in 
a delegation of responsibilities to lower administrative levels, mainly to Borough 
Committees.
If we consider the relationship between a health-care provider and a patient as 
one between principal and agent - the provider as the agent and the patient as 
the principle -  then in theory deconcentration may be seen as an important 
step towards reducing what in this sort of relationship are termed ‘agency 
costs’. These are the costs that inevitably arise given information asymmetries 
between principals and agents. Informational asymmetries exist on account of 
the nature of the ‘good’ being provided (one requiring specialisation and 
expertise, such as in the case of health care provision), and also on account of
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the distance of agents from principals - something of a characteristic feature of 
centralised bureaucracies. Agents, on the whole, know much more about their 
tasks than principals and in many cases this has created incentives for the 
agent to behave opportunistically. The nature of the ‘good’ and the distance 
between agent and principle creates a smokescreen, which prevents principals 
from being able to accurately monitor and judge the performance of agents. 
Decentralisation, by bringing principals and agents closer together is, in theory, 
meant to remove the smokescreen, thereby enabling principals to monitor the 
activities of agents more effectively. Furthermore, through the creation of 
institutionalised channels for local participation, such as Ward Committees and 
Borough Committees, together with the availability of better information, 
through greater proximity, decentralisation was meant to reduce the 
‘transaction costs’ of exerting pressure by principals on agents. Finally, better 
monitoring and the real threat of pressure were meant to result in the 
optimisation in the performance of local officials. The delegation of 
responsibilities to lower administrative levels should mean that local 
government is more responsive to local needs and crises, partly in response to 
local inhabitants’ ability to apply pressure on them. Similarly, the transaction 
costs involved in pressurising officials should also have been significantly 
reduced on account of this greater proximity.158
This has been the theoretical reasoning behind calls for decentralisation to 
improve the delivery of services to the local population. Unsurprisingly, it was 
the reasoning on which the arguments of senior officials and politicians in the 
CMC are based. According to the Municipal Commissioner, “I have pushed the 
decentralisation agenda, personally in the CMC...It brings the government 
closer to the people, it improves the quality of services, and ensures that those 
needing services get them on time. By being close to those they are meant to 
be serving, officials will feel more accountable. They can’t hide now, there is a 
lot more transparency there.”159
158 Inhabitants of both research sites reported that the situation was much better now that they didn’t have 
waste time and money travelling to the city centre, but instead could report problems and request 
assistance at the local councillor’s house office.
159 Personal Interview 17/02/2000, Calcutta Municipal Corporation .
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6.6 Disentangling the Assumptions: Understanding the Implications
Implicit in the causal chains between lower information and transaction costs, 
the exercise of voice and the effects this is supposed to have in improving 
bureaucratic performance, lie a bundle of assumptions, which this section will 
attempt to untangle before analysing the implications of each separate 
assumption.
First, regarding information costs, key to the principal agent relationship is the 
fact that information asymmetries exist between the agent and the principal, 
making it difficult for the latter to monitor the activities of the former. By placing 
the agent closer to the principal, decentralisation is meant to reduce information 
asymmetries, which in turn is supposed to facilitate monitoring. The implication 
is that information asymmetries decrease in proportion to the physical proximity 
of agents to their principals, government to its people. In other words, you have 
a better idea of what your local official is doing because he/she is nearer to you 
and thus you are able to monitor his activities better. The fact that information 
asymmetries arise due to the type of good/service being provided - for example, 
one characterised by expertise and specialisation, like health care - seems not 
to have figured in this calculation. This aside, can it really be assumed that in 
Calcutta, as a result of the CMC Act, principals are clearer as to what agents 
are doing, in relation to what they should be doing, to be able to monitor 
performance effectively?
Second, decentralisation is said to reduce transaction costs; making it easier 
for principals to engage with local officials, report their problems and pressure 
them to address their needs. Here the implication is that transaction costs are 
closely allied to an official’s physical proximity to the public - predicated on the 
assumption, as we have seen, that physical proximity reduces informational 
asymmetries - and the existence of institutionalised channels to exercise voice 
and seek redress. The existence of divisions, differences and power 
relationships amongst local inhabitants that may constrain their ability to act 
collectively does not seem to figure in the calculation of transaction costs.160
160 For a similar point, see Rondinelli et al (1989:67). I have referred to this in Chapter Two.
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One still needs to explore to what extent proximity and channels for 
participation actually make it easier for local inhabitants to pressurise local 
officials.
Finally, it is assumed that officials will respond rationally, by improving their 
level of performance, since their work is now more open to scrutiny. The 
expected response is, in part, due to the fact that local inhabitants can judge if 
they are doing their jobs properly or not, and partly to the increased likelihood 
that local inhabitants, armed with this information, will take advantage of the 
opportunities to harangue them about problems ignored. Thus the incentives to 
behave less opportunistically are considerable, and agents, by choosing to 
behave less opportunistically, are in fact only seeking to enhance their personal 
welfare. And their personal welfare maximisation will lead to greater social 
welfare.
6.6.1 1nformation and Monitoring
Through time spent in the field and interviewing informants there, it was quite 
clear that the inhabitants of DT had little idea of either the responsibilities of the 
local health care officials or their whereabouts.161 Yet these officials were 
located at no more than ten minutes walk from the bustee. Even otherwise well- 
informed and well educated local inhabitants were ignorant about the roles and 
responsibilities of local health care officials. For example, the one university 
graduate in the bustee - intelligent, politically astute and militant - had no idea 
what local residents were entitled to from the Corporation, and thus was at a 
loss to judge whether local officials were performing their roles properly or 
not.162 Even in the better performing ward, in SL bustee, the inhabitants were at 
a loss to tell me the whereabouts of the HHWs and the regularity with which 
they were meant to visit. This was in spite of the fact that the HHWs were 
meant to be community-embedded, primary health care service providers, 
whose outpost was located at no more than 2 minutes walk from the bustee.
161 DT and SL were the two bustees used as case studies, some o f whose characteristics were described in 
Chapter Five.
1621 photocopied sections of the CMC Act for his reference, after which in subsequent correspondence 
with the councillor, he would quote the relevant clause. On many occasions, I found myself in the bustee 
explaining to the inhabitants what they should expect from the local Corporation and what they should do 
i f  the attitude of officials was not collaborative.
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These two brief examples from fieldwork illustrate the extent to which poor 
information was a feature of even procedural aspects of the work of local health 
care officials. If we were to add to these the informational problems innate to 
the provision of health care, it may be assumed that together they would result 
in significant informational asymmetries, between principals and agents, in spite 
of deconcentration and delegation. As Moore has noted in the case of 
Taiwanese irrigation, “numerous small-scale clients cannot normally organise 
effectively to control monopolistic public utilities run by highly organised 
bureaucracies with privileged access to technical knowledge.” (1989:1742). 
This must therefore bring into question the assumption that decentralisation 
reduces information costs and facilitates monitoring.
6.6.2 Transaction Costs: Monitoring and Enforcement
Transaction costs include the costs of monitoring and enforcing contracts, and 
according to Pratt and Zeckhauser, “information is the primary source of 
transaction costs” (1985:11).163 Yet the statement fails to distinguish between 
two rather distinct, yet interrelated causal relationships. Whilst the quality of 
information affects the principal’s ability to monitor, making the task of 
enforcement so much more difficult, independent of the quality of information, 
effective enforcement involves its own distinct challenges.
It would seem self-evident that as principals, if we do not know what agents 
are meant to be doing, then it becomes very difficult to monitor their 
performance, and consequently pressure them to perform their duties 
adequately. The assumption that decentralisation will lead to a reduction in 
transaction costs, making it easier for principals to exert pressure on agents, is 
built on the assumption that through decentralisation, informational 
asymmetries are reduced, making it easier to monitor. Yet it has already been 
shown how in Calcutta, despite deconcentration, significant information 
asymmetries continue to exist, making the basis for effective monitoring 
extremely weak, thereby undermining the potential for enforcement. It would 
seem absurd to think that given the poor quality of information available, in
163 See Chapter Two for a definition of transaction costs.
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general, to the poor at the local level in Calcutta - not to mention the information 
costs inherent in a service like health care - the costs of monitoring could have 
been reduced by the mere fact that agents and principals have been brought 
closer together.
Transaction costs also comprise the costs of enforcement. It has already been 
noted that if information asymmetries are significant then enforcement will 
remain a major challenge. But it may also be worth expanding our definition of 
transaction costs, beyond what is traditionally understood by the term. In public 
sector delivery, the transaction costs have been rather narrowly understood to 
include the time and effort taken to complain or highlight one’s problems to a 
higher authority.164 In part, efforts to reduce the costs of enforcement have 
tended to focus on the nature of the institutional arrangements by which 
principals can exert pressure on agents, and have thus sought to create 
channels for participation and to redress grievances. If agents are close by, and 
there exist institutionalised channels for principals to bring their problems to the 
attention of agents, then transaction costs are understood to be limited. The 
problem is that in calculating transaction costs, there seems to be no attempt, 
for example, to include the difficulties involved in local inhabitants joining 
together to pressurise local officials. Yet these are significant.
6.7 Collective Action and Transaction Costs
The quotation from Moore (1989) above highlights not only the problems 
caused by poor information affecting principals’ ability to control agents with a 
high degree of technical expertise, but also alludes to the challenges of clients 
joining together to act collectively. The previous chapter illustrated some of the 
difficulties faced by local inhabitants in organising collectively. In the absence of 
some external unifying force these seem very difficult to overcome. It was 
shown that in one area where health care services were very poorly provided, 
the local inhabitants appeared to do very little to mobilise collectively and 
pressurise officials, in spite of what are assumed to be reduced transaction
164 The classic case is that of irrigation bureaucracies in India and those in Korea (Wade, 1988; 1992). 
Certain structural features of the irrigation bureaucracies in India mean that farmers are forced to expend 
much time and effort in complaining and having their complaints verified; whereas in Korea, the closer 
involvement of irrigation staff and farmers, through different organisational mechanisms, significantly 
reduces these costs.
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costs. In the other ward, exactly the same channels for participation existed, 
and the officials were also located at the ward level, but in this case local 
inhabitants, through community organisations, were seen to exert pressure on 
local officials.
Ranson and Stewart (1994) have argued that the willingness to participate 
(exercise voice) depends on there being a likelihood of change ensuing from 
pressure being exerted. This rests on the nature of local politics. In the well 
performing ward, an external political force helped overcome social divisions 
and provided the opportunities and incentives for collective action to proceed. 
Here, an external unifying political force reduced the ‘transaction costs’ involved 
in collective action. By contrast, in the poorly performing ward, no comparable 
unifying political force exists and societal cleavages were not overcome so as 
to enable local inhabitants to act collectively.165 But the nature of local politics, 
and particularly pervasive patron clientalism, had its role to play as well.
Patron-client relations within a neighbourhood may further augment the well- 
known challenges to collective action (see Olson, 1965). In DT, these may be 
seen as crucial to containing dissent. Each of the local bustees had a 
prominent local dada or mastaan.166 In my research site the mastaan was both 
respected and feared and therein was the source of his power and influence 
locally. On the one hand, he was respected due to his role as guardian and 
benefactor. For example, he would provide income-earning opportunities for 
local youth through his illegal activities, or shady connections. He was also 
considered to ‘protect’ the bustee from the unwanted attention of others, both 
criminals and police. People trusted his ability to protect, because of what was 
known of his past as a violent and ruthless dacoit (criminal). This reputation 
invoked, paradoxically, both a sense of fear and also one of security. He was 
feared by his neighbours, although they were also reassured by the fact that his 
very reputation would prevent outsiders from meddling with their
165 See Chapter Five.
166 Dada literally means elder brother, but is also a way of respectfully addressing an older male, or one of 
higher status. In the context of the bustees, it is also used to refer to local toughs who may also be patrons. 
Mastaan has only pejorative connotations, and is used to refer to local ‘dons’ with political connections.
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neighbourhood, and from the fact that he didn’t do “that” any more, and that in 
any case he never mistreated “his own”.
This mastaan was not the typical patron in a traditional dyadic patron-client 
relationship. He needed the protection of the local councillor (and the police) to 
continue unperturbed in his illegal business. In return for this he was expected 
to provide money, but perhaps just as importantly, the loyalty (and passivity) of 
bustee dwellers and their votes. This has been termed a classic triadic 
relationship because the patron becomes a broker, an intermediary between 
client and higher official. Thus, the patron is under pressure to gain rewards for 
his clients or risk them transferring their loyalties elsewhere.167
In such a clientalistic relationship, the client is constrained in his/her capacity to 
seek redress, protest or complain to ensure better service from higher officials. 
He/she can break out of this constraint by breaking out of the relationship, but 
by doing so risks threatening what little access he/she does have to goods and 
services. Unsurprisingly, adherence is the favoured path. Wood (1998) has 
described the phenomenon as “adverse incorporation”. He defines this as, 
“incorporation into vertical patron-client relations for the purposes of having 
basic needs addressed”, and comments that the urban poor will often engage 
in such structures because they help them satisfy their immediate needs, even 
though it constrains their long term strategic needs (Wood, 1998:19). Adverse 
incorporation means that the urban poor rely on these people in the long term 
and as a result do not hold bureaucrats and politicians directly accountable and 
thus forego their rights as citizens of a modern liberal democracy (ibid).168
The level of transaction costs depends on the quality of information available. If 
information asymmetries remain, then transaction costs may not be reduced.
167 In triadic patron-client networks, each person is only directly related to the one above them, and has no 
linkage with those above his superior. A patron must be able to interact with followers, which thus limits 
the number of followers that he has. Clients may often have to compete with one another for the resources 
controlled by the patron. Except for the very top and the very bottom, the relationship is wracked with 
competition. Peers compete with one another for the allegiance of followers, and for the limited resources 
of superiors. See Grindle (1977:31-33) for a good discussion of, especially, tryadic patron-client 
networks.
168 Noteworthy is the related point made by Grindle, that these sorts o f relationships are established and 
maintained because they comprise rational and efficient strategies for those living in conditions where 
goods are limited and access is far from straightforward (Grindle, 1977:38).
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Furthermore, if we expand our definition of transaction costs to include the 
difficulties the urban poor/local inhabitants face in organising collectively - 
which incorporates the long-term costs of antagonising patrons and alienating 
oneself from the meagre benefits of clientalist structures - it may be argued that 
independent of the quality of information and the existence of institutionalised 
channels for participation, the transaction costs which accrue to principals, 
related to putting pressure on officials, may continue to remain high.
6.8 Behaving Opportunistically: Bureaucrats responses to
administrative changes
This leaves the final assumption to be examined more closely. Do officials 
respond to lower agency costs by behaving less opportunistically? Firstly, it 
may be worth recalling the points made so far. In Calcutta, it should not be 
assumed that information and transactions costs have been reduced through 
decentralisation, and thus the incentives for agents not to behave 
opportunistically may in fact be weaker than imagined. The situation is 
exacerbated, in the case of the CMC Act, by what I have termed design flaws 
that further weaken the incentives for good performance on the part of agents.
6.8.1 Design Flaws
Officials were assigned to wards within boroughs, to be directed and guided 
and supervised by Borough Committees (BCs), but BCs were not assigned any 
regulatory capacity over these officials. There were thus no incentives or 
sanctions to ensure that directives were actually implemented. In effect it 
meant that although local officials could be given a set of locally defined tasks, 
according to local needs, there was nothing apart from social sanction and 
moral compulsion to prevent them doing as they pleased, even if this meant 
ignoring their tasks. This weakened the capacity of the BCs to act as a platform 
for local inhabitants to pressure local officials. Ultimately, pressure without the 
risk of sanction to back it up, is likely to be of very little effect.
In fact the whole question of accountability remains confused. At best the Act 
provides for a system of dual accountability, whereby local officials are 
responsible both to local representatives in the Borough and to their line
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managers in the administrative machinery (Chakraborty, 1981:23). In practice, 
interviews with administrators as well as municipal politicians, suggested that 
accountability to the Borough Committee chairman and other locally elected 
representatives is erratic and arbitrary. When questioned, all local level officials 
clearly saw themselves accountable to their administrative heads in each 
department. As one Deputy Executive Health Officer, responsible for a 
Borough, said to me, “I don’t take any decisions for myself, I do what the EHO 
tells me, and he does what the DCMHO tells him”.
If by chance local officials do consider themselves accountable to the ‘people’ 
and their representatives at the local level, it is likely to be through informal 
political means, and in no way is the result of institutionalised channels. The 
means of exerting pressure remains political, but not in the idealised way often 
imagined, whereby the aggrieved reports to the elected representative and s/he 
uses the fact that local officials are subordinates, to pressure them to address 
these grievances. The Municipal Commissioner reported that, “if the councillor 
is a political heavyweight, then there is an extra incentive for local officials to 
carry out his directives”. He added, “local councillors have formally very little 
power over officials, they get in touch with them, meet with them, but their 
powers are no more than supervisory...but, I can tell you that some of my 
officers are scared of their local councillors...there is no institutionalised way 
that locally elected representatives can control the work of local officials, 
although some very often manage to do so, by sheer dint of their power in their 
locality and their political strength. This is entirely arbitrary, not 
institutionalised.”
Flaws in the design of the Act have meant that local officials continue to have 
the scope to behave opportunistically. It has meant that even if agency costs 
were significantly reduced and principals could more easily monitor and 
pressurise agents, there would nevertheless be few incentives at their disposal 
to persuade local officials to behave in a more socially optimal way.
The CMC Act 1980 has not resulted in the organisation of local government as 
a strong unit with powers to take decisions as locally as possible-as was 
envisaged when the Act was introduced. Rather, the Act may be seen to have
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created a “democracy of disempowerment”: “the decentralisation of 
responsibilities without corresponding changes in political management and 
fiscal authority” (Cornwall et al: 2000:7).
Design flaws may be easily rectified through amendments to the Act. Flaws in 
the theory, on the other hand, are somewhat more intractable. In particular I am 
referring to the assumption that human beings are rational utility maximising 
individuals, which is central to the choice-theoretic foundations of 
decentralisation. Rational individuals are commonly assumed to choose 
systematically based solely on a calculation of personal advantage (Sen, 
2000:270). Chapter Two set out some of the potential lacunae in the choice- 
theoretic approach to understanding human behaviour. In particular it was 
posited that individual choices may be defined by habits and customs routinised 
over time, and that history and culture have a role to play, as does politics in 
influencing choices and behaviour. The next section provides an illustration of 
this.
6.9 A brief Political History CMC Calcutta (Municipal) Corporation
6.9.1 Premier Institution of Local Government
Established in 1923, Calcutta Corporation was the premier institution of local 
government in India. Yet, from the outset it was wracked by intrigue and 
infighting between factions led by charismatic leaders and icons of the 
independence movement. At the behest of these political leaders, its limited 
resources were used to fight political battles on issues of national concern, 
rather than being directed to addressing problems of municipal administration. 
As the Statesman pointed out, “the Corporation was the spearhead of 
nationalist politics,” but largely at the expense of the mundane matters of 
municipal administration which were its main responsibility (20/03/30). Even 
today, political rivalries continue to play out during working hours and agitation 
led by prominent politicians on a whole range of issues, of no relevance to the 
matter of civic administration in this city, often prevents work being done.
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6.9.2 Nepotism, Patronage and Corruption: Appointments and Promotion in the
CMC
The Corporation spends a large portion of its budget on ‘municipal 
establishment’, largely due to overstaffing. The wage bill that once stood at 70 
lakhs in 1968, by 2000 exceeded Rs 22 crore.169 However, the CMC is not able 
to say with any accuracy how many people it actually employs! It is widely 
accepted that the Corporation is overstaffed, largely because its leaders had 
always felt that they had an obligation to repay political loyalty with offers of 
employment. Jobs were provided for those loyal yet incapable of getting a job 
elsewhere (Ray, 1979). CR Das offered jobs to those who had suffered for the 
country’s cause in Corporation schools. Up to the 1970s, the largest number of 
appointments in the Corporation was made directly by the Commissioner. Jobs 
were distributed to councillors with unemployed relatives, which the 
Commissioner used as a lever for getting the support that he required in the 
Calcutta Corporation(CC).170 The organisation came to be considered as an 
employer of last resort.
Attempts to make the recruitment process more merit-based and transparent 
were always fiercely opposed by the councillors. Similarly, recruitment to fill 
higher posts from within the ranks of the organisation rather than recruiting 
outside - to provide an incentive to staff already employed in the Corporation to 
work harder - was also rejected. Such was the entrenchment of the belief that 
new posts should be offered to outsiders that the councillors themselves 
ardently challenged Sarat Bose’s proposals for reform in 1935. Nirad C. 
Chaudhuri, the writer, who was Principal Secretary to the mayor at that time, 
recounts how he made a draft set of rules for appointments to CC. The revised 
rules stated that with equal qualifications, internal candidates would be 
promoted in preference to outsiders. He reports that the councillors objected 
strongly to these, with one seeming to encapsulate the general mood by saying,
169 In 1962, this was at least 3 times more than the other metros. (Gol Report of the Rural Urban 
Relationship Committee Vol III, June 1966 in Ashraf, 1970:152).
170 According to an ex-officio member o f the CC, Mr. S.K. Gupta in “Improving City Government: 
Proceedings of a Seminar” Part 2 September 1958 published by IIPM, New Delhi, 1959 p27, quoted in 
Ashraf (1970: 87).
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“ready cash, ready cash.” 171 For the councillors, the ability to hand out jobs to 
outsiders had come to be seen as an entitlement.
Given that most of the employees gained their posts other than through 
competitive selection, it proved very difficult, in fact almost impossible, to take 
punitive or disciplinary action against officials, even after serious offences such 
as corruption or bribery.172 Officials knew that they were well protected by 
powerful patrons, and displayed no qualms in blatantly flouting rules. As one 
scholar has noted, the close relationship between councillors and municipal 
employees, “gives scope for malfeasance in municipal administration and 
makes the sole objective the promotion of sectional interests” (Ashraf, 1970:84).
Adding to their sense of job security was the close nexus that had developed 
between politicians and the nascent labour movement. The Trade Union 
movement began amongst white-collar workers in West Bengal, at the 
beginning of the 1920s. By 1921, 137 strikes had taken place in Bengal alone 
(Ray, 1979:97). Unions needed the patronage of politicians, who were often 
members of the city’s liberal professional classes. For their part, politicians’ 
ability to mobilise large numbers of people at short notice for demonstrations or 
non-cooperation, was crucial for their standing amongst the people and for the 
effectiveness of their political actions. Their close relationship with labour, 
beginning at this time and subsequently nurtured, meant that labour could quite 
easily be mobilised on a massive scale for political purposes.
6.9.3 Current Scenario
Patronage and nepotism is a legacy that permeates the procedures for 
appointments and promotions in the Corporation. The distribution of jobs on the 
basis of loyalty or personal connections became a privilege which councillors 
were reluctant to give up. The view of the Corporation as an employer of last 
resort, for which merit and industry took second place to political loyalty and 
personal connections as criteria for employment, became embedded in the
171 See Ray (1979)
172 This was noticed as far back as 1935:“Some reasons for the Unpopularity of the Corporation” Calcutta 
Municipal Gazette, 1935
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culture of the organisation and continues to the present day. The last Municipal 
Commissioner corroborated this when he said:
“CMC began as the rallying point of national leaders like Netaji. It became 
the training ground for the fight against the British. From the very beginning, 
people received jobs through patronage and we are suffering from this now 
(he laughs). Even as far back as the 1951 Act, there was a provision for 
employment through competitive recruitment. But until very recently, a few 
years back, people continued to gain employment here through personal 
contacts and friendship, political or kin ties. There is a legacy, and people 
have come to think of this place as:
a) a charitable organisation, free electricity, free water etc. If you want to set 
up a hospital, fine take free land from us
b) people thought it was organisation there to provide jobs to the faithful, the 
followers of one political party or the other
But there has to be a conceptual mind set change, as this can no longer be 
seen as an organisation for providing employment, or a charity. It has to be 
a slim, effective but benevolent organisation.”173
Interviews held with Corporation staff over a period of 12 months revealed how 
entrenched these practices had become. Eighty per cent of Group B, C and D 
employees of CMC interviewed, reported, often reluctantly, having acquired 
their positions through political or kin ties - a dada or a neta - even though this 
was often hidden by their having been recruited ‘officially’ through the 
employment exchange. Employees as well as administrators reported that their 
initial motivation for joining CMC was seldom based upon a public service ethos, 
but rather as a last resort after failing to secure alternative employment. Even in 
the case of health care employees, including doctors, for whom a firm public 
service ethos should be prerequisite,174 responses from staff themselves 
suggested otherwise. In the words of one senior doctor, “ I joined this service 
(rather than state service) to avoid being transferred anywhere in the state and 
to be able to remain close to my family.” CMC doctors who were interviewed 
reported wanting to serve the people, but also pointed out that municipal
173 Personal Interview 17/02/2000.
174 See Leonard (1993)
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service was seen as entirely compatible with the demands of building up and 
maintaining a private practice. According to one departmental head, “many 
doctors working for the Corporation concurrently run successful private 
practices”.
Moreover, the complete disregard that Corporation employees showed for 
basic rules regarding attendance and punctuality, never mind norms of conduct 
as public servants, was indicative of their confidence in the fact that their 
behaviour would not be punished.
6.9.4 Reforms to the Corporation
As far back as 1935, according to the Deputy Mayor, widespread suspicion of 
nepotism in the distribution of jobs by the Corporation was one of the main 
sources of its deep unpopularity.175 Amidst a maelstrom of accusations of 
corruption and maladministration, the Corporation was dissolved in 1948. The 
first official commission appointed to review the workings of the Corporation, 
the Biswas Commission (1949), outlined three possible reasons for the 
malpractices:
a) that it was a problem of the electoral machinery
b) that it was symptomatic of a wider, more widespread cancer affecting the 
entire sphere of Corporation administration
c) it was a defect in the constitution-either it was too democratic or not 
democratic enough
The final recommendations focused on changing the systems - to insulate the 
executive from “the baneful influence of councillors” - and so no attempt was 
made to address the second reason given for maladministration. As a 
consolation, Biswas noted in his conclusions that, “ the finest machine in the 
world is worked by men and men ruined it by incapacity” (Final Report Vol II, 
Part I: p.193).
175 Calcutta Municipal Gazette, 1935.
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Two further attempts were made to reform the Corporation, in 1962 and lastly in 
1980. Whereas the 1962 reforms sought to extend the insulation of the 
executive from the legislature, the 1980 Act reflects the spirit of the initial 1923 
Act, by giving precedence to the political wing. But the 1980 Act, as Malhotra 
notes, is yet another attempt to change the organisational form of the CMC: " 
the changes incorporated in the CMC Bill are based upon the assumption that 
the intrinsic weaknesses of the Corporation arise from its structural 
dysfunctionalities”(1981:31).
This reflected the priorities of its main architect. Prasanta Sur exempted the 
officials and employees of the Corporation of any blame for its poor 
performance, calling instead to “rectify the ‘corrupt systems’ which have 
permitted such evils of corruption to perpetuate” (Minister’s Speech, op cit). 
Clearly the problem lay beyond the organisational form of the Corporation or its 
structure. As Biswas pertinently comments, “since all city Corporations today 
have the same kind of structure...what made the Corporation of Calcutta much 
less efficient and much less organised than the other bodies given the same 
structural pattern?” (Biswas, 1981:11)
Given the political connections of the majority of the employees in the 
Corporation, it has proved less costly to try and fiddle with the structure of the 
organisation, than to make significant changes in personnel management. 
Hence, in Calcutta, the Corporation and corruption go hand in hand- a popular 
name for the body became chorrporation instead of Corporation.176 The view of 
the Corporation amongst the city’s inhabitants as an organisation manned by 
unmotivated, corrupt and lazy employees is pervasive. A long tradition of 
nepotism and patronage in the system of appointments and promotion, and the 
close nexus that has developed between politicians, trade unions and its 
employees may carry much of the blame for this.
The Corporation was a tool for the mobilisation of political opposition to the Raj, 
and the mundane aspects of municipal administration came second to this. 
Since independence it has continued to be used as a tool for mobilisation by
176 Roughly translated, chor means ‘thief
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one or other of the political parties. Indiscriminate strikes, walk-outs and 
gheraos have become routinised and were widely fomented by politicians for 
political gain.777 More commonplace, everyday examples of labour indiscipline 
have avoided punishment. The foray into the Corporation’s history was meant 
to illustrate how social norms, routinised habits and informal conventions can 
affect the sorts of choices that individuals make. They also appear to have a 
pervasive effect on human behaviour, legitimising norms of behaviour which 
are antithetical to committed and responsive public service. At the same time, 
an ethos of commitment to public service has not emerged because the 
incentives for hard work and dedication have remained weak; and staff 
recruitment and promotion corrupted through patronage and nepotism, take 
away the incentive for accountability to the public, replacing it with a need to be 
responsive to the needs of the patron. The enduring poor performance of the 
Calcutta Corporation, in spite of numerous changes to its organisational form 
such as those embodied by the CMC Act 1980, may be attributed to these 
factors.178
Essentially, the example is meant to support the arguments of those like Bates 
(1995), North (1995) and Khan (1995) who have all highlighted the importance 
of politics to the success of institutional arrangements. At the same time there 
is more than just a passing reference to the notion of path dependency - that 
history and culture matter to the shaping of institutional outcomes. However, 
the example of good performance seen in the previous chapter should guard 
against the overtly negative determinism of the path dependency approach.
177 “ A Gherao is the physical blockade of a target, either by encirclement or forcible occupation. The 
‘target’ may be a place or a person or persons, usually the managerial or supervisory staff o f an industrial 
establishment...” Extracts from the Judgement of the Special bench of the Calcutta High Court in the 
“Gherao Cases” Matter no 343 of 1967, Jay Engineering Works and others V  State of West Bengal and 
others (Appendix 2, Ghosh, 1981).
178 This argument may be compared with that of Stein (1995), who shows how SAPs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa - by re-enforcing and recognizing property rights, as a means of reducing transaction costs and 
making agriculture more efficient - effectively failed to take into account existing system of property 
rights that existed in the African rural setting. The example illustrates how for the success o f any formal 
legal framework, such as the establishment of property rights, must first rest on the socially evolved 
existing concepts of property rights, in order to gain the legitimacy they need to be enforceable and so that 
people will adhere to them. This echoes a point made by North (1995:25) that norms of behaviour support 
and legitimise new rules.
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6.10 NPM and Bureaucratic Performance
Chapter Two showed how, in theory, NPM inspired reforms could improve the 
performance of the public sector. It was noted that whilst the NPM had little 
influence on discussions of general administrative reform in West Bengal, 
recent reports examining the functioning of the health department in the state 
have recommended changes which reflect the influence of the NPM agenda. It 
has been suggested that NPM doctrines have influenced the design of the 
health component of the ODA/DFID funded slum improvement programme 
(CSIP 1), in particular in the creation of a cadre of Honorary Health Workers 
(HHWs). The section begins by reconsidering some of the theoretical 
arguments, which have served to challenge the NPM agenda, before specifying 
in what ways the CSIP health component reflects NPM principles. The 
remainder of the section evaluates the performance of HHWs in delivering the 
health component of CSIP 1 in one of the research sites, in order to interrogate 
some of the theoretical claims of the NPM.
It was argued in Chapter Two that the doctrines that comprise the NPM 
emerged from two main theoretical strands. In part NPM was influenced by 
similar theories as those underpinning the idea of decentralisation - principally 
New Political Economy and public-choice theory. At the same time, NPM’s 
popularity grew out of disillusionment with the traditional Weberian model of 
bureaucracy, with its belief in the assumed superiority of rational-legal authority.
The basic assumptions about individual’s behaviour remain the same as with 
decentralisation: bureaucracies are comprised of rational individuals who seek 
to maximise their own utility. NPM attempts to optimise bureaucratic 
performance through the application of commercial principles to public 
bureaucracies (cf World Bank, 1994). This meant the application of corporate 
management techniques to the public sector, including: setting clear goals and 
focusing on outputs; precisely defining responsibilities; clearly separating 
between deliberative and executive units; introducing flexible contracts and 
using market incentives to enhance standards of performance (Hood, 1991:13). 
This has meant devising ways of evaluating what the outputs have been - 
whether the goals assigned have actually been met - what Hood terms “a 
technical infrastructure of reporting” (1991:12). But whereas decentralisation
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was meant to make government more responsive and accountable by reducing 
information and transaction costs, NPM’s aims to do the same by cutting 
production costs so as to do more for less - “trim fat and avoid slack” (Hood, 
1991:12) - through improvements in management and changes to the structural 
design of organisations (ibid: 15). The critical difference between the two may 
be that NPM builds on a more overtly economistic rationale, by advocating the 
application of market incentives to enhance performance.
The critiques of rational choice theory offered in Chapter Two in the course of 
discussion of decentralisation are equally applicable to NPM, given their 
common theoretical approach, and hence need not be repeated in full here. 
Suffice it to say that individuals may not always respond to choices in a purely 
rational way, by deciding merely after a calculation of the costs and benefits of 
each, the one that will maxmise their own utility. So far in this chapter it has 
been argued, taking the case of the CMC, that habits, customs and informal 
norms of behaviour established over time may affect the way an individual 
chooses and behaves; that history and culture, as well as politics, help to shape 
choices. In addition, Hood (1991) and Hood and Jackson (1991) have set out 
the standard critiques of NPM, augmenting these with the claim that NPM is 
neither based upon hard facts, nor a proven record of success, but rather on 
the application of clever rhetorical devices, or “administrative argument”. The 
next section examines NPM’s penchant for the application of commercial 
principles and particularly market incentives in order to influence bureaucratic 
behaviour.
6.10.1 Applying Commercial Principles to Enhance Bureaucratic Performance
The running of public companies on commercial principles, through the 
application of market-like incentives meant to improve the performance of 
public officials, reflects a fundamental belief in the clear link between personal 
choice and personal welfare - namely that a person chooses to behave only in 
a way that will maximise his welfare.179 This effectively excludes the role of 
‘commitment’ and its centrality to work motivation, which is especially pertinent
179 Behaviour reflects preferences, which are revealed through choices which are reflected in behaviour. 
The circularity of this argument has been noted (Sen, 1983:90) as has its theoretical origins in 
Samuelson’s Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (ibid: 55-57).
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to the case of public employees, in understanding what affects individuals’ 
behaviour. According to Sen, commitment involves a person, “choosing an act 
that he believes will yield a lower level of personal welfare to him than an 
alternative that is also available to him” (Sen, 1983:92).180
When a sense of ‘commitment’ exists, an individual may decide to take a 
course of action that may not maximise his own welfare, thus “driving a wedge” 
between personal choice and personal welfare (ibid: 94). In this way, the 
concept of ‘commitment’ places a spanner in the works of those who conceive 
of individual behaviour in purely economic terms, guided uniquely by economic 
incentives. Considering that, “the existence of attitudes towards work which 
supercede the calculation of net gain from each unit of exertion”, is widespread 
(Sen, 1983:97), particularly in public service, devising incentives to improve 
bureaucratic performance based solely on assumptions about rational utility 
maximising individuals, may not produce optimal results. NPM enthusiasm for 
the application of commercial principles fails to consider how ‘commitment’ may 
distort an individual’s behaviour away from utility maximisation. These critiques 
will form part of the ensuing discussion of the health component of Calcutta 
Slum Improvement Project (CSIP)
6.11 The Health Component of Slum Improvement Programmes: 
Calcutta Slum Improvement Project Phase 1
After a successful trial in the late 1980s, donors began to incorporate a health 
component to slum improvement programmes (SIPs).181 The aim was to deliver 
primary health care services through community based Honorary Female 
Health Workers (HHWs), to the doorsteps of beneficiaries living in bustees. The 
HHW was the link to the community of a health care bureaucracy, comprising 
Health Administrative Unit (HAU) and sub-centres. The HAU is the 
administrative unit for the delivery of primary health care services to 35,000
180 The example that he gives is that “i f  the knowledge of torture does not make you personally worse off, 
but you think that it is wrong and are ready to do something to stop it, it is a case of commitment” 
(1983:92).
181 This began with the World Bank’s Calcutta Urban Development Project Phase 3 (CUDP III)  and was 
later continued by DFID/O DA’s in their Calcutta Slum Improvement Project Phases la  and lb  (CSIP 
la& lb ). For a discussion of the evolution of slum improvement programmes in Calcutta, see Stephens 
and Harpham (1991).
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beneficiaries. As such it houses the office of a District Health officer-the 
technical head of the programme and the person responsible for supervising 
activities at all levels. In addition, there is a part-time medical officer, 1st tier 
supervisor (FTS), 2nd tier supervisor (STS), storekeeper, General Duty 
Attendant (GDA), HHW and a sweeper, who are meant to assist him. The HAU 
is mainly for administrative work- the compilation of reports, storage of drugs 
and of family folders. Treatment is given at sub-centres, which are the base of 
operations for 5 HHWs supervised by another HHW. Here immunisation 
services are rendered, children weighed and nutrition packs distributed. There 
are seven sub-centres under the jurisdiction of one HAU.
HAUs were to be under the administrative control of elected local 
representatives (councillors), who form a local co-ordination committee. The co­
ordination committee is responsible for identifying beneficiaries, the primary 
selection of HHWs as well as the day-to-day administration, supervision and 
monitoring of the programme (CSIP Project Report, 1990:48). In the case of 
CSIP, all project components were supported by ODA for five years, after which 
technical staff were to come under the control of the health department of the 
CMC. The Department of Health (DoH), GoWB pays the salaries of the 
personnel and is responsible for providing the medicines.
6.11.1 NPM and the Health Component of CSIP 1a&1b
NPM envisages a fundamental change in the role of government in the 
provision of public services. Rather than be the sole provider of services, NPM 
has advocated that government should enable, regulate and facilitate the role 
of private or community actors in service provision (Batley, 1999b:761). 
Furthermore, reforms have sought to enhance governmental performance, 
through the introduction of stronger incentives and through improvements to the 
mechanisms for accountability (Bennet & Muraleedharan, 2000:59).
Through CSIP the government continues to be the sole provider of services, 
which clearly does not reflect the influence of NPM. Furthermore, many of the 
classic components of NPM-inspired reforms are absent from the design of the 
health component of CSIP. There has been no contracting out of services,
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nothing has been done in terms of changing the regulatory framework for 
healthcare and CSIP, far from being an autonomous body, falls under the 
jurisdiction of the Health Department, Calcutta Municipal Corporation (CMC).
In spite of this, it is believed that the health component of CSIP provides an 
useful opportunity to evaluate some aspects of NPM thinking. Hood (1991:4-5) 
highlights seven doctrinal components of NPM, identified from public sector 
reform in OECD countries. These include: hands on professional management 
in the public sector, through clear control of organisations from persons at the 
top; explicit standards and measures of performance, through the clear 
definition of goals, targets and measures of success; greater emphasis on 
outputs controls, through performance based rewards and the decentralisation 
of personnel management; shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector, 
through the decentralisation of budgeting and the breaking up of units; shift to 
greater competition in the public sector, through contracting out; stress on 
private sector styles of management practice, by facilitating hiring and firing- 
flexibilising the process; greater discipline and parsimony in resource use, by 
cutting direct costs, enhancing labour discipline and controlling union demands.
The health programme contained very clear targets, activities and indicators 
against the objectives of the health component of the SIP.182 To prove that 
these had been completed, each level of worker was meant to provide status 
reports for the attention of those above them in the hierarchy. HHW were meant 
to collect statistics from, on average, twenty households/day and submit these 
for analysis each week at the sub-centres. They were to report to a first tier 
supervisor (FTS), who was to monitor their activities by checking entries to 
family schedules and also by accompanying them on field visits. This FTS 
would then have to prepare weekly reports on the performance of the five 
HHWs whom s/he was responsible for and submit these to the medical officer 
and the HAU on a weekly basis. A second tier supervisor (STS) was to 
supervise the activities of sub-centres and FTSs as well as of HHWs, where 
needed. S/he was to organise referral services, family planning camps and 
environmental sanitation programmes. The STS was required to submit
182 See Annex H of the CSIP Phase 1 Project Report, CMDA August 1990.
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monthly reports to CMHO and DCMHO (CMC); the director of the Health 
Programme (CMDA) and the Chief Health Officer (CMUHO). There was to be a 
part-time medical officer who would do house calls, on the recommendation of 
the HHW, compile an inventory of supplies for Central stores and where 
necessary refer cases for hospitalisation. A Health Officer was also employed 
to provide overall supervision of the programme. S/he was responsible for 
compiling monthly reports of the HAU and then submitting them to the project 
headquarters and the relevant individuals.
The health component of CSIP stipulates standards and measures of 
performance, through the definition of targets and goals, and by making 
quantitative indicators of success explicit. Robust systems of supervision and 
monitoring have been built in to the health component to reduce the scope for 
opportunism and to ensure that performance is maintained. Although rewards 
are not directly linked to performance, personnel management has been greatly 
decentralised through the introduction of the supervisors at each level, and 
there is an emphasis at each level of the programme to show results. 
Supervisors have specific responsibilities, but are also left ‘free to manage’. 
Furthermore, the health programme is separated into clearly dissagregated and 
defined units. The establishment of a cadre of lower level, ‘honorary’ health 
workers, most closely reflects the last two doctrinal components of NPM. Whilst 
there is little evidence of how CSIP will increase competition in the public sector, 
it is clear that many of the doctrines of NPM are reflected in the design of the 
health programme.
6.11.2 Honorary Health Workers (HHWs)
The programme recognised the fundamental importance of the HHWs in the 
organisational structure for the delivery of health care services to the 
community. The HHWs were to be middle aged women, with a minimum of 
class 8 standard education, selected from amongst the communities where 
they were supposed to work and employed on short-term contracts on a part- 
time basis and paid a small monthly honorarium of Rs 300 without social 
benefits. Each HHW was meant to cover one thousand beneficiaries (200
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families), which for administrative purposes was denominated as a block (CSIP 
Project Report, 1990:53-56).
They would be provided with a kit of basic medicines and made responsible for 
educating selected beneficiaries about family welfare, nutrition, personal 
hygiene, general cleanliness and the availability of government health care 
facilities locally. The medical kit contained medicines meant to provide relief for 
commonly reported illnesses such as fever, headache and diarrohea, which 
were to be delivered to the doorstep. It also contained the oral contraceptive 
pill. If the patient felt no relief, the case should be referred to the medical officer 
of the HAU, who was meant to examine and treat the patient either at the HAU 
or at the patient’s residence. The HHWs were meant to maintain an up-to-date 
family folder of the medical history of each of the beneficiary families.
The HHW exemplified the new emphasis on private sector styles of 
management practice and the need for discipline and frugality - two key 
doctrinal components of the NPM (Hood, 1991:5). It was claimed that the 
establishment of a cadre of HHWs would fulfil two key objectives: it would keep 
expenditure to a bare minimum, and use available resources sparingly whilst 
also ensuring greater flexibility in work contracts. The language of thrift infuses 
the rationale and job description for HHWs: HHWs save on accommodation 
and security costs (1990:53); HHWs are easily accessible, physically, socially 
and culturally (ibid); the employment of HHWs reduces dependence on medical 
and paramedical personnel. At the same time, the contractual aspects of the 
HHWs employment was meant to resist union demands and improve labour 
discipline. This is less explicitly referred to, although the report does note, “if 
any of these HHWs fail to perform their duties properly, her services may be 
dispensed with immediately. Furthermore, these part-time workers cannot 
claim their remuneration, if they are absent from work without sufficient reason” 
(1990:56).
The introduction of flexible work contracts - a key component of the NPM 
agenda - was meant to be an incentive to motivate the performance of HHWs. 
Job security was seen as a cause of poor performance of public officials (see 
Chapter Two). The recruitment of HHWs from amongst the community was
248
seen not just as means of lowering costs (travel and accommodation) and 
improving accessibility, but was also meant to be an incentive to good 
performance. The idea was that by recruiting local women, the programme 
would have workers enmeshed in local life, aware of local needs and concerns 
and would not be able to avoid exposure to pressure from local inhabitants 
(Project Report, 1990:54).
There are clear parallels with the example of the Health Agent Program 
implemented in Ceara in the late 1980, described by Tendler (1997:21-45). In 
Ceara women were hired from amongst the communities where they lived, on 
merit-based criteria, paid a minimum wage, with no job security or social 
benefits. Flexible work contracts and enmeshment in their local communities 
were meant to provide the incentives for good performance of health agents in 
Ceara as well. But in themselves these were not sufficient to enhance the 
performance of health workers in the field. Rather, what Tendler highlights was 
the important role played by the state government in Ceara, in fostering a cadre 
of dedicated health workers. The state directly hired the agents thereby 
conveying a sense of prestige to the process and helping to install a sense of 
‘calling’ in those selected. The state’s “socialisation” of all job candidates 
informed the local communities what to expect from their health agents. The 
state educated local inhabitants about what these agents should be doing and 
encouraged them to complain if they encountered agents not performing their 
roles. The point is that it was not simply the ‘embeddedness’ of the health 
agents in their local communities, which ensured they performed effectively. It 
was rather a combination of this local embeddedness, which helped to build 
trust between clients and providers, and the support for careful monitoring of 
these agents from a central authority. As she says, “what happened... was just 
as much a coming together of the workers and their clients as it was a sense of 
workers being watched by those who could report any wrongdoing” (1997:45), 
and key to this, as she recognised, was the role of the State.
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6.11.3 Assessing the Performance of HHWs
According to the Mayor, in areas of the city where HHWs were active, health 
indicators were far better.183 On the basis of this it was decided that the 
provision of primary health care services through HHWs would be expanded. 
The inference would seem to be that the system introduced through the SIPs 
was performing well, which on the surface may be interpreted as reflecting 
positively on the application of NPM doctrines to this health care bureaucracy. I 
was drawn to study this area based on evidence of better than average health 
indicators, largely attributed to the exemplary performance of HHWs in 
providing primary health care to vulnerable communities. During fieldwork over 
a period of six months in one ward of the city, which included time spent with a 
group of HHWs, I encountered a different scenario to the one that I had been 
led to expect. HHWs visited the bustee that I was researching only once, and 
this was during the pulse polio campaign. The manner in which they were 
received - a mixture of suspicion and bewilderment - gave some suggestion as 
to their familiarity with the bustee and its inhabitants. It merely confirmed certain 
conclusions drawn from conversations with the female residents of the bustee. 
Informants were asked if they knew of any women who came to visit them and 
check on their children. Most of the women were able to recall such a person 
visiting them at some stage, but in every case, they reported that these women 
had not visited for some months. In fact during my time there, the HHWs were 
rarely to be seen in the neighbourhood and the sub centre closest to SL bustee 
remained closed.
This was of course very different from what the application of the doctrines of 
the NPM was meant to achieve; accountability and responsiveness must surely 
be included amongst the keywords in the NPM lexicon, yet the performance of
183 CMC Budget Statement by the Mayor, section 10.4 states, “The infant mortality rate amongst the 
slum population covered by Honorary Health Workers has come down to 20:1000 live births during the 
year 1999, as compared to 37 amongst Calcutta Urban Population” (CMC Budget Statement, 2000-2001
p22).
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HHWs did not seem to reflect this. Was the poor performance of the HHWs in 
ward 67 a reflection the fundamental weakness of these doctrines as some 
have argued?184 To be able to arrive at an informed opinion, long-term 
participant observation at group meetings as well as at an individual level was 
undertaken, together with a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
HHWs, supervisors and CMDA (the original programme managers). At no 
stage were HHWs themselves confronted about the fact that they had not been 
seen working amongst beneficiary communities. Instead, as an observer, I 
attended their team meetings, and paid close attention to their complaints. 
Using these as a cue, I then probed them further about the problems that they 
were encountering as HHWs, as an indication of why they were not perhaps 
carrying out their duties as stipulated. In brief, although some of their gripes 
clearly had to do with aspects of their employment which were influenced by 
NPM, other sources of their poor performance had nothing to do with the 
application of NPM doctrines.
6.12 Some Explanations for the Poor Performance of HHWs
6.12.1 Lack of Monitoring and Supervision
It has already been noted that the health component of CSIP reflected many of 
the doctrines of the NPM. It was designed with clear systems of monitoring - 
each tier of the organisational structure was invested with a supervisory role. 
There was an emphasis on outputs, results and quantifiable measures of 
performance. However, during my period of fieldwork none of these systems for 
monitoring and supervision seemed to be operating.
Supervisors were unable to monitor even basic aspects of the HHW’s work, 
such as regular attendance and the carrying out of duties. This was most 
glaringly exposed in a neighbouring ward where HHWs were discovered to 
have been regularly shirking, apparently unknown to their supervisors, for 
weeks, perhaps even months on end. In reaction to this startling news, HHWs 
in ward 67 were asked to sign a daily roster to prove that they were working
184 Hood and Jackson have claimed “ a carefully selective use of example and maxim rather than 
demonstration from hard data analysis” (Hood and Jackson, 1991).
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during their stipulated hours. It was a knee-jerk reaction to a real problem, but 
one which appeared redundant given the exhaustive system of checks and 
balances which the project already seemed to possess. Furthermore, it was 
well known from comparative experience elsewhere in the city that as a means 
of monitoring bureaucratic performance rosters were ineffective, and had been 
corrupted in numerous ways.185
In addition to the fact that internal systems of monitoring were not functioning, 
there was also the claim from higher officials within the system that part of the 
reason for the deterioration in the quality of the service provided was the lack of 
adequate supervision from outside. In the words of one medical supervisor, 
“now no-one cares about CSIP, only us, the old staff try to maintain a 
standard... previously, ODA sahibs used to visit regularly, every three months 
from Delhi. We used to be very tense before these visits, but in a good sense. 
We had something to aim for, it was a real motivation for us. Now who is there 
to look after us...? To see what we are doing, or how we are doing it? What’s 
the motivation for us now...?”
6.12.2 Low wages and Short Term Work Contracts
Remuneration dominated most discussions both at the individual and also at 
the team level. More specifically, the HHWs made repeated reference to their 
poor level of remuneration, which was contrasted to their considerable and ever 
increasing load of responsibilities. During the period of research, HHWs 
received a monthly honorarium of Rs 1000 - this was three times as much as 
they were originally meant to receive - but this was meant to reflect the fact that 
their responsibilities in terms of the sheer volume of work had also increased. 
This was largely due to the fact that whereas they were initially responsible for 
a block comprising 200 families (1000 beneficiaries), that number had risen to 
600 families (roughly 3000 beneficiaries), whilst HHWs continued to be 
employed on a part-time basis, from 12-4pm each day. They claimed that it 
was physically impossible for one HHW to cover that number of beneficiaries in 
the time allotted. Their supervisors agreed. In the words of their medical
185 See Chapter Five.
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supervisor, “recently their workload has tripled...obviously their performance 
has diluted...we are stretched.”186
Strident complaints were also made about their work contracts, particularly the 
short-term tenures without the commensurate access to social benefits enjoyed 
by other public servants. Short-term contracts were repeatedly cited as a major 
source of insecurity, and were seen to sap loyalty and undermine long term 
commitment to the job. If, as proposed initially, the HHWs together with the rest 
of the SIP health component were to be integrated into the health department 
of the CMC, then the HHWs felt that they should be effectively seen and treated 
like CMC employees.
The HHWs were reacting to two aspects of their employment undeniably 
affected by NPM thinking: low wages and the lack of access to social benefits, 
to cut costs; and short-term contracts to ensure better labour discipline. 
However it is contestable whether paying low honoraria and denying access to 
social benefit has made immediate savings for the government. In fact some 
influential people within government tend to challenge this, arguing that the 
establishment of a cadre of paramedical health workers merely replicated 
existing manpower that was not, in fact, functioning effectively.187 At the same 
time, short-term contracts appeared to have had very little effect in terms of 
inducing greater labour flexibility or the enhancement of labour discipline. At 
various times, HHWs threatened to protest strike and stop work over different 
concerns.188 Whilst these threats remained empty, nevertheless the threat of 
industrial action was seen to be quite an effective tool for disrupting the weekly 
planning meetings between the HHWs, FTS, STS and medical supervisor. It 
was often quite successful in securing small concessions as well. After
186 Personal Interview with Medical Supervisor (identity withheld), Calcutta 27/04/2000.
187 This was the view of an advisor on health issues to the present government. The Subject Committee 
Reports on Health and Family Welfare have grown progressively more disillusioned with the performance 
of paramedical staff in the state. Given the large numbers of staff working in the DOH, and extensive 
building of health care installations, the Reports have recently recommended the optimisation of what 
already exists, rather than the expansion of the present infrastructure. In addition, the point was made that 
once donor funding of expanded infrastructure, including newly hired personnel, finishes, the state 
government is left with the long-term financial burden of supporting these.
188 They even threatened to go on strike if  they were to be asked to do anything to assist me.
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threatening action over the poor state of their bags and umbrellas-which they 
claimed were unsuitable for a protracted immunisation campaign during 
summer, outside, in the hottest part of the day - the HHWs were provided with 
bigger, stronger and more attractive bags, and umbrellas. Moreover, the threat 
to protest was a continual feature of their meetings and characterised their 
relationship with their supervisors. Thus, labour indiscipline remained a serious 
problem, and shirking, as we have seen, was widespread. The medical 
supervisor reported long absences from work due to party or election related 
activities, “they are frequently going to rallies etc, before elections they are busy 
canvassing.”
It is ironic that the NPM-inspired contractual aspects of HHWs job - short-term 
contracts without fringe benefits and low wages - should have made little 
contribution towards raising labour discipline, introducing greater work flexibility 
or enhancing performance; and it is questionable whether they resulted in any 
savings. However, there is considerable evidence that they were the source of 
unhappiness and resentment amongst the HHWs. This supports the findings of 
Hood (1991) and Warrington (1997), who found that NPM reforms damaged 
public service, demoralised workers and weakened organisations, whilst not 
improving efficiency or accountability.
6.12.3 The Distortions Produced by Patronage and Nepotism
In Bengal, there is a tradition of new governments creating positions in the 
lower bureaucracy for distribution to loyal supporters and key figures who had 
helped in their election. This has already been discussed earlier in relation to 
Calcutta Corporation. Congress’s capacity to provide patronage in this way was 
legendary (Franda, 1971a), and S.S. Ray, Chief Minister 1972-77, probably 
came closest to doing this in anything like a systematic way (Chatterji, 1985). 
Whilst this aspect of Congress rule was singled out for redress by the UF 
government, there is nothing to suggest that it has not continued under the LF 
government.189 Indeed it is widely alleged that the implementation of donor 
funded SIPs created the conditions for the continued distribution of posts on the
189 “The government of the United Front will relentlessly fight corruption, nepotism in official and non­
official spheres... fostered under Congress rule” Point 2,18 Point Programme of the UF Govt, 1967 (in 
Ghosh, 1981).
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basis of political loyalty and personal affinity. In particular, it was suggested to 
me by a number of different and reliable sources that the HHWs in ward 67 had 
been recruited on the basis of their political loyalties and personal ties with the 
local Party committee and particularly the councillor.
My own interactions with HHWs left me in no doubt as to where their political 
affiliations lay, but this was insufficient evidence on which to confirm the 
allegations.190 Nevertheless, it was apparent that the women were not all ‘local’, 
and certainly none of them lived in bustees. I got to know five of the women 
quite well. None lived in the immediate vicinity of the bustees, four of the five 
did not even live in the ward, and all seemed to live in what may be described 
as kothabari.m  Moreover, their demeanour and dress pointed to their lower 
middle class status.192 It was not possible to ascertain their educational 
standard, although by being neither ‘local’ or ‘from the beneficiary community’, 
they clearly did not match two of the three main criteria for selection.
A medical supervisor confirmed the suspicion that these HHWs, may not have 
been recruited according to the stipulated criteria. She claimed that the HHWs 
had been employed on the basis of political loyalties: “ the HHWs are all 
politically motivated. They were recruited because of their close links to the 
political party, although other criteria were also taken into account... they were 
needy.” Their links to the political party, she explained, meant long absences 
from work due to party or election related activities. “ They are frequently going 
to rallies etc, and before elections they are busy canvassing.” It was asked of a 
senior official of CMDA and a member of the selection panel for the HHWs, if 
they had been recruited on the basis of the criteria laid out in the Project
190 It would be incorrect to say that this was true of all the HHWs. but certainly more boisterous ones were 
never shy to proclaim their loyalty to the CPI (M).
191 So as not to cause unease, some of this data was never elicited through direct questioning. The women 
were asked if  they lived in the para, or whether x was their councillor; but I never enquired directly if  
they lived in kothabari.. This information was easily elicited indirectly, given the friendly nature of our 
relationship.
192 It is difficult to be unequivocal about this, but having lived in Calcutta for some time and having 
interacted with working class women from bustees, certain signs suggested to me that these women were 
different. All the women were heavy set, they were well attired, carried their own drinking water and read 
newspapers.
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Report.193 His reply was instructive, “O.K, we do not live in a political 
vacuum...to be eligible (for selection), a certificate of residence was given to 
them by the ward councillor, and he made the initial selection of 
candidates..."194
It would appear that the recruitment process for HHWs which was meant to be 
based upon strict criteria of location, educational standard as well as merit, was 
essentially usurped by nepotism. Candidates seemed to have been selected on 
the basis of political allegiance to the ruling party. The close ties between the 
HHWs and the councillor protected them from the sanctions that existed to 
punish poor performance.195 Whilst in theory these carried extra force given 
the more flexible terms under which HHWs were employed, in practice because 
they were never applied, their scope for bringing about improvements in 
performance were effectively limited. As in the case of monitoring and 
supervision given above, this should not be seen as a weakness in the 
doctrines of the NPM - which provide, potentially, powerful incentives to 
motivate good performance - but a failure to implement NPM principles.
In the case of Ceara, Tendler and Freedheim (1994) found that open and 
competitive recruitment procedures helped to drive home the message that for 
the organisation, performance was a measure of professional merit, as health 
agents who had been selected for employment had succeeded on the basis of 
their merit. By selecting candidates on the basis of criteria other than merit, the 
government failed to make its employees understand that ‘performance counts’, 
and missed out on the opportunity to instil a mission-orientated ethos in the 
health component of CSIP.
This section has argued that the organisational design of the health component 
of CSIP reflects the influence of some NPM doctrines, even though the role of 
the State in service delivery has not been changed as a result - as has 
happened in other cases of NPM inspired reform (Batley, 1999b; Russell et al,
193 CSIP Phase 1 Project Report 1990.
194 Personal Interview, Unnayan Bhavan CMDA, Calcutta 8/06/2000.
195 The councillor to whom they were allied, had enhanced his political status by becoming Local 
Secretary of the CPI (M ) in ward 67.
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1999). In the case of CSIP, government remained the main provider of 
services. NPM doctrines were meant to cut costs, enhance accountability and 
improve the performance of officials, but were shown in this case to have 
limited effect on these critical objectives. It has been argued that this reflects, in 
part, a failure to implement some of the principles of NPM. Systems of 
supervision and monitoring that had been incorporated into the design of CSIP 
to ensure that employees did not shirk were not in operation. Similarly, the 
motivation to work conscientiously, which the more flexible work contracts were 
meant to provide, rested on the threat of dismissal or a loss of honoraria for 
those found not to be performing their roles effectively. But there was no 
evidence that such sanctions were ever applied, despite the fact that 
supervisors acknowledged that HHWs abandoned their duties to engage in 
political activities. Hence some NPM doctrines proved ineffectual because they 
were not actually operationalised - the incentives which they contained were 
never applied.
In part the limited effect of these doctrines on the health component of CSIP 
may be attributed to weaknesses in NPM theory. Integral to the formulation of 
NPM doctrines are assumptions about human instrumental rationality. These 
have resulted in policies that focus on changes to administrative structures and 
on the provision of monetary rewards which are designed to create incentives, 
reduce opportunities for rent seeking and make governmental performance 
more transparent. This has led to the view that improvements in bureaucratic 
performance have solely to do with changes at the organisational level. There 
is, however, growing evidence that the roots of performance lie beyond the 
organisation, in the broader social, political and economic context in which 
organisations are located (Hildebrand and Grindle, 1995:443-444).
NPM, to paraphrase Warrington (1997), prescribes 'cures’ to but does not 
attempt to address the underlying causes of these problems. For example, 
inspired by NPM, the health component of CSIP introduced short-term 
contracts and the payment of small honoraria without social benefits, to 
improve labour discipline and to enhance the performance of HHWs. But these 
changes did nothing to address the reasons underlying why labour discipline 
has been such a feature of the public sector, at least in the CMC, some of
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which have been discussed earlier in this Chapter. Similarly, the introduction of 
merit based recruitment procedures to create a results orientated ethos, 
ignored the fact that politicians felt a need to provide employment to supporters 
to reward loyalty and expand their influence locally. Certain political and 
historical factors in ward 67, discussed in the last chapter, may have 
contributed to this.
It would be unfair to criticise NPM for failing to bring about the expected 
changes in the performance of HHWs delivering the health component of CSIP, 
basically because, for most part, the principles were not implemented. There 
are grounds for criticism in its failure to address the broader context and 
underlying causes of poor performance, the factors which lead to the 
persistence of certain practices, such as nepotism and patronage. NPM 
inspired reforms paid no cognisance to the social and political factors in ward 
67 that may have explained why HHWs were recruited on the basis of political 
ties - rather than merit - systems of monitoring were not in operation and 
sanctions for poor performance not enforced. The role of politics was critical 
here. The CPI (M)’s desire to maintain a political hegemony interfered with and 
ultimately undermined efforts to bring about improvements in the performance 
of local officials.
6.13 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a systematic analysis of the theoretical issues 
behind governance reforms designed to improve the delivery of services to the 
public, in the light of empirical evidence of the effect of such policies on 
municipal administration in Calcutta. In particular, the chapter has focussed on 
whether governance reforms - through decentralisation and application of the 
doctrines of the new public management - has improved the performance of 
local health officials in the delivery of primary health care service to bustee 
dwellers in two wards of the city.
The chapter began with a summary of the key assumptions behind the calls for 
decentralisation of service delivery to lower administrative levels, before
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attempting to test two of these assumptions in the light of the decentralisation 
process undertaken in Calcutta through the CMC Act (1980).
It was shown that the CMC Act has not lead to the model of municipal 
administration envisaged by its chief architect, Prasanta Sur. The Act has not 
resulted in locally responsible and responsive government, nor has it resulted in 
decisions being taken more locally and thus, according to Sur’s criteria, it has 
not led to enhanced local democracy. Nor did decentralisation in Calcutta lead 
to a reduction in information costs for principals in their dealings with agents. 
Significant asymmetries of information regarding the work of local health care 
officials were noted in one research site in particular, and it was estimated that 
these could only get worse once the information problems inherent to health 
care provision were included. Given the poor quality of information, transaction 
costs are likely to remain high. Nevertheless, independent of the quality of 
information, it was argued that the definition of transaction costs should be 
expanded to comprise the difficulties for local inhabitants to organise 
collectively and the costs of breaking out of the constraints imposed by patron- 
client relationships in a given area. Given the weakness of the assumptions so 
far discussed, the incentives for agents to behave opportunistically are stronger 
than it was assumed that they would be. In addition, flaws in the design of the 
Act have meant that principals effectively have limited capacity to induce local 
officials to behave in a socially more optimal way.
The chapter has also tried to challenge the assumptions underlying the choice- 
theoreic approach to human behaviour, which has so clearly influenced the 
governance agenda. A brief political history of Calcutta Corporation was 
presented to illustrate some of the weaknesses in the choice theoretic 
approach to human behaviour. It was argued that choices may be shaped by 
history, by culture and by politics; and thus are not solely the result of a desire 
to maximise personal welfare. Habits of thought and patterns of behaviour 
which were inimical to responsive administration were allowed to persist, and 
even encouraged, over time by politicians keen to maintain a pliable army of 
support. In this way, such patterns of behaviour were legitimised. This critique 
was extended to the discussion of the role of NPM in enhancing bureaucratic
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performance. It was noted how a sense of ‘commitment’ can lead individuals to 
choose in a way that may not lead to a maximisation of personal welfare.
NPM doctrines were shown to have influenced the design of the health 
component of CSIP, and were seen to be most clearly reflected in the 
establishment of a cadre of female honorary health workers (HHWs). However 
contrary to theoretical expectations, the application of NPM doctrines was seen 
to have limited effect in improving service delivery, as HHWs performed less 
than adequately. Notable was the fact that the particular aspects of their 
employment which were meant to provide some of the most powerful incentives 
to perform well, were the source of unhappiness, resentment and, crucially, did 
little to improve standards of performance.
It was noted that the systems of monitoring and supervision were not 
functioning, and sanctions for poor performance never applied. Corruption in 
the recruitment process of HHWs, through nepotism and pervasive patron- 
clientalism, go some way to explaining why the incentives, inspired by the 
doctrines of NPM proved so ineffectual. This does not represent a failure of 
NPM - arguably, if some of the NPM inspired changes in organisational design 
set out in the initial project report had actually been adhered to, such 
deterioration in their performance might not have resulted - but it does highlight 
some of the limitations of NPM.
This necessarily brings us back to the question of what it is that leads public 
officials to behave in a socially optimal way? Both NPM and decentralisation 
share common theoretical underpinnings and as such tend to assume that 
administrative structures to increase transparency and the creation of the right 
incentives are sufficient to enhance the performance of public sector officials. 
Their emphasis has been on organisational change. A growing body of 
evidence is emerging to suggest that such reforms, by themselves, do not 
result in better performance (cf. Grindle and Hildebrand, 1995), but that 
“organisational culture is more important as a determinant of performance than 
structures for remuneration and control” (1995:444).
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In Chapter Two it was noted that changes in organisational structure must be 
embedded in an organisational culture that is favourable to these changes, 
which usually means the existence of a political commitment to change. The 
work of Tendler (1997) powerfully demonstrates how it was the state 
government’s commitment to positive outcomes and how it undertook to 
achieve this through its public programmes, which was critical to their success. 
A consideration of the overall contextual environment, of the “established rules 
of behaviour” (Smith, 1975:162), is essential.196 Indeed it has been noted that 
people tend to behave according to what they perceive the “established rules” 
to be, as seen through how others behave (Sen, 2000:277).
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter suggests that politics was the 
critical factor in determining the result of organisational changes. Where 
political priorities lay in responsive local government in one area, local officials 
were seen to perform their roles effectively. Where other political priorities had 
gained precedence - for example the need to buy loyalties and win elections- 
changes were seen to be of less positive effect. Sen points out that to 
understand the success or failure of organisational changes, one must look at 
the attitudes and conduct of those in positions of authority. In fact there is a 
Bengali proverb, which says that, “the fish rots from the head”. Sen singles out, 
“the behaviour of senior civil servants (as) especially important in instilling 
norms of conduct” (Sen:2000:278). I prefer a shift in emphasis from senior civil 
servants to politicians in the case of West Bengal - where civil servants have 
been made answerable to politicians. Here there is need is to look beyond civil 
servants to the behaviour of politicians and particularly elements within the 
ruling coalition, in installing norms of conduct which have had an effect on the 
way that the whole bureaucracy behaves.
196 Quoted in Sen (2000:277)
Chapter 7
Bureaucrats versus Politicians: An Explanation of the Poor 
Performance of the Health System in West Bengal
7.1 Introduction
This dissertation has so far argued that the critical problem with the health 
system in West Bengal is not a lack of resources or infrastructure, but rather 
weak structures of governance that have resulted in the overall poor 
performance and lack of accountability of health sector personnel. Chapter Two 
has laid out the theoretical reasoning on which the policy prescriptions for 
enhancing accountability are based. Chapter Four has provided a detailed case 
study of two bustees and Chapter Five has presented a comparative case 
study of health care bureaucrats in two Calcutta wards, in an attempt to 
describe the circumstances in which local bureaucrats have worked effectively, 
responding to local needs. Chapter Six has attempted a systematic analysis of 
the assumptions behind decentralisation and NPM in the light of the empirical 
evidence from Calcutta. In short, I have tried to argue that organisational 
changes in local government that attempt to create the incentives for officials to 
perform effectively have been of limited effect in improving the delivery of 
health care to the poor. In the cases where they have been successful, the role 
of civil society organisations, fostered by and closely aligned to the ruling 
political Party, have been critical in helping to mobilise the local population to 
make use of the reduced transaction costs to hold local officials to account. 
This pressure from below has been allied to pressure from political leaders on 
local officials to be responsive to the needs of the local population.
Where the political leadership has taken an interest in making government 
respond to the needs of the people, the administrative reforms meant to bring 
about changes in bureaucratic performance were actually seen to produce 
results. Given what can be achieved in this regard, it may seem strange that 
similar ‘success stories’ have not been replicated throughout the state in the 
delivery of health care. In other words, given the circumstances in which local 
officials were shown to perform their duties effectively, the fact that the health 
system in West Bengal is afflicted by such a litany of woes as those described
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in Chapter Three is curious. Moreover, a key concern which emerges through 
the dissertation is why a disciplined and organised Left-leaning government, 
with a specific commitment to alleviate poverty, has been unable to bring about 
significant and lasting improvements in the provision of basic health care, a 
basic human right as well as a key indicator of well-being, to the poorer 
sections of Bengali society.197
In the conclusion to the last chapter it was argued that organisational changes 
must be embedded in an organisational culture committed to such changes; 
and that people, on the whole, behave according to how they perceive the 
‘established rules’ to be. This necessarily means examining the attitudes and 
behaviour of those in positions of power. Amartya Sen has argued that, “the 
behaviour of senior civil servants (is) especially important in instilling norms of 
conduct”(Sen, 2000:277). I have suggested a shift in emphasis, away from 
senior bureaucrats, to politicians, and more specifically those from the ruling 
coalition that has ruled for state since 1977, arguing that it is political 
commitment that determines the effect of organisational changes. The scene is 
thus set for a critical examination of these two contrasting claims. The 
subsequent analysis is based on evidence collected through in-depth, semi­
structured ‘elite’ interviews with senior members of the CPI (M), senior 
bureaucrats (IAS and WBCS), academics and journalists; a thorough reading of 
the secondary literature on Bengali politics and society, gleaned from the 
corpus of scholarly work on the subject written since the mid 1960s as well as 
articles from Calcutta’s leading English language dailies, published between 
September 1999 and June 2001.
7.2 The Bureaucracy
By attributing the blame to bureaucrats, Sen’s comments appear to resonate 
with comments by senior members of the CPI (M) and the Left Front 
Government (LFG), made against the bureaucracy in the state. Since the
197 In an interview with the New York Times, Jyoti Basu, then Chief Minister of West Bengal and head of 
the Left Front Government said, “we are not interested merely in power; power is an instrument of 
meaningful, progressive social change.” (New York Times, January 1978) Similarly, according to Ashok 
Mitra, “the goal of politics is the capture and use of power for social ends.” (quoted in Sengupta, 
1979:23).
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period of the first UF government (1967-68) the Left, and particularly its most 
potent element, the CPI (M), has consistently directed its ire against what it 
perceives to be hostile, intransigent and partisan administrative machinery. The 
main allegation has been that the bureaucracy has impeded, at various times, 
the Left’s attempts to govern the state, in allegiance with opposition political 
parties, the rich and the powerful, as part of a conspiracy of vested interests in 
the state. These ‘vested interests’ - the CPI (M)’s favourite expression to 
describe this nexus - have been bent on denying the poor the benefits of the 
equity-orientated reforms which the LF has introduced during its time in 
government.
The Left’s distrust of the bureaucracy can be traced to the very beginnings of its 
rule in West Bengal. It was expressed both in the 18 point plan of the UF 
government (1967) and in the 36-Point Common Minimum Programme of the 
Left Front government (1977), which promised that the government would rely 
less on the bureaucracy for the implementation of its policies. It was also 
revealed through the statements of senior Party figures, men like Promode Das 
Gupta, who alleged that, “ and the bureaucracy from top to bottom is engaged 
in a conspiracy against the Left Front government”. 198 The reasons for this lack 
of trust in the state administration are not hard to fathom. In the early years of 
Left rule in West Bengal, large sections of the administrative machinery, 
especially the police force, were actively hostile to the Left and its policies and 
primarily concerned with defending the rights of their rich patrons. 199 
Harikrishna Konar, a leading member of the CPI (M) and one of the most 
energetic ministers in the UF government, fervently believed that the West 
Bengal police were, “in the habit of readily going into action on the complaints 
of big jotedars.” 200 Events such as the police invasion of Jyoti Basu’s (the 
Police Minister at the time) private office, and the attack on UF ministers by a 
howling police mob (July 1st, 1969) did little to undermine this suspicion.
198 The Statesman, 26th November 1977.
199 In part this was clearly on account of the fiery rhetoric of certain UF ministers who urged the 
mobilisation of the peasantry in rural areas to forcibly occupy benami lands, usually leading to violent 
clashes with landlords and their allies. Similar rallying calls for the urban poor to mobilise were also seen, 
though on a much smaller scale to that in rural areas. Nevertheless, as one scholar has noted, “it is the 
activation of the bustees that to the keepers of law signals the onset o f danger, and proclaims the 
seriousness of the political Party that undertakes such.” (Ray, 1988:81).
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Neither did the much-publicised disputes between senior bureaucrats and LF 
government ministers over the years. The clashes between the Finance 
Minister, Ashok Mitra and Principal Secretary (PS) Finance, SM Murshed (IAS) 
in this regard were notorious, and did little to rehabilitate the image of the 
bureaucracy in the eyes of the Left and its supporters.
The origins of the distrust felt by the CPI (M) towards the state administration 
can be traced to the early years of Left rule in West Bengal and evidence would 
suggest that these misgivings towards the administration, especially the police, 
were not completely unfounded (c.f. Sengupta, 1979). Recent quotes from 
senior Party figures suggest that, at least in public, the bureaucracy continues 
to be a useful whipping horse for government policy failures. For example, 
amidst the spiralling political violence in Kespur, Biman Bose, a Politburo 
member, blamed sections of the police force and administration of aiding 
Trinamul Congress (TMC) workers in unleashing violence against the CPI 
(M).201 At a press conference after the TMC victory at the Panskura by-election, 
the general secretary of the CPI (M), H. Singh Surjeet, seemed to imply that 
some in the administration had “colluded” with the TMC, saying: “as far as the 
IAS officers are concerned, everyone knows where their loyalties lie”. 202 The 
following month, Biplab Dasgupta (MP) promised to “complain against a section 
of the policemen who were siding with the TMC in Kespur ”.203
Just as the initial hostility of the CPI (M) towards the bureaucracy was not 
unfounded, equally it is difficult to deny that the administrative machinery must 
assume some of the responsibility for the failure of the government to bring 
about the expected improvements in the living standards of the poor in the 
state. Nossiter has alleged that the bureaucracy’s weak performance is one 
reason for the varying performance of some aspects of CPI (M) rule in West 
Bengal (1988:143).
200 Quoted by Franda (1971a: 186). A jotedar is a landholder.
201 Since late 1999 Keshpur block in Midnapore has witnessed violent clashes between supporters of the 
CPI (M ) and TMC. Sections of the local population have been persecuted on account of their alleged 
political allegiances.
202 The Hindu, 9th June 2000.
203 The Statesman, 23rd July 2000.
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The sopor and general sluggishness that tends to characterise the performance 
of, especially, lower level public servants in West Bengal is proverbial.204 Poor 
standards of bureaucratic performance, characterised by sloth and a lack of 
responsiveness, together with the often-hostile treatment of members of the 
public by government employees are ubiquitous in government institutions in 
the state.205 In the words of one researcher, ‘bureaucrats often arrive at noon 
and, after frequent tea breaks and a leisurely lunch, begin their exodus at 3pm” 
(Basu, 1985:35).206 According to Nossiter, ‘lassitude pervades the corridors and 
time keeping is conspicuous by its absence. Come back tomorrow has 
Kafkaesque overtones of a journey on a bureaucratic time-scale somewhere 
near to eternity” (1988:143).
Chapter Three has made some reference to the standards of bureaucratic 
performance more specifically in the health system in West Bengal. It was 
alleged by the Subject Committee on Health and Family Welfare (West Bengal 
Legislative Assembly) based on its own field observations, that staff were rude, 
unmotivated, lazy, corrupt and negligent. My own observations from the field 
confirmed this. Initially, probably out of sheer novelty, the scenario appeared 
quite amusing. Amusement quickly turns to frustration, then irritation and 
annoyance, once any attempt is made to try to get any work done by these 
officials. Ultimately, one is left with a profound sense of sadness by the state of 
affairs: West Bengal has gained an unenviable reputation for its poor work 
culture, its undisciplined labour and the indolence of its public servants.
It is difficult to dispute that standards of bureaucratic performance in the state, 
today, leave much to be desired. It remains to be proven whether this was 
simply due to a lack of motivation, or whether it was out of a more targetted 
vindictiveness towards the Left and the CPI (M) in particular on the part of 
members of the bureaucracy. The remainder of this section will seek to explore 
the extent to which the spectre of a partisan bureaucracy resistant to pro-poor
204 Annexure V of the report o f the Administrative Reforms Committee (1983) provides a witty, though 
telling account of the typical movement of file in government offices.
205 A visit to Writers Building, the seat of government in West Bengal, would suffice to permanently 
dispel any doubts about this. On my numerous visits, I can confirm that it was rare to see staff doing 
other than reading the newspaper, chatting, drinking tea or else sleeping on their desks.
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change and inherently hostile to the Left - an image frequently evoked by the 
ruling coalition to explain the less successful aspects of LF rule in the state - 
still holds true. Moreover, to what extent can it be held singularly accountable 
for the failure of the LFG to bring about significant improvements in the access 
of the poor to basic services, such as health care, in West Bengal?
7.3 CPI (M) and the State Administration
Most of the evidence suggests that since winning power, the CPI (M) has 
managed to use the bureaucracy very effectively for its own ends. After initially 
disparaging the bureaucracy, the CPI (M) has introduced institutional changes 
that have reduced the government’s dependence on it to implement policy, as 
envisaged in the UF and later the LF Programmes of Action. Combined with 
this, where possible, the CPI (M) has used the administration as a tool to 
further its own political goals - alternately through restraint, infiltration, careful 
monitoring and control, and at times, active encouragement to work closely with 
local actors in implementing government programmes.
7.3.1 Restraining the Bureaucracy
In the first UF government (1967-69), CPI (M) ministers consistently 
encouraged popular mobilisation amongst the rural peasantry and the urban 
proletariat. In rural areas, the landless peasantry was urged to occupy lands 
belonging to landlords and the rural bourgeoisie thought to be in excess of the 
land ceiling.207 In the words of the Land Minister at the time, “we wish to make 
the peasants get land from the landowners by their own organised strength.” 208 
The aim was to “recover land involved in benami and other transactions with 
popular cooperation.”209 Only after the movement had gathered momentum did
206 Quoted in Nossiter (1988:183).
207 The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act (1954) placed a ceiling on landholdings of 25 acres, whilst 
providing a certain legal means for exceeding the ceiling through: holding of agricultural land as fisheries, 
excluded from the 25 acre ceiling and by holding excess land through private agreements between the 
landholder and the tenant or government. Though the title is legally in the name of the tenant, the produce 
is distributed as though the title was in the name of the landholder. See Franda (1968) for a more elaborate 
explanation of this.
208 H.K. Konar, quoted by Sengupta (1979:75).
209 H.K Konar, quoted in Franda (1971a: 185).
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Konar confer legality on it (Sengupta, 1979). At the same time as encouraging 
the peasantry to mobilise and occupy land, no doubt wary of the opposition that 
this would incite amongst landholders and their allies in the administration, 
Konar ordered the police “not to suppress the democratic and legal struggles of 
the people.”210 Konar also made it clear to the administration what its role 
should be in such circumstances. “Officers have been instructed to protect the 
rights of peasants to harvest the crops they have grown...the district officers 
will help the peasants against any obstructions that may be coming from the 
jotedars”2U By doing this, the UF created the conditions for mobilisation from 
below by protecting the peasants from the state machinery.
Labour mobilisation in urban areas followed a similar pattern in the UF 
ministries. The Labour Minister, Subodh Banerjee, laid out a new approach to 
labour relations. The aim would again be to encourage popular labour 
mobilisation for the implementation of changes, whilst the government would 
bring about the necessary formal institutional changes. These included a 
mechanism for solving industrial disputes as quickly as possible, whilst the 
retrenchment of workers without government sanction was discouraged 
(Franda, 1971a). In addition, the government legalised the act of gherao and 
the police were ordered not to interfere in labour management strife and “the 
legitimate democratic trade union movement.”
In the words of one scholar, “the CPI (M) thus neutralised the regional state 
apparatus as an agent of political order” (Kohli, 1997:346). In both rural and 
urban areas, the CPI (M) followed a strategy of active encouragement of 
popular mobilisation, whilst simultaneously restraining the police and 
administration from intervening in favour of employers and landowners. This 
was accompanied by the enactment of legislation to legalise the actions taken 
through popular mobilisation. Subsequently, the changes in legislation helped 
to remove the legal basis on which such interventions could be legitimised.
210 H.K. Konar, quoted in Franda (1971a:185).
211 H.K. Konar in Paschimbanga, November 21 1968, quoted in Sengupta (1979:77)
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7.3.2 Breaking the Dominance of Traditional Elites: Land Reforms and the 
Revival of the PRIs
The most celebrated, and possibly most successful, policy of the LFG has been 
land reform - in particular the registration and legislation of tenure of bargadars 
(sharecroppers). Operation Barga provides a classic example of how the CPI 
(M) has been able, where necessary, to use the bureaucracy to achieve its own 
specific ends. Operation Barga created a precedent, breaking with all previous 
ways of working of the bureaucracy in India and West Bengal. For the first time, 
bureaucrats were made to leave their offices in Calcutta and travel to the 
villages, where in specially constructed ‘camps’ they sat for months on end 
registering bargadars’ rights to land that they had cultivated (Kohli, 1987: 128). 
Through Operation Barga, Bhattacharya claims that, “the Left drew the 
bureaucracy closer to the villages. Certain functions concerning the settlement 
of agricultural holdings were physically moved from the towns to the villages” 
(2001:677).
Operation Barga may be seen as the beginning of a process by which the CPI 
(M) sought to transform the relationship between the bureaucracy and the rest 
of the population. The revitalisation of the Panchayati Raj institutions (PRIs) 
was a further step in this process - the government fulfilled its promise to 
reduce its dependence on the bureaucracy and seek the association and co­
operation of the people at all levels and in all matters.212
The LF introduced legislation, which ensured that membership of these 
institutions of local government in rural areas was on the basis of an election to 
be held on a regular basis, every five years. Panchayats were politically elected 
by the local population, facilitating the participation of previously excluded 
groups in the political process, and were made responsible for implementing 
redistributive reforms (Kohli, 1987:113). Panchayats provided the institutional 
base for land reform in West Bengal (including Operation Barga) by identifying 
and distributing surplus land. During natural calamities they coordinated relief
212 See point 18, 18-Point Programme of the UF Government (1967) Appendx 1 in Ghosh (1981). Also 
point 1, last section of the 36 Point Programme of the Left Front Government (1977), Appendix 6 in 
Ghosh (1981).
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work and subsequently identified the beneficiaries of rural development 
programmes such as IRDP (Swaminathan, 1990; Lieten, 1992). Firstly, it is 
argued that, the politicisation of the panchayats helped to break the domination 
of local politics by previously dominant groups- mahajans, jotedars and rich 
peasants, as well as members of the local administration to whom they were 
often allied. The revival of the PRIs led to an incorporation of the ‘lower strata’ 
into the development process, perhaps for the first time. It thus led to a shift in 
resources and power from the bureaucracy to the new panchayats (Kohli, 
1987:113-115), as local officials were now expected to implement decisions 
taken by panchayat members (Robinson, 1998).
Kohli (1987) has argued that the bureaucracy was thus “tamed”, and turned into 
an instrument of the people. While Operation Barga had an immediate effect on 
the traditional ways of working of the bureaucracy, the revival of the PRIs was 
considered to have resulted in a more long-term change in the way that the 
bureaucracy was said to function in the state. According to Bhattacharya, “such 
institutions reduced bureaucracy’s role in making and implementing policies, 
and politicised the social sphere”, thereby demystifying local governance for the 
rural populace (2001:675). In the long run, he has argued, it has “turned the 
scope of rights and entitlement, bureaucracy and law...from obscure and 
uncontrollable areas of ‘high’ politics to those of candid discourse and popular 
scrutiny” (ibid: 677).
The CPI (M)’s efforts at Land Reform have been roundly criticised from those 
on the Left (Rudra, 1981; Mallick, 1993) for not going far enough. It is beyond 
the scope of this chapter to evaluate the strength of these criticisms. Suffice to 
say that if we are to accept the figures for land distribution given by the 
government and corroborated by some scholars (Sengupta, 1981), the 
achievements on this front have been remarkable and one for which the LFG 
should be congratulated.213 These figures clearly testify to the government’s 
success in overcoming the opposition of powerful vested interests in rural areas, 
traditionally opposed to such reforms (the rural bourgeoisie and their allies in
213 According to Sengupta (1981), 8% of the operated area of the state was redistributed, benefiting almost 
one third of landless rural households, with tenancy reforms benefiting many bargadars, especially those 
belonging to the SC/ST.
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the administration). Given that such interests were so well entrenched in the 
state - power and influence derived from land ownership dates back to the Act 
of Settlement and was consolidated through the close nexus between officials, 
politicians and local landed interests during the period of Congress rule - makes 
the LF government’s achievement even more significant.214
7.3.3 Monitoring and Control of the Bureaucracy
It is universally recognised that the CPI (M) is a well-organised and disciplined 
political Party. As a political Party, the CPI (M) has created “an effective 
bureaucratic machine for fighting and winning elections in a multi-Party 
democracy” (Chatterjee, 1997:153). Discipline and organisation have become 
by-words in any discussion of the CPI (M)’s long tenure in power, and 
Chatterjee notes that, “information and system - the two watchwords of modern 
bureaucracy - are abundantly on view at the CPI (M) election office” 
(1997:153). The CPI (M) organises on the principal of democratic centralism, 
and critical to its organisational strength have been the Party’s mass 
organisations, which have proliferated since coming to power.
The “firm alliance of the working class and peasantry”, which was to be the core 
and basis of the CPI (M)’s program in West Bengal, was to be carried out 
through aggressive Party work in trade unions and peasant organisations 
(Franda, 1971a: 183). Popular mobilisation in the state, particularly in rural 
areas, was often organised by the Party’s mass organisations. Konar frequently 
appealed for the cooperation of rural mass organisations in the land struggle. 
These have grown in strength over the years and have been crucial to the 
Party’s electoral success (Chatterjee, 1997).
Observers have noted in awe the sheer organisation and strength in numbers 
which the CPI (M) commands in West Bengal. Congress Party notables admit 
that its organisation could never match that of the CPI (M) in the state.215 
Sengupta (1979) estimated that each of the forty-one thousand villages in West
214 See Franda, 1971a and b; Chatterji, 1985; Kohli, 1990.
215 According to Priya Das Munshi, Congress leader in the state. India Today, 31st March 1987.
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Bengal had at least one Party unit. Chatterjee (1997) has suggested that at 
least two million people are involved in the state working on behalf of the CPI 
(M) during election time. The fact is that the CPI (M) made a conscious 
decision to change, after 1977, from being a cadre-based Party, to being a 
mass-based Party. Mallick (1994) estimates that Party membership rose from 
33, 000 in 1977, to 1,243,000 in 1988. According to Ashok Mitra, the present 
figure stands at around two million.216 This does not take into account the 
membership of its mass organisations, which according to Sengupta (1979) 
stood at the following: Kisan Sabha, 1,285,000; DYFI 250,000 and SFI 86, 000. 
She estimated that the CPI (M)’s front organisations had at least nine million 
members (Sengupta, 1979:195). Not only is the Party highly organised with a 
large membership; it works in close allegiance with a similarly well-organised 
and attended plethora of mass organisations. It is this combination of a 
Bolshevik-like Party organisation allied to a network of mass front organisations, 
which makes the CPI (M) in West Bengal such a formidable electoral force.
The Party’s organisational principles are said to be rooted in the terrorist origins 
of some of its key leaders, according to Franda, “the organisational principles 
practised by these terrorist groups were carried forward to help organize 
communist movements after independence...as in the (Anushilan) Samity, 
Party discipline, secrecy and democratic centralist lines of authority and 
responsibility are enforced” (1971b: 15). Hence the CPI (M), including its mass 
fronts, is not simply a machine for winning elections, but should also be 
considered an effective organisation for monitoring and reporting events and 
controlling officials in the state. Party members at most levels are expected to 
play this surveillance role. Sengupta notes that MLAs “monitor the pace of 
mobilisation, the articulation of demands, the role that villagers play in the 
politics of change. He monitors the implementation of plans and projects, 
watches the attitude of the police and other officials, invigilates the role of the 
exploiting classes and works in closest possible cooperation with district, thana, 
block and village committees of the CPI (M)” (1979:26). In a similar way, one 
MLA confessed to Sengupta that, “we are proposing the setting up of
216 Calcutta Diary, Economic and Political Weekly pp. 2490-2491 15th July, 2000.
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committees everywhere, to observe how officials, including the police, are 
working and to suggest how they should...”.217
With such a formidable organisational set-up, and significant numbers of 
members, it is unlikely that much occurs in West Bengal without the Party 
knowing about it. Chapter Five provides some first-hand evidence of the 
importance of these mass organisations in mobilising the local population in 
urban areas, and ultimately in helping to make local officials more responsive. 
They were also seen to play an important invigilating role in Ward 67. In the 
words of one CMC official there, “you can’t do anything here without the Party 
knowing about it...I mean, you can’t even have a row with your wife without the 
Party getting to know about it.”218
This monitoring role was noted at different levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy. 
In the words of one highly decorated (retired) senior bureaucrat in the Finance 
Ministry. “One reason why bureaucrats are unwilling to talk is that in every nook 
and cranny there are cadres who are only too ready to report on people 
transgressing.219 News will reach ministers, who will harass these officials. In 
the case of the senior bureaucracy they will ensure that they are either 
transferred, or else denied access to popular postings. Of course this fear and 
hesitancy (to speak openly) occurs everywhere amongst bureaucrats, but it is 
particularly strong in West Bengal because of the cadre-based system of 
working”.
Party workers have, when the need has arisen, been rather more proactive in 
monitoring officials, than the evidence so far has suggested. After the murder of 
a local committee secretary in ward 67 (Kasba), cadres first burnt down the
217 Prabir Kumar Sengupta M LA (CPM) Bansberia, quoted in Sengupta (1979:28).
218 My movements were carefully monitored in the area. The CPI (M ) local office knew what I was doing 
in the area, and where I was from. On one occasion, the CPI (M ) local committee secretary asked me to 
write down my address and phone number in Calcutta. When I asked him why he wanted this information, 
he quite openly admitted that cadres in my area had been sent to ‘check me out’, but weren’t quite able to 
locate exactly where I lived.
2,9 One example that he gave of such ‘transgression’ is when officials are approached to grant 
false/replacement birth certificates or ration cards. The supplicants are inevitably Party workers or with 
Party contacts, and if  the official refuses then he is reported through the Party organisation, through MLAs 
to ministers, as being a cog in the wheel. Usually, the minister/senior politician will start to harass these 
officials and ultimately get them transferred. Personal Interview (Kalyani) 27/11/99.
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market and then attacked the police station, effectively taking hostage those 
officers inside. These cadres, backed by senior Party figures, blamed “a 
section of the police in collusion with criminals, backed by the TMC and
Bjp” 220
With its vast network of informants, the CPI (M) has been able to gather the 
information necessary for it to identify ‘transgressors’ in the state machinery, 
and to successfully ‘neutralise’ them when necessary (Kohli 1987:346). Since 
coming to power it has not flinched from transferring or suspending officers who 
it feels are not doing their job effectively, particularly when it perceives that the 
interests of the Party and its workers have not been protected. For example, 
after a spate of violence in the Kasba area of Calcutta during which a local 
committee secretary, Swapan Chakraborty, was shot and stabbed, the police 
officer in charge of the local thana was “asked to go on leave and hand over 
charge”. LF constituents had earlier demanded his transfer.221 A few months 
earlier, both the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police of Birbhum 
were transferred suddenly after the murder of a CPI (M) supporter in the 
Khairasole area. These transfers were considered a show of strength by the 
CPI (M).222
The CPI (M), by working closely with its mass organisations, has over the years 
been able to mobilise the rural landless and urban proletariat. Effectively they 
became the catalysts for radical reforms in labour relations and the rural sector. 
Its organisational strength has made it an impressive election-winning force. 
Furthermore, quite deliberately, the Party has used its organisational structure 
to monitor and control the actions of the administrative machinery throughout 
the state, to the point of making senior bureaucrats reluctant to speak freely. 
Those who are suspected of failing to protect the interests of the Party have 
been punished through transfer. There is evidence to suggest that on 
occasions, before due administrative procedures occured, Party workers have
220 Anil Biswas, CPI (M ) Politbureau Member, echoed their accusations. The Statesman, 25th January 
2000.
221 The Statesman 15th November 1977.
222 The Statesman 26th November 1977.
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dealt their own form of justice on those members of the state machinery felt to 
be acting against the Party’s interests.
Clearly the CPI (M) is capable of monitoring the workings of the health care 
bureaucracy throughout the state, and also able to take action against 
bureaucrats that are known not to be performing their duties effectively. This 
makes the growing catalogue of evidence of bureaucratic malfunctioning in the 
state’s health sector appear even more curious. It suggests that either the Party 
organisation is not functioning as it should, or that it has not taken an interest in 
monitoring the performance of health care officials. If we are to accept the 
alleged biases and failings of the bureaucracy in the state, set out earlier in the 
chapter, the questions remains as to why the CPI (M) with its awesome 
organisational set-up, has been unable to tackle this serious issue.
7.3.4 Infiltration
It may not have been incorrect to blame the bureaucracy for being partisan at 
the start of LF rule. Since then much has changed in social and political 
relations in the state. Not least is the fact that many of those who may have 
been hostile to the Left have now retired, after, probably, having been 
effectively ‘neutralised’ during their remaining years in service. It is not unlikely 
that on their departure, those sympathetic to the Left have taken their positions. 
As Nossiter has noted, the CPI (M) has not been averse to “recompensing 
those who have worked in hard times for the cause”, providing jobs on the base 
of political loyalties (1988:182). This seems to have been the case with the 
HHWs employed as part of the CSIP Project. Almost every day, the Calcutta 
press provides at least one case of nepotism in securing government jobs. For 
example, on March 29th, 2001, carried the story of a District Committee 
member of the CPI (M) who had been given the post of Youth Office/Affairs in 
the CMC - a job for which he possessed no relevant qualifications or 
experience. If the bureaucracy is partisan today, it is most probably more 
towards the Left, rather than any other political party.
The creation of new posts in the CMC and their subsequent distribution, 
allegedly, to those sympathetic to the Party, is insufficient evidence from which
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to argue that the bureaucracy is likely to be biased towards the Left. So as to 
consolidate these allegations, the following section will show how the Left has 
systematically infiltrated the bureaucracy at all levels with those sympathetic to 
it.
It has long been accepted that members of the lower bureaucracy, in levels C 
and D, recruited either from the employment exchange or by senior officers (as 
in the case of hospital superintendents and class IV employees) have been 
selected subjectively rather than on the basis of more objective or merit-based 
criteria. According to Nossiter, “the great mass of executive and clerical staff in 
public service...are members on the whole of Left unions” (1988:183).223 As 
explained in Chapter Six, nepotism has long been a tradition in the recruitment 
of employees for Calcutta Corporation, with politicians acting as patrons 
rewarding loyal supporters with the offer of employment in the Corporation. 
However, senior, gazetted officers in the state civil service (WBCS), continue to 
be selected through competitive examination and interview by a selection 
board, known as the Public Service Commission (PSC). The PSC has widely 
been considered a fair and transparent method of recruitment, based on merit, 
and thus unsullied by charges of favouritism, nepotism and corruption. Yet 
interviews with senior officials, belonging to the state civil service, would seem 
to challenge this view.
According to an additional secretary in the DOH, there remains a “veneer of 
independence and credibility around the PSC, but in reality even this has been 
corrupted...Basically the whole system of recruitment and deployment has 
been totally politicised. There is a close relationship, through the cadre system, 
between Party higher officials and lower level workers, which means that when 
the minister sanctions a position or recommends a transfer, he will know if that 
person will be sympathetic to the Party’s cause... The PSC is comprised of 
twelve members. Half of them have been nominated by the Home Ministry 
(GoWB), and consist of retired officers held in high esteem by the government,
223 Take for example the case of CMUHO. According to one union representative, staff members of 
CMUHO are part of the Non-medical technical Personnel Cadre (NMTP). There are approximately 10, 
000 NMTP staff in West Bengal. 8 out of the 10,000 are affiliated to the Non-Medical technical 
Employees Association, which is affiliated to the State Co-ordination Committee, which is closely linked 
to the CPI (M). Personal Interview, 05/11/99.
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which one can assume means that they are politically sympathetic to the 
government. Candidates are required to take a written exam, and those 
attaining certain marks are called for viva voce. Those who pass the viva are 
included in a final list of candidates eligible for government posts in the state. 
Not all are guaranteed jobs...say there are fifty vacancies in the state, the PSC 
selects around fifty candidates from the final list for each of the postings, and 
sends the complete list via the DHS to the Health Minister. The Health Minister 
has the right to cross names off the list and change the location of postings. 
His final decision will be affected by political considerations...”
The same officer also claimed that the decentralisation of appointments and 
transfer of health officials, including medical officers, to the District Health 
Implementation Committee (DHIC), has increased the scope for nepotism to 
occur in the recruitment of staff for the health department. The DHIC is made 
up of five members: a Sabhadipati224; the DM; CMOH; a member of the health 
committee under the panchayat and a representative of the government. Three 
(possibly even four) are clearly political appointees, who are likely to select 
primarily according to Party political considerations. To illustrate the point, he 
gave me the following example. “I went for the selection of a Health Assistant to 
South 24 Parganas. The Sabhadipati told me,
‘Sir, look at this man. He, I am sure, is loyal and hardworking.’
So I asked the man to look at the pictures in the office and identify the chief 
minister. He pointed to a picture of Bankim. So I asked him to identify the man 
in the poster giving the pulse polio drops-the chief minister- and the man was 
unable to do this. I gave him zero points, whereas the Sabhadipati gave him 
twenty-five. Needless to say, the man was appointed.”
The IAS comprise the third and smallest group of bureaucrats working in the 
state, yet the one most often (together with the police) singled out for criticism 
over the years by the CPI (M). The selection process for IAS officers is 
centralized and notoriously rigorous. Recruitment is made on the basis of merit, 
primarily on intellectual capabilities. It is not my intention to suggest political 
bias has corroded the ‘steel frame’ in any way. A certain number of all-India
224 Sabhadipati is an elected district councillor and ex-officio member of most district committees such as 
the DHIC. It is the most important political position at the district level.
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IAS officers are assigned to a particular state, and are effectively under the 
jurisdiction of state-level ministers. The state government appoints them to their 
relevant positions and makes the recommendations for their transfer. The state 
government has jurisdiction for their deployment and length of tenure in any 
given post. Although seniority rather than performance remains the main 
criterion for promotion and salary increments of these officers, it has been 
alleged that in West Bengal relatively junior officers have overtaken their 
seniors in being appointed to positions of influence in the administration, 
because of their perceived sympathies towards the ruling Party. This was the 
allegation levelled at the government after the appointment of the latest 
Principal Secretary (Health), Mr. A.M. Chakrabarti.225 This accusation was not 
challenged by the government and seemed to cause little surprise amongst my 
informants. In the words of one political commentator, “I’m not the least bit 
surprised, but why make an example out of Chakrabarti, when most of the 
senior bureaucrats in Writers have been appointed because of their sympathies 
to the Party?” According to the director of a prominent NGO which works 
closely with the government, “why make a fuss about the P.S. Health...? The 
Party has penetrated every single public institution and organisation at every 
level...”
To further reinforce my argument, I would like to cite the evidence on one other 
group of government officials, doctors, who are routinely criticised for their 
failure to perform effectively and deliver good quality service to their patients.226 
The allegation that health care is suffering in West Bengal because doctors are 
out of control and unwilling to perform their duties, is one that is often levelled 
against the medical profession in the state.227 West Bengal has had two 
doctors’ associations since 1983, before which all the state’s government 
doctors belonged to the Health Services Association (HSA). In 1983 the HSA 
split, expelling those doctors who had not taken part in industrial action in the
225 The Statesman Editorial, 1st March 2000
226 See Chapter Three for examples of this.
227 See Subject Committee Reports 1988-1999. In the words o f Prof Biplab Dasgupta MP, “most public 
employees, including doctors, are out of our control... Junior doctors have consistently resisted postings, 
transfers and the allocation of duties, they have organised several strikes against us”. Personal Interview, 
30/06/2000.
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state.228 Those expelled formed the Association of Health Service Doctors 
(AHSD), which began as much the smaller of the two organisations. Since 1983, 
the AHSD has been actively supported by the CPI (M), and its membership 
now stands at approximately five thousand, comprising roughly two thirds of all 
doctors working in the state government units.229 Unofficially members of AHSD 
are given preference for promotions and postings.230 If government doctors are 
an impediment to the effective functioning of the health care system in the state, 
it is puzzling that this state of affairs has been allowed to continue - apparently 
unfettered - by a government which effectively has been the patron of the 
association to which most now belong.
Few independent commentators that I met doubted that the ruling Party in West 
Bengal has politically infiltrated all levels of the bureaucracy. A recent 
newspaper editorial summarises the situation as such: ’’The state 
administration’s failure is near complete...At the core, the problem is the 
politicisation of the bureaucracy and the police at every level. Senior posts go 
to a coterie of favourites, who are only too happy to do the bidding of their 
political bosses to the detriment of their proper duties. At the lower end of the 
scale, the bureaucracy is packed with Party sympathisers, expected to help the 
CPI (M) bring popular institutions under its control...” (The Statesman Editorial 
Calcutta, 22nd March 2000).231
This first section has argued that since it first came to power, as part of the UF 
ministries and later as a member of the Left Front, the CPI (M) has tended to 
blame the administrative machinery for the less successful aspects of its rule
228 The LFG had vehemently opposed industrial action by the doctors.
229 The exact number o f doctors employed by the state government in West Bengal is unknown. It is 
estimated that there are roughly eight thousand, which is why the ADHS, with a membership of roughly 
five thousand, is calculated to have about two-thirds of all doctors in the state affiliated to it.
230 1 am deeply indebted to those doctors working for the state government who agreed to talk to me, and 
especially to a leading member of the AHSD who very kindly granted me an interview on the guarantee of 
confidentiality (13/07/2000).
231 The Union Home Ministry, to defend the government against protests led by the Left against the 
Gujurat government’s decision to allow government employees to take part in RSS programmes, prepared 
a note detailing the extent to which two CPI (M ) organisations, the State Government Employees 
Coordination Committee and the Non-Gazetted Police Karmachari Samiti, had infiltrated different wings 
of the state government through the years. “Left gifts ammunition to return fire from Sangh-bashers” The 
Telegraph, Calcutta 16th February 2000.
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especially during times when its dominance in the state has looked like being 
challenged. Whereas initially the CPI (M) may have been justified in being 
suspicious of the administration’s avowed neutrality, since 1977 much has 
changed in the state, in many ways due to the efforts of the CPI (M) and its 
allies.
Through the introduction of redistributive reforms and the revitalisation of the 
PRIs, the LFG has transformed the position of bureaucrats in the state in 
relation to the population, and has affected their traditional ways of working. 
Bureaucrats were brought closer to the village, and the lower strata, for the first 
time, was incorporated into local politics and given some resources- a sharp 
break from the past, where previously these groups had been excluded from 
local politics in rural areas. The balance of power tipped away from the 
bureaucracy towards these newly empowered groups, for whom the 
bureaucracy became an instrument of their control. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that the CPI (M) together with its mass fronts has become an 
organisational force of formidable proportions able, not only to mobilise the 
electorate and win elections, but also to monitor and control the activities of the 
state administration. As such, it would be difficult for supposed hostile elements 
within the bureaucracy (never mind, more generally in society as a whole) to 
flourish and jeopardise the success of governmental policies. If a fifth column 
does exist in the state administration, it is likely to be one sympathetic to the 
Left, rather than to its opponents. The final part of this first section has claimed 
that the Party has been successful at infiltrating all levels of the bureaucracy. 
Given what has been said earlier, this makes the continued allegations about 
the supposed anti-Left partisanship of the state administration, especially in the 
case of health sector employees, particularly doctors, look increasingly 
untenable. At the same time, it makes the continuing poor standards of 
bureaucratic performance in the state seem even more puzzling.
7.4 Politicians
If responsibility for the failure of the LF to bring about substantive improvements 
in certain areas, particularly in access to health and education, cannot be laid 
singularly at the door of the state administration, then the focus must
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necessarily shift to the politicians. In Nossiter’s words, “probably more critical 
than any resistance as such, is the failure of the government to motivate its own 
civil servants. Precious little bustle of the CPI (M) headquarters is 
transmitted...” (1988:143). Later he argues that, “clearly linked to the below par 
performance of the LFG also is the inability to motivate the great mass of 
workers in public service. Left Front governments have found it difficult to 
shake them out of their customary inertia and petty corruption” (1988:183). The 
implication here is that the blame for bureaucratic failure lies, largely, with 
politicians from successive Left Front governments. Similarly Chatterjee has 
alleged, “ the fact is that in the last three or four years, the Left Front has failed 
to put forward and carry out even a credible parliamentary programme of 
change” (1997:116). In the same article he accuses the Left Front of doing 
nothing to formulate a viable programme of agricultural development or to halt 
industrial stagnation in the state. He ends by noting, “on power, transport, 
health and education, not only has there not been any effective programme of 
change, even the existing systems have been allowed to rot and crumble.” 
(ibid)
Those who seek to lay the blame for the poor standards of bureaucratic 
performance at the feet of politicians may be divided into three camps. On the 
one hand are the proponents of the extreme version of this argument, who 
claim that as an essentially bhadrolok Party, the CPI (M) has never really been 
concerned with such issues as improving the provision of basic health care to 
the masses. Then there are those who argue, less extremely, that the Party 
tends to agitate over issues where it perceives an opportunity to make political 
capital - expanding its support base, entrenching itself and widening its 
influence. The third view is the one most sympathetic towards the CPI (M). It 
holds that whilst essentially committed to equitable reform, a number of factors 
have contributed to douse its radicalism, turning the Party from revolution to 
reform (Kohli, 1987:ch 3). Whilst retaining the language of ‘class struggle’- 
albeit in a more tempered format- the CPI (M) moved away from its previous 
strategy of elite-led mobilisation from below and control of the state apparatus 
from above. Instead it has sought to consolidate its power and to accommodate 
the interest of not just the lower strata, but also the middle strata and even
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property owning groups (Kohli, 1997:361). This section will examine the 
arguments presented by these three groups.
7.5 The CPI (M) as a Bhadrolok Party
The bhadrolok have been called a rentier class (Ashraf, 1977:62). The 
bhadrolok, literally the ‘gentlefolk’, are a distinctively Bengali phenomenon: 
usually middle to upper class men, generally Hindu and from the three upper 
castes, although the term is not ascriptive of class, caste or religion. The 
bhadrolok is a status group in the Weberian sense (Broomfield, 1968:5) in 
which status is acquired through a style of life. Though rare, members of ritually 
unclean groups and even Muslims have entered this elite circle.
Effectively there may be three distinguishing features of a bhadrolok. Firstly, 
engagement in manual labour has been considered a basic distinction between 
bhadra and abhadra lok. The bhadrolok have avoided manual occupations, 
which they consider inferior (Broomfield, 1968:6). Generally occupied in the 
professions or in clerical work, traditionally, they have derived their wealth from 
the land. Finally, education, especially English language education, “became 
the hallmark of bhadrolok status” (Ibid: 8). According to Ray, “the bhadrolok 
were, par excellence, the educated classes, the epitome of that Anglicised 
education...’’(Ray, 1988:70).
Hence the term is used to describe Bengali men of a particular status. Often 
from the urban middle classes - though descended from the landed gentry - 
often from the upper castes, who as a rule do not engage in manual 
occupations and have enjoyed the benefits of access to, especially English 
language, education. To call the CPI (M) a bhadrolok Party is to attribute the 
aspects of the bhadrolok to its leadership and its political outlook: urban- 
orientated, privileged, educated, elitist with an innate disdain for manual 
occupations. It is a daring accusation - for reasons that will be explained 
presently - yet one that scholars have not recoiled from levelling.
As far as can be detected, the argument dates back to the work of Franda 
(1971a). He claimed that Communism in West Bengal has been elitist and that
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Communist leaders have hailed from middle-class and upper middle class 
families. Since emerging as a political force in the 1950s he argues, “the 
Communists have not succeeded in bringing members of low status groups into 
leadership positions” (1971a: 6). He adds that twenty-four of the thirty-three 
members of the State Committee in 1969 were from the three highest castes, 
and only three had engaged in manual labour for their livelihood.232 (1971:13- 
14) Ray has asserted that, “in succeeding the CPI (M) has accommodated its 
ideology to the demands of the bhadrolok and has emerged in an even more 
fundamental sense as a Party of the bhadrolok’ (Ray, 1988:81).233 The 
implication is that as a bhadrook Party, the CPI (M) does not have any real 
interest in quality of life and the standard of living in the vast majority of the 
population in the state. These are, on the whole, barely educated, rural-based, 
manual labourers and thus chotolok - literally the common or vulgar folk, who 
are primarily engaged in manual and thus menial occupations.
Such a view is lent credence by contemporary scholars, such as Chatterjee 
(see above quote, 1997:116) and was reinforced through interviews with senior 
bureaucrats working in the state. In the words of one IAS officer working in the 
education department, “the social sector is not a priority for this 
government...we have been able to tackle many problems in our national 
history-where we have been successful there has been political will and proper 
local planning.”234 Similarly, according to a recently retired IAS officer, a once 
promising candidate for principal secretary to the Chief Minister, “social sectors 
do not have priority in the government’s work program. Health being one such 
sector has suffered...same with education and social welfare. The commitment
232 It should be noted that engagement in manual labour has been considered to be key in distinguishing 
bhadra and abhadra or choto lok.
233 Moni Nag contrasts the strong rural base of political parties, particularly the Communist Party, in 
Kerala and their history of mobilisation of economic and political rights for the poor in rural areas, with 
the Western-educated, urban professional nature of the Communists in West Bengal - where agitation and 
political mobilisation has been based around the capital, Calcutta. It is for this reason, he has argued, that 
people are more politically aware in Kerala than West Bengal. (Nag, 1989).
234 Personal Interview (Calcutta), 3rd July 2000.
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to reduce poverty is primarily a rhetorical commitment...it sounds good, it 
sounds progressive.”235
Unsurprisingly, senior Party figures vehemently rebut the view that as a 
bhadrolok Party the CPI (M) is unconcerned with the lot of the masses. 
According to one MLA, “The CPI (M) is not an urban Party. How can you 
explain developments that we have pushed forward in rural areas like agrarian 
reform?” In the words of another senior MP: ”No I think to attribute the criticisms 
of us which you make in our performance in health and education - which I am 
not in a position to substantiate or neglect - to the fact that the CPI (M) is a 
bhadrolok and hence a bourgeois Party, is too simplistic.”
Senior Party figures unanimously dismissed the allegation as spurious, usually 
by referring to land reform and the process of decentralisation of power to PRIs 
-  considered the greatest achievements of the LFG -  as clear evidence of their 
commitment to improve the living conditions and empower the poorest in the 
state. If the Party was so dominated by bhadrolok interests, they claimed, why 
had it taken such great steps to help the rural poor, especially the landless 
peasantry often at the expense of its own class interests? (This refers to the 
idea of the bhadrolok as an essentially rentier class).
Their case is a strong one, which is difficult to refute. After all it was the CPI 
(M) that encouraged and protected the mobilisation of the peasantry and urban 
proletariat in class struggles, to appropriate above-ceiling land and agitate for 
better wages and conditions. And, it was a CPI (M) dominated LFG, which 
enacted the land reform legislation and democratised the traditional institutions 
of local government in rural areas, giving the previously marginalised lower 
strata a stake in local governance. Yet it may be argued that the LFG’s 
measures to transform agrarian relations in West Bengal, partly grew out of an 
urgent necessity, and also, in part, from a desire to maximise short-term 
political goals as well as secure long-term strategic interests. In other words 
with ulterior motives, not out of a real concern for the condition of the rural 
landless.
235 Personal Interview (Calcutta), 20th June 2000.
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7.6 The Chance to Make Political Capital
There can be little doubt that some drastic measure was needed to stem the 
escalating crisis in the state, much of it due to the tension in agrarian relations. 
The agrarian situation had become critical by the time the CPI (M) first came to 
power in the UF government. Food shortages as a result of successive 
droughts and exacerbated by a huge influx of refugees from East Pakistan, was 
one feature of the state by the late 1960s. Coupled with this was the gradual 
pauperisation of the rural peasantry (Harriss, 1993), which was helping to fuel 
increasing conflict and violence in rural areas, as seen through Naxalbari and 
the land grab movement. In the cities, West Bengal’s manufacturing industry, 
which had been in gradual decline since the end of the war, was now beginning 
to stagnate, creating the real possibility of redundancies and shutdowns 
(Chatterjee, 1997).
A political Party that was able to offer a solution to these issues, or at least 
address them effectively, would be guaranteed to increase its influence and 
popularity in the state. This is what Kohli seems to refer to when he says, “The 
UF experiments in West Bengal created peculiar conditions under which those 
who were in power, or more precisely, exercised partial power came to have a 
vested interest in fomenting radical mobilisation”(Kohli, 1997:350). Whether or 
not this was their intention, the elite - led mobilisations of the late 1960s - 
occupying benami lands in the rural areas or gheraoing and resisting in 
factories-brought political gains for the Party, in the short term at least. As Kohli 
explains, “there were enormous pressures on the CPI (M) to expand its own 
power base within the coalition, as well as against the opposition...allowing 
organised labour to go on a rampage against the employers...was bound to 
enhance the CPM’s popularity with labour, and as the election results that led 
to the creation of the second UF government in 1969 indicated, indeed it did” 
(Kohli, 1990:146). Franda has claimed that the Left parties (CPM and CPI) 
“used the tactic of gherao to gain support among trade union workers” during a 
time where there was a scramble to enlist the support of organised workers into
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trade unions.236 (Franda, 1971a: 194-195) Equally in rural areas, Franda has 
acknowledged that, “almost everyone would agree that the CPI (M) gained 
more than any other parties in securing short-run support from the land 
distribution movement”(Franda, 1971a: 190).
Few would deny that post-1977, land reform and the transformation of local 
governance by the politicisation of the PRIs allowed the CPI (M) to consolidate 
a rural power base (Robinson, 1998), penetrate the countryside and entrench 
it’s influence in the rural sector where traditionally it did not have a comparative 
advantage (Kohli, 1987: 113).237 The CPI (M) was thereby transformed from 
being a Party the power of which lay in urban areas, amongst the organised 
working class and lower middle/middle class intellectuals, to becoming a Party 
with mass appeal, which would draw its main support from rural areas (Kohli, 
1987).
Any measure to deal with the critical situation described above would help to 
expand the CPI (M)’s support base. Additionally, CPI (M)-led agitation and 
mobilisation was facilitated by the alignment of forces, at that time, against the 
demands of the rural landless and the urban proletariat. The CPI (M) created 
the “shared perception of a common class enemy “(Kohli, 1987:98), and could 
portray itself as fighting for the rights of the poor, against a clear enemy, in the 
sense of people who were easily identified as actually controlling power and 
privilege. Sengupta (1979) argues that one of the key organisational strategies 
of the CPI (M) in power was to feed polarisation, by creating class and political 
consciousness amongst the peasantry and, I would argue, also amongst the 
urban proletariat.238 This was seen as the best way to isolate the owners of
236 The CPI (M ) acknowledged its weakness in the trade union front and saw the “real Bolshevik method 
of mobilising the masses” as the only solution to this. See Tasks on the Trade Union Front, Resolution of 
the Central Committee of the CPI (M ) pp30-33, Calcutta 1967, quoted in Franda (1971a: 191-192).
237 Congress had developed an effective machine for conciliation and dispute arbitration, together with an 
elaborate patronage network extending into rural areas of the state. There have been a few notable studies 
of the Congress Party in India, on which this information is based. See for example Kothari (1964) and for 
Bengal, Franda (1971b).
238 The Labour Minister, Subodh Banerjee’s explanation for the existence of over one thousand gheraoes 
around Calcutta in the initial months of UF rule, seems to perfectly encapsulate this. He is reported to 
have said, “I have allowed a duel between employees and employers in West Bengal, and the police have 
been taken out o f the picture so that the strength of each may be known.” Quoted in Moorhouse 
(1974:324).
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privilege and power and ensure a transfer of power to the poor. Those opposed 
to demands of the peasantry and urban proletariat could be isolated and thus 
clearly identified as ‘class enemies’. A clearly identifiable ‘enemy’ made the 
whole task of mobilisation and the raising of class-consciousness much easier.
A view emerges of the CPI (M) as clearly working for the benefit of the poor, in 
part because of the urgency of the situation, and in part because there were 
strategic incentives for it to do so. Here we have a more subtle and nuanced 
view of the CPI (M) in power, than the one presented above. Rather than 
having no interest in the poor on account of its bourgeois leadership - which 
would seem too extreme, if not an unfair analysis of the CPI (M), given what is 
known about its achievement in transforming the condition of the rural poor - 
the nuanced position holds that the CPI (M) is guided by where it sees political 
capital to be made from agitating for the interests of the poor.
The evidence of CPI (M) activities amongst the urban working class in the late 
1960s would seem to support this view. According to Franda, CPI (M) affiliated 
trade unions were particularly militant and aggressive towards employers and 
other trade unions, in a bid to outmaneuver its own trade union rivals, and 
thereby increase its own trade union base. (1971a: 193-194) Its strategy proved 
successful, as seen through the increased support amongst labour unions in 
the Calcutta industrial belt in the 1969-election campaign for the CPI (M) 
(Franda, 1971a: 195).
By fomenting such popular mobilisation, the CPI (M) clearly saw an opportunity 
to increase its own influence and expand its support base, amongst the urban 
proletariat and the rural peasantry. The point is that no comparable popular 
mobilisation has ever been launched against an obdurate and unresponsive 
bureaucracy. The Party has done little, in terms of mobilising the masses, to 
make (mainly, lower level) health care officials more accountable- a key 
obstacle to improving the poor’s access to basic health care in the state. Here 
was a clear opportunity to act in the interests of the poor. The government’s 
inertia on this front may be attributable to a perceived potential conflict of 
interests between increasing its support base and expanding its influence-
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making political capital; and agitating for the interests of the poor, at the risk of 
alienating its traditional supporters in the process.
This is the dilemma which the CPI (M) faces. According to one former Principal 
Secretary (Health), “for agrarian reform, government action was quick and 
decisive. It had been thought out quite carefully, and it was widely felt amongst 
those holding power that it needed to be addressed, both through its effect on 
poverty alleviation, and also because of the popular support from large 
numbers that could be gleaned from it. Similar efforts in PHC and primary 
education have been lacking on behalf of the government. A sharecropper 
given land immediately sees a tangible positive benefit for himself, which 
translates in tangible electoral results for the ruling Party. In education and 
health, the results are not so immediately tangible for the vast majority, and in 
the process many powerful and numerous interest groups are offended and 
alienated. Their dissatisfaction is likely to be felt hardest by the government, in 
terms of votes, than the electoral benefits gleaned from those who are pleased 
with the changes. Reforming the health or education sector is not as electorally 
rewarding as something like land reform.... Because there are such large 
numbers of them (public servants), it means that they have both a voice and 
considerable leverage; politicians need their support to get elected. They are 
usually listened to very carefully, and a high priority given to meeting their 
requirements, instead of meeting the requirements of the vast majority-who 
form part of the poor, marginalised and usually unorganised masses.” 239
The other point to be made in relation to this, is that in the case of the rural and 
urban mass movements of the late 1960s and 1970s, the CPI (M) had an 
definable opposition, who were made into class enemies, against whom it could 
mobilise its forces. However, once in power and in control of the state 
machinery, it was much more of a problem for the Party to identify a clear 
enemy and thus to mobilise mass movements against it. Senior Party figures 
preferred this explanation of the government’s inability to improve the 
performance of health care officials. According to one senior MLA, “the sorts of
239 Personal Interview (Calcutta), 10th April 2000. There are parallels with Bates’ analysis of public 
policy in Africa. He has suggested that governments design food policy in response to political pressure 
by organised private interest groups, usually, to the detriment of the majority of the population living and 
working in rural areas (Bates, 1988:331-359).
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problems afflicting the health care system in this state would need, ideally, the 
launching of a movement...but I am a member of the ruling Party, how can I set 
up a movement against my own Party?”240
Another senior Party figure, a Politburo member and prominent spokesman, 
claimed that there was a need for a health campaign, similar to the literacy 
campaign, to raise people’s awareness about health issues and what they can 
expect of the health system. It was people’s lack of awareness that accounted 
for the poor performance of the health sector in West Bengal. I put it to him that 
the CPI (M) were experts in raising awareness and in mobilising people, as can 
be seen from the events in the state in the late 1960s; so why had it not been 
able to conduct a similar effort for health? His answer was illuminating, “We 
could not take up the issue with that level of seriousness as we did the issue of 
land.” He went on to accept that while it was easier to mobilise against a clear 
enemy, in the case of health care no such enemy could be identified. He 
agreed that it was “partly the case”, that those responsible for the health care 
delivery were mainly unionised by the CPI (M)-affiliated unions, and that this 
made it very difficult to mobilise against them. The other ‘part’ of the problem 
he identified, was the lack of a catchy slogan, as had existed in the literacy 
campaign.
These insights seem to support the view that for the CPI (M), the costs of 
bringing about real improvements in health care delivery in the state outweigh 
the benefits of doing so at this present moment. To bring about necessary 
improvements in health care delivery would mean making officials necessarily 
more accountable, which, it has been argued, may only come about by 
enforcing the incentives for greater accountability more strictly. Given the level 
of shirking and malfeasance reported in the health care bureaucracy in the 
state, this step would doubtless antagonise significant numbers of health care 
officials, most of whom are unionised by Left trade unions and act as a valuable 
vote bank.241 This immediately poses a problem in terms of mobilisation-how do
240 Personal Interview (Calcutta) 14/06/00.
241 The evidence of this is not conclusive, and thus one can only surmise from newspaper reports and 
conversations with officials themselves, as well as with those likely to be well informed. In addition Kohli 
has claimed, “what the patterns of unionisation do suggest, however, is that babu, or white-collar, 
unions...support the leftists” (Kohli, 1990:142).
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you support mobilisation against your own supporters? This becomes even 
more acute when one considers that enforcing incentives (and hence also 
sanctions) would very likely lead to an erosion in support from a section of the 
electorate which not only votes for the Party, but also may be mobilised to 
encourage others to do so at particular times. The Party’s dilemma is by no 
means straightforward.
It should not be considered too cynical or Machiavellian of the CPI (M) to be 
keen to hold on to power. After all, this is amongst the primary concerns of 
most political parties around the globe. Electoral performance for the CPI (M), 
as Chatterjee has noted, represents an “increasingly more powerful 
consideration” (1997:155). The Party’s involvement in the state machinery, he 
argues, “moreover has no definite goal in sight except to keep winning elections 
and staying in power” (1997:132). The same author talks of the,“new politics 
sweeping the Party -the politics of creating and holding local power...” (ibid: 
156). In the case of the CPI (M) in West Bengal at this particular juncture, the 
desire is heightened given the constellation of opposition political forces that 
have aligned together in the state and the country as a whole.242 According to 
one eminent economist and Party acolyte, “if Bengal goes to the anti-Left forces, 
the effect on the Left in national politics would be devastating, and it would 
serve as a huge filip to the BJP.”243 There is a real fear amongst Party cadres 
that losing an election may release a wave of vendetta against them by those 
formerly in Opposition. Many Opposition leaders were closely allied to, if not 
members of the last Congress administration in the state, which has been 
accused, of sponsoring the persecution of the Left during the tumultuous 
decade 1967-77.244 In which case, the failure to introduce reforms in a bid not
242 This was written and researched between August 1999 and August 2001, with a sectarian BJP 
dominating a coalition government at the Centre. In West Bengal, the first serious threat to CPI (M )’s 
hegemony had appeared in the form of the Trinamul Congress - a key alliance partner of the BJP at the 
centre. It is not too much of an exaggeration to state that the Left, together with a fractious Congress, 
provided the only real opposition to right wing, religious sectarian interests which seemed to be 
dominating the Centre as well as key states in the Union.
243 Personal Interview (Calcutta), 26/06/2000.
244 This is a view substantiated by Kohli who has stated, ‘the current leaders of the Calcutta Congress 
had their political origins in the ‘decade of chaos’.” Through a profile of three contemporary Congress 
leaders in West Bengal, Kohli argues that Congress today is lead by a youthful band of Sanjay-disciples, 
effectively ruffians, who had cut their teeth in the Chatra Parishad of the 1970s, and in particular in its 
battles and later persecution of the Left (Kohli, 1990:130-133).
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to alienate allies, and thus ensure continued presence in power, should not be 
seen as an entirely extraordinary ploy, or by any means egregious charge to be 
directed at the CPI (M).
It would not be inaccurate to describe the CPI (M) in West Bengal as a 
bhadrolok Party. But to claim that this has meant that the Party and its 
leadership have been completely consumed by a bhadrolok mentality and point 
of view, spilling into its politics and resulting in policy making which has shown 
little concern for the needs of the masses, would seem too cynical. More 
convincing is the evidence that supports the view that the Party has tended to 
agitate mainly where it sees an opportunity to increase its influence. Where a 
potential conflict of interests emerges it would appear that the CPI (M) - 
consumed by the need to retain power- has been reluctant to risk losing the 
support of an influential minority so as to try to ensure improvements in the 
quality of life for the majority. This, it has been argued, may be another reason 
for why the government has been unwilling to enforce the incentives to make 
officials perform better.
7.7 Changing Composition of the CPI (M)
There is a third view of the CPI (M) which holds that whilst being essentially 
committed to the poor and equity orientated reform, the Party has nevertheless 
assumed a less radical political agenda over the years. Senior and formerly 
radical Party figures have died or retired, and the Party has sought the support 
of the middle classes, and has ‘middled’. This has doused the zeal of its 
previously radical reform agenda. Added to this is the inevitable fact that as the 
Party in power, the CPI (M) has attracted a considerable band of ‘opportunists’ 
in its ranks, which the Party has failed to indoctrinate, educate and filter out. 
This has meant that now large swathes of the lower level cadres, the Party’s 
foot soldiers, probably do not share the ideals and commitment of the original 
Party faithful. Incumbency and a growing proclivity towards the accoutrements 
of power has made the Party less willing to antagonise interest groups on 
whose support it has come to depend, thereby impeding further reform. Added 
to this is the sense that since the period of its third term in office (the late 1980s
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onwards) there has not existed a viable political challenge to the Party’s 
hegemony in the state - either from the Centre or from political opposition within 
the state. The most radical reforms of the LFG were carried out in the first and 
second ministry, under the constant threat of intervention from the Centre. To 
counter this threat, the Party needed to establish a power base in the state by 
entrenching itself especially in rural areas. Together with the urgent need for a 
change in agrarian relations, this provided an important incentive to reform. 
The lack of a viable political opposition in the state, from Congress, has helped 
the CPI (M) to become complacent.
7.7.1 From Radicalism to Reform: The 'Middling' of the CPI (M)
There seems to be some consensus amongst scholars of West Bengal politics, 
that since first coming to power as part of the UF governments in the late 1960s, 
the CPI (M) has become a far less radical Party. As Kohli notes, “back then 
the CPI (M) adhered to a more revolutionary line...” (1997:345). The “core and 
basis” of its programme was the establishment of a “firm alliance of the working 
class and the peasantry.” 245 Since coming to power in 1977, the CPI (M) had 
“moved away from a revolutionary inclination to a reformist orientation” (Kohli, 
1997:356). Whilst originally wanting to abolish landlordism without 
compensation and sharecropping, since coming to power the Party has avoided 
such options, and instead has invested a huge amount of effort to register 
sharecroppers, through Operation Barga (Bhattacharya, 1999). In comparison 
to its election campaigns of 1967 and 1971 where, “the principal line which 
divided the political field was a line of class divisions”, what stands out now is, 
“the virtual absence in the Left Front campaign today of the rhetoric of class 
struggle”(Chatterjee, 1997:166). Kohli notes that that since coming to power in 
1977, the CPI (M) has committed itself to preserving democratic institutions, 
has replaced the strategy of popular mobilisation in urban and rural areas, by 
‘legal’ and constitutional’ struggles, and has welcomed nearly all social classes 
into its fold, (ibid: 356-57).
245 New Situation and Party’s Task (CPM: 1967) quoted in Franda (1971a: 183).
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The shift, it is claimed, may have been precipitated by the death of such 
radicals as HK Konar. According to one scholar, it was symbolised by the 
gradualist approach to land reform of Benoy Chowdhury and consolidated by 
the rise of the Jyoti Basu to the status of Party leader in West Bengal, on the 
death of Promode Das Gupta. He notes, “the centrist position had come to 
dominate the Party and gradual reform became the order of the day, with only a 
theoretical adherence to revolutionary politics...” (Mallick, 1994:207).
Other scholars have noted the Party’s retention of a radical rhetoric - “the LFG 
cultivated a doctrine of peasant unity and an image of radicalism" 
(Bhattacharya, 1999:293) - to increase its appeal across the country. At the 
same time, it has followed less radical policies that have enabled it to, 
“accommodate a variety of political persuasions and a wide base of support 
from groups whose interests and ideology may have been contradictory to the 
espoused ideology of the CPI (M)” (ibid). Bhattacharya sums up his argument 
by saying, “the CPI (M) excelled in what may be regarded as the ‘politics of 
middleness’, a consensus-evoking unifying politics of mediation between 
several sectional interests” (Bhattacharya, 1999:292).
The abandonment of its more radical policies whilst pursuing a more 
consensual middle of the road politics, yet continuing to hang on to a radical 
rhetoric, was not mere pragmatism by the CPI (M) - an attempt to 
accommodate more disparate social interests - but rather signalled a loss of 
ideology. According to the celebrated former finance minister, “several of the 
problems plaguing the Left Front in West Bengal are arising on account of the 
fade-out of ideology or philosophical belief. The Front is no longer the collage 
of passion and resistance to authoritarianism that it was a quarter of a century 
ago...Iron has entered the soul. It is a tired assembly of worn-out politicians, 
led by a visibly tired CPI (M), which in turn is led by the chief minister who 
himself is well-advanced in age”(Calcutta Diary, 2000:1333-1334).246
It may be argued that the new consensual politics of the CPI (M) has led to a 
dilution of the Party’s radical reformist zeal. Whilst this is clearly noted in its
246 The Calcutta Diary is a bi-weekly column which appears in Economic and Political Weekly, probably 
written by the Dr. Asok Mitra, the LF’s first Finance Minister 1977-85.
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agrarian policies, the insinuation is that it has spread to other fields of 
government. This has been recognised by Kohli who states, “the CPI (M)’s 
simultaneous attempts to sustain an alliance of the middle and lower strata and 
to avoid any further alienation of property owning groups have placed serious 
constraints on any further redistribution of wealth (1997:361).” It may help to 
explain why other spheres of policy making - notably in the social sector, in 
health and education, which can have a significant impact on the quality of life 
of the poor - do not seem to have been pursued with the same enthusiasm as 
earlier policies on land and local government. With a sole concern for the 
interests of the lower strata, an attention to these areas would be 
indispensable. By trying to accommodate wider social interests, it may be 
argued that the incentives to deal with these issues are weakened.
7.7.2 The Entry of Opportunists
Contributing to the process of de-radicalisation and the dilution of the reform 
agenda, according to some commentators, has been the entry of new members 
into the Party since it came to power. Over 80% of Party members in the state 
joined after 1977. (Chatterjee, 1997:132) The CPI (M) made a conscious 
decision to transform itself from a cadre-based Party comprising some twenty 
two thousand members in 1977, to a mass-based Party of almost two million 
members today.
An urgent recruitment drive was necessary just so as to be able to field 48, 392 
candidates for the 1978 Panchayat elections.247 CPI (M) leader Promode Das 
Gupta recognised that the Party could not find all the candidates from within its 
own ranks and so had to support or accept non-Party people and independent 
candidates. The Party recognised the inherent dangers of such a rapid 
increase in numbers stating, “a mass Party necessarily means a reformist 
social democratic Party, it necessarily means the influx of low consciousness in 
the Party” (CPM, 1978:68).248 Whilst the organisational presence of the Party
247 Anundo Bazar Pratika, May 31st 1978, quoted in Sengupta (1979:130). This meant doubling its 
membership in less than one year after coming to power.
248 CPI (M ) Report and Resolution on Organisation adopted at Salkeria Plenum, 1978.
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and its mass fronts was bolstered by the entry of so many new members 
(Chatterjee, 1997:132), their entry had important implications for Party 
discipline. (Sengupta, 1979; Chatterjee, 1997)
From the very outset, Sengupta noted, “with rapid growth in the number of CPI 
(M) members, cadres, workers and supporter sympathisers, enforcement of 
discipline became a difficult task and some of the local level Marxist cadres 
were found to be defiant of directives transmitted from the state committee” 
(1979:136). Chatterjee alleges that the “influx of members and their almost 
exclusive concern with the politics of winning elections” has led to the alienation 
of many of the Party’s older members in the districts. It has led to the 
emergence of factionalism “on an unprecedented scale”, not around political 
issues, but around the names of individual leaders, “universally thought to be 
the result of differences over sharing the spoils of power” (1997:154). All this, 
he claims, places tremendous pressures on the enforcement of discipline in the 
Party ranks (ibid).
As well as through active recruitment, the Party also grew in size by the entry of 
people who probably saw it as a vehicle, possibly the only one available to 
them, for gaining access to power and privileges - so to speak, opportunists. 
Even in the initial period of the LFG, reports from rural areas suggested that 
perhaps the Party had accepted the wrong people into the fold, “a new 
generation is coming up. But in the countryside they are the new recruits who 
had joined the CPI (M) out of sheer expediency. These up and coming leaders 
are usually the sons of rich farmers, who tomorrow with a change in the wind 
might switch over to Congress” (Banerjee, 1983). Chatterjee has alleged that, 
“ the very growth of the Party organisations in the last ten years is not unrelated 
to the fact that the Party now has the power to distribute government patronage 
to its supporters...” (1997:131-32). One Politburo member has noted that, “in 
the earlier days when they came to join the Party, they did not think that they 
could get something by associating. Now some who join obviously do so 
thinking that they might get something.” 249 By contrast, previously - according 
to one MLA - “when we were Party members we never thought that the Party
249 Personal Interview (Calcutta), 06/10/00.
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would come to power. People who join now are joining a Party which is in 
power, until recently unbridled...”
These new members make up the organisational structure of the Party, which 
has been so successful in ensuring that it stays in power. The Party has come 
to depend on them for its continued electoral success, and in return succours 
them with patronage. It would appear that this is not unlike the way in which the 
Congress used to function in the past - the CPI (M) has protected its position in 
power by developing its own networks of patronage. Apart from the obvious 
insecurity of being supported by opportunists, some scholars perceive that, in 
addition, this has helped to undermine the CPI (M)’s radicalism. According to 
Chatterjee, continuous political power, oiled, as he sees it, by networks of 
patronage, effectively robs the Party of its capacity to be really radical and 
reforming. He says, “ ...to tie the everyday life of the Party to the network of 
governmental patronage is not simply to succumb to reformist politics...it is to 
bury the very possibility of revolutionary politics”(1997:132).
Publicly, the most vociferous proponent of the argument that new members to 
the Party (i.e. post 1977) have been the source of corruption and low political 
awareness, ultimately weakening the Party’s radicalism and hence affecting the 
implementation of policies, has been the former Finance Minister, Dr. Asok 
Mitra. Dr. Mitra has used his bi-weekly columns in EPW (Calcutta Diary) to 
rally against the infiltration of new members into the Party. In April 2000 he 
claimed, “the Party’s decision in 1977 to convert its cadre-based organisation 
into...a mass-based one, has created...more complications than advantages.” 
He goes on to note, “many of the post 1977 recruits have no history of 
involvement in mass movements, nor have they gone through the grill of Party 
training and instruction....” In his inimitably acerbic way, he laments, “a large 
section of the new entrants in the Party belongs to the species of flotsam and 
jetsam”(Calcutta Diary, April 15, 2000:1333-1334). By July, with the violence in 
Midnapore spiralling, the massacre in Nanoor and after the loss of the 
Panskura constituency by the Left to a newly resurgent Opposition, Mitra once 
again rages, blaming the failures of the LFG to the entry of new members at the 
lower levels. “Many of the post-Emergency entrants have suspect or indifferent 
credentials and the complaints of Party corruption lodged against the Front
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government is to a large extent due to the infiltration of such elements at 
different levels of the Party and administration...” (EPW July 15th, 2000:2490).
From what can be understood amidst the morass of innuendo and accusations 
about who was responsible for the bloodletting in parts of Midnapore district, 
one thing is certain and lends credence to the allegations and fears outlined 
above. The conflict has been fuelled by a recent shift in loyalties of a number 
of CPI (M) cadres to the Trinamul Congress (TMC), who have used the 
knowledge about the workings of their former comrades to their own, and 
Trinamul’s, benefit. This in turn has given rise to a sense of betrayal by the 
local CPI (M), fueling an upsurge of mutual resentment. Each side is no doubt 
now enacting its own revenge on account of this.
The case of Mohammed Rafique, the TMC’s key local leader and election 
strategist in Panskura constituency (Midnapore), is an illustration of this. 
Rafique was from a traditionally Congress family - Midnapore was never 
particularly a CPI (M), but rather a Congress stronghold- who became an 
activist for the CPI (M) in the 1980s. From the start his working class 
credentials were doubtful-he was Secretary of an organisation of public 
transport owners- and his commitment to the Party and its ideals, suspect. In 
his own words, “ (I) became so dissatisfied with senior Congress leaders of 
my area that I had to hobnob with the CPI (M), particularly with the DYFI 
leaders in Keshpur”. During his time with the CPI (M) he apparently learnt how 
to ‘manage poll victories’, and is said to have brought his experience of 
‘campaigning’ with the CPI (M) to bear on the surprise victory of the TMC in 
Panskura last June.250
Some leading Party figures argue that the problem does not so much lie with 
the mass influx of new members (of dubious commitment) to the Party, but 
rather the Party’s failure to educate and indoctrinate these new members. In 
the words of Biman Bose, “in the earlier days we had less cadres, but all were 
committed. Now we have lots of cadres, but not all are committed. This is a
250 Report of the TMC victory in Panskura and profile/interview with Mohamed Rafique. The Telegraph 
(Metro Section), Calcutta 16th June 2000.
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problem of growth...we are (sic) to educate and re-educate the cadres.” In the 
words of another MP, “all parties begin with a small band of committed people. 
As it grows, obviously many people will join, but it is the job of the political Party 
to educate and assimilate them.”251
Senior Party figures accept that the influx of new members is an inevitable by­
product of the process of growth. At the same time, they seem to recognise 
that the rise in membership may have ushered in to the Party some people who 
do not share its ideology or objectives. The answer they think lies with better 
education. According to one MP, “Dr. Mitra’s logic has the danger of idealising 
some isolationist logic...opportunism has inevitably crept in, but I don’t blame 
the people that have just joined - opportunism is not just a problem with 
newcomers - but our failure to educate or deal with them.” These echo the 
words of Biman Bose, “I do not believe that old cadres are good and new 
cadres are bad, there are many new people that joined, amongst them there 
are committed cadre. Dr. Mitra’s comments are to an extent correct, new 
members do create some problems...Party education is suffering. We have to 
strengthen the Party’s political education in all tiers of the organisation.”252
Traditionally, the process of acquiring membership was never immediate. 
Those who expressed a desire to join were first classified as auxiliary or 
primary Party members (A.G.). These first time members had to pass through 
at least one year of education and mentoring, during they were expected to 
take classes on history, on politics and especially on Marxism. Those who 
passed this stage were made into ‘candidate members’ (CM), where the 
mentoring and classes continued. Candidates’ participation in Party activities - 
canvassing, attending rallies and meetings - were noted, as were their 
standards of behaviour and general comportment in public. According to one 
former Branch Secretary, “ I couldn’t do just anything...you know that I like a 
drink, but I couldn’t be seen to be drinking in public, or with just anyone; I was 
expected to act according to a strict pro-forma...” On the successful completion 
of one further year as a CM, the person was allowed to become a full card
251 Personal Interview with Nilotpal Basu MP (New Delhi), 15/09/00.
252 Personal Interview (Calcutta) 6th October, 2000.
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carrying CPI (M) Party member.253 With the urgent need to boost membership 
through massive recruitment, it has often not been possible to follow this 
process of educating and mentoring new aspirants.
7.7.3 Incumbency and the Trappings of Power
According to a retired senior IAS officer who had worked in the state 
government for most of the CPI (M)'s term in office, much of the CPI (M)’s 
reforms occurred in the first and partly the second administrations (1977-82; 
82-87).254 The zeal with which they pursued pioneering reforms was, he holds, 
because the Party did not envisage its political tenure to be so long. The LFG 
did not know how long it was going to be allowed to stay in power. On two 
previous occasions, during the UF governments, a Left dominated 
democratically elected government was dissolved and replaced by President’s 
Rule from the Centre, by Indira Gandhi. Furthermore, the Left’s chances of 
victory in the 1972 Assembly elections were scuppered by massive vote rigging 
allegations, which are now widely accepted. The LFG felt threatened, and this 
sense of threat increased when Indira Gandhi came back to power in the early 
1980s. Nevertheless, it seemed to act a spur for the LFG, which was keen to 
show that it could deliver on its promises, and thus hoped to be returned to 
power by producing results. The view of, especially, the first two LF ministries 
as blazing a trail of radical reforms primarily for the benefit of the poor, under 
threat of intervention from the Centre, has been re-iterated by those within the 
Party. According to one eminent economist, “the first few LF ministries were 
extraordinary...they were informed by a vision. The government had to finish 
its plans for land reform and also get the poor into the panchayats...it was 
almost a race against time to get this done, they were always under pressure 
from the Centre.”255
The murder of Mrs. Gandhi removed the LF’s potentially greatest external 
political threat. At the same time within West Bengal, the Party’s growing
253 1 am deeply indebted to an anonymous friend, life-long Party member and former Branch Secretary of 
CPI (M ) for this information.
254 Personal Interview (Calcutta) 20th June, 2000.
255 Informant’s emphasis. Personal Interview (Calcutta) 26/06/00.
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strength and popularity, particularly in rural areas, contrasted with the 
factionalism of the main Congress opposition. Congress, as its leaders had 
admitted, could never match the sophistication of the CPI (M)’s organisational 
structure; furthermore, its leadership was fractious and the Party had come to 
be associated with corruption when in office. Through the years of Left front 
rule, the state Congress seemed to disintegrate - in the words of Nossiter, “the 
factionalism of the Congress unit in West Bengal is proverbial and its Party 
organisation a bit of a joke” - and this in turn consolidated the LF in power 
(Nossiter, 1988:195).
The disappearance of any external threat, together with the withering of the 
main Opposition within the state, left the CPI (M) unbridled in power at the helm 
of the LFG.256 The absence of any serious political challenge to the government 
took away the incentive to introduce the kinds of innovative equity orientated 
policies of earlier years; inevitably complacency set in. Echeverri-Gent’s 
analysis lends support to this view. He has argued that the CPI (M) has been 
responsive to the poor due to the fall of Congress and the lack of political 
competition; the Party, he claims, no longer needs to consolidate its power 
base amongst these groups. (Echeverri-Gent, 1993: 169).
Probably on account of its long, largely unchallenged tenure in power, the CPI 
(M) rank and file has inevitably grown accustomed to the benefits of being in 
power. One senior MLA explained it in the following way, “our cadre activist 
were once beaten and tortured. Now they are in power...they are also human, 
and think that they are due some privileges...The Party is aware of this and is 
fighting it.” A clear fondness for some of the accoutrements of power may be 
detected amongst Party members. Although eager to present an image of 
frugal living, senior Party figures are not exempt from these allegations, and 
have been found to be using public money to support ‘high living’ 257 The former
256 External 'threat' was also found to be a powerful incentive for the implementation of land reforms after 
the second world war in South-east Asia, see Putzel (1992).
257 Senior MP, Somnath Chatterjee, chairman of WBIDC and the managing director of the same 
organisation, between them presented expenses totalling USD 1, 072.76. This was in addition to their 
room rental charges and was spent on “mini-bar, bar, breakfast, laundry and tobacco”. “CAG Filch 
Charge against Somnath”, The Statesman 2nd August 2000.
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chief minister also recognised this, commenting that being in power, the 
temptations for corruption and the abandonment of old ideals comes to the 
fore.258 In fact, so common is this scenario that it has become the subject of 
humorous wall graffiti in Calcutta.259
A.K.Gopalan summed up many of the dilemmas facing communists in power. “I 
found myself in an environment calculated to ruin a man. First class travel, 
comfortable chambers in parliament, a surfeit of money, magnificent quarters 
and a life free of responsibility. All circumstances favourable to a life of pleasure. 
Communists like me who had suffered for want of a change in clothes to wear, 
for want of shelter for a night’s sleep, for want of money to pay for our tea and 
bus fare and who were scoffed at by the elite of society, were particularly liable 
to be spoilt by this sudden onset of luxury” (1973:181-82).260
The point that I wish to make is that political incumbency may have helped to 
distance Party members from the grassroots, by providing them with comforts 
and the access to power and privileges, which few would now be prepared to 
pass up. This in turn provides a particularly strong incentive not to risk the 
losing power by agitating for changes which are likely to alienate supporters 
and traditional vote banks. Rather than rock the boat, the impulse is now to 
maintain the status quo, even if this is at the expense of reforms to benefit the 
poor in the state.
7.8 Conclusion
The chapter began by accepting, tentatively, that organisational changes are 
only effective if they are introduced in an organisational culture committed to 
change, and that those in positions of power must play an important role in 
installing norms of conduct. I have discussed two positions in relation to this.
258 Interview with Jyoti Basu :”Tin Bajhar Bamfront Sarkar Porichalana Arigyata samparkoy Kicchu 
Baktyauba” in Deshhitaishee (Puja edition) p l9 ,1990.
259 For example, “Sakai holei, kouto nare, rate kore feast, erai abar chechea bole, amra Communist”.
This roughly translates as, ‘at dawn they take their begging bowls and hit the streets. At night they meet at 
grand feasts. These are the people who shout and say, we are Communists'. The Statesman, 6th April 
2001.
260 Taken from his book, “In the cause o f the people” New Delhi Sargam Books Orient Longman 1973.
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Firstly, that of a highly respected scholar (A.K. Sen), who has argued that it is 
the behaviour of senior civil servants which is important in installing norms of 
conduct; and in contrast, the view that given the peculiar context of West 
Bengal, it is that of politicians from the ruling coalition, which is of greater 
significance.
There is little doubt that, in general, the bureaucracy performs poorly in the 
state, and health sector officials with their lack of accountability provide an 
adequate illustration of this. It is difficult to continue to attribute this to a state 
administration that is inherently spiteful and mean-spirited towards the Left, as 
some members of the CPI (M) continue to do. Rather, the blame for this, 
according to some scholars, lies at the feet of the LFG for being unable to 
motivate its administrative machinery.
The evidence to support this is persuasive. The spectre of an inherently biased 
bureaucracy has effectively vanished after 24 years of Left rule in the state. In 
its place is a lower-level bureaucracy largely unionised by the CPI (M). 
Moreover, the CPI (M) has been shown to comprise a formidable organisation, 
experienced and adept at monitoring and controlling officials at every level in 
state. Those considered to have transgressed, are reported and ‘neutralised.’ 
Furthermore, I have argued that there has been a symbolic shift in the 
relationship between the bureaucracy and the (predominantly rural) masses, 
brought about during the campaign to register sharecroppers in the early years 
of the LFG, and through the enactment of institutional changes which effectively 
meant that resources and, to an extent, power were taken out of their hands 
and placed with those from the previously marginalised lower strata. The CPI 
(M) brought “the bureaucrats closer to the village”, and the CPI (M) carried out 
its promise to depend less on the bureaucracy and more on the people.
If responsibility for the failure to improve the performance of officials and make 
them accountable lies with politicians from the ruling coalition - in part, even the 
CM seems to admit this261 - the second part of this chapter has tried to examine
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the explanations of why this may be so. After all, for some years scholars have 
claimed that West Bengal was one of the better governed states in India, and 
that the LFG was one of the most radical, pro-poor state governments in the 
Union, dominated by a Party, the CPI (M), which is both disciplined and 
organised. For analytical purposes the explanations were divided, broadly, into 
three separate camps.
On the one hand are those who argue that as an essentially bourgeois and 
elitist Party, the CPI (M) has never had the concerns of the poor and the 
masses at heart. Whilst partially true - the CPI (M) is dominated by what are 
locally referred to as bhadrolok, and its leadership is comprised of middle class 
professionals - this is not the same as saying that only middle class or elite 
interests have dominated policy-making. The charge is vehemently refuted by 
senior Party figures, who point to a weighty body of evidence in their defence. It 
cannot be denied that the LFG introduced some of the most far-reaching land 
reforms in post-independence India, and by revitalising and then decentralising 
certain responsibilities to the panchayats, set the pace in terms of subsequent 
changes to local governance in the rest of India.
Thus a variation on this first argument has emerged which claims that whilst the 
CPI (M) has been clearly committed to bringing changes which would benefit 
the poor, these have largely been out of self-interest, in other words to expand 
its support base and extend its influence amongst sections of the electorate. 
Mass mobilisation and the subsequent enactment of changes, especially in 
agrarian relations, were born partly out of sense of necessity. Given the critical 
situation at that time the Party saw the chance to reap significant electoral 
rewards by encouraging such direct action. Furthermore, this policy was 
pursued due to the ease in which they were able to mobilise the masses 
against a clearly identifiable class enemy. The conclusion reached from this line 
of argument is that the LF government has failed to enforce the incentives to 
make health care officials accountable, because to do so would risk alienating a 
small, yet highly organised and influential group of supporters. Where a conflict
261 Mr. Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, Chief Minister, admitted “there was truth in the criticism that the state 
government has only recently taken steps to make its staff accountable”, during the release of the CPI 
(M )’s fourth and final election pamphlet outlining the Left Front’s performance over the last 24 years. 
“CPM Pamphlet on LG Govt Performance” The Statesman, 6th April 2001.
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of interests arises between the needs of the poor and the practical need to 
remain in power, the CPI (M) has tended to opt for the latter.
The third set of arguments presented claim that the CPI (M) is in fact committed 
to helping the poor, but that in an attempt to widen its appeal beyond the lower 
to the middle strata, has abandoned radicalism and instead has followed a 
'middle' path of gradual reform. Aiding to douse its radicalism has been the 
entry of large numbers of newcomers - many purely out of personal expediency 
- to the ranks, of dubious commitment to the Party and its ideals. These 
newcomers, it has been claimed, lack commitment, are undisciplined and 
corrupt. They are alleged to be more interested in helping themselves than 
ensuring that the changes introduced by the CPI (M) result in benefits for the 
poor. However, senior Party figures have challenged this. They have argued 
that the problem is not with a mass influx of new members, some who may be 
opportunists, but the Party’s failure to educate and indoctrinate them. Finally it 
is argued that incumbency and a growing fondness for the trappings of power 
have brought with them a sense of complacency amongst the CPI (M) and its 
coalition partners.
The evidence from this chapter suggests that the political influence of a well- 
organised interest group, public sector workers, may have affected the 
willingness of the ruling Party to enforce the incentives which the institutional 
arrangements introduced to improve the performance of health care officials in 
West Bengal were meant to provide. There are clear parallels with the work of 
Bates (1988; 1989), who has shown how dominant groups in society were able 
to impose and shape institutions to favour them over other societal actors, 
resulting in institutions which were socially inefficient. This challenges the neo­
classical view of the emergence of institutions, which sees them as solely as a 
way of overcoming market failure and social dilemmas.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions: Local Governance, Bureaucratic Performance 
and Health Care Delivery to Bustee Dwellers in Calcutta
8.1 Introduction
This dissertation has argued that informal constraints, politics and history have 
an effect on the performance of public officials, and in trying to address 
problems of poor bureaucratic performance, we must move beyond depending 
upon policy prescriptions that are premised on the excessively narrow 
assumptions of rational choice theory. The dissertation has also suggested a 
modification of prevailing notions about the relationship between civil society 
and ‘good government’. As such, the dissertation may be considered a critique 
of the ‘governance agenda’ that has latterly informed efforts to improve the 
performance of officials working for public bureaucracies in the developing 
world.
Despite significant reforms, which presented unique opportunities for more 
developmentally orientated governance in West Bengal, little has been 
achieved in terms of improving the provision of basic services to the poor. It 
was also noted that the constraints on the urban poor’s access to basic 
services represented one of the key weaknesses of the LFG rule in the state. 
Hence, the dissertation began by highlighting the need for a more equitable 
provision of basic health services to the urban poor in Calcutta. An examination 
of the health system in West Bengal in Chapter Three exposed the many 
shortcomings in the delivery of basic health care services to the poor in the 
state. It was argued that there were few incentives for good performance in the 
health sector in West Bengal, whilst at the same time pointing out that the 
sanctions on poor performance were ineffectual. Added to this, the dissertation 
has also highlighted the high transactions costs involved, especially for the 
poor, in trying to make use of the channels which exist for holding public 
officials accountable.
Weak systems of governance in the health sector have given rise to rude, 
unmotivated and unresponsive officials, which the dissertation has shown up in
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common with others (e.g. Banerji, 1985; Jeffery, 1988) and identified as an 
impediment to the equitable provision of health care in West Bengal today. 
Widespread evidence of poorly performing public bureaucracies has given rise 
to a concern for better ‘governance’ in contemporary developing countries, with 
a view to providing consumers of services with the information and the means 
to hold service providers to account for their performance. Attempts to improve 
governance have included policies which try to ensure more transparency in 
the delivery of services, whilst also facilitating the means by which the 
performance of officials may be rewarded, if it is good, or on the contrary, 
punished.
Whilst policy prescriptions have differed, it was argued in Chapter Two that the 
governance agenda shares a common theoretical framework, which seeks to 
apply the theoretical assumptions of neo-classical economics to the study of 
bureaucratic decision-making. Behind calls for decentralisation and the 
application of the doctrines of NPM, lies a choice-theoretic approach to human 
behaviour, which assumes that public officials are rational, self-interested, utility 
maximising individuals, whose behaviour is determined by the institutional 
arrangements in place. Certain institutional arrangements are thought to 
privilege opportunistic behaviour while others constrain it. Policy prescriptions 
that have arisen from NPM and decentralisation have sought to create the 
organisational structures which provide the optimal incentives for officials to 
perform their duties well.
Through the presentation of some criticisms of these theoretical assumptions, 
Chapter Two suggests that policies which focus on changing organisational 
structures so as to create the incentives for improved bureaucratic performance 
- based as they are on assumptions that officials always choose a course of 
behaviours which maximises their personal advantage - may be flawed.
8.2 Re-examining Decentralisation in Calcutta
Eighteen years after the decentralisation of municipal government in Calcutta, 
the research set out to make a comparative case study of the performance of 
local health care officials in two wards of the city, one with an average health 
status and one with a higher than average health status. Chapter Five shows
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the performance of health care officials to vary greatly between these two 
wards of the city. In one, officials were judged to perform their duties well, 
according to a set of qualitative criteria set out in the text. In the other, officials 
were judged to perform poorly against the same set of criteria. It was argued 
that the better performance of officials in one ward of the city (67), was largely 
on account of pressure exerted on them by popular organisations - sometimes 
referred to as ‘civil society organisations’ (CSOs) - active locally, and thus had 
little to do with bureaucratic rules and regulations, or the distinctive ethos and 
motivations of these officials.
8.3 Information and Transaction Costs
The traditional distance between officials in centralised bureaucracies and 
members of the public was believed to create a smokescreen which prevented 
consumers from monitoring the performance of officials (information costs) and 
made it difficult for them to hold officials to account for their actions 
(transactions costs). High information and transaction costs were considered to 
be key impediments to consumers’ ability to monitor and appraise the 
performance of public officials. Proponents of decentralisation advocated 
bringing government closer to the people, both as a way of making the work of 
officials more transparent and also to make it easier for members of the public 
to exert pressure on officials so as to improve their standards of performance. 
The assumption was that proximity would enhance the quality of information 
that consumers received, and that greater proximity together with 
institutionalised channels to complain and seek redress, would result in citizens 
joining together to pressure officials. In turn, the assumption was that officials, 
as rational utility maximisers, when faced with the dual prospect of their work 
being more open to scrutiny and themselves more exposed to pressure, would 
decide that the costs of behaving opportunistically outweighed the benefits of 
performing their duties properly.
Chapter Two highlighted how the view that decentralisation would reduce 
information and transaction costs for consumers was linked to the question of 
distance between officials and the public and, particularly in the case of 
transaction costs, on the existence of institutionalised channels for redress.
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However it was pointed out that scant attention is paid to the fact that the type 
of good being provided was a significant factor in determining the costs of 
information for the consumer. Thus, independently of whether health care 
officials are close to the local population or not, informational problems would 
arise on account of the fact that the service being provided is health care, which 
requires both technical expertise and specialist skills for its effective provision. 
Moreover, there was no evidence to suggest that greater proximity improved 
the quality of information available to local inhabitants. Despite deconcentrating 
local officials to the ward level, bustee dwellers were no clearer as to what 
services they could expect from local officials, and thus had little basis to judge 
whether officials were performing their roles effectively or not. Information is a 
major source of transaction costs, and given that informational asymmetries 
have remained high in regard to local health care provision, the dissertation has 
questioned the assumption that decentralisation necessarily leads to lower 
transaction costs.
It has been suggested that the decentralisation literature sees transaction costs 
as a function of the distance between clients and providers and of the existence 
of institutional channels for participation through which consumers may seek 
redress for the grievances. Yet one of key challenges for local inhabitants in 
holding officials to account that the dissertation has highlighted, is the cost 
involved for them in acting together to exert pressure on local officials to 
perform better. The nature of local politics was seen to be crucial in this. In the 
poorly performing ward it was suggested that a process of ‘adverse 
incorporation’ had taken place, whereby bustee dwellers preferred to invest in 
clientelistic structures so as not to risk losing what little access to goods and 
services which they enjoyed, rather than break out of these structures by 
holding officials to account directly. As a result of this, it was argued, they 
avoiding acting collectively to complain or protest to ensure better performance 
from local officials.
The findings from these two wards of Calcutta do not suggest that simply 
bringing local citizens and officials closer together has reduced transaction 
costs. Apart from the fact that significant information asymmetries continue to 
exist, the dissertation has highlighted how local political constraints can also
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add significantly to the costs of holding local officials to account, no matter how 
close they may be. By not holding local officials to account, local inhabitants in 
ward 85 may be seen to have chosen a course of action which does not, in the 
long-term, maximise their own personal welfare.
8.4 Rational Individuals and Social Norms: the Historic and Cultural 
Roots of Organisational Performance
The last point is significant as it suggests that it may be problematic to extend 
the assumptions of rational utility maximising behaviour to all individuals in all 
circumstances. This argument was developed in relation to local officials 
working for the CMC. Officials, it was argued in Chapter Six, did not respond in 
such a way to the organisational changes brought about by decentralisation, 
partly on account of the fact that the incentives which they were faced with in 
the new organisational structures remained weak. Design flaws have meant 
that decision and policy making remained highly centralised, and borough 
committees, meant to act as a platform for local inhabitants to put pressure on 
local officials, remained deliberative bodies with no regulatory powers.
However, beyond the fact that the incentives contained in these newly 
decentralised structures were weak, the chapter argued that the poor 
performance of CMC officials in the city may also lie in the ‘culture’ of the 
organisation. Rather than as a tool for effective municipal administration, 
politicians have used the Corporation’s human and financial resources to 
further their own political objectives. In the early years of the Corporation, the 
objective was independence from the British. For this reason, posts were given 
in return for political loyalty and employees were encouraged by their political 
leaders to disrupt, as much as possible, life in Calcutta - the administrative and 
commercial hub of British rule in India. After independence, nepotism and 
patronage continued to be the basis on which many of the lower level 
employees, the mass of the organisation, were recruited. Safe in the knowledge 
that they were well protected by powerful patrons, officials made little effort to 
abide by organisational rules and regulations. Bureaucratic corruption and lack 
of responsiveness were allowed to flourish unchecked, and despite two reforms
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to its organisational structure, such standards of bureaucratic performance 
would seem to constitute the norm.
Hence, through a reference to the political history of Calcutta Corporation, the 
chapter has supported the idea that individual behaviour is affected by informal 
constraints with deep historical and cultural roots which change very slowly 
(North 1989). However, there is a risk contained in endowing history and 
culture with too much of a role in shaping institutional outcomes, for as Grindle 
(2000) has noted, it cuts off the possibility of “dramatic changes”; and “dramatic 
changes” in bureaucratic performance, are possible, as evidence from ward 67 
as well as from further afield (Evans, 1996; Tendler, 1997) shows. This 
dissertation argued that political interests have helped to give rise to norms of 
behaviour inimical to responsive local administration, but also that where 
political interests lie in ensuring that services are provided effectively, 
remarkable changes have ensued in the performance of local officials. Thus the 
dissertation has tried to highlight the significant political dimension to the 
success of institutional arrangements, thereby refuting the sort of determinism 
which too much of a focus on history and culture can lead to.
Chapter Seven has developed the argument about the importance of politics to 
the shape of institutional outcomes. It has argued that the failure to bring about 
long-lasting changes in the performance and accountability of public officials - 
argued throughout the dissertation as a key constraint to the poor’s access to 
basic health care services - cannot be blamed solely on a poorly motivated and 
politically partisan bureaucracy. Whilst accepting that both of these factors 
provided challenges to the Left Front’s implementation of equity orientated 
reform, where had been a political commitment to reform, these were 
overcome. The dissertation cites, in particular, the case of agrarian reform in 
the early years of Left Front rule in the state.
It has been argued that there existed an important institutional basis for the 
government’s commitment to and implementation of agrarian reform in the early 
years of Left Front rule. On the one hand, there was a clear need for a more 
equitable redistribution of assets in rural areas. The Party saw in this chance to 
develop a much needed support base particularly in rural areas, the Left Front
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government was under the threat of being toppled from the Centre and 
therefore was under pressure to bring about popular changes which would 
assure it widespread support if such an event should occur. The Party was 
helped in its efforts by a significant organisational structure, separate from the 
bureaucracy, which was able to mobilise the population. Popular mobilisation 
was facilitated by the identification of a clear class enemy. It has been argued 
that the same institutional basis for political commitment to bring about long- 
lasting improvements in bureaucratic performance has been lacking.
The Left Front government has failed to support the organisational changes in 
the health care bureaucracy, which were meant to bring about improvements in 
the performance of health care officials. It has been argued that to fully 
implement these changes would risk alienating a small, yet well-organised and 
influential group of supporters, public officials, on whose support the Party has 
traditionally relied. By choosing to not hold officials to account, the government 
ends up protecting the interests of a few against those of the vast majority in 
the state. There are clear parallels here with the argument made by Bates 
about public policy in Africa (1988, 1989).
On account of the weaknesses associated with the neo-classical view of how 
institutions emerge (Bates, 1995), and on the basis of research findings, the 
dissertation concludes by accepting the need to embed institutionalism in the 
study of politics (ibid) and to recognise that the balance of groups in a political 
context may determine the outcomes of institutional arrangements (Khan, 
1995).
8.5 Civil Society and Good Government
Proponents of decentralisation tend to privilege the role of local citizens, the 
poor or lower strata, as the source of good governmental performance. It is 
assumed that local citizens somehow come together as a social unit in private 
and autonomous organisations to keep the state in check and hold local 
officials to account. This view affords the state little more than a peripheral role 
- confined to regulation, monitoring, setting standards and in activities involving 
externalities and economies of scale - where the current orthodoxy believes its
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comparative advantage to lie. Empirical evidence of well performing officials in 
one ward of the city offers a more nuanced view of the relationship between 
civil society and good government.
In Chapter Five, well performing health care officials were shown to be reacting 
to the pressure exerted on them by civil society organisations (CSOs). Insofar 
as this was the case, the evidence reflected the prevailing orthodoxy. However, 
these organisations which proved so effective in making local officials 
responsive were neither private, nor autonomous from and opposed to the 
state. Rather, their internal structure, organisational norms and historical 
origins point to their close relationship to the CPI (M), the dominant partner in 
the Left Front coalition that has governed the state since 1977. It was 
suggested that the Party fostered these organisations, for practical purposes, 
so as to be able to monitor potentially hostile activities in the local area, and to 
mobilise the local populace for the electoral victory of the Party in this key 
strategic area. Furthermore, it was suggested that the Party provided 
incentives for the sustenance of these local organisations, by bringing 
considerable benefits to the area, and thus its inhabitants, through the 
channelling of external investment from donors as well as from the state 
government into social and infrastructural projects. Their close ties to the Party 
have given these organisations considerable leverage over local officials.
The evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that civil society in these 
areas of Calcutta bears little resemblance to the notion spurned by contemporary 
liberal theory, but rather is a closer fit to the Gramscian notion. Gramsci made a 
distinction between civil society and political society. Political society was where 
the coercive apparatus of the State was concentrated, whereas civil society was 
the location where the State operates less tangible and subtler forms of power. 
Civil society discussed in this dissertation was neither autonomous nor opposed to 
the State, rather, in the way described by Gramsci it has been the location where 
the State has operated to forge consent for its policies and programmes, not 
through force but through hegemony.
The evidence questions the view that such groups and associations only 
emerge in areas with historical endowments of social capital. Calcutta has a 
strong tradition of associational life, in the sense that clubs and societies have
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flourished in the city, but this has not produced high standards of bureaucratic 
performance in the city as a whole. Poorly performing officials in ward 85 are 
testimony to this. Chapter Five has argued that it is not the existence of 
associations which is key to enhanced governmental performance, but the type 
of associations which is important. In ward 85, clubs have flourished for many 
years, but these have tended to be for the benefit of men from a particular 
ethnic group and dedicated to sporting or leisure activities. By contrast, civil 
society organisations in ward 67, which were shown to have had a key role in 
enhancing governmental performance, are of a political nature, more inclusive 
in terms of their membership, run on democratic lines and most importantly 
dedicated to addressing the concerns of local inhabitants.
Furthermore, the notion that such groups emerged in ward 67 on account of the 
fact that the inhabitants of this area had more in common with one another in 
terms of class, ethnic and linguistic affinities, was challenged by a detailed 
analysis of social relations in two bustees, presented in Chapter Four. 
Advocates of decentralisation see it as a way to incorporate the participation of 
the poor in the development process, which it is believed will result in public 
policies more attuned to their needs. As such, proponents see it axiomatically 
as an end in itself. However, this point of view presumes that the poor 
comprise a homogenous and harmonious group of people, prepared to act 
together as a social unit. The comparative case study of two bustees, one in 
each ward, highlighted how in neither case could the inhabitants be said to 
comprise a consensual social unit. Rather, both bustees were shown to be 
divided along ethnic lines, kin ties and occupational as well as educational 
status. The point was that even in what appeared to be homogeneous ethnic 
and linguistic residential clusters, differences existed which cut across these 
distinctive social categories.
There was insufficient evidence to isolate any one particular factor in explaining 
the emergence of such groups in ward 67 and not in ward 85. The different 
ideological positions of the political parties that controlled these areas -  the 
CPI(M)’s commitment to setting up mass front organisations compared with the 
Congress Party tradition in West Bengal of patronising socially influential 
individuals at the local level, as a means of holding on to power -  may have
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been one factor, although it should not be considered decisive. The CPI (M) 
has controlled most of the state for the last twenty-five years, but this has 
clearly not resulted in significant improvements in the performance in the state 
as a whole. The peculiarly violent political history of the area to which the 
origins of these organisations could be traced, together with the fact that in 
electoral terms the area had acquired strategic importance, were cited as 
possible reasons to explain the vibrancy of such organisations.
Nevetheless their vibrancy owes a great deal to the support they have received 
form the regime which has controlled the state for the last twenty-five years. 
Chapter Five thus concludes by supporting the case for a “state-society 
synergy” (Evans, 1996), where the government goes beyond the provision of a 
rule-based environment, and in a whole number of different ways supports and 
promotes the efforts of local citizens to hold the state to account.
8.6 NPM
The arguments so far elucidated have important implications for attempts to 
improve performance and enhance accountability through reforms inspired by 
the doctrines of the New Public Management (NPM). Sharing the same 
behavioural assumptions as decentralisation, part of the appeal of such reforms 
lay in their claims to universality. As it was assumed that officials always chose 
on the basis of an analysis of the costs and benefits a course of action, one 
which would maximise their personal welfare, it was believed that a common 
package of reforms - comprising stronger incentives for performance, through 
contracting out, the separation of regulatory and supply roles and a focus on 
outputs rather than inputs - would in all settings produce the same optimal 
results.
In Chapter Two it was argued that advocates of the application of NPM reforms 
in the developing world tended to ignore the fact that their success in 
developed countries rested on certain key constitutional changes. For example, 
NPM reforms in places like New Zealand altered relationships within the 
Executive, by changing procedures for appointing and removing senior 
bureaucrats and by decentralising human resource management. Without 
these changes, efforts by managers to improve performance at lower levels of
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the administrative hierarchy would have been undermined. The fact that such 
significant changes were ignored - possibly on account of the massive political 
challenges expected from trying to implement them - meant that they did not 
feature in public sector reform packages introduced in developing countries 
subsequently. This partly accounted for the fact that NPM reforms in many 
Commonwealth countries were seen to be less successful than expected. It 
resulted in NPM reforms being implemented in a piecemeal way against a 
background of more traditional methods of bureaucratic management.
Attempts to implement NPM inspired reforms in two states in India served to 
illustrate this dilemma quite well. Certain NPM-style reforms were suggested in 
the Department of Health (West Bengal), on account of poor discipline and a 
lack of accountability of health care officials. For example, it was recommended 
that disciplinary powers be devolved to the chief medical officer at the District 
level throughout the state, and lines of responsibility fixed at each level. 
However, little was done to change the fact that by statute, systems of 
personnel management remained centralised and the power to discipline 
rested, in the case of most employees, with the appointing officer - often the 
Director of Health Services sitting in Calcutta. This served to weaken the 
powers of district level officers to discipline those below them in the 
administrative hierarchy, and may explain why lower level officers were found 
to be reluctant to use their disciplinary powers. Systemic constraints, such as 
centralised accounting structures and financial regulations, were noted to 
undermine the success of NPM reforms in Tamil Nadu (Bennet and 
Muraleedharan, 2000). Centralised personnel management together with the 
fact that public employees are well protected by the Indian constitution, mean 
that incentives that local managers can offer to improve performance remain 
weak.
A key criticism of NPM is that it does not take account of local context. One 
aspect of this has already been discussed, namely the legal framework and 
constitutional conventions which underpin relationships within the Executive in 
developing countries such as India. Another aspect of local context which NPM 
has been accused of failing to take into account has been the prevailing 
organisational culture. Organisational culture has been shown to be a major
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determinant of performance, for example organisational cultures characterised 
by patronage have prevented attempts to contract out services in the health 
sector.
Organisational culture has been used to refer to the norms and conventions 
and values of public officials working for the municipal administration. It has 
been argued that these norms, not so much formal organisational rules and 
incentives, have tended to guide the behaviour of public officials in the CMC. 
The point is that efforts to improve the performance of public officials have 
tended to focus on structures and mechanisms of control at the organisational 
level -  by, for example, designing the appropriate formal institutional structures 
and controlling opportunities for rent seeking, through ‘getting the incentives 
rights’ -  whereas the evidence from this dissertation suggests that the 
determinants of organisational performance lie in the broader social and 
economic conditions. These conditions can foster, establish and legitimate 
norms and patterns of behaviour by individuals within an organisation and 
ensure that even in the face of new incentives and structures of control, the 
organisation’s performance remains the same.
The dissertation has criticised the tendency to see organisational culture in a 
monolithic way, as the residual in the path of reform. For instance, it is not 
enough to recognise that nepotism has curtailed attempts to recruit staff on the 
basis of merit, but to explore what are the factors that have given rise to the 
prevalence of nepotism. The dissertation has suggested that to understand 
what gives rise to certain organisational cultures, there is a need to understand 
local social relations and to appreciate the role that those in positions of 
authority have in establishing rules of behaviour and norms of conduct.
Chapter Six suggests that politics has a crucial role to play in the success of 
NPM reforms. Politics in a very formal sense of political authority devises and 
enforces new institutional arrangements brought about through organisational 
change. But in a more informal sense, what the dissertation has tried to show 
is how political interests can shape institutional outcomes. A politician’s desire 
to widen his/her support base and extend their local influence may result in 
posts being given on the basis of political loyalty, thereby undermining attempts
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to make officials more responsive through the types of reforms typically 
associated with NPM.
The sorts of reforms advocated by NPM to create the incentives for public 
officials to perform better were shown to have been of little effect in the case of 
a cadre of HHWs. The criticism was not that the incentives brought about by 
such organisational changes were not effective, but that they depended on a 
political commitment. To support such changes would effectively mean 
foregoing the opportunities for political patronage and exposing officials to the 
full set of incentives which the organisational changes provided. For example, 
in the case of HHWs, it would mean recruitment exclusively on the basis of 
merit based criteria, the operationalisation of systems of monitoring and the 
enforcement of sanctions against those found not to be carrying out their 
duties.
In the case of the HHWs, the suggestion was that the desire of the Party to 
provide political patronage locally meant that the criteria for recruitment were 
ignored. HHWs were chosen on the basis of their political loyalties rather than 
on the basis of the official criteria for selection. The chance to create a 
mission-focused ethos in the organisation which a transparent and merit-based 
recruitment procedure was said to have contributed to in Ceara (Tendler, 
1997), was thereby lost.
The dissertation has criticised the assumption that public officials always 
behave in an instrumental^ rational way - that they always choose 
“systematically based on a calculation of personal advantage” (Sen, 2000:270). 
First of all it has been suggested that if there exists a sense of commitment, 
then a person may not behave in a way that will maximise his/her personal 
welfare. It has also been argued that informal constraints - often termed as 
‘culture’ - the norms of behaviour and codes of conduct which individuals adopt 
and which become inculcated over time through their education, family or work 
life, may be just as important as formal institutional arrangements such as laws, 
official rules and regulations in shaping human behaviour. These informal 
constraints have a pervasive effect on individual behaviour and can be seen to 
underpin the success of more formal institutional arrangements. The
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dissertation has also argued that politics plays an important role in determining 
the success of institutional arrangements. Not only do political institutions have 
to define and enforce formal institutional arrangements but also the balance of 
power between different groups can determine what is regarded as an 
acceptable way to behave for individuals in an organisation like a public 
bureaucracy. Political groups and interests can shape the nature of the informal 
constraints which have such effect on individual’ behaviour. Powerful political 
interests can force government to devise public policies which protect and 
accommodate their interests, often to the detriment of the majority. Hence, to 
rely on changes in an organisation’s structure to create the incentives for 
officials not to behave opportunistically, as governance reforms tend to 
suggest, is not likely to be sufficient.
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Appendix 1
Interviewing Bustee Dwellers: Interview 1-Closed ended questionnaire:
I nterviewer___________________________
Date/Time____________________________
I will ask some questions about you. The answers in most case are provided, you are 
asked to choose the one that is most applicable
Section I Identification of Sample Bustee
1.1 Ward No___________ Borough No___________
1.2 Bustee Name & Address_________________________________________________________
1.3 Thana__________________________________________________________________
1.4 Councillor_______________________________________________________
Section II Household Characteristics (Background)
2.1 Name of Household Head _____________________________________________
2.2 Address _____________________________________________________________
2.3 Informants Full Name_____________________________________________
2.4 Relationship to Household H ea d __________________________________
2.5 Place of Origin (including state and district) ______________________________________
2.6 Father’s Occupation_______________________________
2.7 Number of Household Members Living at Present Accommodation__________
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Section III Informants Characteristics
3.1 Sex
Male
Female
3.2 Age
15-20 yrs 21-25 26-30 31-35
41-45yrs 46-50 51-55
over 60
3.3 Marital Status
Married Single separated
widow
3.4 Religion
Hindu Muslim Sikh Christian
3.5 Social Group
SC ST OBCs other
3.6 Formal education Yes/No
3.7 Schooling
Primary or less 
Upper primary or less 
Secondary or less 
High school or less 
Diploma or less 
Vocational Training or less 
University or more
3.8 Occupation
Housewife/husband
Manual
Administrative
Professional
Other
3.9 Brief Description of occupational history
36-40
56-60
divorced
others
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Section IV Household Income and Assets
4.1 What is the approx. household income/month
Less than 200 rupees 
Less than 500 rupees 
Less than 1000 rupees 
1000-2000 
2000-3000  
More than 3000
4.2 Type of Habitation 
Owned
Owned by relations
Rental
other
4.3 Nature of Dwelling Unit 
Walls
Pacca (Brick, stone, cement) 
Katcha (Mud etc) 
Semi-pacca 
Wood
Roof
Tin,
Tile
Asbestos
4.4 Basic Services inside the Household
Electricity yes/no
Portable W ater tap yes/no
Washing/cooking water tap yes/no
4.5 Household Assets
Pressure Cooker Yes / No
Refrigerator Yes / No
TV Yes/ No
a) colour
b) B & W
Radio yes / No
Tape recorder/Record Player Yes/No
Fan Yes / No
Car Yes / No
Motorbike/Scooter Yes / No
Bicycle Yes / No
J Z J
Section V Mortality and Morbidity amongst Normal Household Members
5.1 When was the last death in the household?
Within the last year 
Within the last two years 
Within the last three 
More than three years ago
5.2 How do you rate your level of health?
Very good 
Good 
Average 
Poor
5.3 Have you had your full quota of vaccinations?
Full Mostly
Don’t Know
about half less than half none
5.4 How do you rate your children’s level of health?
Boy children Very good Good Average
Girl children Very Good Good Average
5.5 Have your children had their full quota of vaccinations?
Boy children
Full Mostly about Half less than half
Don’t know
Poor
Poor
None
Girl children
Full Mostly 
Don’t know
about Half
5.6 Where were your children vaccinated?
Boy child
Private clinic 
Public clinic 
Private Hospital 
Public Hospital
Other (please specify) _________
less than half None
Girl Child
Private Clinic 
Public Clinic 
Private Hospital 
Public Hospital 
Other__________
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5.7
I would like to ask you about the illnesses you have suffered in the last two weeks. I will provide you with a list of illnesses and ask you how often (if at a l l ) 
you have suffered from them, and whether they have caused you to interrupt your daily activities
Incidences of Suffering Affected daily activity
Never Sometimes Frequently Completely Quite Moderately Not at all
Headache
Cough
Fever
Jaundice
Skin
disease
Stomach
Ache
Breathing
difficulties
TB
Diarrhoeal
Diseases
Pneumonia
Organs
(heart,
liver,
kidney)
Malaria
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5.8
I would like you to indicate which form o f treatment you commonly use when suffering from certain illnesses
Initial Strategy Later Strategy
Alio  
Pu Pr
Trad
Healer
Homeo 
Pu Pr
Home
Remed
y
Druggist Other Alio 
Pu Pr
Traditional
Healer
Homeopath 
Pu Pr
Home
Remedy
Druggist Other
Headache
Diarrhoeal
Diseases
Cough
Fever
Jaundice
Skin
disease
Stomach
Ache
Breathing
difficulties
TB
Pneumonia
Organs
(heart,
liver,
kidney)
Malaria
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Section VI Health Care Providers
6.1 Which health care provider do you most commonly use ?
Name of provider____________________________________________
Address ___________________________________________________
6.2 How many times have you visited him/her in the last 2 weeks?
Once
Twice
Thrice
More than 3 times 
Never
6.3 Why do you commonly visit this doctor?
Because he lives 
near you 
residence
Because he has 
dispensary near 
your residence
Because he is 
your relative
Because he is a 
family friend or 
caste member
Because he has 
been you family 
doctor for many 
years
Because he is 
considered the 
best around
Because his 
charges are 
reasonable
Because his 
treatments have 
been effective for 
symptom 
alleviation in the 
past
Because o f  his 
kind nature
Because of the 
welcoming 
Surroundings and 
quick service
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6.5 Which Health care provider do you least use ?
Name of Provider ____________________________________________
Address of provider_________________________________________
6.6 How many times have you visited him/her in the last 2 weeks?
Once
Twice
Thrice
More than 3 times 
Never
6.7 Can you briefly explain why
Far away 
No dispensary 
No relation 
Different Caste 
Not a friend
Considered not very good 
Charges high
Treatment do not alleviate symptoms
Due to nature of the illness
Rude and unkind
Place is dirty and unwelcoming
Slow service
Long waiting times
6.8 What is the name and address of the local government health care provider? 
Name______________________________________________
Address ____________________________________________
6.9 How frequently have you visited the govt provider in the last 2 weeks?
Once
Twice
Three times 
More than 3 times 
Never
6.10 Can you briefly explain why ?
Because he lives 
near you 
residence
Far away
Because he has 
dispensary near 
your residence
No dispensary
Because he is 
your relative
No relation
Because he is a 
family friend or 
caste member
Different caste, not 
a friend
Because he has 
been you family 
doctor for many 
years
Only recently 
commenced visits
Because he is 
considered the 
best around
Not very good
Because his 
charges are 
reasonable
Charges are high
Because his 
treatments have 
been effective for 
symptom 
alleviation in the 
past
Treatments do not
alleviate
symptoms
Because of the 
nature of your 
illness
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Because of his 
kind nature
Rude and 
aggressive
Because of the 
welcoming 
Surroundings and 
staff
Shabby/dirty 
surroundings and 
offensive staff
Q uick, efficient 
service
Slow service, long 
waiting times
Other(please specify).
Any other comments ?
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